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ABSTRACT 
The NHS Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is a Payment for Performance 
(P4P) scheme that was launched on 1 April 2004, as a key feature of the new 
General Medical Service (GMS) contract. Previous research has revealed that GP 
practices made several organisational changes after the introduction of QOF. 
However, there is no clear evidence on how the change process was undergone in 
practices and what factors contributed to this process. Thus, this thesis is 
interested in exploring the change process from the perspective of organisational 
memory. The primary aim is to explore how and why QOF served as a trigger for 
change in influencing the direction of GP practices and the extent of change that 
was made in GP practices because of QOF.    
An in-depth qualitative case study was conducted in four large GP practices in the 
north of England. Semi-structured interviews with thirty nine informants, 
including 15 GP partners, 2 salaried GPs, 4 practice managers, 9 nurses, 2 
healthcare assistants (HCAs) and 7 administration staff were considered as the 
main source of data. 
The study was able to provide evidence that the GP practices developed their 
strategy to respond to QOF, based on their organisational memory and 
competence. It was also found that organisational structure contributed strongly to 
the enhancement of organisational memory, which in turn led to better 
organisational competence. These findings provide insight into practices engaging 
in an emergent type of change. This was evident through their strategic decision 
making and the idea of contextualism, which underlay their unique responses 
during the changes. The study revealed that the practices were engaged in 
predominantly strategic level change. The significant contribution of this thesis is 
how organisational memory and competence could be used to understand the 
phenomenon of change in health care settings.  
 
Keywords: QOF, Pay for Performance, Organisational Memory, Competence(s), 
Organisational Change, Organisational Strategy, Organisational Structure. 
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C H A P T E R  1  
R E S E A R C H  O V E R V I E W  
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The NHS Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is a Payment for Performance 
(P4P) system which uses financial incentives to motivate General Practitioners 
(GPs) to meet specified quality targets (NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2006; 
NAO, 2008). Evidence from previous research indicates that financial incentives 
can improve the performance of healthcare providers in particular context (Cutler 
et al., 2007; Tahrani et al., 2007; Cupples et al., 2008; Falaschetti et al., 2009a; 
Falaschetti et al., 2009b). Whilst financial incentives have been reported to 
improve performance and influence behaviour in beneficial ways, the impact of 
such rewards has been shown to be of limited duration, and induce a range of 
unintended and dysfunctional consequences for organisations, staff and patients 
(Doran et al., 2006; Fleetcroft et al., 2008; Grant et al., 2009; McDonald and 
Roland, 2009).  
Since its introduction in 2004, QOF has represented a significant proportion of 
public expenditure, costing the UK economy approximately £1 billion per annum 
(Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 2008). GPs can increase their income by up to 
25% per annum, depending on their performance as measured against 134 
predefined quality indicators. The quality metrics are classified in terms of four 
domains: i) clinical care, ii) organisational, iii) patient experience, and iv) 
additional services (Roland, 2004; NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2006). For 
each domain, practices are able to claim points corresponding with their 
performance, which are then translated into the financial rewards distributed to the 
practices. 
While QOF has been said to achieve its target of improving health care services 
through meeting clinical and organisational targets and increasing physician‘s 
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remuneration (Greene and Nash, 2008; Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 2009), it has also 
been reported as resulting in a range of unintended dysfunctional consequences 
(McDonald and Roland, 2009). The unintended effects of the QOF programme 
identified in previous research include mispresentation of data, the erosion of 
internal motivation (crowding out), the avoidance of very ill patients (adverse 
selection) and focusing on dimensions of performance included in the 
measurement system, to the detriment of other important areas of performance not 
included in the measurement system (tunnel vision) (Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 
2007; Doran et al., 2008b; Mannion and Davies, 2008a; McDonald et al., 2008; 
Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 2009).  
With this debate, a better understanding of How and Why QOF scheme has 
affected GP practices is timely given the increased reliance on such scheme to 
deliver improved quality and performance in health systems around the world.  
1.2. SCIENTIFIC JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY 
Most previous research on the impact of the QOF used quantitative and 
econometric methods and focused primarily on exploring the association between 
QOF effectiveness and practice characteristics (Ashworth and Armstrong, 2006; 
Doran et al., 2006; Guthrie, McLean and Sutton, 2006; Wright et al., 2006; Doran 
et al., 2010; Griffiths et al., 2010), the characteristics of patient populations 
(Sutton and McLean, 2006; Ashworth et al., 2007; Ashworth, Medina and 
Morgan, 2008; Doran et al., 2008a), and the effect on quality of specific medical 
conditions, such as diabetes and chronic heart diseases (Campbell et al., 2007; 
Tahrani et al., 2007; Campbell et al., 2009; Griffin and Graffy, 2009).  
Moreover, a large part of the literature has shown that the engagement of GP 
practices with QOF has encouraged them to make adjustments to their systems, 
these adjustments represent organisational changes. These changes include 
increasing the number of staff, structural rearrangements, installing Information 
Technology (IT) systems and setting up new chronic disease clinics (e.g. 
Checkland, McDonald and Harrison, 2007; Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 
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2008; Grant et al., 2008; Huby et al., 2008; Maisey et al., 2008; Damberg, Raube 
and Teleki, 2009; Gemmell et al., 2009; McDonald et al., 2009; Checkland and 
Harrison, 2010). Yet, whether the practices‘ engagement in such decisions fitted 
their organisational strategy and structure is still unknown. 
In their study, Huby et al. (2008) found that large-scale GP practices ran the 
practice as a business, so that their adaptation to QOF reflected the practices‘ 
strategic decisions. In fact, what the authors discovered during the observation 
was rather different from the story respondents told them. This difference in the 
stories can be seen as part of the sense-making processes of people in 
understanding change. Indeed, as stated by Wilson (1992), organisational change 
can be understood through individuals‘ perception of specific situations. This 
implies a need to understand and analyse the narrative of change as stories told by 
members of organisations. The need to pay attention to stories of change was also 
highlighted by Checkland and Harrison (2010). While there is evidence that QOF 
caused several changes, it was found that people in GP practices tried to convey 
the message that QOF had brought little or no change to their activities, as they 
already had such activities prior to QOF (Checkland and Harrison, 2010). These 
studies raise questions as to why there is a discrepancy between the stories of 
practice staff and reality, and whether organisation staff contribute to shaping an 
understanding of change processes in their organisation. 
Members of an organisation are considered to be one of the main knowledge 
repositories in the organisation and hence contribute to building Organisational 
Memory (OM) (Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Abel, 2008; King, 2009). OM is an 
organisation‘s stored knowledge which can be used to explain and justify the 
processes and results of organisational change (Adler, Goldoftas and Levine, 
1999; Feldman, 2000; Becker, 2004; Hanvanich, Sivakumar and M. Hult, 2006; 
Tsai, Lin and Chen, 2010).  More specifically, OM is a generic concept which 
refers to managing knowledge, information and intangible assets as a key 
organisational competence, which leads to organisational success (Stein and 
Zwass, 1995; Wijnhoven, 1999).  
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Only a very limited number of studies focused on the link between organisational 
memory and QOF as a trigger of organisational change. GP practices were 
reported to experience various changes in their strategy, structure, IT systems and 
other organisational processes (Checkland, 2007; Checkland, McDonald and 
Harrison, 2007; McDonald et al., 2009; Checkland and Harrison, 2010). The 
authors linked these changes to the notion of memory through the stories shared 
by members of GP practices on the change processes (Checkland, 2007; 
Checkland and Harrison, 2010). Thus, this study is interested in investigating the 
organisational change process from the perspective of organisational memory. 
1.3. THE AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
To comprehend the impact of QOF in practice organisations, the main interest of 
the study lies in how organisational memory constructed organisational 
competence, which in turn, influenced practice organisations in conducting 
change. The specific objectives of the study are to: 
 Elucidate the influential relationship between organisational memory, 
competence, strategy and structure;   
 Explore how the QOF initiative triggered changes in GP practices; 
 Explore the factors that have contributed to the direction of changes in GP 
practices; 
 Identify the extent of organisational change that was made after the 
introduction of the QOF scheme.  
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1.4. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
Overall, QOF has rarely been discussed in terms of how practices engaged in the 
change process. The literature review of this study indicates that a gap exists, in 
terms of lack of research focusing on the linkage between organisational 
competencies and memory which involves knowledge and skills, and the linkage 
between OM and organisational change. Set against this background, the study 
intends to contribute to an improved understanding of how and why QOF has 
served as a trigger for change in influencing the direction of GP practices and the 
level of change that was made in GP practices after the introduction of QOF. 
Accordingly, this research utilises the framework of OM in two ways: firstly, OM 
as the main source of knowledge in the organisation gives us an in-depth analysis 
of the organisational changes that have been taken place (Adler, Goldoftas and 
Levine, 1999; Feldman, 2000; Becker, 2004; Hanvanich, Sivakumar and M. Hult, 
2006; Tsai, Lin and Chen, 2010). Secondly, OM as a part of organisational 
competence (Wijnhoven, 1998, 1999), and competence as an essential constituent 
for organisational strategy, determines where the organisation is heading 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Lei, Hitt and Bettis, 1996; Hahn et al., 2006).  
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In order to fulfil the aim of this study and achieve its objectives the following 
main research question has been formulated: ‘how and why does organisational 
memory contribute to the development of organisational competence in GP 
practices, and how do these competencies affect organisational change in such 
practices? In order to answer this research question three analytical propositions 
were developed based on several working hypotheses: 
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Analytical proposition 1:  
Organisational memory of core competences in GP practices shapes 
their organisational strategies in response to QOF. 
Working Hypotheses: 
 A) The more a GP practice is involved in procedural memory (routines), 
the more likely it will be competent to implement changes in response to 
QOF;  
B) The more GP practices are aware of previous failures and successes 
and the more they integrated knowledge into their organisational 
memory, the more able they are to develop an organisational strategy in 
response to QOF. 
Analytical proposition 2:  
More structured and organised GP practices are better able to enhance 
their organisational memory and competencies to hit QOF targets. 
Working Hypotheses: 
A) The higher degree of specialisation a GP practices has, the more 
competent it becomes at hitting the QOF targets; 
B) The higher degree of specialization a GP practice has, the more 
emphasis it places on rules and norms, to ensure knowledge sharing; 
C) The larger a GP practice, the more formalisation to standardise 
behaviour there will be. 
Analytical proposition 3:  
GP practices respond to QOF by pursuing strategic-level changes. 
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1.6. THE OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is organised in eleven chapters. The outline of each chapter is 
presented below. At the end of each chapter, a summary is provided. 
1. Chapter 2 – Pay for Performance: Policy and Rationale 
This chapter provides detailed background information about the 
development of P4P in healthcare settings, paying particular attention to the 
implementation of the QOF scheme. The chapter aims to provide the 
conceptual background for conducting a systematic review and to support the 
analysis conducted in the following chapters. The review starts with a brief 
history of how P4P developed over time. This is followed by a discussion of 
the factors which have contributed to the involvement of the health sector in 
P4P programmes. 
2. Chapter 3 -  Review of Empirical Evidence  
This chapter presents a systematic review of the empirical evidence on P4P 
implementation in the healthcare sector. The review focuses on P4P in GP 
practices and physician groups in Primary Health Care. The chapter starts by 
providing a summary of previous reviews. Evidence from previous reviews 
indicates that P4P programmes have mixed results for health care quality, with 
some dysfunctional consequences. 
The chapter continues by presenting the search protocol, which was employed 
in the current systematic review. The findings are organised based on the 
themes which emerged in the review process, including evidence on the 
effectiveness of P4P in improving health quality, the factors affecting P4P 
implementation, the dysfunctional consequences and evidence on the 
organisational memory and change.   
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3. Chapter 4 – Theoretical Background 
This research study employs two main bodies of theories, which are 
organisational change and organisational memory. For organisational change, 
attention in Chapter 4 is given to process, implementation and levels of 
change. The chapter also focuses on procedural memory and its role in 
competence development. In order to address the changes that were conducted 
by GP practices, the research framework along with three analytical 
propositions were developed. They were based on the elaboration of those two 
theories and the concepts of organisational strategy and structure.  
4. Chapter 5 – Research Methodology 
This research is based on an in-depth qualitative case study approach, the 
study was carried out in four GP practices in the north of England. 
Triangulation data was used; as a primary source of data, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 39 informants from different professions. 
Data analysis was conducted using thematic framework analysis. The chapter 
also addresses the limitations and difficulties experienced during the data 
collection processes.  
5. Chapter 6 – QOF and Perceived Organisational Change 
This chapter, together with the subsequent three chapters, comprises the 
empirical part of the thesis. The empirical findings are presented based on the 
themes that emerged during the data collection and analysis. Chapter 6 focuses 
on perceived organisational changes in the practices under study. It starts by 
providing a general description of the practices. The chapter aims to explore 
how the practices responded to QOF as a new payment strategy and presents 
the changes perceived by the organisation staff. The findings which will be 
presented in this chapter show that practices have engaged with changes in 
their systems in order to accommodate QOF. While positive impacts were 
reported, this chapter also presents the perceived dysfunctional consequences 
taking place in the practices.  
9 
 
6. Chapter 7 – Organisational Strategy 
This chapter presents changes in practice strategy. It shows that the practices 
had to follow government regulations, which tended to direct their strategic 
direction in the first place. However, after 2004, when QOF came in, the 
practices rearranged their priorities and tried to assess their weaknesses and 
strengths and find new opportunities for investment to maintain their income, 
such as establishing chronic disease clinics. This chapter demonstrates that the 
GP practices became more targets driven and managed more as business 
organisations.  
7. Chapter 8 – Organisational Structure 
Chapter 8 delineates how practices conducted changes in their structure. 
Attention is given to structural arrangements, distribution of job 
responsibilities, the decision making process and power dynamics. In general, 
all four practices maintained that they had a flat structure with flexible 
relationships amongst individuals within the structures. There were different 
decision making mechanisms that corresponded to different levels of 
decisions, strategic or operational. After QOF, the organisational structure of 
the practices become more complex, due to the increase in the number of staff, 
formalised units/divisions, the establishment of new clinics and the delegation 
of clinical work to lower level healthcare professionals. In addition, the 
chapter shows that the characteristics of the relationship between the practices 
and the PCT were having less bargaining power and feeling more distant.  
8. Chapter  9 – Norms and Identity  
This chapter presents the perceived changes in both the norms and identity of 
the practices. Norms were found to exist strongly across members of the 
practices. Moreover, a strong ‗blame-free‘ norm encouraged individual 
healthcare professionals to embrace failure and learn from their mistakes. As 
for identity, all four practices strongly emphasised the identity of being 
patient-centred practices. However, both QOF and changes in the practices‘ 
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internal and external environment contributed to how norms and practices 
identity had changed.  
9. Chapter 10 - Discussion 
The discussions in this chapter are presented in four main sections. The first 
focuses on how practice members perceived the changes caused by QOF and 
the consequences on their work activities. The second section provides insight 
about how organisational memory and competence have shaped the practices‘ 
organisational strategies to comply with QOF. In section three, the 
organisational structural changes that were made after QOF and the reasons 
behind these changes are shown. The last section discusses the various levels 
of changes and determines the degree of change that took place in the GP 
practices. The chapter shows that the findings of the study evidence the three 
analytical propositions. It also compares these findings with the existing 
literature. 
10. Chapter 11 – Conclusion 
Chapter 11 is the final chapter of the thesis. It conveys the contribution of 
knowledge and implications of the study findings. These implications 
comprise theoretical and organisational implications, as well as suggestions 
for policy makers seeking to improve the quality of healthcare organisations. 
The chapter also presents the limitations and challenges that have been 
recognised in this study and recommendations for future research to enhance 
knowledge and evidence in this research area. 
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C H A P T E R  2  
P A Y - F O R - P E R F O R M A N C E :  
P O L I C Y  A N D  R A T I O N A L E  
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, there has been an increasing interest in improving the 
quality of public sector organisations (Vigoda-Gadot et al., 2005). Public 
organisations are increasingly concerned about the effectiveness of their service 
delivery, while controlling costs and increasing efficiency. One of the well-known 
methods used to improve the quality of public services is to adopt private sector 
management techniques i.e. New Public Management (NPM) reforms (Ferlie, 
1996; Brunetto and Farr-Wharton, 2005).  
Since 1997, successive labour governments in the UK have heightened the need 
for improving the performance of public sector providers in education, health, law 
and order, transport and local government. In primary care, QOF was introduced 
under the new General Medical Services (nGMS) contract, as a national P4P 
scheme, which was conceived as an attempt to recast primary healthcare on the 
basis of assumptions which are rooted in NPM principles (Goodwin et al., 2008; 
Grant et al., 2008).   
This chapter discusses the growth of P4P schemes in the health sector, with 
particular emphasis on the implementation of QOF in the English National Health 
Service (NHS). The chapter starts with a brief history of how P4P developed over 
time. This is followed by a discussion of the factors which have contributed to the 
engagement of the health care sector in P4P. 
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2.2. P4P: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND ORIGIN IN 
HEALTHCARE SECTOR 
Over the last decade, efforts to improve the quality of health services have shifted 
from measuring and publicly reporting data to using financial incentive schemes. 
One of the most widespread type of these schemes is P4P (Rosenthal et al., 2005; 
Landon and Normand, 2008; Mannion and Davies, 2008a). P4P is defined as a 
financial reward scheme that measures aspects of the performance of health care 
providers and rewards  them according to their level of success in meeting 
specified and predefined performance targets  (Baker & Carter, 2005; Baumann 
and Dellert, 2006; Hahn, 2006).  
Three main reasons lie behind the growing adoption of P4P in the health sector. 
Firstly, there was the failure of traditional payment systems (Fee-for-Service, 
Capitation and Salary) to motivate and change the behaviour of health providers, 
overcome the considerable increase in health care cost, improve the quality and 
reduce the variability in services provided across different regions and among 
various groups of patients (Bazzoli et al., 2004; Ferman, 2004; Seidel and Nash, 
2004; Kirsch, 2006; Bozic, Smith and Mauerhan, 2007). Secondly, there was the 
widespread use of Information Technology (IT) and Electronic Medical Records 
Systems (EMR) (Carter, 2004; Accenture, 2005), which were used as valid and 
reliable quality measures, enabling health providers to document their 
performance in a way that patients and health care payers could track and 
understand (Kozinets et al., 1999; Miller, 2005; Sachdeva, 2007). The third reason 
was political pressure exerted by healthcare payers, such as taxpayers and the 
government, to control escalating health care costs (Kimmel, Sensmeier and 
Reeves, 2005; Moser et al., 2006; Bozic, Smith and Mauerhan, 2007). 
Despite growing interest in P4P, its basic idea is not novel. The earliest example 
of P4P can be traced back to the 18
th
 century BC, when King Hammurabi of 
Babylonia set up the ‗Code of Hammurabi‘, which regulated how incentives for 
merchants were to be paid, based on their ability to double up the return of 
investment from the principal (Peach & Wren, 1992). However, until the Middle 
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Ages, which was dominated by piece-work payment, there was no clear rationale 
for using incentive systems (Roberts, 1958 as cited in Peach & Wren, 1992). 
During the era of industrialisation, the debate about ‗hungry man‘ versus 
‗economic man‘1led economists to raise several questions about the importance of 
wages and their effects on productivity (Smith, 1776 as cited in Briggs, 1969). 
This era was characterised by using a piece-rate payment, task wages and fixed 
daily pay (Lipson, 1948 as cited in Peach & Wren, 1992). Some initial attempts 
towards group-based P4P emerged, although the impact on labour productivity 
was reported to be weak (Pollard, 1993).  
While using financial incentives evolved over time, it was the movement of 
scientific management, advocated by Frederick W. Taylor in the early 1900s, that 
established the basis of modern incentives schemes. Taylor broke down each job 
into its component tasks, to find the most time-efficient and best method of doing 
it. Once the best method had been found, skilled workers who could perform each 
task were selected and rewarded for each produced unit. Taylor also created a 
differential payment rate; the workers who could achieve the target number of 
units would receive extra money, while those who could not achieve the target, 
would receive an ordinary payment. Gantt realised that this differential payment 
rate failed to motivate workers to produce more units than the targeted amount. To 
overcome this, Gantt and Emerson developed a bonus system to reward workers 
who exceeded the target number of produced units or completed job within the 
time.  In that era, Frank and Lillian Gilbreth also played an important role in 
developing modern incentive schemes; they used monetary incentives in the same 
way that Taylor had used them. However, the Gilbreths believed that although 
Taylor had emphasised the importance of training and development, and good 
supervisory support and communication with individual workers, they felt that 
money as prime motivator was overvalued in his scheme. They believed that a 
broader consideration of human elements of work with financial incentives was 
needed to establish an effective motivational system (Nadworny, 1957; Louden, 
                                                             
1
 The assumption of ‗hungry man‘ was based on the idea that people tend to spend their wages and 
only return to work when they need more money; while the ‗economic man‘ maintained the 
assumption that wages can be used to encourage workers to work better (Peach & Wren, 1992). 
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1944 as cited in Peach & Wren, 1992; Baumgart and Neuhauser, 2009; Mousa 
and Lemak, 2009).  
From the above, it can be seen that the key difference for modern incentive 
schemes is that these schemes are output based and do not specify the way work 
should be done, which was the core of Taylor‘s ―science‖ and the basis for 
breaking down collective ―soldiering‖ or output restriction. Thereafter, social 
scientists started to investigate whether monetary incentives alone improved 
productivity or not, on the basis that individuals work within groups. In this sense, 
it was argued that ‗social comparison‘ of incentives could shape workers‘ 
productivity, as they compared themselves with other workers, even where 
―soldiering‖ was not the case (Williams, 1920 as cited in Peach & Wren, 1992). In 
other words, individuals evaluate themselves relative to others and financial 
incentives may not positively motivate workers, as this is dependent on how they 
see themselves relative to their co-workers. The social science era also contributed 
to raising awareness of other influential factors in improving workers‘ motivation. 
Hence, productivity issues raised throughout the  Hawthorne Studies (Wren, 
2004) were argued to underline the notion of ‗social man‘ in addition to that of 
‗economic man‘ (Peach & Wren, 1992). 
Thus, it can be inferred from the above examples that the philosophical 
background of the payment systems, criteria for performance and targets of 
payment changed significantly, and seem to have varied, depending on different 
economic contexts and situations. It can also be seen that the idea of P4P was 
developed from various perspectives, including economics and psychology, which 
reflects the fact that managing performance is a complex task. 
In terms of its development in the healthcare context, P4P was initiated in the US 
around 1970, when Walter McClure, an American health policy activist, 
introduced his ‗Buy Right‘ strategy. According to this strategy, health purchasers 
can enhance competitive performance among providers by increasing patient 
volume and paying more money to doctors and hospitals who provide high quality 
and efficient  services and penalising those who do not (Millenson, 1999). This 
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induced health providers to improve their performance and reduce the cost of 
healthcare delivery (Scanlon, 2005). In the UK, despite the fact that P4P had been 
brought into the realm of public policy in the parliamentary debate on teachers‘ 
performance in 1861 (Wragg et al., 2004), early P4P initiatives in healthcare were 
only introduced in 1986, through ‗Good Practice Allowance‘, which provoked 
refusal from the British Medical Association (BMA), on the ground that all GP 
practices offered ‗good‘ quality of services and impossible to measure quality of 
health care (McDonald et al., 2009; Roland, 2011). 
P4P really gained its reputation after 2001, when the Institute of Medicine (an 
American non-profit national academy) published two reports (in 1999 and 2001) 
about quality and patient safety problems (Swayne, 2005; Pentecost, 2006; Schatz 
et al., 2007). These reports argued that underperforming health systems might 
expose patients to preventable risks. Accordingly, policy makers concluded that 
the existing medical approaches to treatment were inadequate and significant 
improvements were required to remedy the situation. As part of this analysis, the 
misalignment between financial rewards and quality of care was highlighted as a 
major reason for poor performance (Kohn, Corrigan and Donaldson, 2000; 
Corrigan et al., 2001). While these reports triggered a wider interest in P4P 
worldwide, in the UK, such attempts had started a decade earlier.  
In 1990, the UK Government introduced clinical audit schemes, which were used 
to reward practices financially based on their achievements in improving 
childhood immunisation and cervical cancer screening (Baker and Middleton, 
2003; Alshamsan et al., 2010). This initiative was considered successful in 
improving the performance of physicians (Hearnshaw, Baker and Cooper, 1998; 
Seddon et al., 2001; Roland, 2011). Ten years later, after a failed first attempt to 
link quality of care and financial incentives, introduced in 1986, the government 
engaged in another initiative in early 2000. This time, the BMA showed a great 
deal of enthusiasm for the scheme, which was taken as evidence of a cultural 
change in the healthcare system in the UK (Roland, 2011). Specifically, it can be 
argued that clinical audits, initiated in the early 1990s, introduced new 
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experiences that built up into a habit of clinical scrutiny in the form of audit. This 
enabled various parties to learn and open up their perspective on clinical care 
improvements. However, there were also policy considerations that induced the 
UK Government to focus on the role of financial incentives in improving the 
quality of health services. The following section discusses different aspects of the 
rise of P4P in the UK, and more specifically that of QOF.  
2.3. PAY FOR PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
In managed health care systems, such as the UK, general practitioners (GPs) play a 
key role as the first-line contact for patients dealing with the health system (Scott, 
2000). The work of GPs is centred on understanding a patient‘s medical history, 
screening out-patients and referring them to secondary care services, if they 
decide that the cases need further clinical treatment and/or investigation (Day and 
Klein, 1986; Scott, 2000). This is said to reduce the possibilities of unnecessary 
clinical treatments, which can in turn reduce healthcare expenses (Franks, Clancy 
and Nutting, 1992; Starfield, 1994; Scott, 2000). This understanding, along with 
other factors (See Page 12), helped in the process whereby the policy makers have 
encouraged the use of direct and indirect financial incentives to improve the 
productivity of GPs, and as a formal way of measuring the quality of GPs‘ 
services (Marshall and Harrison, 2005; Mannion and Davies, 2008a; Mannion and 
Davies, 2008b).  
2.3.1. POLICY IMPERATIVES FOR THE NEW GMS CONTRACT: 
PUBLIC HEALTH, PRACTICE PERFORMANCE, OR 
CONTROL DEVICE?  
With more than 1.6 million employees across the country (Parkin, 2009), the NHS 
has become a major target for change, which has made it a ‗laboratory of 
experimentation in changing work practice‘ (Walby & Greenwell, 2004). Since 
the 1970s, the UK Government has recognised the need to make administrative 
changes, in order to maintain good quality of service and to ensure that public 
health needs are met (DHSS, 1972; DoH, 1997).  
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While considerations relating to public health seem to dominate discussions 
amongst academics, the potential conflict of interests between the government 
agendas and professional organisations should not be neglected. Thus, although 
the consensus on improving healthcare performance has grown, the subsequent 
healthcare policies imposed by the Government on primary care organisations 
were perceived to involve a political agenda of controlling GPs. This 
interpretation has been applied in particular to the introduction of various medical 
contracts for primary care (Pollock, 2004).   
During Thatcher‘s premiership, various initiatives were launched for managing 
the quality of services offered by primary care organisations. In 1986, the 
Government published a green paper entitled ‗Primary Health Care: an Agenda 
for Discussion‟ which demonstrated its intention to pursue efficiency, on the basis 
of market and managerial strategies (HMSO, 1987). While GPs were expected to 
be more sensitive to customer preferences and patients were encouraged to choose 
their doctors (market strategies), this proposal also aimed to increase control over 
the managerial activities of GPs. Therefore, it attracted strong opposition from the 
BMA (Klein, 2010).  
The government subsequently published a white paper entitled ‗Working for 
Patients‟ (HMSO, 1989; Klein, 2010). One of the key aims of this paper was to: 
„„...help the family doctor improve his service to patients, large 
GP practices will be able to apply for their own budgets to 
obtain a defined range of services direct from hospitals. Again, 
in the interests of a better service to the patient, GPs will be 
encouraged to compete for patients by offering better services. 
And it will be easier for patients to choose (and change) their 
own GP as they wish‟‟ (HMSO, 1989).  
While the negotiation on a new GP contract with the BMA stalled, this paper led 
to the creation of a new internal market which separated healthcare providers  and 
buyers (Propper, Wilson and Söderlund, 1998). This market entailed an 
expectation that healthcare organisations would be managed as businesses, in a 
way that they could sell their services at the contract price to purchasers. This idea 
was inspired by the incentive models prevalent among US Health Maintenance 
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Organisations (HMOs), which encouraged competition between health providers 
in order to be more competitive for customers
2
 (Paton, 1992).  
In the early 1990s, the NHS introduced its fundholding scheme to incentivise GPs. 
The main aim of the GP fundholding experiment was to enable health 
professionals (in this case, GPs) to have more control over negotiating patients‘ 
referrals with other health providers, such as hospitals and community health 
providers (Greener and Mannion, 2006). GP fundholders had the opportunity to 
purchase secondary care contracts and to decide ―which providers, services and 
patients would benefit from their funds and keep any surpluses that they 
generated‖ (Kay, 2002). The scheme was thought to make GPs more interested in 
the financial implications of their prescriptions and referrals (Stoker, 1990; 
Greener and Mannion, 2006)
3
. Under this contract, GPs were rewarded 
individually according to their population coverage and claims for the work 
performed (Independent Contractors) (Leese and Petchey, 2003; NAO, 2008). 
Consequently, GPs used to offer services to the NHS and worked alone or in 
small group practices (Leese and Petchey, 2003). Their rewards were based on the 
GP‘s rather than the patients‘ needs (NAO, 2008). Apart from its financial impact 
on the fundholders, the GP fundholding experiment was criticised for creating a 
‗two-tier‘ structure, in which hospitals served patients of GP fundholders more 
quickly than patients of non-fundholders (Pollock, 2004). 
                                                             
2
 In the American case, the idea of the competitive market system in healthcare was a response to 
‗weak and politically subverted planning in the 1970s‘. The competitive approach itself was 
initiated around 1980 in the US (Paton, 1992). 
3
 Studies reported different outcomes in assessing the effectiveness of the scheme. GP fundholders 
were argued to be more responsive in terms of reducing waiting times for secondary care and 
getting more involved in the process of commissioning (Greener and Mannion, 2008); on the other 
hand, patients who were served by fundholding practices tend to be less satisfied compared to their 
counterparts in non-fundholding practices (Dusheiko et al., 2003). Patients reported that GP 
fundholders seemed more concerned about keeping costs down, rather than about their health. 
Thus, patients might experience the change as a factor in a declining health service (Dusheiko et 
al., 2003). At this point, it seemed that the implementation of fundholding had become extremely 
problematic. Fundholders could not act as ―ruthless purchasers‖ as the choice of health care 
provider was often limited, if not nonexistent. Moreover, fundholding practices were to some 
extent considered as a factor in both the threat to and the opportunity for health policy related to 
budget spending (Lliffe and Freudenstein, 1994). The literature also notes that the perceived 
failure of this scheme was related to a design which was not pilot tested, despite authoritative 
advice, due to worries about potential rejections from the profession, as well as not being based on 
reliable data representing the potential consequences of the scheme (Lliffe and Freudenstein, 1994; 
Greener and Mannion, 2008). 
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An early type of P4P scheme, which was initiated alongside fundholding, was 
related to the initiation of cervical cancer screening (Baker and Middleton, 2003). 
The P4P scheme was limited as it was only focused on incentivising GPs to 
conduct childhood immunisation and cervical cancer screening. A reward was 
given to those achieving the target level of 80%, which was calculated from the 
population base of the GP practice.   
During Blair‘s administration, the idea of the internal market was changed into a 
more integrated system which was ‗based on partnership and driven by 
performance‘ (DoH, 1997)4 5. Instead of abolishing the limited mechanism of the 
internal market, as offered by Conservative Government, it became a mandatory 
collaboration between purchasers and providers, under the creation of Primary 
Care Groups/Trusts (Denham, 2003; Pollock, 2004). Along the same lines, while 
fundholding was cleared from the system, GPs retained, or even expanded, their 
primary roles as purchasers (Alcock, 2002; Klein, 2010).  
While there were similarities between the initiatives offered in 1990 under the 
Conservative Government and the new Labour initiative, the BMA seemed to 
show greater interest in supporting the new Labour programmes (Klein, 2010; 
Roland, 2011). This was evident when the white paper entitled ‗The New NHS – 
Modern, Dependable‟ was issued (DoH, 1997). The paper suggested that the 
former medical contract (the old GMS) was unable to tackle under-provision of 
primary care in deprived areas of England (Leese and Petchey, 2003). To 
overcome the shortage of primary health care provision, the Personal Medical 
Services (PMS) contract was introduced in pilot form during 1998, as an 
alternative to the national scheme (GMS) (Smith and York, 2004).  
                                                             
4
 The separation between purchaser and provider aims to provide better choices for patients, by 
allowing new entrants to the healthcare market, reflecting a pluralistic model of healthcare 
provision. This means that various providers are given the opportunity to offer healthcare services 
for patients. Current reforms are also aimed at pursuing better organisational performance, through 
practice-based commissioning or payment by result, and to enable greater autonomy at 
organisational level (DoH, 2004a, 2005a, 2006; Peckham, 2007). 
5
 This period also continued a sense of privatisation of primary care practices, by the induction of 
Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT), which was a Private Finance Initiative PFI scheme for 
practice premises. This initiative enabled GP practices to work with private companies in 
refurbishing their premises (Pollock, 2004).  
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Unlike the old GMS, the PMS contract based payment on negotiations between 
the Primary Care Trust (PCT) and GP practices (Campbell et al., 2005). Its 
implementation came in two ‗waves‘. During the first wave, negotiations were 
conducted between health authorities and practices, while during the second wave 
this was to take place between practices and PCTs (DoH, 1997). Payment was to 
consist of a lump-sum for the services which were covered under the GMS and 
additional incentives for the services that they provided to special patients groups 
and services provided according to local circumstances (Gosden et al., 2002; 
NAO, 2008). The PMS provides more flexibility for designing creative 
procedures to offer services that meet local needs. It allows individual and group 
practices, as well as PCTs and community trusts, to negotiate for arranging 
service provision, such as salaried GPs and the role of nurses (DoH, 2002). 
In conducting these changes, the government came to believe that a 
comprehensive transformation of various aspects of the system was required. This 
was eventually stated in the NHS Plan – A Progress Report: 
„‟This requires a fundamental rethink of the way we work 
together throughout the service to really deliver what people 
want. In this way the success of The NHS Plan rests quite 
literally on the people working in the NHS and social services. 
Money alone will not solve the problems. It will not make 
services patient-centred. It will not create change in every 
health community. Only people can do that. To meet the vision 
outlined in The NHS Plan, we will all have to embrace change 
on a massive scale. This means no less than a fundamental shift 
in our working practices and attitudes, some of which have 
remained unchanged since 194‟‟8(NHS-Modernisation-Board, 
2002). 
Subsequently, the Department of Health emphasised the importance of increasing 
the role of primary care while at the same time focusing on skill improvement for 
staff. This was tied to the observation that there was an increasing number of 
people with chronic conditions requiring care, with 80% of consultation time in 
primary care organisations spent on chronic diseases (DoH, 2005b; Wilson, Buck 
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and Ham, 2005; Coulter, 2006). As a result, the government replaced the old 
GMS with the new GMS.  
2.3.2. NEW GENERAL MEDICAL SERVICES (NGMS) 
CONTRACT 
Replacing the old GMS contract, in April 2004, the NHS launched a new GP 
contract, the new General Medical Services (nGMS), which has changed the 
responsibilities and relationship between PCTs and GPs. Although GP practices 
and other health care providers act as ‗independent contractors‘ within the NHS, 
the implementation of this new contract places PCTs in charge of designing 
services that can be performed in accordance with the needs of the local 
population (NAO, 2008). This means that even GPs still work as independent 
contractors, under the nGMS the NHS tries to control the authority and monitor 
the GP practices and enforce them to structural changes through the PCTs (Grant 
et al., 2009). 
Under the nGMS contract, NHS spending on primary care increased from £5.8 
billion in 2003/04 to £7.7 billion in 2005/06. Consequently, the contract brought 
extra funding to GP practices. The extra funds were designed to improve GP 
recruitment and help with retention, especially in under-doctored and deprived 
areas, as well as to increase expenditure on Information Technology, premises and 
pensions (DoH, 2004b; NAO, 2008).  In addition to the extra funding, the nGMS 
contract reallocates practice payments for the services that they would have 
provided under the old contract, as shown in Table 1 below (GPC-BMA, 2004; 
NAO, 2008).  
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Table 1. Summary of Comparison between Old GMS and New GMS 
The Contract 
Items 
Old General Medical 
Services Contract 
New General Medical Services Contract 
 Individual GP GP Practices 
Funding for 
core services 
Apart from Basic 
Practice Allowance, each 
individual GP is given a 
fee per patient and type 
of health service 
delivered. 
The funding for healthcare essential services is 
based on ―global sum‖ which weighs the 
demographic structure of population, list turnover, 
additional needs and unavoidable healthcare service 
delivery cost in the calculation.   
Service 
delivery 
GPs are allowed to make 
claims for limited 
services only. 
Practices are offered flexible structure of service 
delivery, which may enable them to customise their 
additional services to particular patient needs. 
Out of hours Out of hours is 
obligatory; but may be 
delegated to other 
healthcare providers. 
Enhancing the balance between work and life, out-
of-hours service is not compulsory and arranged 
under separate contract covering healthcare service 
delivery outside core hours of service.  
Quality 
rewards 
Rewards are offered for 
quality service in some 
areas. Former schemes 
include ‗Investing in 
Primary Care‘. 
Rewards are distributed through the QOF scheme 
that incentivises practices regarding their ability to 
achieve predefined quality targets of healthcare 
service performance. 
Staffing There is no funding for 
developing staff other 
than GPs.  
The nGMS provides reward for services delivered 
by other healthcare professionals apart from GPs. It 
also enables other expenditures on IT, premises, 
and pensions, and it addresses the importance of 
seniority and the development of different skills 
mix. 
Source: Department of Health (NAO, 2008) 
As a part of the new GMS, the Department of Health introduced the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF), as a national P4P scheme aiming to ensure high 
‗clinical and organisational quality‘, with particular emphasis on managing 
chronic diseases (DoH, 2003). The QOF scheme is meant to encourage the 
improvement of quality of care through promoting accountability (evidence-
based) and simultaneously endorsing cost-efficiency (Coutts and Thornhill, 2009).  
2.3.3. THE QUALITY AND OUTCOMES FRAMEWORK 
QOF is considered to be a key feature of the nGMS, it aligns up to 25% of GP 
practice‘s income with the quality of service they provide (Campbell & Lester, 
2011). This scheme involves the creation of an evidence-based quality and 
outcomes framework, as well as trying to improve the quality of the patient 
experience and comply with professional practice (DoH, 2003). QOF functions as 
a means for measuring and incentivising the quality of care delivered to patients. 
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Under this scheme, data related to practices‘ performance will be available to 
PCTs, Government and patients (NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2005). 
Along with the evidence-based medicine and global interest factors towards P4P 
that were discussed earlier (Kozinets et al., 1999; Miller, 2005; Rosenthal et al., 
2005; Sachdeva, 2007; Landon and Normand, 2008; Mannion and Davies, 2008a), 
the UK also experienced a growing concern about the variation in quality of care 
provided; so that the Government perceived a need to reduce or eliminate the gaps 
(Roland, 2011). Another concern which was raised related to the funding available 
for primary care. This led to the announcement of the Government‘s intention to 
increase funding for the NHS, to reach the average European health budget.  
Data show  that in the UK spending on health care as a percentage of GDP 
increased to 9.4% in 2006, bringing UK spending close to the average in Europe, 
compared to 7.1% in 2000 and 8.6% in 2004 (Office_of_Health_Economics, 
2007). The NHS also witnessed a huge and extraordinary increase in public 
spending rising from £43.9bn in 2000/1 to £84.3bn in 2006/7, representing an 
increase of 92.3% in cash terms and over 50% in real terms (DoH, 2007). The UK 
Government was willing to invest huge amounts of money (up to 25% of primary 
care budget) to support this quality improvement scheme (Roland, 2011). 
By doing so, healthcare professionals expected that a significant portion would go 
into the primary care system. While there was a continuing trend of an increasing 
government budget for the NHS, the proportion it spent on primary care was 
claimed to be less significant than that allocated to hospitals. For a proxy 
illustration, data on PCT budgets for primary, hospital and other care showed that 
hospitals had been allocated 60% more than primary care (Featherstone and 
Evans, 2010)
6
. Yet, GPs also realised that increased investment meant that more 
work was expected in exchange (Roland, 2011).   
                                                             
6
Prior to this period there was no clear data on what proportion the NHS spent on primary care. 
Featherstone and Evans use data from 2006/07 PCT returns to provide an illustration of the 
proportion of PCT funding that went into hospitals (76.35%) compared to primary care (11.3%). 
The data were collected from various sources, reflecting the complexities and ‗impenetrable nature 
of NHS cost and account‘.  Although this data was 2006-2007 basis, it can be used as a reflection 
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2.3.3.1. THE COMPONENTS OF QOF: MEASURES AND INDICATORS 
The QOF framework employs a complex performance measurement system 
(Coutts and Thornhill, 2009), in which performance is measured against four 
domains; each domain consists of a well-defined set of measures of achievement, 
known as indicators. Indicators then translate to points with different weights and 
each point is worth £124.60
7
 (NHS_PCC, 2009)
 8
. The performance of GP 
practices is assessed through their QOF points, whereby a higher score reflects 
higher quality of care and hence, a greater amount of financial reward. However, 
workload and disease prevalence are also used to adjust the final payment for the 
practices. Part of this payment is paid in advance, particularly for high performing 
practices, to encourage them to invest in the practices‘ infrastructures 
(NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2009).  
The four QOF domains are weighted with a total of 1,000 points; 697 of them are 
related to the clinical domain. The four domains  and their related indicators are as 
follows (NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2009):  
1. Clinical domain (maximum of 697 points). This deals with the main features 
of healthcare practices, containing 86 indicators of 20 major clinical diseases 
that are believed to be encountered by healthcare professionals and GPs. The 
clinical domain acts as the leading part of the quality framework(Van den 
Heuvel et al., 2010).   
2. Organisational domain (maximum of 167.5 points). This provides 
rewards for ―good organisational and human resource practices‖ and 
comprises 36 indicators for records and information; information for 
patients; education and training; practice management and medicine 
management.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
on the situation, in which even there was claimed an increased funding, the portion was still low 
even after QOF.  
7
 Until 2006, each point was worth £75 (DoH, 2003). 
8
 Following its inception in 2004, QOF was reviewed and changed in 2006 and 2009 (Leech, 
2008). The changes were mainly in quality indicators and scores assigned to indicators. Further 
changes were planned for 2010 some of which were about inclusion of indicators for new diseases 
and illnesses (NICE, 2010).   
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3. Patient care experience domain (maximum of 91.5 points). Three 
indicators included in this domain deal with the length of consultation and 
patient surveys.  
4. Additional services domain. This covers nine indicators for four 
additional service areas, such as cervical cancer screening, child health 
surveillance, maternity services and contraceptive services.  
In its first application, QOF also included a reward for quality measure, which 
covered three types of payment: a holistic care payment, a quality practice 
payment and an access bonus (NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2005). Holistic 
care payments measured the achievements of healthcare providers across the 
clinical domain. The maximum points for this measure were 100 (9.5% of the 
total). Quality practice payments measured general achievements in the 
organisational areas, patient experiences and additional services (except clinical 
domain) and was scored out of a maximum of 30 points (2.9% of the total). The 
access bonus rewarded the target level achievement in terms of patient access to 
clinical care. These points count for 4.8% of the total points available. Table 2 
below represents the development of the four domains over time, since their 
inception in 2004, up to the expected changes in QOF 2009/2010. 
Table 2. Changes in the Quality and Outcomes Frameworks 
QOF Dimensions 2004-2006 2006-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 
DOMAINS 
Clinical 550 655 650 697 
Organisational 184 181 167.5 167.5 
Patient Experience 100 108 146.5 91.5 
Additional Services 36 36 36 44 
DEPTH OF QUALITY MEASURES 
Quality Practice Payment 30    
Holistic Care payment 100 20   
Access  Bonus 50    
Maximum QOF points 1050 1000 1000 1000 
DISEASE AREAS 10 19 19 20 
        Source: (NAO, 2008; NHS_PCC, 2009; NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2010) 
The QOF score can serve as a tool for benchmarking quality of care, either within 
practices for different years, or between practices. Since 2006, the maximum QOF 
points has remained at 1,000 points (NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2009). 
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In the clinical domain, there are three different types of indicators, structure, 
process and outcome indicators (NHS_PCC, 2009). Structure indicators relate 
to whether a certain register of patient exists in the practice. Process indicators 
represent whether appropriate treatments or interventions are conducted, while 
outcome indicators relate to the extent that interventions have improved the health 
of patients. Meanwhile, outcome measures focus on intermediate patient health 
outcomes (Roland, 2004; NHS_PCC, 2009). These indicators are mainly process 
oriented, based on the assumption that actual health outcomes are both difficult 
and need time to be measured (Roland, 2004; Doran, 2008).   
In measuring indicators, this framework sets thresholds which comprise lower 
and upper limits (DoH, 2003; NHS_PCC, 2009). For the 2004 QOF scheme, 
some of the lower level thresholds were less than 40%. However, relying on 
the achievement data for 2005, it seemed that most participants were able to 
attain this level or above (Doran et al., 2008a). Consequently, all thresholds 
lower than 40% were raised up to 40%. The upper thresholds of most 
indicators had a limit of 90%; for the majority of indicators the upper 
thresholds remain at this level (Campbell & Lester, 2011). 
Since its launch, QOF has been subjected to both major (2009) and minor (2006) 
changes to its indicators and measurement. Table 3, presents the changes to each 
dimension over time, showing that the clinical domain remains the main indicator 
for QOF with an increasing allocation of points for the six years of QOF 
implementation. While additional service shows a slight increase from its original 
2004 scheme, organisational and patient experience domains experienced a small 
decrease in the number of points allocated (BMA, 2009; Campbell & Lester, 
2011).  
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Table 3. QOF Scheme 
QOF Dimensions 2004-2006 2006-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 
DOMAINS 
Clinical 
550 
(52.4%) 
655 
(65.5%) 
650 
(65.5%) 
Additional points from 
reallocation (62 points) 
(71.2%) 
Organizational 
184 
(17.5%) 
181 
(18.1%) 
167.5 
(16.75%) 
167.5 
(16.75%) 
Patient Experience 
100 
(9.5%) 
108 
(10.8%) 
146.5 
(14.65%) 
72 points are removed to be 
reallocated into other areas 
(7.45%) 
Additional Services 
36 
(3.4%) 
36 
(3.6%) 
36 
(3.6%) 
Additional points from 
reallocation (10 points) 
(4.6%) 
DEPTH OF QUALITY MEASURES 
Quality Practice 
Payment 
30 
(9.5%) 
   
Holistic care payment 
100 
(2.9%) 
20 
(2.0%) 
  
Access  Bonus 
50 
(4.8%) 
   
Maximum QOF points 1050 1000 1000 1000 
DISEASE AREAS 10 19 19 19 
Source: Figure was developed based on data/information adopted from (NAO, 2008; NHS_PCC, 
2009; BMA, 2009) .  
Policy process involved in such changes was also altered. Between 2005 and 
2009, changes in QOF measurement and indicators were made through expert 
panels, which involved primary care academics and clinicians interested in 
particular domains. While their ideas were prioritised, the panels were to 
comprehend the story behind the suggestion as well as the reason of why some 
indicators may not be feasible or suitable to be implemented. Reviews by both GP 
clinical system experts and patient organisations followed the process to ensure 
indicators were achievable prior to final negotiation between the Department of 
Health and the BMA (BMA, 2009; Campbell & Lester, 2011). 
However, this process has changed again since April 2009. The process of 
evaluating and establishing indicators is now led by the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). NICE has the status of an independent 
and credible institution, therefore this alteration is expected to bring a more 
transparent and objective process in developing indicators. In accordance with its 
expertise, the process led by NICE is more focused on the development of clinical 
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indicators. While the review for indicator feasibility is similar to the previous 
policy process, with the involvement of clinical experts, the new NICE-led 
mechanism involves real-situation testing by piloting particular indicators in 
practices representing different settings across country  (Campbell & Lester, 
2011). 
2.3.3.2. THE EXCEPTION REPORTING MECHANISM 
Rather different from previous medical contracts, the nGMS includes the concept 
of exception reporting. Exception reporting enables practices to systematically 
remove any patient from the denominator, while still receiving the reward for the 
services they have performed
9
. This system distinguishes the QOF framework 
from P4P programmes in other countries and such a system is said to be required, 
especially in the absence of a Case-Mix adjustment mechanism (Martin et al., 
2010). The rate of overall exception in England was 5.83% in 2006/07 and 5.26% 
in 2007/08 (NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2008). According to NHS Primary 
Care Commissioning, the purpose of exception reporting, as described in the 2003 
contract documentation is: 
„‟....to allow practices to pursue the quality improvement 
agenda and not be penalised, where, for example, patients do 
not attend for review, or where a medication cannot be 
prescribed due to a contraindication or side-effect‟‟(NHS_PCC, 
2009). 
Exception reporting criteria can be applied to indicators in the clinical domain and 
to one cervical screening indicator, which is under the additional services domain.  
Patients on the disease register would be included in the indicator denominator. 
However, to avoid financial penalties, a practice can make exceptions to the 
patients in the indicator denominator, if patients meet one of the exception 
criteria. For example, these criteria can include patients who (1) have previously 
refused to attend an interview on at least three occasions during the preceding 12 
                                                             
9
 Exclusions: patients on a clinical register but excluded from an indicator denominator. For 
example, an indicator may include patient of a specific age group, patients with a specific status or 
patients with a certain duration of diagnosis. 
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months; (2) have terminal illness or extreme frailty; and  (3) do not take 
medication for clinical reasons, such as those who suffer from drug allergies 
(NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2006; NHS-Employers and BMA, 2007). 
Patients can be excluded in cases where the inclusion criteria do not fit them. 
Nevertheless, patients should be carefully treated, even if they are exempted from 
the denominator (NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2006). 
During the policy negotiation process, the government observed that this 
mechanism could lead to improper exclusion of patients for financial gain 
(Roland, 2011). There is also a body of evidence suggesting that the exception 
system may encourage practitioners to neglect the more difficult indicators 
(NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2006; NHS-Employers and BMA, 2007).  
There is a possibility that some GP practices might inappropriately use exception 
reporting to score high QOF points (Doran et al., 2006). Fleetcroft et al (2008)  
argue that setting up certain levels of threshold (e.g., less than 100), combined 
with exception reporting, may lead to a performance gap. This means that there 
will be a negative possibility, in which GP practices may intentionally exclude 
some patients from the performance report (Greene and Nash, 2008; Gravelle, 
Sutton and Ma, 2009).  
2.3.3.3. THE LEVEL OF GP PARTICIPATION TOWARD QOF AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
Each GP practice works under various medical contracts with the government and 
these contracts form the practice‘s income 10 . This means that the services 
provided by each practice are paid through different contracts and the same 
                                                             
10 There are four contracting options for GP practices:  
1) nGMS:- Practices contract with their local PCTs on nationally agreed terms; 
2) PMS:- Practices negotiate and contract with their local PCTs on a locally agreed terms, 
about one third of GP practices in England hold this contract; 
3) Alternative Provider Medical Services (APMS):-Private health care companies can 
provide GP services, a small number of practices work under this contract; 
4) Primary Care Trust Medical Services (PCTMS):- This contract allows local PCTs to 
run and manage practices directly (see the website of BMA: 
http://www.bma.org.uk/press_centre/pressgps.jsp; NAO, 2008). 
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practice might have different contracts.  Figure 1, below, shows that by February 
2008, 62% of total GPs services in England were covered by nGMS, while the 
rest of the services were under alternative payment schemes (NAO, 2008). 
Altogether, 99.8% of GP practices in England are involved in QOF and consider it 
as a significant source of income (Lester and Majeed, 2008; Van den Heuvel et 
al., 2010). This means, most practices under Personal Medical Services are also 
involved in the QOF scheme (NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2006).  
Figure 1. Proportion of GPs Participation 
 
Source:  (NAO, 2008) 
Regarding the level of QOF achievement, most GPs appear to have been able to 
achieve good quality of services, fulfilling more than 90% of QOF targets.  Figure 
2 shows that the average achievement was relatively high, as it reached 96.80% by 
2007/2008 (NAO, 2008; Van den Heuvel et al., 2010).  
Figure 2. Level of QOF Target Achievement by GPs (England) 
 
Source: (NAO, 2008; NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2010) 
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From the figure above, we can see also that the achievement level decreased 
slightly in 2006/2007, but increased again in the 2007/2008 report. This slight 
downturn could be a response to the amendment of the thresholds conducted in 
2006. Although there was a downturn, the achievement level was still very high 
(reaching 95.5%) and kept the increasing trend the following year (2007/2008). 
For the years of 2008/2009 and 2009/2010, changes initiated in the Patient 
Experience domain were likely to be the cause of the significant decrease in 
average achievement (NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2010).  
Finally, the high achievement in QOF points since its inception in 2004 raised the 
question of whether the QOF scheme really did improve the quality of healthcare 
or merely encouraged reporting and ‗tick boxing‘ and/or manipulating of data 
(Johnston and Fellow, 2005; Mannion and Davies, 2008b). Another doubtful issue 
is whether high QOF score attainment was obtained because the NHS had set very 
easy achievement targets, especially in the first year (Epstein, 2006; Gravelle, 
Sutton and Ma, 2007).  
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2.4. CONCLUSION 
Despite available alternatives the nGMS contract records a high level of 
participation from GPs. The key feature of the new contract is the QOF 
framework. QOF links around 25% of a GP practice‘s income with the quality of 
care they deliver compared against 134 predefined indicators. It developed within 
the primary healthcare system, based on the internal market, evidence-based 
medicine, competition and controlling GP services.  
QOF was introduced in the UK in an effort to improve the performance of GP 
practices by offering additional funding. It focuses on four domains, clinical, 
organisational, patient experience and additional domains. The clinical domain is 
considered critical for determining the quality of healthcare services provided by 
GP practices. The percentage of points attributed to the clinical domain against the 
total score in QOF ranges from 550 (2004) up to 697 (2009) points. The change in 
the number of points reflects adjustments made to the indicators. 
Since its inception in 2004, the QOF scheme has been amended two times. By 
relying as much as possible on the best available evidence in the process of 
establishing indicators, changes have been made by altering, reallocating and 
adding indicators and the number of points attached to them, as well as increasing 
the thresholds (particularly lower thresholds). 
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C H A P T E R  3  
A  S Y S T E M A T I C  R E V I E W  O F  E V I D E N C E :  
T H E  I M P A C T  O F  P A Y  F O R  P E R F O R M A N C E  
I N  P R I M A R Y  C A R E  O R G A N I S A T I O N S  
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a review of empirical evidence on the efficacy of P4P in the 
health sector, with a focus on the primary care contexts. The chapter begins by 
discussing previous reviews of evidence. Further aspects of the reviews are 
organised according to key themes, which emerged in the review processes. 
 
3.2. PREVIOUS REVIEWS 
A review of the literature was able to identify sixteen previous reviews of P4P in 
healthcare. The reviews only included English language articles published in peer 
reviewed journals. A summary of previous reviews is presented in Table 4 below.  
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Table 4. Summary of Previous Reviews 
No Studies Context 
Type of 
Incentives 
Specific Issues Findings and Conclusions 
1.  
(Achat, McIntyre 
and Burgess, 1999) 
Physician level 
Financial 
incentives 
Immunisation 
uptake 
Findings showed that there were increases in both primary immunisations and 
preschool boosters. Both financial and non-financial incentives may have 
contributed to the improvement. In order to enhance effective implementation, 
programme design should include collaboration between key players, as well 
as customisation to fit the nature of the population. 
2.  
(Alshamsan et al., 
2010) 
Primary care  QOF 
Inequalities of 
care 
Some issues of inequality, especially related to age, gender and ethnic 
inequalities still exist. In deprived areas, although QOF was closely associated 
with ensuring equalities between prosperous and deprived areas, evidence was 
found that QOF might not be the only cause, as the UK Government had 
engaged in such inequalities reduction programmes a decade before QOF. It is 
argued that the focus of design should be directed toward eliminating 
inequalities and improving health outcomes. 
3.  
(Armour et al., 
2001) 
Physician level 
financial 
incentives 
Explicit financial 
incentives 
There is a lack of research addressing the issue of explicit financial incentives 
given to physicians. The findings were mixed, with some studies stating 
positive improvements and others maintaining they have no impact on quality. 
4.  (Chien et al., 2007) Primary care  US P4P 
Public Reporting 
and Ethnic 
Disparities 
Certain ethnic groups (whites) were noted to receive particular healthcare 
treatment in all US states, especially in New York, after the P4P programme 
was implemented.  
5.  
(Christianson, 
Leatherman and 
Sutherland, 2007)
11
 
Primary and 
secondary care 
Financial 
Incentives 
Effectiveness of 
efforts  
cost and 
utilisation  
The findings were mixed, with little evidence on the positive impact of P4P on 
quality. Furthermore, most of the literature noted that its implementation was 
complemented with other quality efforts, resulting in difficulties in assessing 
its actual effectiveness.  
6.  
(Dixon and 
Khachatryan, 
2010) 
Primary care  QOF 
Public Health 
impact 
Narrowing the gap between practices servicing deprived and affluent areas was 
observed. Yet, QOF impact on health outcomes was less clear. 
7.  
(Dudley et al., 
2004) 
Primary and 
secondary care 
Financial 
Incentives 
Strategies to 
support Quality 
The study showed that it was possible to implement quality based payments 
without any significant risk, especially related to an institution‘s good will or 
                                                             
11 This review published in The Health Foundation/ London; which is an independent charity working organisation. 
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No Studies Context 
Type of 
Incentives 
Specific Issues Findings and Conclusions 
Based 
Purchasing 
programme 
financial condition. It was noted that a positive effect took place, especially 
when the payment was not attached as a bonus, but as an addition to the fee-
for-service to the organisations. More research was expected to strengthen 
evidence.  
8.  
(Glickman et al., 
2008) 
Emergency 
care in 
hospital 
P4P 
Measurement 
designs 
Some measurement metrics (5/9) did not meet ACC/AHA
12
 selection criteria 
for measurement. Some other metrics were questioned for cost effectiveness. It 
was suggested that better designs for measurement should be directed toward 
the nature of emergency care to better reflect its quality. 
9.  
(Greene and Nash, 
2009) 
No specific 
context 
P4P 
Description, 
outcomes, cost 
analysis, 
perceptions, 
arguments 
against and 
supports for P4P  
While the effectiveness of P4P on quality of care tended to be positive, the 
evidence of its cost effectiveness should be strengthened. Although some 
unintended consequences existed, P4P was considered to have the potential 
impact to improve various aspects of the quality of healthcare, including 
healthcare professional-patient relationships and reducing expenses. 
10.  
(Peckham and 
Wallace, 2010) 
Primary care  P4P Quality of care 
Limited evidence on how P4P affects quality of care. Incentivised processes 
were improved, yet, its positive impacts on physicians‘ behaviour and health 
outcomes were less plausible.  
11.  
(Petersen et al., 
2006) 
Primary and 
secondary care 
P4P Quality of care 
Authors found unintended consequences of P4P implementation. Question on 
the longevity of impact was yet to be explored. The need for sustainable 
monitoring to ensure effectiveness and avoid unintended consequences was 
suggested. 
12.  
(Rosenthal and 
Frank, 2006) 
Primary and 
secondary 
care. 
13
 
US P4P Quality of care 
Little evidence and mixed impact on the effectiveness of P4P in improving the 
quality of health care. 
13.  (Scott and Hall, Physician level Financial GP remuneration The review found that it was difficult to define an optimal payment system 
                                                             
12The inclusion criteria used in Glickman et al (2008) were based on the professional associations in the American College of Cardiology (ACC) and American 
Heart Association (AHA) areas. Those criteria includes (1) the strength of evidence that supports measure inclusion, (2) the clinical relevance of the outcome 
associated with adherence to the performance measures, (3) the magnitude of the relationship between performance and outcome and (4) the cost-effectiveness of 
the quality improvement intervention. 
13
 Also included other contexts, i.e. industrial, educational and psychology organisations. 
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No Studies Context 
Type of 
Incentives 
Specific Issues Findings and Conclusions 
1995) Incentive reflecting the imperative for further research. Most literature did not point out 
remuneration impacts on patients‘ health outcomes. 
14.  
(Steel and 
Willems, 2010) 
Primary care  QOF 
Research 
implication 
Despite growing empirical evidence on QOF, its impact on health outcome was 
still unclear and inconclusive. The importance of high quality research, 
designed to enlighten policy makers on maximising the implementation of 
QOF to improve quality and inequality of health care, was suggested. 
15.  (Town et al., 2005) 
Primary and 
secondary care 
Financial 
incentive 
Preventive care 
This review included only literature with randomised trial methods, resulting in 
lack of empirical evidence on preventive care.  The findings show that 
physicians‘ behaviour could not be changed with only a small amount of 
financial reward. To induce the wider effect of behavioural change, it was 
suggested that ‗system-level economic incentives‘ be imposed. 
16.  
(Van Herck et al., 
2010) 
Primary or  
acute hospital 
care  
P4P 
Effects, design 
choices and 
context 
Broad ranges of result reflecting both strong and weak impacts. It was 
concluded that those impacts related to how the programmes were designed 
and the context of implementation. 
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There was a consensus among all the 16 reviews that incentive schemes had at 
least some impact on the quality of healthcare provision; yet, the degree of impact 
varied in different settings and across different units of analysis. Additionally, 
some reviews asserted the need for richer evidence to assess the effectiveness of 
financial incentives in general and specific to P4P (Scott and Hall, 1995; Dudley 
et al., 2004; Peckham and Wallace, 2010; Steel and Willems, 2010).  
Several reviews found that along with improving overall healthcare quality, P4P 
also led to potentially dysfunctional consequences (Rosenthal and Frank, 2006; 
Christianson, Leatherman and Sutherland, 2007; Peckham and Wallace, 2010). 
These dysfunctional consequences included adverse selection, gaming, tunnel 
vision and crowding out the internal motivation (Rosenthal and Frank, 2006; 
Christianson, Leatherman and Sutherland, 2007; Petersen et al., 2009; Peckham 
and Wallace, 2010). 
Relating these issues to the aim of this research, P4P can potentially improve the 
performance in delivering healthcare services. Taking this to the sphere of 
organisational memory, the practices which experience an improvement in their 
performance may be able to take advantage of learning, by doing better over time. 
This is expected to strengthen their capacity to be able to conduct changes and 
respond effectively to such government intervention.  
3.3. PROTOCOL OF THE STUDY 
This study started by investigating the existing systematic reviews covering 
research on financial incentives. A broad search strategy and protocol were then 
used, to ensure that a maximum amount of published evidence which fitted the 
inclusion criteria would be included. A detailed protocol of the study along with 
the keywords which were used in the electronic databases are presented in the 
Appendix 1. 
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Table 5. Criteria for Inclusion 
CRITERIA DETAILS 
Language Only literature published in the English language was included. 
Publication 
type Only empirical studies were reviewed. 
Setting Academic research, government studies related to health sector, 
especially in the context of primary healthcare. 
Study 
Design All types of study designs and research methods were included. 
Period Papers published between 1970 and 2010. 
 
3.4. RESEARCH REVIEW/DESCRIPTION 
The literature collection for this study took place between October 2007 and 
November 2010. When the last literature update was conducted at the end of 
October 2010, a total of 115 empirical articles, focusing on the primary health 
care setting were included.  
Figure 3. Process of Literature Inclusion 
 
 
 
Original  
(698) 
Excluded 
(489) 
Healthcare Setting 
(172) 
Public Sector  
(21) 
Other Reviews 
(16) 
Higher Education 
(5) 
Schools 
(16) 
Secondary Care 
(57) 
Primary Care 
(115) 
Included 
(209) 
Final inclusion 
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Although the review was designed to include research published between 1970 
and 2010, the earliest study found was published in 1998. Moreover, the interest 
in P4P has grown rapidly since 2001; the highest number of studies was published 
in the year 2007, with 30 papers (26.08%). Most of the studies were conducted in 
the UK (60%) or the US (33.91%). Around 76.52% of studies employed 
quantitative methods, 19.13% qualitative studies and there were 4.35% employed 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches.  
Figure 4. Year of Publication 
 
More than 60% of studies focused on process and outcome measures. The 
research on outcomes mostly employed intermediate outcome measures to assess 
the impact of P4P on the quality of care. In addition, most P4P schemes worked 
with absolute thresholds and were targeted toward group/organisation level 
incentives
14
. 
3.5. FINDINGS OF P4P AND ITS IMPACT 
In this section the findings of the existing empirical studies are discussed and 
evaluated systematically. The findings are presented under five major themes; 
these themes are: 
 Evidence on the effectiveness of P4P in improving health care quality; 
 Evidence on the factors affecting P4P implantation; 
 Evidence on unintended consequences; 
                                                             
14 A further description of the empirical studies included in this review, along with the main 
characteristics of the P4P programmes that have been studied can be found in Appendix 2.  
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 Impact on organisational behaviour and 
 Evidence on organisational memory and change. 
3.5.1. EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF P4P IN 
IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY 
This part of the review includes 71 studies. About 90% of these focused on how 
P4P schemes affected quality indicators, while the rest looked at transfer rate or 
referral from primary to secondary care (5.71%) and some minor issues (4.28%).  
Table 6. Evidence for the Effectiveness of P4P in Improving Quality 
Themes Findings Studies 
Achievement 
of 
healthcare 
quality in 
targeted 
chronic 
diseases 
The performance of healthcare 
organisations improved, but less 
patient-centred care was reported 
and there was a move towards a 
‗biomedical model‘ which sees 
the body as a host for disease and 
therapeutic intervention is 
directed at the disease, rather than 
the individual.  
(Checkland, McDonald and Harrison, 2007; 
Checkland et al., 2008; McDonald, Harrison and 
Checkland, 2008; Checkland and Harrison, 
2010; Eleftheriou and Tang, 2010) 
There is an increasing focus on 
the use of outcome measures and 
cost-efficiency measures, rather 
than relying on process measures 
alone. 
(Rosenthal et al., 2007; NAO, 2008; Alabbadi et 
al., 2010; Lee et al., 2010; Martin et al., 
2010; Walker et al., 2010) 
P4P potentially improved the 
quality of healthcare, yet, the 
evidence was varied as some 
studies showed a decline in 
treatment. In that sense, most 
research mentioned that the 
measurement of effectiveness 
was complex as it involved 
different factors.  
 
Diverse findings on the 
effectiveness of P4P in reducing 
inequalities of care in deprived 
areas, as well as for different 
ethnic groups. In the UK, the 
exception reporting system in 
QOF may contribute to ‗conceal‘ 
the actual performance. QOF is 
found to improve the 
achievement of intermediate 
outcomes for diabetic patients in 
all ethnic groups. 
P4P should be targeted to clinical 
(Kouides et al., 1998; Beaulieu and Horrigan, 
2005; Rosenthal et al., 2005; Ashworth and 
Armstrong, 2006; Bokhour et al., 2006; Doran et 
al., 2006; Hippisley-Cox, Vinogradova and 
Coupland, 2006; McLean, Sutton and Guthrie, 
2006; Sigfried et al., 2006; Bruni, Nobilio and 
Ugolini, 2009; Campbell et al., 2007; Cutler et 
al., 2007; Elder et al., 2007; Gilmore et al., 
2007; Gulliford et al., 2007; Mandel and 
Kotagal, 2007; McCarlie, Reid and Brady, 2007; 
McGovern et al., 2007; Pham et al., 2007; 
Rosenthal et al., 2007; Steel et al., 2007; Sutton, 
Ikenwilo and Skatun, 2007; Tahrani et al., 2007; 
Ashworth, Medina and Morgan, 2008; 
Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 2008; Cupples 
et al., 2008; Pearson et al., 2008; Calvert et al., 
2009; Campbell, 2009; Campbell et al., 2009; 
Crawley et al., 2009; Crosson et al., 2009; 
Falaschetti et al., 2009a; Falaschetti et al., 
2009b; Millet et al., 2009; Petersen et al., 2009; 
Vaghela et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010a; Chien, 
Li and Rosenthal, 2010; Chung et al., 2010a; 
Doran et al., 2010; Eleftheriou and Tang, 2010; 
41 
 
Themes Findings Studies 
problems with high impact on 
overall public health.  
 
The generalisation of results on 
effectiveness may be questioned, 
as it might work better in one 
setting than in another.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Elliot-Smith and Morgan, 2010; Fagan et al., 
2010; Fleetcroft et al., 2010; Kahn et al., 2010; 
Kiran et al., 2010; Mabotuwana et al., 2010; 
Oluwatowoju et al., 2010) 
Higher spending did not 
necessarily result in higher health 
outcomes. Level of compliance is 
high, but unsure about the 
outcomes. 
(Fisher, 2006; Williams and Lusignan, 2006; 
Coleman, Reiter and Fulwiler, 2007; Crosson et 
al., 2009; Coleman, 2010; Lee et al., 2010) 
Transferring 
rate 
(referral) 
from 
primary to 
secondary 
care 
For referral rate and/or admission 
to hospital, findings were varied. 
There was no strong evidence to 
support that P4P could reduce the 
hospitalisation rate. Some 
demographic characteristics were 
associated with referral rates. 
(Srirangalingam et al., 2006; Bottle et al., 2007; 
Bruni, Nobilio and Ugolini, 2009; Downing 
et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010b; Lee et al., 
2010) 
 
Other issues 
Higher prevalence was reported 
by practices which were 
previously above the upper 
threshold. Meanwhile, higher 
exception reporting was more 
common by those below upper 
threshold than those above the 
upper threshold. 
(Sutton and McLean, 2006; Gravelle, Sutton and 
Ma, 2007, 2009) 
Network performance is also 
improved. 
(Levin-Scherz, DeVita and Timbie, 2006; 
Mandel and Kotagal, 2007) 
The prescription for QOF drugs 
was noted to increase faster than 
non QOF drug, both prior to and 
post QOF. 
(McCarlie, Reid and Brady, 2007; MacBride-
Stewart, Elton and Walley, 2008; Alabbadi et 
al., 2010) 
In general, the research indicated improvements in the quality of care, in terms of 
increases in quality scores or achieving targets under different P4P schemes (i.e. 
Campbell et al., 2007; Fleetcroft et al., 2008; Millet et al., 2009; Vaghela et al., 
2009; Mabotuwana et al., 2010; Oluwatowoju et al., 2010). However, such 
improvements were not consistent across different chronic diseases (Wang et al., 
2006; Campbell et al., 2007; McGovern et al., 2007; Crawley et al., 2009). On the 
basis of quality targets, and comparison with unincentivised targets, some 
research found mixed results in effectiveness (Rosenthal et al., 2007; Steel et al., 
2007; Sutton, Ikenwilo and Skatun, 2007); deterioration of the treatment received 
by patients (Mullen, Frank and Rosenthal, 2010); and an adverse effect on 
equality of care (Gulliford et al., 2007; Ashworth, Medina and Morgan, 2008; 
Eleftheriou and Tang, 2010). Other studies indicated that the quality of care had 
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shown improvement prior to P4P schemes; that there were reasons to doubt the 
effect of P4P (Young et al., 2007a; Pearson et al., 2008; Campbell et al., 2009).  
Reflecting on notions of change and memory, these findings can be used as a 
departing point to understand how practices engaged in organisational changes. 
Despite mixed results, many studies showed that there was a high degree of 
enthusiasm from practices for participating in P4P schemes. The findings also 
showed that practices were able to improve their performance by fulfilling targets 
and achieving high scores, even in the early years of implementation. This reflects 
a willingness to change, as well as to adopt different approaches to managing 
service delivery.  
3.5.2. EVIDENCE ON THE FACTORS AFFECTING P4P 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Seventy two studies discuss the factors contributing to P4P implementation; 
socio-demographic characteristics, practice characteristics and organisational 
characteristics were the main factors that arose in the studies. Some minor factors 
such as organisational infrastructure, lag time and the interference with other 
programmes were also addressed. 
Table 7. Evidence for Factors Affecting Implementation of P4P Schemes 
Themes Findings Studies 
Socio-
demographic 
characteristics 
Different age groups of 
patients show different 
relations amongst the 
measured variables. 
(Doran et al., 2006; Hippisley-Cox, 
Vinogradova and Coupland, 2006; Bottle et 
al., 2007; Downing et al., 2007; McGovern et 
al., 2007; Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 2009)  
Some studies show 
differences in performance 
between genders to varying 
degrees. 
(Doran et al., 2006; Downing et al., 2007; 
McGovern et al., 2007; Campbell, 2009; 
Falaschetti et al., 2009b) 
Deprived areas experienced 
poor performance, inequalities 
of health care provision and 
higher disease prevalence, as 
well as unplanned hospital 
admissions. 
(Doran et al., 2006; McLean, Sutton and 
Guthrie, 2006; Sigfried et al., 2006; Sutton 
and McLean, 2006; Wang et al., 2006; Wright 
et al., 2006; Ashworth et al., 2007; Bottle et 
al., 2007; Downing et al., 2007; Elder et al., 
2007; Felt-Lisk, Gimm and Peterson, 2007; 
Gulliford et al., 2007; Leese, 2007; 
McGovern et al., 2007; Ashworth, Medina 
and Morgan, 2008; Doran et al., 2008a; 
Falaschetti et al., 2009b; Friedberg et al., 
2010; Griffiths et al., 2010; Kiran et al., 2010) 
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Themes Findings Studies 
Organisational 
feature 
Larger practice size was 
associated with readiness to 
implement P4P schemes. 
Practice size showed different 
impacts in the improvement of 
quality. 
(Doran et al., 2006; Sutton and McLean, 2006; 
Wang et al., 2006; Ashworth et al., 2007; 
Saxena et al., 2007; Young et al., 2007a; 
Landon and Normand, 2008; Grant et al., 
2009; Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 2009; Chung 
et al., 2010b; Doran et al., 2010; Fagan et al., 
2010; Griffiths et al., 2010)  
Scope and 
magnitude of 
incentive 
Although there was no 
agreement on the percentage 
of payment considered as 
enough to motivate, the size 
of incentives was considered 
to be an important factor to 
motivate and change 
behaviour of health providers. 
(Kouides et al., 1998; Beaulieu and Horrigan, 
2005; Bokhour et al., 2006; Doran et al., 2006; 
Rosenthal et al., 2006; Chien et al., 2007; 
Gulliford et al., 2007; Mehrotra et al., 2007; 
Rosenthal et al., 2007; Young et al., 2007a; 
Young et al., 2007b; Pearson et al., 2008; 
Chung et al., 2010a; Chung et al., 2010b; 
Friedberg, Hussey and Schneider, 2010; 
Mullen, Frank and Rosenthal, 2010) 
Organisational 
infra-structure 
The increasing use of IT in 
assisting the delivery of 
healthcare in practices. This 
especially related to the use of 
electronic medical records.  
(Williams et al., 2006; Checkland, McDonald 
and Harrison, 2007; Felt-Lisk, Gimm and 
Peterson, 2007; Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 
2007; Mehrotra et al., 2007; Sutton, Ikenwilo 
and Skatun, 2007; Cupples et al., 2008; 
Landon and Normand, 2008; Locke and 
Srinivasan, 2008; Pearson et al., 2008; 
Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 2009; McDonald 
and Roland, 2009; Menachemi et al., 2009; 
Petersen et al., 2009) 
 
The socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender and social situation) of the 
patients served by primary care providers became a major concern in P4P 
research. Some of the studies focused on the issue of patient age and how it 
contributed to the implementation of P4P. Evidence shows that age correlates with 
how P4P affects quality (Doran et al., 2006; Williams and Lusignan, 2006; 
Williams, 2006; Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 2009) and the prevalence of diseases 
potentially goes in line with the age increase (Hippisley-Cox, Vinogradova and 
Coupland, 2006; Downing et al., 2007; McGovern et al., 2007; Roland et al., 2009). 
Meanwhile, patient gender was found to have a moderate but significant effect on 
performance (Doran et al., 2006). Gender was also used to distinguish the 
variation between patient categories (Downing et al., 2007; McGovern et al., 2007; 
Falaschetti et al., 2009a; Falaschetti et al., 2009b; Roland et al., 2009). The issue 
of deprivation was reported, asserting that deprived areas were associated with 
under performance and a gap  in the quality of care provided , higher disease 
prevalence and unplanned hospital admissions (Bottle et al., 2007; Downing et al., 
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2007; Felt-Lisk, Gimm and Peterson, 2007; Gulliford et al., 2007; Roland et al., 
2009; Kiran et al., 2010).  
Several studies found that P4P reduced inequalities of care between deprived and 
affluent areas (Ashworth et al., 2007; Elder et al., 2007; McGovern et al., 2007; 
Ashworth, Medina and Morgan, 2008; Doran et al., 2008a); while some research 
revealed that the gap between these areas was widened (Sigfried et al., 2006; 
McGovern et al., 2007). Importantly, most P4P schemes did not reward the extra 
efforts needed to deliver care in such cases, which in turn discouraged healthcare 
professionals (McLean, Sutton and Guthrie, 2006; Friedberg et al., 2010).  
Larger practice sizes were generally associated with readiness to implement P4P 
schemes (Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 2009).  Yet, evidence on the performance 
of these practices varied and was not necessarily better than those of a smaller size 
(Doran et al., 2006; Ashworth et al., 2007; Saxena et al., 2007; Doran et al., 2010; 
Griffiths et al., 2010). The different sizes implied different ways of managing 
change (Grant et al., 2009). It reflects the capacity and resources owned by 
organisations in delivering services to patients, such as the use of IT or more 
clinicians (Sutton and McLean, 2006; Landon and Normand, 2008). This raised 
concerns about small practices that potentially face a lack of organisational 
infrastructure and staff. However, it was found that despite differences in size, 
small practices were also able to excel in their performance (Wang et al., 2006).  
Parts of the literature focused on the magnitude and scope of incentives. Although 
there was no consensus on the amount of financial incentive that should be 
distributed, most studies agreed that the amount of incentive was vital in making 
the P4P motivate healthcare professionals to change their behaviour (Kouides et 
al., 1998; Mehrotra et al., 2007; Rosenthal et al., 2007; Mullen, Frank and 
Rosenthal, 2010). It was also reported that the existing incentives were considered 
small, albeit that considerable motivational effects were expected from them 
(Young, Burgess Jr and White, 2007; Young et al., 2007a; Friedberg et al., 2010).  
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As a general theme, the studies indicate that complexities in managing 
organisations are functions of both internal (i.e. practice size) and external (i.e. 
socio-demographic characteristics of population) factors.  
3.5.3. EVIDENCE ON UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
This review found 38 studies which identified unintended consequences of P4P 
implementation. Dysfunctional consequences were reported to exist in varying 
degrees. Some studies maintained that there was little evidence or insignificant 
effects of P4P in causing dysfunctional consequences, such as tunnel vision, 
erosion of motivation and gaming (Beaulieu and Horrigan, 2005; Chien et al., 
2007; Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 2008; Doran et al., 2008b; Millet et al., 
2009). However, some research reported that adverse effects were significant, 
especially on the distraction of patient-healthcare professional relationship (Shen, 
2003; Maisey et al., 2008; Campbell et al., 2009; McDonald and Roland, 2009; 
Van den Heuvel et al., 2010).  
Table 8. Evidence for P4P and Its Unintended Consequences 
Themes Findings Studies 
Tunnel 
vision 
The literature reports mixed results 
about the tunnel vision. However, 
more evidence shows that tunnel 
vision took place when focusing 
only on rewarded targets and 
ignoring other, unincentivised ones. 
(Beaulieu and Horrigan, 2005; Roland et 
al., 2006; Young, Burgess Jr and White, 
2007; Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 
2008; Maisey et al., 2008; Campbell et 
al., 2009; Mullen, Frank and Rosenthal, 
2010; Van den Heuvel et al., 2010; 
Walker et al., 2010) 
Erosion of 
motivation 
There is little evidence to show that 
P4P did undermine internal 
motivation, especially amongst 
physicians, but contrary evidence 
also exists especially amongst 
nursing staff. 
(Roland et al., 2006; McDonald et al., 
2007; Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 
2008; Maisey et al., 2008; McDonald, 
Harrison and Checkland, 2008) 
Discontinuity 
of care 
P4P could lead to potential loss of 
continuity of care. 
(Roland et al., 2006; Campbell et al., 
2007; Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 
2008; Maisey et al., 2008; Campbell et 
al., 2009) 
Racial and 
ethnic 
disparities 
Mixed results with some showing 
improvement in the quality of 
healthcare provision in all ethnic 
groups; yet, the magnitude is 
different for each ethnic group. 
(Wang et al., 2006; Chien et al., 2007; 
McGovern et al., 2007; NAO, 2008; 
Millet et al., 2009; Chien, Li and 
Rosenthal, 2010; Friedberg et al., 2010) 
Adverse 
selection and 
gaming 
P4P might have led to gaming and 
adverse selection. 
Gaming: manipulation of the 
(Shen, 2003; Beaulieu and Horrigan, 
2005; Casalino et al., 2007; Chien et al., 
2007; Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 2007; 
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Themes Findings Studies 
programme to magnify payment, 
such as miscoding diagnosis or 
mispresenting data. 
 
Adverse selection: avoiding 
severely ill patients.  
 
Mixed results, with some degree of 
gaming reported.   
Rosenthal et al., 2007; Doran et al., 
2008b; Fleetcroft et al., 2008; Gravelle, 
Sutton and Ma, 2009; Sutton et al., 
2009)   
Workload 
Increase in both clinical and 
administrative workload 
(Leese, 2007; MacBride-Stewart, Elton 
and Walley, 2008; Maisey et al., 2008; 
Whalley, Hugh and Sibbald, 2008; 
Gemmell et al., 2009; McDonald and 
Roland, 2009; Van den Heuvel et al., 
2010) 
Ongoing 
physician-
patient 
relationship 
 Loss in patient centeredness, loss 
of choice of whom to see and the 
treatments became heavily 
dependent on ‗pharmacological 
approaches‘ to attain rapid medical 
progress. 
(Beaulieu and Horrigan, 2005; 
Checkland, McDonald and Harrison, 
2007; Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 
2008; Checkland et al., 2008; Fleetcroft 
et al., 2008; Maisey et al., 2008; 
McDonald, Harrison and Checkland, 
2008; Campbell, 2009; McDonald and 
Roland, 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2009; 
Van den Heuvel et al., 2010) 
Impact on 
autonomy 
and 
authority 
Significant changes in autonomy 
especially for nurses. 
(McDonald et al., 2007; Maisey et al., 
2008; McDonald, Harrison and 
Checkland, 2008; Whalley, Hugh and 
Sibbald, 2008; Grant et al., 2009) 
Changing 
professional 
boundaries 
Changes in relationships amongst 
health professionals. 
Re-stratification of roles. 
(Leese, 2007; Maisey et al., 2008; 
McDonald, Harrison and Checkland, 
2008; Grant et al., 2009; Checkland and 
Harrison, 2010; Van den Heuvel et al., 
2010) 
Others 
Tendency to treat patients more 
than they need or more than 
necessary. 
Positive spill over to unincentivised 
indicators. 
(Roland et al., 2006; Gravelle, Sutton 
and Ma, 2007; Maisey et al., 2008; 
Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 2009; 
Menachemi et al., 2009; Rodriguez et 
al., 2009; Sutton et al., 2009; Checkland 
and Harrison, 2010; Chung et al., 2010b; 
Coleman, 2010; Walker et al., 2010) 
 
Apart from those showing dysfunctional effects, some studies also identified 
significant shifts in professional roles. UK QOF for instance caused an increase in 
workload for healthcare professionals as they put their focuses on both patient 
care and information recording. In turn, this led doctors to delegate the most 
routine work to nurses (Leese, 2007; Maisey et al., 2008; Whalley, Hugh and 
Sibbald, 2008; Grant et al., 2009). This implied an expansion of roles for nurses, 
while at the same time, potentially de-skilling doctors (Campbell, 2009; Van den 
Heuvel et al., 2010).  
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In terms of organisational memory, acceptance of change in role boundaries may 
become an incentive for engaging in mutual learning among professionals, which 
in turn enhances an organisation‘s knowledge capacity and memory. This enables 
organisations to engage in more complex processes.  On the downside, as 
relationships become a source of competence and knowledge, changes in patient-
doctor relationships can disturb an organisation‘s ability to accrue information and 
knowledge on patients.  
Despite such cautions, the interest in applying P4P in health care settings has 
continued over the last decade. This paradox arises from the fact that despite the 
overall consensus on the dysfunctional consequences and disadvantages, P4P 
programmes continue to be implemented as a promising strategy to improve 
health care quality. 
3.5.4. IMPACT ON ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 
This section discusses how P4P implementation affects organisational behaviour 
and involves 42 studies. Table 9 below shows the main themes of this section.  
Table 9. Evidence for P4P and Its Organisational Behaviour 
Themes Findings Studies 
Effectiveness 
in affecting 
behaviour 
Financial incentives were perceived 
to be effective when they were able 
to drive behavioural change. 
However, the current P4P schemes, 
especially in the US, were perceived 
to offer modest financial incentives, 
which is not enough to induce 
behavioural change. 
(Rosenthal et al., 2005; Bokhour 
et al., 2006; Elder et al., 2007; 
Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 
2008; Doran et al., 2008a; 
McDonald, Harrison and 
Checkland, 2008; NAO, 2008; 
Campbell et al., 2009; Crosson et 
al., 2009; Alabbadi et al., 2010) 
Motivation 
Various perspectives on individual 
motivation, some less favourable 
findings exist, but it was found also 
that P4P did not damage internal 
motivation. In fact, there was a 
notion of ‗altruistic motivation‘. 
Some issues of motivation were 
specifically reported by nurses.  
(Roland et al., 2006; McDonald et 
al., 2007; Campbell, McDonald 
and Lester, 2008; McDonald, 
Harrison and Checkland, 2008; 
Campbell, 2009; Friedberg et al., 
2010) 
Attention to 
risk 
More attention is paid to risk 
adjustment. 
(Rosenthal et al., 2007) 
Organisational 
structure and 
process 
Notable changes in responsibilities 
as well as roles in organisations. 
There were also increasing collective 
efforts from organisational member, 
(Rosenthal et al., 2005; Roland et 
al., 2006; Sutton and McLean, 
2006; Teleki et al., 2006; 
Checkland, McDonald and 
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Themes Findings Studies 
in achieving targets. Harrison, 2007; Leese, 2007; 
McDonald et al., 2007; Campbell, 
McDonald and Lester, 2008; 
Checkland et al., 2008; Huby et 
al., 2008; MacBride-Stewart, 
Elton and Walley, 2008; 
Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 
2009; Grant et al., 2009; 
McDonald et al., 2009; 
Menachemi et al., 2009; Strong, 
South and Carlisle, 2009; 
Checkland and Harrison, 2010; 
Van den Heuvel et al., 2010) 
 
Others 
Changes in roles and identity, as 
well as autonomy. Self-surveillance 
emerged.  
P4P was seen to encourage 
organisations to engage in quality 
improvement, not only at an 
organisational level, but also at an 
individual level. Additionally, P4P 
induced a more systematic method in 
managing chronic illness diseases. 
(Meterko et al., 2006; Checkland 
et al., 2008; Maisey et al., 2008; 
McDonald, Harrison and 
Checkland, 2008; McDonald et 
al., 2008; Crosson et al., 2009; 
Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 
2009; Grant et al., 2009; 
McDonald and Roland, 2009) 
Primary care practices were reported to have built new chronic disease clinics, 
installed compatible IT system and set up new positions to accommodate 
requirements. Building new clinics enabled some practices to offer services for 
targeted diseases; yet, this also led to the recruitment of additional professionals, 
who in most cases were nurses. This expanded the structure of organisations and 
changed patterns of staffing (Leese, 2007).     
There was a need to install IT systems to support practices in obtaining patients 
information. In the case of UK QOF, the use of data templates became a necessity 
for practices to collect the data required for the performance assessment 
(Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 2009; Menachemi et al., 2009). While this focus on 
IT enhanced the knowledge repository capacity of organisations by keeping more 
detailed patient information, it also came as a distraction for patient-healthcare 
professional  relationships (Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 2008). Moreover, as 
attention was focused on completing the templates, the richness of information 
was reduced, as most of data took the form of yes/no questions (Strong, South and 
Carlisle, 2009). Checkland and Harrison (2010) suggested that the application of 
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IT to assist P4P systems affected the way people work, in the sense that the 
templates ‗dictated‘ what healthcare professional should do.  
The incentives created by P4P encouraged collective efforts from the members of 
an organisation and created new roles in organisations (Teleki et al., 2006; 
McDonald, Harrison and Checkland, 2008; Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 2009). 
Doctors were reported to delegate more routine clinical work to nurses, which 
changed roles and responsibilities within a practice (Checkland, McDonald and 
Harrison, 2007; McDonald et al., 2007; Maisey et al., 2008; Grant et al., 2009; 
Van den Heuvel et al., 2010). This delegation would be enhanced by the fact that 
around 30% of GPs work could be undertaken by nurses (Leese, 2007). However, 
nurses became more proud of their new roles and responsibilities and enjoyed 
more autonomy(Grant et al., 2009). There is modest evidence that recruiting more 
nurses to perform routine clinical QOF targets would lead to better intermediate 
patient outcome (Gemmell et al., 2009; Griffiths et al., 2010). 
Most practices were also reported to have created an additional role for a person 
who was in-charge of ensuring targets fulfilment (Huby et al., 2008; Grant et al., 
2009). Formally, the creation of these new roles affected the structure of 
organisations, in terms of expanding the diversity of organisational roles (Roland 
et al., 2006). Informally, the emergence of new ‗strata‘ within the practices is said 
to have induced a re-stratification of roles amongst health care professionals 
(Huby et al., 2008; McDonald, Harrison and Checkland, 2008). This means staff 
became more aware of their responsibilities and at the same time they felt that 
they were being ‗chased‘ by those  who were responsible to ensure targets were 
achieved (McDonald, Harrison and Checkland, 2008). 
These findings indicate that there are interplays between individual and 
organisational-level behavioural changes, as well as between informal and formal 
relationships. It is also worthy of note that the way people understood the change 
process appeared to be very much influenced by their individual journeys. The 
way in which people justified changes in relationships and roles and accepted the 
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facts that they needed to behave differently, gave the importance of organisational 
memory in shaping both personal and organisational readiness for change.  
3.5.5. EVIDENCE ON ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY AND 
CHANGE  
This review was able to find 23 studies that discuss the impact of P4P on 
organisational change and how organisational memory influenced the 
performance of such changes (see Table10). 
P4P schemes can be considered as a ‗mechanism for change‘ (Huby et al., 2008). 
This means that they act as a trigger for practice organisations to engage in the 
change process. Virtually all the research included in this part of the review 
suggests that organisations that participated actively in P4P schemes, such as UK 
QOF, adjusted their organisational systems. However, the literature also 
demonstrate that there were differences in how members of organisations viewed 
the impact of P4P on their organisations  (Huby et al., 2008). These differences 
reflected a process of staff ‗sense- making‘ of how they understood and reacted to 
P4P as a trigger for change and the consequences of this on their organisation. In 
the UK, for example, although considerable changes took place in GP practices 
because of QOF, practice staff might attribute these changes to other factors rather 
than the QOF (Huby et al., 2008; Checkland and Harrison, 2010). In their study, 
Checkland and Harrison (2010) noted that GP practice staff repeated a narrative of 
having ‗no change‘ because of QOF in their organisation and their clinical and 
professional behaviours and their ethos had always been ‗patient-centred‘. 
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Table 10. Evidence on Organisational Memory and Change 
Themes Findings Authors 
Readiness to 
implement change 
Practices equipped themselves for the 
implementation of P4P in several ways, 
including incentive distribution and 
trainings for staff. 
(Beaulieu and Horrigan, 2005; 
Bokhour et al., 2006; Casalino 
et al., 2007; McDonald et al., 
2007; Locke and Srinivasan, 
2008; Whalley, Hugh and 
Sibbald, 2008; Grant et al., 
2009) 
Engagement of 
members to 
change 
High engagement of all healthcare 
professionals in accomplishing P4P targets 
was reported; for example, the 
involvement of nurses in doing routine 
work for QOF. Substantial re-organisation 
was reflected through new strata, enabling 
people to ensure that their colleagues 
fulfilled the responsibility for QOF targets.  
(Roland et al., 2006; 
Checkland, McDonald and 
Harrison, 2007; Leese, 2007; 
Huby et al., 2008; Damberg, 
Raube and Teleki, 2009; 
Grant et al., 2009; McDonald 
et al., 2009) 
Source of change 
Studies found that practices adjusted or 
changed the way they conducted their 
activities ‗mode of operation‘ as required 
by P4P schemes. This underlines the 
importance of financial incentives as a 
mechanism of change. 
(Checkland, McDonald and 
Harrison, 2007; Campbell, 
McDonald and Lester, 2008; 
Huby et al., 2008; Damberg, 
Raube and Teleki, 2009; 
Checkland and Harrison, 
2010) 
Levels of change 
Incentives can be used as s catalyst for 
change, especially in system level change. 
Practices made adjustments in various 
organisational elements, such as structure. 
It was also reported that there were 
changes in the ethos and style of work.  
(Bokhour et al., 2006; Huby et 
al., 2008; Damberg, Raube 
and Teleki, 2009; Sutton et 
al., 2009; Checkland and 
Harrison, 2010) 
Changes in 
organisational 
elements 
Each study reported different changes in 
details, but the pattern was relatively 
similar, such as increase in staff including 
those responsible for IT and HCAs, overall 
increase in expense to offset financial 
gains, setting up informal/formal teams 
and setting up chronic disease clinics. 
There were also some issues regarding re-
stratification of status amongst healthcare 
professionals. A more bureaucratic 
environment was also reported. 
(Roland et al., 2006; Leese, 
2007; Checkland et al., 2008; 
Huby et al., 2008; Maisey et 
al., 2008; Damberg, Raube 
and Teleki, 2009; Gemmell et 
al., 2009; Grant et al., 2009; 
McDonald et al., 2009; 
Menachemi et al., 2009; 
Checkland and Harrison, 
2010) 
Knowledge 
repository in hard 
system (Database, 
protocol, 
procedures, 
rulebooks) 
Organisations store information in their 
memory systems using IT and data 
templates. While it offered advantages as a 
source of knowledge, the strict guidance 
embedded in data templates brought some 
disadvantages. The use of templates 
provided ‗certain norms or values‘ to 
diagnose and deal with patient‘s condition. 
This could be discouraging sometimes. 
Specific to QOF, the use of templates 
(Beaulieu and Horrigan, 2005; 
Checkland, McDonald and 
Harrison, 2007; Campbell, 
McDonald and Lester, 2008; 
McDonald et al., 2009) 
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Themes Findings Authors 
helped in the accomplishment of QOF 
targets. 
Assist sharing 
information/access 
of knowledge/ 
knowledge 
sharing 
IT was used in assisting P4P 
implementation to improve efficiency and 
better use of evidence. Yet, a drawback 
was that it potentially shaped the norm of 
not recording unneeded information in the 
system. 
(Checkland, McDonald and 
Harrison, 2007; Mandel and 
Kotagal, 2007; Checkland and 
Harrison, 2010) 
Knowledge 
repository in soft 
system (people). 
The development 
of organisational 
stories 
People served as repository of knowledge 
or memory. They contributed to the 
development of ‗stories‘ in the 
organisation.  
Healthcare professionals maintained the 
narrative of ‗no changes‘ to reflect that the 
practice had already undergone various 
things with regard to QOF.  
(Checkland, 2007; Huby et 
al., 2008; McDonald et al., 
2008; Checkland and 
Harrison, 2010) 
Others 
Practices developed or improved their 
patients‘ records to ensure better patient 
management, as well as being a part of 
compliance to guidelines. It shows a more 
rigorous approach to patients. Consistent 
use of data recording system, especially 
for incentivised conditions.  
GPs reported less control over the 
achievement especially in coordinating 
resources to achieve targets. In addition, 
there was a reported gap between observed 
change and reported change by 
respondents. 
(Young et al., 2007b; Huby et 
al., 2008; Maisey et al., 2008; 
Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 
2009; Grant et al., 2009; 
McDonald et al., 2009; 
Menachemi et al., 2009; 
Checkland and Harrison, 
2010) 
In reality, P4P has led to changes in both hard systems, such as physical and 
infrastructure changes, and soft systems, including behavioural and structural 
changes (Checkland, McDonald and Harrison, 2007; Edwards and Neal, 2008; 
Maisey et al., 2008; McDonald, Harrison and Checkland, 2008; Grant et al., 2009; 
McDonald and Roland, 2009). Physical and infrastructure changes typically 
involve purchasing new equipments, installing IT systems and setting up new 
chronic disease clinics (Edwards and Neal, 2008). Changes in organisational 
structure were related to an organisation‘s decision to enlarge their capacity by 
establishing new clinics and this required recruiting new healthcare professionals 
and creating additional positions to accommodate the establishment of the IT 
system. While this reflected changes in staff patterns and workflows, it also led to 
changes in professional roles and relationships. Some research showed that GPs 
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started to work as specialists and nurses began to run minor and stable medical 
conditions (Checkland, McDonald and Harrison, 2007; Maisey et al., 2008; Grant 
et al., 2009). Changes also affected the pattern of decision making and control in 
an organisation. Thus, fewer people initiated decision making and a group of GPs 
was formed to monitor the behaviour of their colleagues to ensure a better 
performance, which in turn affected the identity of the professionals (Checkland, 
McDonald and Harrison, 2007; Maisey et al., 2008; McDonald, Harrison and 
Checkland, 2008; Grant et al., 2009; McDonald and Roland, 2009). 
Altogether, this evidence suggests that there was a significant shift or 
reconfiguration of roles within GP practices. Although the clinical authority 
attached to professionals remained respected, additional roles were attached to 
those who ensured the accomplishment of QOF targets blurred professional 
boundaries.  
There was also evidence that some practices made adjustments or changes to their 
systems which represented a deeper level of organisational change (Bokhour et 
al., 2006; Sutton, Ikenwilo and Skatun, 2007; Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 2009; 
Checkland and Harrison, 2010). Various studies showed how practices embedded 
change initiatives by developing physician level incentives to strengthen shared 
learning, or in the case of large and modern practices, conducted financial 
investment to make them more business-like (Bokhour et al., 2006; Roland et al., 
2006; Sutton, Ikenwilo and Skatun, 2007; Maisey et al., 2008; Damberg, Raube 
and Teleki, 2009; Menachemi et al., 2009; Checkland and Harrison, 2010). 
Bokhour et al. (2006) suggest that financial incentives can be used as a catalyst 
for change and especially for system level change. Specifically, the involvement 
of various organisational members can be seen as evidence of a genuine 
engagement process, in a way that involves different professions in self-
surveillance (McDonald, Harrison and Checkland, 2008). This means that 
practices undergo changes and adjust themselves at different levels by setting up 
changes in organisational elements. Moreover, previous research also notes the 
emergence of a practice unique ethos and style of work.  
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Yet, it can be noted that individual and organisational memory influenced the way 
people behaved and reacted to the trigger of change, based on their former 
experience. Practices experiencing successful changes might be more able to deal 
with P4P and use it as a stepping stone to improving their services. For an 
organisation‘s members, such successes might affect their understanding of 
changes, which in turn, enriches their professional knowledge. Consequently, the 
way professionals developed the knowledge and use it in day-to-day 
organisational life could potentially shape the organisation‘s identity. 
While studies did not specifically discuss the notion of memory, it is clear that the 
use of data templates in the information system created the physical repositories 
of knowledge. With the implementation of P4P schemes, such as QOF, practices 
were required to comply with data templates (Beaulieu and Horrigan, 2005; 
Checkland, McDonald and Harrison, 2007; Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 
2008; McDonald and Roland, 2009). Along with the function to capture and store 
patient information in the system which can be used for the assessment, these 
information repositories serve as a bank of information on a patient‘s condition, as 
well as the treatments provided from them. In that sense, practices were able to 
extract information much more easily than they had done when using a paper-
based system. The use of data templates improved capacity for knowledge and 
helped other organisational members obtain and share knowledge. While these 
templates benefitted nurses in particular by reminding them of what they were 
supposed to do (Checkland, McDonald and Harrison, 2007), their implementation 
had both negative and positive effects.  
The advantage of using templates lies in encouraging healthcare professionals to 
collect the required information relating to particular chronic diseases. In addition, 
in terms of sharing knowledge, the effective use of information stored in the 
templates means that there is a transfer of knowledge. This enables physicians to 
delegate work and pass on clinical information to be used by less experienced or 
less qualified staff (Checkland, McDonald and Harrison, 2007; Menachemi et al., 
2009). However, on the other hand, the extensive use of data templates could limit 
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and undermine the role of healthcare professionals in getting more information 
about a patient‘s health (Checkland, McDonald and Harrison, 2007).  
Overall, there is a strong indication that most changes were externally driven, as 
practices tried to accomplish government targets (Campbell, McDonald and 
Lester, 2008). In this sense, practices appear to have adjusted or changed the way 
they conducted their activities ‗mode of operation‘ regularly, according to the 
requirement of the respective P4P schemes (Checkland and Harrison, 2010). 
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3.6. CONCLUSION 
Despite a considerable amount of evidence and research on the effectiveness and 
consequences of P4P programmes, there is relatively little evidence in the 
literature about the practical implementation issues of P4P and in particular, the 
readiness of organisations for change, and organisational memory are rarely 
considered. However, this review provides insights in two main areas: the first is 
broad organisational changes or commodifying effects; and the second relates to 
changes in working practices. It is also noted that nearly all relevant studies were 
conducted on the UK QOF.  
Changes in working practices were observed, including IT-assisted patient 
information recording and re-stratification of roles between healthcare 
professionals. As information became more readily accessible for organisations, 
this enabled knowledge sharing between professionals and enhanced the 
organisational memory capacity.  Another change in working practice involved a 
significant shift in the roles attached to healthcare professionals. Practice staff also 
reported having a strong shared commitment to achieving QOF targets, so that 
they were reminding each other to fulfil their QOF related responsibilities. This 
created a situation of ‗chased and chaser‘ in the practices, which reflected 
people‘s awareness of role expectations.  
In a broader sense of organisational change, this review was able to identify 
several changes. Firstly, there was a high degree of enthusiasm for P4P and the 
changes it brought forward to the practices; acting as a stimulus for change, QOF 
has been able to push the practices to expand and improve their service delivery.  
Secondly, practices became more aware of various factors that could potentially 
contribute to their performance level. These factors could be either their internal 
capacity (i.e. practice size) or external factors such as demographic characteristics 
of patient population. Thirdly, in order to ensure that they were capable of 
achieving the QOF targets, practices managed changes in organisational 
arrangements, including recruiting more staff, delegation of routine clinical work 
from doctors to nurses and also from nurses to healthcare assistants, as well as 
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more engagement in skill training, which were prominently shown in the studies. 
Finally, while the evidence of change was detected, interestingly the narrative of 
having ‗no change‘ was similarly observed. Healthcare professionals believed 
strongly that the implementation of QOF had not led to actual differences in 
working practices. Instead, they believed that they were already involved in such 
activities prior to QOF. This was the focal point for addressing the ‗sense-making‘ 
view in the practices and showing how people perceive changes based on their 
memory.
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C H A P T E R  4  
R E V I E W  O F  L I T E R A T U R E :  
T H E  N A T U R E  A N D  T H E  L E V E L  O F  
O R G A N I S A T I O N A L  C H A N G E S  
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses on how GP practice organisations respond to QOF. Most 
importantly, the thesis aims to explore what changes QOF has triggered in 
practices and what factors have influenced the practice responses to QOF. While 
the literature suggests that there have been some common patterns of response, 
the organisational impact of QOF is not well understood. In order to provide an in 
depth understanding of these issues, this chapter explains the applicability of a 
group of theories of organisational change, including: 1) levels of change (Wilson, 
1992); and 2) organisational memory, in particular related to organisational 
competence (Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Winjhoven, 1999).  
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4.2. ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
4.2.1. PROCESS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Organisational change is a complex concept and different researchers define it in 
different ways. Difficulties in defining change arise from the fact that ‘change is 
predominantly a perceptual phenomenon, understandable only in terms of 
individuals‟ accounts of definitions of the situation‟ (Wilson, 1992). Change takes 
place when organisations shift from one state to another (Ford and Ford, 1995; 
Ragsdell, 2000). Change may also refer to the continuous renewal processes of 
organisational direction and structure, as well as organisation‘s  capacity to fit 
with internal and external environmental demands (Moran and Brightman, 2000). 
Although it can be difficult to deal with change (Rollinson & Broadfield, 2002), 
an organisation‘s ability to do so determines their competitive survivability (Hage, 
1999).  
Organisational change can be triggered internally or externally. Such triggers 
include technological changes, shifts in the economic climate, political changes, 
changes to government regulations, performance gap, leadership regimes and 
shifts in the core business strategy (Nadler and Tushman, 1989; Bedeian & 
Zammuto, 1991; Buchanan & Huczynski, 2004; Senior & Fleming, 2006; 
Cummings & Worley, 2008; Johnson et al., 2008). In healthcare, the complexity 
of organisational change has been analysed through the lens of complex adaptive 
systems (Fraser and Greenhalgh, 2001; Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001; Wilson, Holt 
and Greenhalgh, 2001; Parkin, 2009). From that perspective, an organisation can 
be seen as: 
„‟…a collection of individual agents with freedom to act in ways 
that are not always totally predictable, and whose actions are 
interconnected so that one agent's actions change the context for 
other agents‟‟ (Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001). 
Consequently, the way people respond to change can be varied and may involve 
resistance to change (Plsek and Wilson, 2001). Healthcare organisations are often 
perceived as highly resistant to change, because of the ‗political nature of health-
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care delivery‘, the various clusters of professionals (physicians, nurses, health 
technicians and administration staff), and the ‗special veto power of 
clinicians‘(Alford, 1975). For instance, an individual professional may approve of 
applying new ways to cure diseases, but be resistant to how target numbers are set 
up for curing those diseases, professional could adopt their own judgement to 
decide how to manage their individual cases (Plsek and Wilson, 2001). This 
implies that different mental models and the preferences of health staff, such as 
practitioners, nurses, and other healthcare professionals, may influence their 
actions (Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001; Wilson, Holt and Greenhalgh, 2001; 
Checkland, 2007). Senge (1990) argues that the success of change is affected by 
the presence of a shared mental model representing a widely shared vision. People 
should have a similar perspective on how they understand the change and how 
they want the outcome to be.  
In conceptual change, the mental model can be used to interpret and analyse how 
individuals share, exchange, and negotiate their ideas (Chi, 2008). According to 
Wijnhoven (1999, p. 13) these processes can be influenced by a defensive and 
competitive course of actions. This explains how people debate their ideas and 
perspectives on change. In healthcare, the nature of ‗tensions and paradoxes‘, 
which is created as a result of competition and cooperation, leads to dynamic 
response to external changes (Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001; Parkin, 2009). The 
dynamic response provides an interpretation of why change in healthcare 
organisations is an unpredictable, non-linear phenomenon, and highly resistant 
(Checkland, 2007).  
In order to lessen resistance, organisations can find ways to push driving forces 
for change ,while at the same time eliminating restraining forces (Iles and 
Sutherland, 2001; Heward, Hutchins and Keleher, 2007). In this scenario, reward 
or payment can be used as one of the ways to support change (Cornell, 1996). 
However, the impact of reward on change can be varied, as it may affect 
performance positively or negatively (Gagné, Koestner and Zuckerman, 2000; 
Burke & Litwin, 2008).  
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In understanding the change processes, Nadler and Tushman (1989) categorise it 
into four different types, adaptation, re-creation, re-orientation and fine-tuning; re-
creation and re-orientation potentially involve adjustments in strategic direction, 
either in anticipation or in reaction to changes in the environments. Such changes 
can also be categorised as second order changes, since they may involve a 
substantial shift or replacement of strategic orientation (Nadler and Tushman, 
1989; Iles and Sutherland, 2001). 
Change can also be seen from a process and implementation perspective, as well 
as whether its occurrence is planned or emergent. While emergent change reflects 
political decisions in its process; planned change is built upon logical 
incrementalism, involving elaboration of commitment and shared needs in its 
processes (Wilson, 1992). From an implementation perspective, planned change 
has the advantage of being able to construct plans to reduce resistance; emergence 
change assumes the implementation process as a follow-up from various factors 
and processes which preceded it.  
Figure 5. Characterisation of Approaches to Organisational Change 
 
The Process 
of Change 
The Implementation 
of Change 
Planned  
Change 
1 
Logical incrementalism and various 
need, commitment, and shared vision 
models 
2 
Reducing resistance to change (e.g. 
force field analysis) 
Emergent  
Change 
3 
Characteristics of strategic decisions: 
political process models 
4 
Contextualism: 
implementation is a function of 
antecedent factors and processes 
          Source: (Wilson, 1992) 
Each proposed framework has points of strength and weakness. By focusing on 
the timing of change, Nadler and Tushman (1989) were able to describe how 
change differs in form as a reactive and gradual process or even as a major 
strategic shift. Wilson (1992) portrayed organisational change in the context of 
process and implementation. He underlined the importance of incorporating 
organisational context, such as the political process and the interaction of various 
factors, including resistance, which acts as an antecedent for the implementation 
of change. As this research aims to analyse and explore the implementation of 
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QOF in primary care practices, the adoption of Wilson‘s framework is particularly 
useful in assisting the analytical process.  
Without disparaging the complications of any change, strategic change is said to 
be particularly difficult. Both re-creation and re-orientation change involve a 
significant shift in both organisational process and strategic orientation. In such 
change, organisations need to ensure that changes are implemented through all 
organisational levels and subsystems(Rollinson & Broadfield, 2002). Rollinson 
and Broadfield (2002) add that the interconnection between strategy, structure, 
people, technology and tasks should be taken into account. Change fails because 
organisations tend to overlook the interconnection between these areas. 
Therefore, there is no definite way to ensure the success of change (Rollinson & 
Broadfield, 2002). Yet, the possibility of achieving successful change is much 
higher if organisations consider changes at different levels and manage the 
interconnectedness between sub-systems (Applebaum and Wohl, 2000; Ferlie and 
Shortell, 2001; Rollinson & Broadfield, 2002).  
4.2.2. LEVELS OF CHANGE 
Change may take place either on the operational level or go deeper into the 
strategic levels (Street and Gallupe, 2009). Ferlie and Shortell (2001) argue that 
changes take place on four different levels, individual, group, organisational and 
larger system or environmental. Meanwhile, Wilson (1992) categorises levels of 
change differently, by emphasising whether changes take place at mainly 
operational or predominantly strategic levels.  
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Table 11. Levels of Organisational Change Classified by Degree of Change 
DEGREE OF 
CHANGE 
OPERATIONAL / 
STRATEGIC LEVEL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Status Quo Can be both operational 
and strategic 
No change in current practice 
Expanded 
Reproduction 
Mainly operational Change involves producing more of the same 
(goods or services) 
Evolutionary 
Transition 
Mainly strategic Change occurs within existing parameters of 
the organisation (e.g. change, but retain existing 
structure, technology, etc). 
Revolutionary 
Transformation 
Predominantly strategic Change involves shifting or redefining existing 
parameters. Structure and technology likely to 
change, for example 
  Source: Wilson (1992) 
With a minimum degree of change, organisations maintain the status quo. At this 
point, there is no significant change taking place in an organisation, either at the 
operational or strategic levels. The next degree of change, expanded 
reproduction, takes place mainly at the operational level. At this level, 
organisations conduct change without modifications to the existing goods or 
services (Wilson, 1992).  Other researchers refer to this level of change as 
developmental change, which refers to the improvement of the existing situation, 
with either planned or emergent change (Ackerman, 1997). This change is usually 
categorised as a first order change (Iles and Sutherland, 2001).  
By contrast, evolutionary transition takes place mainly at the strategic level. This 
type of change takes place within the existing organisational context or similar 
organisational structures (Wilson, 1992). It means that organisations may 
experience change, yet, the underlying organisational contexts are still the same. 
Transitional change can also be understood as a staged process, in the sense that 
change may not happen neatly, but the transition from the original condition to a 
new one is managed in stages, so as to make it more manageable (Garside, 1998; 
Alvesson, 2002). This level originates in Lewin‘s three-stage change process 
which consists of (1) unfreezing the existing equilibrium or status quo; (2) change 
or movement; and (3) refreezing the new status or equilibrium (Ackerman, 1997; 
Iles and Sutherland, 2001). 
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The degree of change reaches its highest level when it affects the strategic level. 
This change is referred to as revolutionary transformation (Wilson, 1992) or 
more generally as transformational change (Iles and Sutherland, 2001). Unlike the 
first two types of change, transformational change addresses a fundamental shift 
of strategic orientation or even shift in the way organisations think (Ackerman, 
1997). Undergoing transformational change may bring a significant alteration to 
organisational strategy, structure and norms and values (Wilson, 1992).  
Organisations may find it difficult to control everything, especially when they 
undergo a radical transformational change process. The time period for 
conducting transformational change is longer and less controllable than 
developmental or transitional change (Wilson, 1992; Ackerman, 1997).  
In order to explore why and how GP practices have changed after the introduction 
of QOF as a new government payment policy, this study tries to analyse and 
understand in depth the level and direction of changes took place in GP practices 
after 2004.  
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4.3. ORGANISATIONAL COMPETENCE: THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY 
With the growing importance of knowledge management, intangible assets such 
as organisational memory gain importance as key factors for constructing 
organisational competence (Winjhoven, 1999; Drejer, 2000; Drejer & Riis, 2000; 
Drejer, 2001). For the purpose of this thesis, the focus of this discussion is on the 
role of organisational memory (OM) in constructing competence
15
.  
In general, organisational memory comprises two aspects, which can be discussed 
as mental and structural aspects(Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Weick, 2000; Kruse, 
2003). The mental aspect deals with data, knowledge or information (Walsh and 
Ungson, 1991; Weick, 2000). Mental OM relates to the capacity and capability of 
organisations in managing knowledge embedded in organisations (Conklin, 1996). 
This includes the process of knowledge acquisition (Kruse, 2003), and the 
understanding of what information is essential for organisational memory, as 
knowledge is sourced from information which includes a process of judgement 
and behavioural consequences (Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Cong and Pandya, 
2003).  
 The structural aspect of memory refers to the use of roles, procedures, or 
structural and architectural memory arrangement (Walsh and Ungson, 1991; 
Weick, 2000).  This relates to the processes of knowledge retention and 
knowledge retrieval (Kruse, 2003), which are also essential components of 
organisational learning (Olivera, 2000). The existence of memory or ‗knowledge 
storage‘ enables organisations to use and re-use knowledge, which in turn allow it 
to develop organisational competence over time (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Anand, 
Manz and Glick, 1998; Cong and Pandya, 2003; Winter, 2003; Tsai, Lin and 
Chen, 2010).   
                                                             
15 In their work, Hamel and Prahalad define a core competence by using the following example ‗a 
bundle of skills and technologies rather than a single discrete skill or technology. [ ] A core 
competence represents the sum of learning across individual skill sets and individual 
organisational units. Thus, a core competence is very unlikely to reside in its entirety in a single 
individual or small team.‘ (Hamel & Prahalad, 1996). 
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Over time, memory helps individuals and organisations to learn how to justify 
their decisions and their actions through the wisdom and insight inspired by their 
accumulated knowledge (Kruse, 2003). OM enables organisations to utilise their 
knowledge in managing and coordinating activities, which can include the 
modification or standardisation of resources (Weinberger, Te'eni and Frank, 
2008).   
4.3.1. PROCEDURAL AND DECLARATIVE MEMORY 
Organisational memory is constructed on different levels, and has different forms 
and even contents, each of which has its own features and may affect 
organisational competence in different ways (Cohen, 1991; Walsh and Ungson, 
1991; Tsai, Lin and Chen, 2010). The literature notes different categorisations of 
memory, sometimes referred to as knowledge. Based on its function, there are 
four types: (1) know-how, which is useful in conducting operational 
responsibility, and is procedural; (2) know-why, which understands why such 
tasks are conducted; (3) memory information, which may be represented through 
information technology or systems; and (4) meta memory, which is the super level 
of memory, sometimes is called memory on memory (Brown and Duguid, 1991; 
Moorman and Miner, 1998; Wijnhoven, 1999). Other categorisations of memory 
include the notion of tacit and explicit knowledge (Wijnhoven, 1999). 
The most common types of OM are procedural memory and declarative memory. 
Both of these types of memory can also be called substantive memory 
(Wijnhoven, 1999). Procedural memory can be referred to as knowledge about 
how things are done, and this represents skilled performance both ‗cognitive and 
motoric‘ (Cohen, 1991; Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994), procedural memory also 
known as know-how memory (Wijnhoven, 1998). Know-how memory comprises 
rules, procedures, facts and skills built on routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Gersick and Hackman, 1990; Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Wijnhoven, 1998; 
Becker, 2004).  
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The second type of memory is declarative memory, which contains knowledge of 
facts, concepts, or events (Cohen, 1991; Anderson, 1996; Tsai, Lin and Chen, 
2010). Wijnhoven (1999) asserts that it exists ‗when the information speaks of 
itself‘. This type of memory involves knowledge of know-what or know-why, that 
can be applied to various contexts and used to rationalise or interpret data (Huber, 
1991; Moorman and Miner, 1998; Wijnhoven, 1999; Tsai, Lin and Chen, 2010). 
In primary care practice, such memory may be represented by information about 
patients‘ demographic characteristics. 
These two types of memory develop and function differently. Procedural memory 
is created through regular or routine engagement in certain activities, while 
declarative memory can be found from readily available sources. Organisations 
typically rely on both types of memory when implementing policies. A simple 
analogy of this is while procedural memory explains how an individual learns to 
ride a bicycle, their declarative memory about two different locations helps them 
to get from the point A to B in time. Therefore, the ‗know-how‘ can also be seen 
as an operationalisation of the ‗know-why‘.  
Both memory types involve aspects of ‗remembering‘. Individuals and 
organisations learn and remember what they have learnt in a process which can be 
described as ‗episodic memory‘ (Rowlinson et al., 2010). Episodic memory 
reflects how experiences help organisations articulate a sense of their future. 
Accordingly, Van der Bent et al (1999) note that „related events/initiatives are 
more likely to have an impact on memory and subsequent learning‟. In this sense, 
this research believes that staff in GP practices would be able to compare and 
contrast their experiences with their current position and future expectations. 
Beyond the level of episodic memory, there is meta-memory and memory 
information
16
. Meta-memory represents the value, norms and quality information 
of the substantive memory; it is also called memory-about-memory (Wijnhoven, 
1999). Meta-memory is centred on the need for organisations to align their past 
                                                             
16
 Memory information includes ‗retrieving, using, and communicating‘ memory (Wijnhoven, 
1999).  
68 
 
experiences with their organisational structure, norms and management systems, 
to utilise the OM (Wijnhoven, 1999; Tsai, Lin and Chen, 2010). 
Another critical aspect of organisational memory management is related to the 
‗storing‘ of knowledge. Knowledge needs to be stored, so that it can be used and 
re-used to support organisations in achieving their goals (Heiman and Nickerson, 
2002). Olivera (2000) states that knowledge can be spread throughout an 
organisation, including in the information systems and in different units. 
Organisations therefore need to find ways to ensure that their knowledge reservoir 
is sustainable, without reducing the need for content updating. Formation of 
organisational memory (See Figure 6) starts from the acquisition of knowledge, 
which is then stored in knowledge reservoirs. While the organisation needs to 
ensure its easy and timely retrieval, the memory content itself needs to be 
maintained and updated over time to reflect organisational dynamics. 
Figure 6. The Processes of Organisational Memory 
 
 
 
 
Source: Stein (1995) 
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environment, the competencies attached to people are controlled by owners or 
principals or through the organisational values and norms (Wijnhoven, 1999).  
4.3.2. ROUTINES AND COMPETENCE DEVELOPMENT 
There is agreement on the importance of memory in supporting organisational 
competence, especially related to the building up of ‗know-how‘ memory, as an 
essential source of organisation‘s competitive advantage (Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990, 1996; Wijnhoven, 1999; Heiman and Nickerson, 2002). Moreover, memory 
plays a primary role in achieving organisational effectiveness and reinforcing 
processes of learning and adaptation, which all in turn crucially affect change 
(Duncan and Weiss, 1979; Stein, 1995). 
Figure 7. Competence and Organisational Memory 
 
     Source: adapted from Wijnhoven (1999, p.4) 
The congruence point between competence and OM is routines, as a form of 
individual habit, which take place in organisations (Dosi et al., 2000).  Routines 
start with people engaging in particular things, contemplating them and 
accordingly repeating similar patterns or conducting similar things (Feldman, 
2000). Similar to habits, routines represent ‗patterned sequences of learned 
behaviour‘ (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994). Their nature is recurrent, which means 
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habits, routines involve an interaction between individuals in the organisational 
context, which makes them dynamic.   
The repetitive nature of routines entails competence being built over time and 
through memory (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988; Dosi et al., 
2000; Becker, 2004). In this sense, David (1997) maintains that the way 
competencies change is commonly path dependent; in the Resource-Based View 
(RBV), an organisation is embedded within its history, which uniquely contributes 
to how an organisation accrues resources (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 
1991). Thus, it is unlikely to find two organisations possessing similar resources, 
as they have different histories (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Through the learning 
process, organisation-specific experiences and resources are accumulated and 
stored as knowledge. This knowledge is stored in the organisational memory and 
may potentially become tacit knowledge, as organisations use and reuse it (Lei, 
Hitt and Bettis, 1996). The process of use-reuse of knowledge is argued to be 
dependent on organisation‘s previous experience or historical path, as 
organisations try to meet their future needs (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003). Over 
time, the continuing process of accessing and deploying knowledge contributes to 
the development of core competences.  
Furthermore, experience and organisational history are crucial in constructing an 
organisation‘s identity, which is relatively permanent because it is attached to the 
history; permanent identity would preserve organisations from  adapting to the 
external environment (Gioia, Schultz and Corley, 2000; Albert & Whetten, 2004). 
Nevertheless, identity is important to support change and organisations need to be 
able to undergo organisational change to ‗preserve identity‘ (Gagliardi, 1986; 
Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Hatch & Schultz, 2004). 
In this contradictory context, it is important to differentiate between ‗an enduring 
identity and an identity having continuity‘ (Gioia, Schultz and Corley, 2000). This 
means that an organisational identity can have continuity and hold the same core 
beliefs and values over time. The question arising here is how those core values 
and beliefs are understood and interpreted over time. Thus, a comprehensive 
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understanding of the historical, cultural, political and structural context of an 
organisation, as well as the nature of their core business is essential  (Pettigrew, 
Ferlie and McKee, 1992; Hamlin et al., 2000).  
Finally, as an identity develops through embodied history and experience, and as 
OM is the storage of these experiences and inherent in an organisation‘s history, 
so organisational identity forms within and through its memory. Therefore, 
organisations need to maintain their memory and evolve with it, in order to 
preserve their organisational identity (Weick, 1979, 1991; Stein, 1995).   
This chapter underlines the apparent effect of organisational competence and 
memory in directing organisational change. Furthermore, analysing and 
understanding this effect will help in exploring the direction and level of changes 
that GP practices have followed after the QOF scheme was introduced, and why 
such changes have been made. The next section provides a link between the 
theory and how this study tries to achieve its aims and answer the key research 
question. The section discusses the formulation and development of the research 
propositions which guide the research methodology and field work of this study. 
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4.4. PROPOSITION DEVELOPMENT 
4.4.1. ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY AND STRATEGIC 
CHANGE 
A set of routines represent organisational procedural memory and hence can be 
described as a memory repository (Miner, 1991; Adler, Goldoftas and Levine, 
1999; Feldman, 2000; Becker, 2004; Tsai, Lin and Chen, 2010). Therefore, 
routines can be used to explain the phenomenon of change as an organisational 
object ( result) and an organisational process ( activity) (Pentland and Reuter, 
1994).  
However, organisational capability resides within organisational memory which, 
in turn,  constitutes competence (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003). Where 
this memory is highly articulated, as in case of routines, organisational 
capabilities are often pronounced (Tsai, Lin and Chen, 2010). The nature of 
repetitiveness in organisational routines enables individuals and organisations to 
become competent and skilful at particular activities or tasks which in turn, may 
increase efficiency (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994). Moreover, the 
institutionalisation of knowledge, values and systems in organisations are 
strengthened by routines, which build competence and hence constitute 
organisational strengths (Wernerfelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1991; Hawawini, 
Subramanian and Verdin, 2003). 
In UK primary care, GP practices have been working under QOF since 2004. 
There are long-standing practices, which have been in the industry for many 
decades whilst others are newly established. Over time, practices might develop 
their capabilities and thus, improve the way they responded to QOF. On the other 
hand, practices with a long working history might have been able to respond 
better to QOF when it was first introduced.  
This research attempts to find out how the direction of change has been influenced 
by organisational memory of core competencies within the context of QOF. For 
that reason, this thesis adopts the first working hypothesis that the more a GP 
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practice is involved in procedural memory (routines), the more likely it will be 
competent to implement changes in response to QOF (H1).    
Organisational strategy can be emergent in a way that organisations might need to pursue 
unplanned strategic direction in order to adapt to changes in the external environment 
(Mintzberg, 1978; Shortell, Morrison and Robbins, 1985; Shortell & Kaluzny, 2006). 
Substantial drivers for change can include perceived performance gaps, identity gaps, 
adapting to changes in the external environment, such as government policies and 
advancement of technology  (Shortell, Morrison and Robbins, 1985; Hurst and 
Zimmerman, 1994). Moreover, the process of internal and external environmental 
scanning contributes to the construction of organisational memory (Aguilar, 1967; Daft 
and Weick, 1984; Wijnhoven, 1999). Change itself may involve a process of re-creation 
and re-orientation of strategy that reflects substantial adjustments in strategic direction 
(Nadler and Tushman, 1989). In this sense, it is also essential to understand that each 
organisation possesses a paradigm that is built through their collective past 
experiences and represented through their beliefs and assumptions. This paradigm 
serves as a framework of reference and affects their ways of understanding and 
determining strategic direction. It is argued by Johnson that only by external 
stimuli is an organisation able to trigger such process as a learned response.  This 
also implies that within the same environment different organizations might 
respond differently to the external stimuli (Johnson, 1987, 1992).  
This learned response can be either a preventive action, which is  planned or an 
emergent reaction to changes (Nadler and Tushman, 1989; Wilson, 1992; Iles and 
Sutherland, 2001). From this, it can be inferred that although strategy might be 
started as a deliberate process, as organisations try to accommodate the dynamics 
of the environment, planned strategy might be gradually altered. Johnson argues 
that the strength of the paradigm can alter the way the environment is perceived to 
the point that ―strategic drift‖ occurs, and eventually a crisis point is reached – 
that some organisations may not survive. The point there is that all organisations 
see themselves as responsive to change: the question is whether they perceive the 
need for change accurately enough to change sufficiently, and quickly enough to 
survive and prosper. 
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The notion of time is therefore important in understanding organisational strategy, 
as it deals with how, and to what extent, the present strategy corresponds to an 
organisation‘s preceding strategies and whether it will prevail for future strategies 
(Shortell, Morrison and Robbins, 1985; Pettigrew, 2002). This has dual 
implications. Firstly, there is no shortcut to achieving organisational objectives. 
The time lag between the implementation or process stage and the expected 
outcome demands that organisations think proactively about what they are going 
to achieve. Secondly, strategy often follows pathways, which means that changes 
in strategy are influenced by previous experiences. Organisations often take into 
account stories about success and failure when they develop new directions.  
Despite the importance of strategy setting, there is little empirical research on the 
relationship between organisational memory and strategy, especially in healthcare. 
This also applies to the context of QOF. Research indicates that organisations 
make adjustments or change their systems, in this context, but it is less clear how 
QOF affects the strategies of practices. As a working hypothesis this study 
assumes that the more GP practices are aware of previous failures and successes 
and the more they integrated knowledge into their organisational memory, the 
more able they are to develop an organisational strategy in response to QOF 
(H2). 
It is expected that findings of this study will show practices to have employed 
their organisational memory to recall their strength and weaknesses through 
experiences or narratives. Organisations recall their knowledge of what has 
happened and use their organisational memory to learn about their strengths or 
competences, as well as their weaknesses to guide their decisions. Therefore, the 
development of strategy very much depends on organisational competence 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990,1996).  
Although notions of strategy are central to research in a business context, it is also 
possible to apply some of these to the public sector, particularly in primary 
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healthcare. While private sector organisations tend to build their strategies on the 
basis on their strongest competence to survive in business, the way GP practices 
conduct changes in their systems, as reviewed in chapter 3, follows different 
patterns. In the case of UK QOF, practices tend to be partially driven by external 
policies, which are imposed on them (Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 2008; 
Crosson et al., 2009; Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 2009). However, it is unclear 
how existing competences influence strategic decision making when practices 
respond to such policies. One of the aims of this study is to explore whether GP 
practices address routines in their narratives, and in what ways, and whether they 
use recall of organisational memory to evaluate core competences in drawing and 
developing their strategy to respond to QOF.  
Analytical Proposition: 1 
Organisational memory of core competences in GP 
practices shapes their organisational strategies in 
response to QOF. 
4.4.2. MEMORY AND ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Chandler  argues that ‗unless structure follows strategy, inefficiency 
results‘(1962). Furthermore, the ‗fit‘ between strategy and structure is immensely 
important to ensure effective performance, especially in the context of 
organisational change (Chandler, 1962; Miles et al., 1978; Hardy, 1996; Morgan, 
2006).  This argument potentially overlooks the possibility that organisations may 
unconsciously engage in a new strategy, and that takes place when ‗strategy 
grows out of structure and in turn may lead to its modification‘ (Hall and Saias, 
1980; Burgelman, 1983). For the purpose of this study, it is not important whether 
change is internally or externally driven. However, it is important to stress that 
structure and strategy need to be aligned for change to be effectively implemented 
(Shortell, Morrison and Robbins, 1985; Lukas et al., 2007; Roberts, 2007; Burke 
& Litwin, 2008; Wasserman, 2008).  
Organisational structure  is more than a static entity representing a ‗planned 
network‘, which deals with activities, players, and processes in the network (Hall 
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and Saias, 1980). Structure is built through dynamic processes which blend 
historical force and management decisions, as a part of a broader process of 
organisational memory creating (Walsh and Ungson, 1991). This dynamic process 
also reflects the complexities embedded in structures, and complex structure is a 
characteristic of healthcare organisations (Zinn and Mor, 1998; Plsek and 
Greenhalgh, 2001; Begun et al., 2003).  
Elements of organisational structure include specialisations/differentiation, 
formalisation/standardisation and authority, which is closely related to distribution 
of power and centralisation/decentralisation in decision making (Bazzoli et al., 
1999; Shortell & Kaluzny, 2006; Aldrich, 2007). The interaction between actors 
managed under a structure reflects ‗the political hierarchy‘, representing the 
dynamics of power relationships and dependency amongst them (Hall and Saias, 
1980; Hardy, 1996; Burke & Litwin, 2008). While power can stem from both 
formal and informal sources, it gives power holders control over decision making 
processes (Pfeffer, 1997; Alexander et al., 2006). This leads to the notion of 
centralisation, which shows ‗the nearness of decision making authority to the 
topmost level of the organisation‘s hierarchy‘, and it reflects the direction toward 
aggregation of autonomy (Huber, Miller and Glick, 1990; Peckham et al., 2007) . 
In the healthcare context, the degree of centralisation becomes an intense topic of 
discussions, especially from macro policy perspectives (Bankauskaite & Saltman, 
2007). In the UK, for example, there is a tendency towards decentralisation with 
regard to control inputs and processes of healthcare delivery; yet, at the same 
time, the government tends to centralised outcome measurements, which are 
required through performance targets and regulations (Peckham et al., 2007).  
For the purpose of this study, the analysis of organisational change and memory 
focuses on specialisations/differentiation and formalisation/standardisation. 
Differentiation refers to the degree of specialisation in organisations, which 
relates to how the work system is divided into subsystems, reflecting the 
organisation‘s value chain (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Porter and Millar, 1985). 
In healthcare organisations, this is exemplified by providing different types of 
77 
 
services, such as different clinics for chronic heart diseases or diabetes (Luke, 
Begun and Walston, 1994; Bazzoli et al., 1999). As organisations maintain 
different units with specialised tasks or functions, one challenge becomes how to 
integrate the various specialised tasks, functions, knowledge, departments or units 
to seamlessly achieve the strategic objective of the organisation (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Aldrich, 2007). Integration is an essential component of successful 
transformations in healthcare organisations, as it acts as a ‗bridge‘ between 
different organisational units and supports alignment between organisational 
systems (Bazzoli et al., 1999; Lukas et al., 2007).  
Specialisation denotes the degree to which specific knowledge and capabilities are 
used and reused in a particular task (Favela, 1997; Fiedler and Welpe, 2010). It 
implies that a higher degree of specialisation contributes to increasing levels of 
knowledge being owned by individuals (Postrel, 2002; Argote, McEvily and 
Reagans, 2003). This perspective is closely linked to cybernetic models of 
organisational memory, which assert that one of the key aspects of robust design 
of organisational memory is the division of work, which allows individuals to be 
specialised (Simon, 1997). Division of work or learning enables individuals to 
focus on particular field or problems, to which they can specifically direct their 
knowledge and effort (Wijnhoven, 1999). Specialisation leads to the development 
of organisational competence, as knowledge and skills are accumulated and used 
intensively. Thus, this research believes that the higher the degree of 
specialisation a GP practice has, the more competent it becomes at hitting the 
QOF targets (H1). 
On the other hand, one notable disadvantage of division of work or specialisation 
is that it might lead to fragmentation of knowledge or memory (Wijnhoven, 
1999). Specialisation contributes to memory development and it should be 
balanced with sharing of information so that an organisation is able to achieve its 
objective collectively (Argote, McEvily and Reagans, 2003; Fiedler and Welpe, 
2010). In order to ensure that individuals work together in an organisation, 
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mechanisms of integration are required, to guide how information can be 
channelled and knowledge shared. 
Specialist knowledge in organisations can be coordinated through formalisation, 
which deals with procedures, rules, roles and the standard operation of the 
procedures (Zinn and Mor, 1998; Aldrich, 2007). Formalisation makes it possible 
for an organisation to maintain control over activities and people as they grow. 
Formalisation is also a devise for ‗standardising patterns of behaviour‘ (Katz & 
Kahn, 1978), which may result in less variety of expected results in operations.  
With regard to the aims of this study, the issue of formalisation relates to two 
issues. First, there has been a long-standing debate on whether organisations 
should emphasise formalisation or standardisation. While it helps to reduce 
variations and guide people‘s behaviour (Stinchcombe, 1965; Mintzberg, 1979; 
Fredrickson, 1986; Fiedler and Welpe, 2010), formalisation also reduces 
flexibility, which may lessen the ability of organisations to adapt to change 
(Glisson and Martin, 1980; Burns & Stalker, 1994; Wally and Baum, 1994). Sine, 
Mitsuhashi, and Kirsch (2006) allege that both ideas can be true, in the way that 
once organisations are large and tend to be bureaucratised, it is important to 
maintain flexibility by reducing formalisation. However, the situation is reversed 
when organisations are newly established as they require procedures, rules and 
roles in place to ensure that operations run smoothly. In healthcare, ensuring high 
quality service delivery is a priority for organisations. However, this requires a 
degree of formalisation in order to lessen deviation or variation in quality of 
services, which has side effects including redundancy of tasks (Marchment and 
Hoffmeyer, 1993; Munkvold, Ellingsen and Koksvik, 2006).  
Second, formalisation also reflects important parts of organisational memory, 
especially how organisations store the knowledge of how things work through 
rules and procedures. The availability of written rules and procedures in 
organisations serves as a form of knowledge reservoirs (Walsh and Ungson, 1991; 
Moorman and Miner, 1998; Wijnhoven, 1999). People can refer to those 
documents and extract information and knowledge that is readily available for 
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them to use and reuse as part of the organisational memory. Although excessive 
use of rules and procedures can be disadvantageous to organisational change 
processes, they also help people to learn and share information with those who 
have less competence in particular subjects. Based on this premise, this research 
believes that the more specialised a GP practice, the more emphasise it places on 
rules and norms, to ensure knowledge sharing (H2).  
As well as dimensions of organisational structure, contextual variables need to be 
considered in analysing organisational structures. Size is claimed to be important 
in determining how an organisation should be structured to best fit the external 
demands from the environment (Hall, Johnson and Haas, 1967; Dalton and 
Kesner, 1983).  Larger organisations will be more complex, which means that 
they would make a greater effort to achieve integration and coordination 
(Robbins, 1990). Size will also moderate the effect of formalisation in the 
structure (Meyer, 1972, as cited in Pfeffer, 1982). Hence, this research considers 
that the larger a GP practice, the more formalisation to standardise behaviour 
there will be (H3). 
To sum up, organisational structure plays an important role in both changes and 
memory. While it functions to guide interactions and flow of information, people, 
and tasks within an organisation, the structure itself also contains ‗stories‘ that 
serve as a memory. The way structure is arranged may affect the ability of an 
organisation to conduct change, as well as how effectively it channels information 
and knowledge to enhance organisational competence. Specialisation, supported 
by an appropriate degree of standardisation or formalisation, allows practices to 
build competencies. However, the way practices do that can differ from practice 
to another depending on their organisational scale. 
Analytical proposition: 2 
More structured and organised GP practices are better 
able to enhance their organisational memory and 
competencies to hit QOF targets. 
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4.4.3. COMPETENCE AND LEVELS OF CHANGE 
The literature in strategic management argues that the existence of (core) 
competence is critical in determining an organisation‘s direction (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990, 1996; Barney, 1996, 2001). Further, the mutual interplay between 
resources and skills embedded in organisations builds organisational competence, 
and in turn shapes the strategic direction of the organisations (Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990; Hill & Jones, 2009). As organisations pursue their strategies over time, this 
strengthens both their resources and skills. However, organisational strategic 
direction is reflected through strategic level change which could take place at both 
operational and strategic organisational levels (Wilson, 1992).  
Referring back to the notion of the complexity of healthcare organisations, 
changes may require healthcare organisations to adjust their strategy and structure 
by differentiating and specialising in certain aspects of clinical care  (Koeck, 1998; 
Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001). In doing that, organisations need to direct their 
strategic orientation to what they are competent in and this can strengthen their 
efforts to achieve organisational objectives (Aimé, 1997; Prahalad & Hamel, 
2006).  
As well as the analytical proposition suggested above, these discussions also 
assume that organisations change in the direction that suits their (core) 
competence. However, as (core) competence shapes an organisation‘s strategic 
direction, then it can be inferred that this reflects strategic level change. On the 
other hand, strategic level change requires or is followed by structural 
rearrangement and modifications (Wilson, 1992). As this research tries to explore 
the idea that QOF has pushed organisations to adjust or shape their strategies, 
which potentially means strategic-level change, combining both ideas, it will be 
interesting to find out whether owning (core) competence determines in how 
much depth the changes in organisations has been carried out. In other words, this 
research tries to investigate whether organisations lacking core competence will 
only undergo superficial changes or whether possessing (core) competence change 
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leads to a strategic level of change, which is followed by structural 
rearrangements. Based on this idea, the second analytical proposition was formed. 
Analytical proposition: 3 
GP practices respond to QOF by pursuing strategic-level 
changes. 
4.5. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
QOF was initiated by the UK Government through the new GMS contract, in 
order to improve the quality of healthcare delivery. It attaches financial incentives 
to performance of services, which forms part of a practice‘s income. Previous 
studies have suggested that the implementation of QOF compels practice 
organisations to make adjustments to strategic decisions, such as expanding the 
number of staff. However, there is a lack of evidence to show why and how GP 
practices adopt certain changes or how such changes relate to their existing 
competences.  
The literature demonstrates that the construction of (core) competence involves 
elaborations on tangible and intangible assets, such as knowledge embedded as 
organisational memory. Organisational routines that take place in organisational 
day-to-day activities, and are stored as knowledge can become the source of the 
unique competence of organisations. Yet, the development of these competencies 
must be supported by other elements, such as organisational structure, which aids 
the coordination of resources; organisational norms and beliefs that standardise 
the behaviour; and organisational identity that strengthens and binds the 
organisation as a whole. The interplay of these elements over time constructs the 
organisational competence.  
In a mutual relationship, while competences determine the strategic direction of 
an organisation, organisations might need to direct their strategic objectives 
orientation to what they are competent in, in order to achieve their organisational 
objectives. A high level of change, which mainly takes place on the strategic 
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level, might require structural rearrangements. The QOF literature reveals that GP 
practices have gone through different structural adjustments to accommodate 
QOF work. However, the factors which influenced the practice decisions to make 
such changes and the depth of the changes, is still poorly understood. In addition, 
whether the adjustments and changes fitted with the practices‘ organisational 
strategy is not yet known. This research attempts to explore the phenomenon of 
change in terms of level and direction of change. More specifically, in order to 
deeply explore the impact of the QOF scheme on GP practices, this research aims 
to determine the influential relationship between organisational memory and 
competences, organisational strategy and organisational structure.  
Figure 8. The Impact of QOF on GP Practices 
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4.6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a review of the literature along with the development of the 
analytical propositions used to guide the thesis. It started by discussing how health 
care organisations can go through a series of changes to improve the delivery of 
their services. Three main propositions were developed, through five working 
hypotheses. These hypotheses were delineated based on two main bodies of 
theory used in the research: (1) organisational change and (2) organisational 
memory (OM). To add to the comprehensiveness of discussions, organisational 
elements which are closely related to both organisational memory and change 
were also discussed to enrich and strengthen the arguments.
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C H A P T E R  5  
R E S E A R C H  M E T H O D O L O G Y  
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters set up the groundwork for justifying the importance of this 
research. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 brought a comprehensive view on P4P from 
both policy and empirical perspectives. Chapter 4 provided a theoretical 
background and analytical propositions development, focusing on the dynamics of 
organisational change and organisational memory and competence. These 
chapters together framed the rationale for the research design and methods used in 
this study.  
This chapter outlines methods used to approach this research. The chapter has two 
main objectives. Firstly, it reviews the main research question and the 
propositions and summarises key points from the theoretical background and 
findings from a systematic review. Secondly, a research design and methodology 
are discussed, with details of the case selection, data collection and data analysis 
employed. 
5.2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Having worked as a healthcare professional, the researcher had been able to 
observe how individual professionals were motivated by various factors, including 
financial ones. This initial curiosity encouraged a review of the further literature 
and the discovery that P4P was becoming a growing phenomenon in the 
healthcare sector. Then, a more robust and systematic review of the literature was 
conducted, in order to gather evidence on the impact of P4P on organisational 
change in primary care contexts. 
However, in organisational research contexts, research can be implemented using 
different approaches such as case studies, ethnography, experiments, action 
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research, historical analysis, surveys and archival analysis (Easterby-Smith et al., 
1991; Silverman, 2005; Yin, 2009). Choosing the appropriate research design 
approach is determined by: (1) the type of research questions developed by the 
researcher; (2) the extent to which researcher controlled the events being studied; 
and (3) whether the phenomenon of the study is contemporary or based on 
historical events (Yin, 2009).  
This study aims to explore how and why GP practices have changed after QOF. 
‗Why‘ and ‗how‘ questions are explanatory in nature, and need deeper operational 
links along the time frame than intensities or frequencies of events on their own. 
Such questions can be answered through different research designs, including case 
study, history, or experiment (Yin, 2009). However, case study is described as 
being particularly useful in understanding contemporary phenomena because it 
focuses on  ‗dynamic presents within single settings‘ (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2009). A case study is also considered to be as a suitable research design when 
empirical research and theory are still in their development phase (Bensabat, 
Goldstein and Mead, 1987; Darke, Shanks and Broadbent, 1998). Accordingly, as 
changes are still taking place and an in-depth investigation of the impact of QOF 
on GP practices is needed; furthermore, and perhaps more importantly as core 
competence(s) and organisational memory are rarely discussed in primary care 
settings, this study has adopted the case study design as its research strategy. The 
study followed the approach in (Yin, 2009), which proposes five main phases in 
conducting case study research :  
1) Establishing the study question(s) 
2)  Put forward any propositions 
3) Determine the unit(s) of analysis 
4) Conduct the logic linking the data to the propositions 
5) Set up the criteria for interpreting the findings.  
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5.3. CASE STUDY RESEARCH DESIGN 
Based on a review of the literature on P4P in primary care settings, there were 
relatively few studies attempting to explore how the changes introduced in GP 
practices since the start of QOF had been undertaken, or what factors contributed 
to these changes and there was no clear evidence to support any findings. More 
importantly, it is noted that there are no studies that report the level and the 
direction of changes that were made because of QOF, or discuss the role of 
organisational memory and competence in conducting such changes. 
Consequently, the main research question is how and why does organisational 
memory contribute to the development of organisational competence in 
GP practices, and how do these competencies affect organisational 
change in such practices? 
In order to answer the research question, the literature review in Chapter 4 
produced three main analytical propositions (See Page 72), which were developed 
through working hypotheses, based partly on empirical evidence of P4P, and 
partly on theories of organisational change and memory. These propositions are:  
(1) Organisational memory of core competences in GP practices shapes 
their organisational strategies in response to QOF;  
(2) More structured and organised GP practices are better able to 
enhance their organisational memory and competencies to hit QOF 
targets; and  
(3) GP practices respond to QOF by pursuing strategic-level changes. 
 
Before starting data collection, and to ensure that the propositions would be 
supported, it was necessary to determine which type of case study would be 
employed. In order to do that, this study originally expected to find similar results 
to previous work (literal replication) (Yin, 2009). For example, it was reported 
that after 2004, most GP practices installed new IT systems and increased their 
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staffing levels. However, after the research framework and working hypotheses 
were formulated, it was expected that this study would also come out with new 
findings (theoretical replication) (Yin, 2009). On the other hand, strategic 
organisational change requires changes throughout all organisational levels and 
subsystems. Hence, this study has adopted multiple embedded case studies. 
After choosing the type of case study, the practice organisation was selected as the 
unit of analysis for this research, because the focus is on organisational level 
changes. 
5.3.1 SAMPLING METHOD 
Research in qualitative studies tends to employ purposive sampling methods 
(rather than randomly selecting), by seeking out groups or individuals or settings 
that are able to provide comprehensive information on certain research issues 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Stake, 2005). As this method is 
mainly based on the researchers‘ judgment and their understanding of the key 
themes and contexts of the research, it helps to select the inclusion criteria of the 
study. Purposive sampling also enables researchers to engage in depth in context-
fit and information-rich cases  (Patton, 2002; Stake, 2005). Hence, purposive 
sampling was considered appropriate for unveiling the phenomenon of change in 
organisations in this research. More specifically, employing purposive sampling 
allows intentional identification and selection of samples, i.e. GP practices, which 
were perceived to be able to provide rich and in depth information on the question 
under investigation.  
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5.3.2. NUMBER OF CASES INVOLVED 
Qualitative research needs to have enough cases to reach theoretical saturation and 
answer its research question(s) satisfactorily (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Eisenhardt, 
1989). While there are no clear-cut rules for selecting the number of cases, 4 to 10 
cases are considered to be enough for a multiple-cases study (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In addition, a review of the evidence on P4P, particularly on QOF, showed that 
most qualitative studies were based on 2 to 4 cases. For example, Checkland et al 
(2007) conducted a qualitative study using two GP practices representing a big 
and a medium-sized practice, to evaluate the social effects of new data collection 
systems in the UK. McDonald et al (2009) employed two practices comprising 12 
GPs, 9 nurses, 4 HCAs, and 4 administrative staff, to evaluate the impact of 
healthcare service reforms.  Meanwhile, Grant et al (2009) chose to have 4 GP 
practices; 2 in England and 2 in Scotland as sources of information for the 
research. Based on this and a consideration of the cost involved and data to be 
analyzed (Miles & Huberman, 1994) it was decided to collect data from four GP 
practices. 
5.3.3. SELECTION OF SAMPLES: INCLUSION CRITERIA FOR 
CASES 
In order to address the research question(s) and the propositions clearly, the cases 
for any multiple case study should be selected carefully to ensure that selected 
cases are good representatives of the population under investigation, which in turn 
minimises bias (George & Bennett, 2005). This implies the need for inclusion 
criteria; in this study, although participation was entirely voluntary and the 
willingness to participate was the main concern in the data collection phase, the 
following criteria were considered before approaching the participants: 
1. Large practice size.  
In UK primary care settings, studies demonstrate the use of GP practice size, 
associated with the number of patients being served annually (Bower et al., 
2003; NHS_The_Information_Centre, 2006; Wang et al., 2006). The 
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Information Centre categorisation of practices has defined a large size 
practice as a practice that serves more than 8,000 people. 
 
This criterion is based on the idea that large practices often  have a better 
organisational performance and outcomes, which reflect well-structured and 
organised practices (Conrad et al., 1988; Zinn and Mor, 1998), and this may 
become a signal for better technical facilities and more substitution of clinical 
tasks by non-GP health professionals (Wensing et al., 2009). The literature 
review reveals that larger practice sizes were generally associated with 
readiness to implement P4P schemes (Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 2009).  
Furthermore, the different sizes implied different ways of managing change 
(Grant et al., 2009). This reflects the capacity and resources owned by 
organisations in delivering services to patients, such as the use of IT or more 
clinicians (Sutton and McLean, 2006; Landon and Normand, 2008).  
 
Altogether, this study assumed that larger practices represented actualising 
organisational memory and established distinctive competence(s) that enable 
more flexibility in responding to change. Moreover, this research assumed 
that similar size practices had relatively similar capacities and resources, so 
that the information obtained from them was expected to be relatively 
comparable.  
2. QOF score.  
Each year, the NHS issues a report on QOF scores obtained by GP practices. 
This research included GP practices that had very high QOF scores and had 
maintained their scores for 4−5 years. Including such practices may generate 
insights about best practices or good performers, as it potentially showed that 
they have been able to cope and adjust to changes. 
3. Socio-demographic characteristics.  
Location, resources, and interdependence are also contextual variables for 
organisational structure (Robbins, 1990). The review of the literature reveals 
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that socio-demographic characteristics may have a significant impact in 
achieving QOF targets; see for example (Guthrie, McLean and Sutton, 2006; 
Gulliford et al., 2007; McGovern et al., 2007; Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 2009) . 
To ensure that all practices have the same opportunity to obtain equivalent 
QOF scores, practices from the same geographic area (under the same PCT) 
and which serve population with the same socio-economic characteristics 
were included in this study. This study assumed that practices operating and 
sharing similar areas of operations would have patients who shared similar 
characteristics.  
5.4. DATA COLLECTION 
5.4.1. SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS 
Previous studies in this area suggest that about forty participants should be 
sufficient to generate the desired information (Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 
2008; Maisey et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 2009; McDonald and Roland, 2009). 
This study aimed to recruit between ten and fifteen participants from each practice 
including GPs, nurses, other healthcare professionals, administrative staff and 
practice managers.   
Participation was voluntary, and once participant agreed to be involved in the 
study, consent forms were signed by both the participant and the researcher to 
ensure that both parties understood the terms of research and to assure them that 
the research would not breach any confidentiality protocols.  
5.4.2. TYPE AND MAIN SOURCES OF DATA 
This research utilised triangulation data, which is argued to help researchers in 
dealing with issues of trustworthiness, completeness of data and bias for 
subjectivity (Gillham, 2000). Semi-structured interviews with all healthcare 
professionals (physicians, nurses, and healthcare assistants), practice managers 
and members of administration teams were considered as a main source of data. 
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By involving various professionals, it was expected that richer information could 
be obtained. This was based on the idea that people are a rich source of data as 
they are ‗repositories of knowledge, evidence, and experience‘ (Mason, 2002), a 
reflection of research focusing on organisational memory. 
Moreover, through the interviews, this study expects to gain in-depth perspectives 
on the social reality. This is informed by both ontological and epistemological 
positions in a way that ‗discursive constructions of the social or the self‘ are 
important in fulfilling research objectives (Wetherell et al., 2001; Mason, 2002). 
Ontologically, this research believes that people‘s memory is constructed from 
their knowledge and experiences, and memory may construct social reality which 
could be different to what is available in the literature. Epistemologically implies 
a need to engage in ways that allow a more critical approach to managing and 
interpreting information collected through qualitative interviews. Mason asserts: 
„‟ [...] the interview method is heavily dependent on people‟s 
capacities to verbalise, interact, conceptualise, and remember. 
It is important not to treat understanding generated in an 
interview as though they are a direct reflection of 
understandings „already existing‟ outside of the interview 
interaction, as though you were simply excavating facts‟‟ 
(2002). 
Using semi-structure interviews means that there were spaces for improvisation. 
This study developed a thematic interview guideline.
17
 The initial guideline was 
pilot-tested on two GP practices and involved a limited number of interviewees. 
Both interviewees were key individuals responsible for QOF and their suggestions 
were very useful in revising and finalising the guideline. As qualitative research 
involves an iterative process by its nature, the researcher was able to learn about 
constructing questions alongside the interview processes. 
For each theme in the guideline, interviewees were asked to compare between pre 
and post QOF, if the interviewee could not remember, or was new to the practice, 
then she/he was asked about the changes and pattern of changes as far as she/he 
                                                             
17 For full interview guideline and the main theories behind the development of the themes used in 
the interviews see Appendix 3. 
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could remember. On this basis, interviews were conducted through open questions 
using broad themes; the researcher was not restricted to a strict list of interview 
questions. Open questions were used as a way to recalling practice-specific 
knowledge and experiences in implementing QOF and changes that took place in 
the practices. This meant that as the researcher‘s understanding of the field 
developed, the interview questions adapted and new questions emerged. For 
instance, the findings and understanding gained from the first three or four 
interviews in each GP practice were considered as input for the following 
interviews, both in terms of the questions asked and who was asked. 
Trustworthiness was established by triangulation of data sources and by asking 
interviewees to comment on emerging issues. This allowed the researcher to 
obtain richer and more in depth information about the impact of QOF on each 
practice. This process could serve as a way to ensure the validity and reliability of 
information for further analysis. However, the questions were constructed to be as 
objective as possible and not to offend the interviewee by asking for personal 
information.  
To ensure that the quality of the case study was maintained, the research also 
employed secondary data sources. These sources included updated QOF policies 
and published practices‘ information. This was expected to support qualitative 
information gathered from participants.  All information was subject to double-
checking and cross-checking to ensure the validity of information for further 
analysis and to enrich the quality of memory-based information. The extensive 
and intensive use of QOF document analysis and interviews were the main 
characteristic of the study.   
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5.4.3. APPROACH TO FIELDWORK (IN CHRONOLOGICAL 
ORDER) 
The field work for this research started in June 2009. The process started by 
obtaining ethical approval from the University of York Ethics Committee. As this 
research is conducted in the area of healthcare and involves participants from the 
NHS, specific NHS procedures were also required to be followed. Table 12 lists 
the chronological order of how the research fieldwork was approached
18
.  
Table 12. Approach to Fieldwork 
Time Activities Done and To Be Conducted Detailed Explanation 
July 1, 2009 
Ethical Approval Form and other documents were 
submitted to the Humanities and Social Science 
Ethics Committee at the University of York.  
Some revisions based on 
suggestions from the committee 
were completed. 
July 5, 2009 
Ethical Approval Application with other documents 
and submitted to NHS Ethical Committee. 
A hearing with the ethical 
committee was conducted on the 
3rd of August, 2009. Minor 
revisions on the information sheet 
and consent form were resubmitted.  
August 15, 
2009 
Site Specific Information Form and NHS/HSC 
R&D Form with other documents were sent to 
R&D Department. 
The approval from R&D dept 
follows approval from the Ethics 
Committee. 
August 25, 
2009 
Ethical Approval from University of York was 
obtained. 
 
August 24, 
2009 
Ethical Approval from NHS Ethics Committee was 
granted. 
REC Reference: 09/H1311/67 
October 27, 
2009 
Once approval from R&D is obtained, formal 
invitation letters along with a study information 
sheet was sent to managers of GP practices which 
meet the inclusion criteria for the study.  
R&D Unit Ref: NYY-P01447 
Preliminary contacts with GP 
practices managers had been made.  
October-
November, 
2009 
When initial approval from practice managers was 
obtained; an invitation letter, a study information 
sheet, a reply slip, and a stamped envelope to return 
the slip, were sent for healthcare professional and 
administrative staff individually. 
 
November -
December 2009 
Arrange meeting for interviews.  
November 
2009–Aprill 
2010 
Conducted interviews. 
A consent form was signed by each 
participant before the interviews.  
May 2010  Data collection was completed.  
 
 
 
                                                             
18
 For more detail about ethical consideration and ethical approval see Appendix 4. 
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5.5. ANALYTIC STRATEGIES  
The interviews lasted between 40 and 75 minutes, they were fully transcribed and 
read and re-checked by the researcher, emerging themes were discussed with the 
supervisory team in regular meetings. The analysis proceeded in parallel with data 
collection, allowing issues that emerged to be explored in the field.  
Following ethics procedures, to ensure confidentiality of data prior to analysis, all 
means of identification were removed and the data was treated anonymously. 
Analysing data from case studies involves examination, categorization, tabulation, 
exploring, and combining of evidence to produce empirical conclusion(Yin, 
2009). As an analytical strategy, the study drew on a range of theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks; this involved arranging the data into several themes. The 
main idea of framework analysis is ―a systematic process of sifting, charting, 
pattern matching, and sorting material according to key issues and themes‖ 
through elaboration of  theoretical and empirical issues in the process (Ritchie & 
Spencer, 1996; Pope et al., 2006). Apart from its common use in healthcare 
research, framework analysis was chosen based on the idea that it would help to 
critically analyse and reanalyse the ideas across the different stages of the 
research, as suggested by the literature (Ritchie & Spencer, 1996; Pope et al., 
2006).  
The three analytical propositions, developed through several working hypotheses, 
were also used in this study to guide both the data collection and analysis process. 
Throughout the process of data analysis, reference to the conceptual framework 
was maintained to ensure that all important information was collected.  
The information collected was also used integratively Elliot, (2006), to construct 
an organisational level view. As this research aimed to explore how organisational 
memory contributed to the way in which practices responded to change, the 
researcher needed to be able to obtain a collective memory, by finding the general 
pattern from each individual‘s stories. 
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To assist in the analytical process, this study used Atlas-ti version 5 
(www.atlasti.de) to manage and process the data for analysis. It is a conceptual 
network builder which allows researchers to manage and analyse large amounts of 
qualitative data. Atlas-ti as one of the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software (CAQDAS) package provides a set of tools that enables coding, 
ordering, linking, storing and retrieving of data, as well as developing memos and 
creating conceptual diagrams. In order to benefit from these tools, the researcher 
participated in two training workshops provided by the University of York. In 
addition to the ability to run the software, the practicality and the availability of 
this device became the main consideration for using it in conducting the research. 
5.6. LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES 
In conducting interview-based research, some factors were predicted to influence 
the effectiveness of the interviews and the guideline against obtaining rich 
information from the participants. One of these factors was the fact that the 
researcher came from a different background from the research participants. As 
the characteristics of the researcher were different from the interviewees, potential 
limitations and challenges might have occurred such as understanding of contexts; 
at the same time, being different could also be argued to reduce the degree of bias 
more than the researcher shared similar characteristics (Galtung, 1969; Brown et 
al., 1991; Simmons et al., 2000).  
In addition to that, the researcher faced various challenges and technical 
limitations in the research process, these challenges were:  
Prior to the data collection process, the main difficulty faced by the researcher 
was related to finding practices willing to participate. The process itself took more 
than 6 months to get the first responses. The reasons behind that might be: 
a. Timing: - the process was conducted around the autumn and winter season 
2009. It was mentioned by informants that all practices in England always 
had their busiest time during these seasons, especially winter. It was 
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characterised with a significant increase in the number of patients visiting the 
practices, which made it less possible for practices to deal with non-clinical 
issues, like this research.  
b. Disease: - during that time, the UK faced a significant outbreak of swine flu. 
Considering its critical consequences on public health, many practices as well 
as the Government pushed their efforts to tackle this disease. The swine flu 
was worsening as it entered the winter season.  
c. One of the practices mentioned that the partnership responded late because 
they had to focus their attention towards clinical care (with swine flu and 
winter) and QOF report development. The QOF report is usually due around 
March/April each year and the practices were very busy in ensuring that all 
evidence was recorded in time, to avoid losing points. While they found the 
research interesting to participate in, their time availability became 
increasingly limited with their need to obtain and submit the QOF evidence. 
However, during the data collection process, most participants welcomed the 
research on the basis that it would help the researcher in contributing to the 
potential development of a similar system in his home country. Participants were 
noted to be open and speak freely on their perceptions regarding both 
organisational change as well as the QOF policy itself.  
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5.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided the methods used to approach the study. Four GP practices 
were involved in the research. Data was collected by way of semi-structured 
interviews. Several strategies were undertaken to ensure that there were no any 
breaches of ethical conduct. Data analysis was conducted through framework 
analysis. Finally, the limitations and difficulties of the study were addressed. 
The next four chapters present the findings and analyses of the study. The first 
empirical chapter mainly discusses how practices perceived QOF and 
organisational changes in general. This becomes a foundation to engage in 
analyses at more depth in the three chapters that follow. 
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C H A P T E R  6  
Q O F  A N D  P E R C E I V E D  
O R G A N I S A T I O N A L  C H A N G E S  
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This research study was carried out in four GP practices in non-deprived areas in 
the north of England. All four practices were managed and worked under the same 
PCT, which was characterised as the largest geographically PCT in England 
covering 3,200 square miles and had the third largest population PCT in England, 
with a relatively high level of deprivation (APHO and DoH, 2010).  
This chapter is designed to provide a foundation for further examination of the 
impact of QOF on GP practices, which will be presented in subsequent chapter. It 
presents the first part of the empirical findings, focusing on perceived 
organisational changes in the practices under study. The chapter gives a general 
description of each practice individually, followed by how each practice 
responded to QOF as a new payment strategy and presents the changes perceived 
by organisation staff.  
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6.2.  PRACTICE A: EMBRACING POSITIVE 
CHANGES  
6.2.1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
Practice A was located in a city in the north of England, it was established in 
1947. Figure 9 below provides the composition of patients registered at the 
practice. There were a total of 13,280 patients as of March 2010. The highest 
number of patients was in the category 35 – 74 years of age.  
Figure 9. Age Characteristics of Patients (Practice A) 
 
With more than 8,000 patients, this practice was categorised as a large practice 
(The_NHS_Information_Centre, 2007). To cater for the health care services of its 
patients, the practice has nine General Practitioners (GPs), three nurses, one health 
care assistant, two administrative staff and eleven receptionists. Nine members of 
staff were able to take part in this study (see Table 13). 
Table 13. The Characteristics of Informants in Practice A 
No Informants Gender Professions Status in Practice 
Experiences 
in Health 
Care 
Years in 
Current 
Practice 
1 PA.D1 Male Physician Senior Partner 18 years 14 years 
2 PA.D2 Female Physician Salaried GP 16 years 2.5 years 
3 PA.D3 Male Physician Senior Partner 18 years 18 years 
4 PA.N1 Female Nurse Practice Nurse 20 years 20 years 
5 PA.A1 Female Admin Data Management 13 years 7 years 
6 PA.A2 Female Admin Practice Manager 20 years 9 years 
7 PA.HCA1 Female HCA HealthCare Assistant 14 years 4 years 
8 PA.D4 Male Physician Partner GP 18 years 4 years 
9 PA.D5 Male Physician Salaried GP / Locum 3 years 2 years 
0 - 34 years old, 
6036, 45%
35 - 74 years old, 
6476, 49%
Over 74 years 
old, 768, 6%
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The practice intended to provide a personalised health care service for its patients. 
It claimed to be ‗a traditional family doctor service‘ by emphasising the continuity 
of care. One of the physicians mentioned: 
Our vision is to trying to preserve personalised general 
practice, which is actually what patient‟s want when you ask 
them (PA.D1). 
Part of the effort to fulfil patients‘ needs was done by ensuring that patients got 
their preferred appointment time. When this was not possible, the practice offered 
alternative ways to ensure that patients‘ needs were accommodated. 
[...] if you can‟t make an appointment for the patients, then 
there will be a doctor that you can speak over the telephone. So 
that I think everybody‟s here, the staff, secretary, nurses, 
doctors, practice managers, all are trying to make the best for 
the patients‟ needs (PA.HCA1). 
In its attempt to provide better quality service for patients, Practice A had 
undergone various changes, especially related to the practice location and staff 
composition. The practice ran its services through two branches in the same city 
to ensure a wider area of coverage. It offered various health care clinics, including 
minor surgery, over 75 checks, travel health, babies and children, vaccinations, 
and chronic disease management clinics, for diseases such as diabetic monitoring, 
heart diseases and respiratory diseases (Asthma/COPD). 
6.2.2. THE QUALITY AND OUTCOMES FRAMEWORK 
(QOF): THE PERCEPTIONS OF INFORMANTS AND 
PRACTICE ACHIEVEMENTS 
6.2.2.1. PEOPLE’S PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS QOF 
According to one senior partner, QOF was initiated as a response to a crisis in 
recruitment into general practices in the late 1990s, which mostly related to GP 
workload issues. Some factors, such as long working hours and the financial 
situation of practices, were perceived to contribute to workload issues.  
There was a recruitment problem because of the lack of people 
going into general practices. Practices couldn‟t recruit. So, 
there were many practices that really needed four or five 
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partners but only had three in post and those three would try to 
make the practice work then with only three fifth of the money 
that they needed. So, that‟s what brought the crisis from the 
medical point of view. The government did recognise it, but 
refused to put any more money into the contract or make the 
alterations, unless they had something that they could measure 
(PA.D1). 
QOF was understood as a performance-related system, which served as a ‗device‘ 
for the Government to justify funding distribution to primary care practices.  It 
was perceived by informants, in particular partners, as an assurance for the 
credibility of public funding and as strengthening evidence-based practices. 
Informants also perceived QOF as a general guideline for clinical care. They 
believed that QOF led to better clinical care management, especially in terms of 
keeping patient records and standardising the care. One physician stated:   
QOF standardises clinical care. It has actually made us sort of 
focus on making sure that everyone is getting the same 
standards, monitoring and investigation, follow up. So that we 
know that when you see somebody, if they send me anything 
highlighted, that needs following up. That is made it easier some 
ways to manage patients (PA.D2). 
Although informants understood that QOF aimed to improve health outcomes, 
less enthusiastic responses emerged following government decisions to impose 
changes in indicators and allocated points. Some indicators, for example in patient 
experience domain, were seen not to correlate with clinical care. While the 
government considered such changes were necessary to reflect the importance of 
particular clinical or non-clinical conditions; informants tended to perceive it as a 
deterrent to achieving the maximum QOF points. It was viewed as a political 
interference, rather than a way to improve clinical care. Moreover, some 
informants felt it was virtually impossible to fulfil those indicators.  
Some of the incentives are the rules that are done for QOF 
now...are unrealistic. Why? 
Not to be able to achieve. There are some figures that are virtually 
impossible to achieve. I can see the reasoning for it, but sometimes, 
if you got certain case, say, blood pressure level or certain HbA1C 
level for diabetic, sometimes are impossible to achieve, as in a 
group of immobilize obese people (PA.N1).  
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As a consequence, continues changes in achievement measures led to a situation 
where health care professionals felt de-motivated to pursue such indicators.  
They only budgeted to pay us about 75% of what QOF is actually 
cost. But, we all hit 95 plus, so it costs them more a lot than they 
budgeted, and they didn‟t like that. Because of that, they 
systematically trying to get that back ever since by making it 
harder, like making very specific by taking some points out, by 
introducing political aspects to I, as supposed to clinical aspects. 
So, they introduced the patient survey, which is scientifically 
unfounded. Statistically, you can‟t have 80 patients making a valid 
decision about what the practice with 13,000 patients does 
(PA.D1).  
In general, the practice‘s narratives embodied its endeavours to get rid of the 
factors which potentially decrease their QOF points. Its main consideration was 
related to QOF contribution to total practice income, which was more than 17%. 
Therefore, this drove the practice to think about how to sustain or increase QOF 
points. 
QOF is more than one sixth of the practice‟s income, so the size 
will matter. Income with total turnover for this practice is about 
£1.5million. So, its 250,000 pound, it is what QOF contributes, 
so it is a large amount of money. And effectively, QOF is the 
new money that we‟ve got since 2004, without it, there‟s no new 
money on the table. So, if you want new money, we have to work 
on the QOF (PA.D1). 
Recognising QOF‘s potential contribution to income-streams, the practice ensured 
that it had prepared sufficiently in various areas, including human resources. This 
involved arranging skills training for nursing staff and health care assistants to 
perform QOF-related work. 
We rely heavily on the QOF as an income stream for our profits, 
which means of course for the financial viability of the practice. 
So, we have to make sure that every year, that our organisation 
is care to maximise income through the QOF, and that means 
that we need to make sure that we‟ve got the nursing staff and 
health care assistant staff qualified and organised in order to 
make sure we see patients who have relevant illnesses or 
sometimes things like smoking. We need to ask about smoking 
[...] it is just got to keep up with all those different things to get 
the points (PA.D4). 
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6.2.2.2. ACHIEVEMENTS ON QOF 
Robust preparation for QOF resulted in consistently high QOF points for the last 5 
years as shown in Table 14; the practice maintained an average of 99% of total 
QOF points. 
Table 14. QOF Score of Practice A 
Year Achievement Maximum Points  Percentage 
2004/2005 1032 1050 98.29% 
2005/2006 1047 1050 99.71% 
2006/2007 995 1000 99.50% 
2007/2008 995 1000 99.50% 
2008/2009 978 1000 97.80% 
Source: The NHS Information Centre (2010) 
However, the practice experienced a slight decrease in the QOF points in the year 
of 2008/09. Informants confirmed that it had become more difficult to achieve 
perfect points. They associated the loss of points with a flaw in the method used to 
assess patient experience. 
The patient survey was based on a posted survey, answered by 
80 patients out of about 13,000. Based on those 80patients out 
of the 13,000 who answered, we only got 70% „yes‟ right, so 
that we lost £5- 6,000 out of it. It‟s scientifically flawed 
(PA.D1). 
As QOF is a performance-based incentive scheme, the higher QOF points 
obtained consequently means an increase in the amount of financial incentive 
received by the practice. Accordingly, a decrease in percentage of achievement in 
points would result in a lower income-stream from QOF. As stated above, the 
QOF contribution to the practice income was around £250,000 annually, so that a 
slight decrease in points meant a considerable income reduction. When income 
was low, it potentially restricted the practice‘s capacity to deliver a quality 
service. 
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6.2.3. PERCEIVED CHANGES IN THE ORGANISATION: THE 
RECALL SYSTEM AND RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY 
Practice A maintained that it already provided services for diseases like diabetes 
and asthma prior to QOF. However, QOF was perceived to provide better chronic 
disease management for the practice through the implementation of a recall 
system. This system was introduced to ensure regular health checks for chronic 
disease patients, which were done through reminding them of their upcoming 
consultation appointments. When patients did not make their scheduled 
appointment, the practice was required to re-call them up to three times, before 
categorising them as ‗exception cases‘.  
There were some chronic disease management clinics pre QOF 
in the practice for taking care things such as diabetes and 
asthma, but it wasn‟t organised very well. Whilst now the recall 
system [...] within the practice makes it much more organised, 
it‟s much stricter, it‟s pleased, slightly more aggressive. We will 
go hunting the patients that don‟t turn up. We‟ll make sure they 
get those three letters, and if they don‟t turn up, then that would 
be exception (PA.D1). 
For the informants, the recall system urged the practice to be more proactive in 
approaching patients than prior to QOF. 
It has clearly got more preventive and proactive. So, I‟m no 
longer dealing with just illness, but I‟m also dealing with 
chronic disease a lot more, as we all are (PA.D4). 
On the other hand, informants pointed out some potential side effects of this 
system. Regular health checks also meant more frequent visits. Informants 
believed that this potentially caused inconvenience for patients as they needed to 
find times to visit the practice at regular intervals. Moreover, inconvenience might 
also be experienced as a result of more medication prescribed for patients. One 
physician added that regular visit did not guarantee a continuity of care, in a way 
that patients tended to end up seeing a different clinician on each visit.  
The QOF has resulted in more inconvenience to the patients, 
because they have to come in more often, which is raised our 
consultation. Our consultation has gone up from three per 
patient per year to five per patient per year (PA.D2). 
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I think the patients are seeing lots of different people, and the 
continuity of care is less. Also, they end up on many more 
medications, because the diabetic, they are paid more to make 
sure that they‟re on this and that (PA.D4).   
Besides the recall system, QOF has required the practice to equip itself with 
robust information technology to support data management. Hence, patient 
information became much better documented than before. This system came with 
the use of templates and protocols that assist healthcare professionals to collect 
the necessary information and record it in the database system.  
The system, it can be good for focus. When you are a GP 
partner, and the amount of money coming into the practice is 
not fixed, then with all these organisational changes, and 
making sure that all the areas are looked at, then it is not 
difficult to score highly with QOF. So, it is really an 
organisation thing to make sure that your systems are in the 
place and make sure that you can score highly on QOF. People 
are getting very good clinical care before QOF came out, but 
QOF had made them to do things that are measureable. Things 
like diagnosis can‟t be measured by QOF can it? QOF looks at 
measurable things and with certain system in place, we can 
make sure that things are being measured and recorded 
(PA.D2). 
Everything is documented and we‟re doing most of the up-to-
date things now. So that the ongoing things each year [...] we 
are looking for our protocols and how we do things in the 
practice to improve the service (PA.N1). 
Furthermore, clinicians tended to agree that such a system ‗standardised‘ the way 
they conducted their work as they were bound to follow the templates. Hence, 
even though they worked separately and dealt with different patients, the 
procedures were similar and standardised.   
[…] the quality is better, because we‟re all doing the same 
things, whereas a lot of people are working separately and not 
doing the same things. We‟re all tending to try to stick to the 
same templates, and the computer now helps (PA.N1). 
On the other hand, the reliance on the information system to enter patients‘ data 
was perceived to create less favourable consequences. While it was beneficial in 
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providing evidence for performance measurements, it required healthcare 
professionals to spend time during the consultation entering data. In turn, this 
affected the way the healthcare practitioners perform their jobs. Issues such as less 
actual time to deal with a patient‘s health, longer consultation times and less free 
time for healthcare professionals were argued to be some of the practical 
dysfunctional consequences of QOF. 
Thus, these findings underline that practice staff had varied views about the QOF 
scheme and show how QOF affected them in performing their work. QOF was 
believed to drive the practice to be more focused on chronic disease care and 
standardised procedures in delivering care. However, informants were also 
concerned about some unintended consequences of implementing QOF. The use 
of an IT system with templates and protocols helped in dealing with data 
management; yet, it also caused disruption in consultation time. Moreover, 
although the practice‘s average achievement during 5 years of QOF was very 
high, there was a notable disappointment on the loss of points in 2008/09. This 
was believed to be caused by a flaw in the QOF patient experience survey. 
6.3. PRACTICE B:  A FORWARD-THINKING 
PRACTICE  
6.3.1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION  
Practice B had a long history of being a primary healthcare organisation that 
provided quality healthcare services. Its establishment dates back to before 1920. 
This practice is located in an outer suburb of a city in northern England. At its 
initiation, the practice started as a small health care establishment. However, it 
underwent significant development in the number of registered patients, which 
now reached over 19,000 patients, covering 50 square miles. This entitled the 
practice to be categorised as a large practice (The_NHS_Information_Centre, 
2007). The largest proportions of patients registered in the practice were those 
aged 35 – 74 (54% of total patients). 
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Figure 10. Age Characteristics of Patients (Practice B) 
 
To serve such a considerable number of patients, the practice had a large number 
of professionals including 13 GP partners, 1 managing partner, 5 salaried GPs, 1 
head of nursing, 7 nurses, 4 health care assistants, 1 HR manager, 1 IT manager, 1 
audit manager, 1 practice administrator, 1 finance team leader, 2 site leaders, and 
25 administrative support staff, comprising receptionists, data officers and 
secretaries. Amongst the staff, ten professionals participated in this research. 
Table 15. The Characteristics of Informants in Practice B 
No Informants Gender Professions Status in Practice 
Experiences 
in Health 
Care 
Years in 
Current 
Practice 
1 PB.D1 Male Physician Senior Partner 20 years 15 years 
2 PB.A1 Female Admin Staff 
Audit Project 
Assistant 
15 years 15 years 
3 PB.N1 Female Nurse Practice Nurse 4 years 2 years 
4 PB.A1 Female Admin Staff Practice Admin. 11 years 11 years 
5 PB.D2 Male Physician Partner GP 2 years 1 year 
6 PB.D3 Male Physician Senior Partner 32 years 29 years 
7 PB.A2 Female Admin Staff Practice Secretary 21 years 21 years 
8 PB.A3 Male Partner Admin Practice Manager 8 years 8 years 
9 PB.N2 Female Nurse Practice Nurse 25 years 10 years 
10 PB.D4 Male Physician Partner GP 31 years 27 years 
Practice B considered itself to be a community-based practice, whose staff had 
either spent most of their lives in or came from the surrounding area. Researchers 
define ‗community-based practice‘ differently as it relates to various fields, such 
as anthropology and sociology, as well as health science. Refer to Heitman and 
McKieran (2010), Johnson (1998), Eckert and McConnel-Ginet (1992) and 
Kristjanson and Chalmers (2007). Originally initiated in sociological research, the 
0 - 34 years old, 
6598, 33%
35 - 74 years old, 
10684, 54%
Over 74 years 
old, 2587, 
13%
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term ‗community‘ may represent a sense of belongingness, common symbol 
systems, shared values, mutual influence, emotional bonds or connectedness, 
shared needs and commitment to meet the use or a sense of ‗us‘(Israel et al., 
1994). It can also refer to ‗a group of people from the same geographic location or 
catchment area‘, which provides people with ‗recognizable common needs and 
interests of concern to public health‘ (Heitman and McKieran, 2010). 
A lot of us are local, which has a huge impact obviously because.  
We have had people who‟ve left, who've regretted it because it‟s, 
yes they might have a bit more money, they might have a bit more 
holiday, but they haven‟t got the people, it's the people that make 
the practice really, rather than anything else (PB.A2). 
This practice believed that good health care could only be achieved by a 
partnership between practice and patients. Thus, it was important to involve 
patients in the healthcare process.  
We want to give the best service possible and have well-trained 
staff, give them patient-centred care; make sure the patient has 
their say as well, because it has to be a contract between us and 
the patient. It‟s patient-centred care all the time ultimately. We 
want to give the best service we can within the budget and 
within our capabilities really. They should take part in their 
care. They should have a say in their care (PB.N1).  
This value was widely shared within the practice. Informants acknowledged that 
the process of health care delivery was not only when patients met doctors or 
nurses, but started immediately when they met the receptionists in the front office 
(PB.A1).  
Patients are paramount, patients are the first port of call, are 
our priority.  We have to, we try and give our patients the care 
and the quality of, that they need, right from reception, right 
through to clinicians, and when we take enquiries on the phone. 
We try our best to meet the patients‟ needs.  If we can't do it, we 
pass it over to a clinician. Patients are our, they're our bread 
and butter, that's what we‟re here for (PB.A1). 
The practice characterised itself as a ‗forward-thinking practice‘, which had 
developed hugely since its initial establishment. 
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We give a really good service; the patients are happy; we get good results 
back from questionnaires; we‟re very forward thinking. I think as a 
surgery, we stand quite well in the community [… ] very well and amongst 
other GP practices as well. I think because we lead in so many ways.  I 
think they probably strive to be like us (PB.N1). 
Historically, the practice had been known to apply ‗innovative‘ approaches in 
facilitating good services. These included a patient appointment system with 5 
minute intervals (1960s), remote communication for doctors-on-call by using 
radio communication (1970s) and a computerised patient register installed since 
1986.  
6.3.2 THE QUALITY AND OUTCOMES FRAMEWORK (QOF): 
THE PERCEPTIONS OF INFORMANTS AND PRACTICE 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
6.3.2.1.  PEOPLE’S PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS QOF 
Healthcare professionals in Practice B responded positively toward QOF, which 
was seen as an integrated approach to manage health care delivery. Moreover, it 
was regarded as providing a guidelines and setting targets for a high quality 
standard of health care.  
I think we are more QOF guided and we do follow QOF and we 
do maintain that, because it is important and it‟s a structure of 
care and a guideline, and we appreciate that, that we give good 
quality service (PB.N1).  
Informants believed that if the practice continued to follow QOF guidelines in 
delivering services, it would result in better health outcomes. Yet, they were 
aware that it would be too early to assess whether QOF really led to better health 
outcome (PB.N2; PB.D2).  
You know in 20 years time, when we‟ve controlled, when we've 
had 20 years of controlling everybody‟s blood pressure 
perfectly, monitoring the kidney function, controlling their 
diabetes and measuring the cholesterols, and people are living 
till they're 95, with quality of life, then we can say „well we've 
done something right there‟ (PB.D2). 
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QOF was seen to drive the practice to generate robust evidence for good health 
care. At this point, informants agreed that more efforts were needed to prepare 
such evidence. This included an engagement with statistical procedures, 
templates, and protocols. These were crucial in managing the required QOF data.  
[...] it‟s really on a basis of trying to improve quality and have 
evidence based on improving the quality really. And have better 
statistics, our statistics in Britain are the best in the world 
because people keep the data well recorded.  And it was an 
opportunity, from going from one contract to another contract 
to do it then [...] to change it from doing out of hours, change it 
from doing in hours.  And it was an opportunity to, while the 
whole of the project, while the whole of the contract was being 
reviewed, to change at that stage.  And they really wanted to do 
it to say „we‟re giving you money, we need to have evidence of 
where that money is going and that it‟s actually improving 
patient care‟ (PB.D2). 
The practice‘s ability to provide robust evidence of their performance also proved 
that the practice was ‗worth the money‘. The informants understood that the 
quality of their services determined the amount of financial incentives from QOF.  
QOF is good clinical care, we recognised that the measurement 
of performance, and proof of that performance, was going to be 
imperative to meet the higher standard of targets and also to 
prove that we were worth the money (PB.A3). 
Along with having positive perceptions, informants were also concerned about the 
potential dysfunctional consequences of QOF. While QOF encouraged the 
practice to keep good records of health care activities, it was seen to make 
clinicians focus more on obtaining data rather than dealing with patients‘ health 
concerns. Indeed, for some informants, data acquiring activities meant extra works 
for them.   
[...] sometimes it‟s a bit extra work. Priorities I think remain the 
same, trying to provide good patient care. Sometimes it distracts 
you. [How?] Well, if you're thinking too much about have you 
measured this? Have you measured that? You‟re looking on the 
computer to see is it there. Whereas before, you would 
concentrate first on the patient and maybe less on the numbers. 
But as you get used to the numbers and you have a system to 
remind you, you don‟t have to think about it. It‟s there and at the 
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end or the beginning or whenever it fits in, but it can be a 
distraction sometimes (PB.D4).  
The engagement on the extra work was believed to have some impact on the 
consultation time allocated for patients. Both doctors and nurses admitted that 
they had less time to deal with patient care. One of the physicians expressed: 
Because often the patient comes for one thing, but we‟re looking 
at the computer and thinking, „ah this patient needs their blood 
pressure checking and their cholesterol‟, but the patient might 
have come in with a sore toe!  You know, poor old patient 
doesn‟t get as much time for the toe, as we're trying to do other 
things (PB.D3). 
This situation was perceived to negatively influence clinician-patient interaction. 
While informants believed that QOF was necessary to ensure good clinical 
procedures and improve patient health outcomes, they noticed that patients 
possibly felt ignored during consultations.  
Not on the patient outcome. But on the patient‟s consultation, 
because they're sitting. I mean I turn my screen, and I try and 
involve them, and try and make them aware that what I'm doing 
is actually good for them, and good as part of their care, rather 
than just data collecting (PB.N2). 
 
I think sometimes it can get in the way of why a patient comes to 
see you.  If a patient comes to see you because they are 
depressed and you kind of talk about their smoking habits, and 
you take their height and weigh them, and you talk about 
whether they need a cholesterol check, it will interfere in that 
patient dynamic (PB.D1). 
In addition, informants claimed to experience increased workloads, as well as 
work pressures, that stemmed from targets embedded in QOF (PB.N2). At the 
same time, informants were very keen to achieve the maximum possible QOF 
points for the practice. They recognised that the practice tried to ensure optimal 
achievement by setting up systems to obtain the required data and information. 
Some adjustments, such as setting up teams to manage collected data, extending 
consultation times and regular QOF meetings were made to make sure QOF 
targets were achieved (PB.D1). 
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These findings suggest that at one point, informants acknowledged that QOF 
encouraged evidence-based practices and helped the practice to improve the 
quality of care; on the other, it was perceived to increase the workload and 
pressure for individual healthcare professionals. Some concerns relating to 
interruption in patient-clinician relationships were also expressed.  
6.3.2.2. ACHIEVEMENTS ON QOF 
Practice B was able to consistently achieve full QOF points for four years in row. 
However, there was a decrease in the 5
th
 year. 
Table 16. QOF Score of Practice B 
Year Achievement 
Maximum Points 
Available 
Percentage 
2004/2005 1,050 1,050 100% 
2005/2006 1,050 1,050 100% 
2006/2007 1,000 1,000 100% 
2007/2008 1,000 1,000 100% 
2008/2009 982.65 1,000 98.27% 
Source: The NHS Information Centre (2010) 
Informants associated the decline in the 2008/2009 score with the introduction of 
the patient survey.  The method used in the survey was seen to be ambiguous, as it 
only involved small numbers of patients, compared to the huge number of patients 
served by the practice. Consequently, the result might have been biased. On this 
matter, the practice administrator commented:  
[…]we didn‟t achieve that last year, through no fault of our 
own, because the government brought in a new system, whereby 
instead of us meeting, giving the patients questionnaires and 
giving the feedback from that to QOF, it was decided that the 
Department of Health would employ their own, outside, like a 
MORI type poll, and they would send the patients direct 
questionnaires, to the patients and receive them back, and they 
would implement the feedback (PB.A1). 
Although it was a slight decrease, it affected the practice significantly as QOF 
contributed almost 30% of practice income (PB.A4). It became a critical concern 
as it could serve as a disincentive for the practice to put in more effort. Indeed, as 
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stated by the Practice Manager, the practice had already invested to provide 
supporting activities, facilities and time to ensure that QOF targets were achieved.  
Thus, the practice realised that QOF was financially influential for the running of 
the practice. To support that, the practice was willing to put in more investment 
and make adjustments to their system. The next section describes findings 
regarding organisational changes experienced by the practice since 2004.  
6.3.3 PERCEIVED CHANGES IN THE ORGANISATION:  
WORKLOAD INCREASE AND A SHIFT TOWARDS A 
PROACTIVE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
All informants agreed that they were currently experiencing an increase in 
workload; yet, they had divergent opinions on the causes. One of the causes 
narrated was changes in patients‘ expectations. This was perceived to increase 
pressure on staff as they were expected to satisfy the expectations.  
[…] patient expectations now are so huge that sometimes you 
can get a bit de-motivated because there's nothing you can do, 
you know, you can't, you cannot please all people, and I think 
that's probably the hardest thing in reception to deal with, the 
fact that you know, you take a lot flak from people because they 
can't get the doctor they want, they can't get the time they want 
and there's nothing you can do about it [...] if we cut down the 
number of patients we‟ve got by half, we could provide a 
fantastic service, but, and if patients‟ expectations are so much, 
even in the 11 years I've been here, it's changed a hell of a lot, 
they expect it, whereas they didn‟t years ago (PB.A2). 
Another cause narrated was that the practice offers additional health care services. 
The practice‘s decision to offer additional health care services was intended to 
attract more patients, as stated by one of administrative staff; such services 
included vasectomies and minor surgeries, such as carpel tunnel and cysts 
(PB.A1). Consequently, this meant more work for healthcare professionals, which 
led to an increase in workload.   
Furthermore, most informants confirmed that QOF had contributed significantly 
to a workload increase. This related especially to recording patient data in the 
system. With the additional responsibility, informants claimed that the time 
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allocated for consultation was not sufficient, as they needed to accommodate the 
data collection process. Clinicians said that this had made them not only 
concentrate on patient health issues, but also on administrative issues. Based on 
this, the practice adjusted its consultation time (PB.A2). The practice also adjusted 
its working hours and days to accommodate the changes in consultation time and 
the expectation of patients. To fit in with the changing nature of society and life 
style, the practice extended its opening hours to include Wednesday evenings and 
Saturday mornings. This was crucial to improve patients‘ access to the practice 
(PB.A1). 
Despite an increasing workload, QOF was believed to shift how health care 
provision was delivered. It made the practice move from a reactive health care 
system into a proactive system. More importantly, QOF was also perceived to 
help the practice raise its organisational performance, as well as clinical service 
quality. 
I also think that they wanted to strongly link general 
practitioner‟s income to an increase in general standards of not 
only care, but also organisational standards. And if you look at 
the early standard of QOF, a lot of them were organisational 
and simple things like having contracts with staff and having 
good protocols and a good human resources system as well as 
clinical care (PB.A4). 
To ensure that the practice was able to fulfil the standards, various preparations 
were made, including a process of checking and rechecking QOF activities. 
Hence, QOF was believed to bring individual healthcare professionals a higher 
degree of accountability. Staff felt that it was part of their responsibility to ensure 
that other people also completed their tasks. Thus, regardless of their position in 
the practice, people took their QOF responsibility quite seriously and were proved 
to be very much accountable for their jobs.  
[…] everybody in the practice was kind of allocated a QOF, an 
area of QOF, a responsibility, and that person was then made 
accountable for the performance of that area of QOF (PB.D1). 
In sum, practice B accommodated QOF through several adjustments to its system, 
including extending opening hours and allocating administrative responsibilities. 
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This contributed to a notable increase in workload. Some new roles checking and 
rechecking activities emerged as a result of QOF, which reflected how individual 
healthcare professionals shared accountability to achieve the targets. Overall, 
QOF was seen to support a proactive healthcare system.  
6.4. PRACTICE C: BETTER FACILITIES TO 
BECOME A TRAINING PRACTICE  
6.4.1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION  
Located in a historic spa town, Practice C aimed to ensure effective and high 
quality health care services provision, which was supported by a friendly and 
caring environment. At the time of the interviews, this practice had just moved 
into a new medical centre equipped with modern facilities. This development was 
expected to suit the practice‘s strategic needs. 
The practice was formed in 2006, through the amalgamation of two well-
established practices. One of the reasons for the merger was to have a more 
efficient management through reducing the individual practice‘s overhead costs. 
The merger also enabled the practice to provide a wide range of health care 
services for patients, through its pool of experience.  
[...] when you're running a small business your overheads can 
be high, so we employed a manager between us, splitting the 
cost. Then almost by osmosis, staff started cross-covering, and 
clinically it made sense for the doctors to cover each other. We 
have interests in different areas and we all get on together, so it 
was a pooling of experience, workforce and power (PC.D2). 
 
[...] by coming together we could provide a greater range of 
services for our patients (PC.D5). 
This practice catered for a total of 10,253 patients, most of whom were middle-
class people. The largest number of patients was in the age range 35 – 74 years, 
with around 51% of total patients. Deprivation was reported to be minimal in that 
particular area and far less than the average of the area covered by the PCT. 
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Figure 11 (below) presents the age characteristics of patients registered in Practice 
C. 
Figure 11. Age Characteristics of Patients (Practice C) 
 
The practice‘s priority was the patients, which served as an underlying reason to 
become a better practice in the future. To support its efforts in providing essential, 
additional and enhanced health care services for its patients, this practice had a 
large pool of health care professionals. There were 8 GPs, 5 practice nurses, 3 
health care assistants, 6 administration team members and 12 receptionists. Ten 
members of staff agreed to take part in the research.  
Table 17. The Characteristics of Informants in Practice C 
No Informants Gender Professions 
Status in 
Practice 
Experiences 
in Health 
Care 
Years in 
Current 
Practice 
1 PC.A1 Female Admin Practice Manager 15 years 6.5 years 
2 PC.D1 Male Physician Partner GP 14 years 10 years 
3 PC.D2 Female Physician Partner GP 11 years 6 years 
4 PC.D3 Female Physician Partner GP 19 years 10 years 
5 PC.D4 Male Physician Partner GP 31 years 14 years 
6 PC.D5 Female Physician Senior Partner 20 years 20 years 
7 PC.N1 Female Nurse Practice Nurse 20 years 6 years 
8 PC.N2 Female Nurse Practice Nurse 40 years 20 years 
9 PC.A2 Female Admin Practice Admin 8 years 8 years 
10 PC.D6 Female Physician Partner GP 22 years 8 years 
The practice aimed to expand its competences by becoming a training practice. 
This enabled the practice to become involved with research, as well as education 
and training programmes for both undergraduate and postgraduate students. 
Moving toward a training practice was expected to bring some benefits for the 
0 - 34 years old, 
3906, 38%
35 - 74 years old, 
5264, 51%
Over 74 years 
old, 1083, 
11%
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practice in terms of inducing an ongoing thinking and updating of its knowledge 
and capacity.  
Our vision for the future is to be [...] become a training 
practice. Being involved in training, both of undergraduates and 
postgraduates. And also nurses, nurse training and we‟re also 
going to, but we‟re already dingo a fair amount of research 
projects, but we‟re going to try and expand our research work 
as well (PC.D3). 
6.4.2. THE QUALITY AND OUTCOMES FRAMEWORK (QOF): 
THE PERCEPTIONS OF INFORMANTS AND PRACTICE 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
6.4.2.1. PEOPLE’S PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS QOF 
In general, informants acknowledged QOF as a guideline that directed and led the 
practice in delivering services. Through its indicators, QOF aimed to ensure that 
the practice maintained quality of care for its patients (PC.D1; PC.A1).  
It gives a common focus and goal and we all want to maintain 
the quality of care to the patients so it has a bearing on that 
(PC.D1). 
QOF ensured quality of care through emphasising evidence-based practice. The 
practice was required to prove that it had delivered good services by providing 
evidence. While informants were aware of the robust assessment of the practice‘s 
performance based on QOF indicators, they noted that some indicators were not 
relevant to clinical evidence, especially when associated with health outcomes. 
The indicators were perceived not to represent clinically proven targets. 
I want to get to the clinically proven targets that do help 
patients and prevent all the longer term complications and 
diseases. The problem comes from not all the targets in the 
current QOF being clinically proven and how much are they of 
benefit. Whereas QOF was originally set out on a clinical thing 
with an evidence base behind it, to show the targets were going 
to improve patient care, mortality and morbidity, therefore, 
they‟re a good thing. Now, you have silly things like doing a 
depression scale on a depressed person when they are first 
diagnosed and then 5-12 weeks afterwards. How much does that 
improve clinical care? I don‟t know! Also asking everyone 
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under 25 if they smoke, every year! Is that of huge benefit? 
(PC.D1). 
The nature of the QOF assessment that was conducting it annually was perceived to 
be a repetitive task. Moreover, some of QOF related activities were seen to be less 
clinical care related and more about doing the work. Informants asserted that 
ticking boxes and repeating of work contributed to an increase in workload. 
It‟s difficult actually to get it all done and I think one of the 
problems is sometimes not all the points seem as important as 
other points. So, a lot of work seems a bit repetitive or not as 
relevant and therefore you don‟t[…]you feel as if you‟re ticking 
boxes rather than actually improving patient care you know. On 
other issues you think: yeah, I should have done that and it‟s 
good to review things, but other times, you sometimes feel that 
you're doing work for the sake of doing that work. So that 
increases your workload (PC.D6). 
One of partner informants added that while standardisation of care through QOF 
was important, it potentially led to unnecessary treatments or ‗over treating‘ 
patients (PC.D4). Patients came with different health problems that particular 
procedures might not be necessary or relevant to their particular case.  
Not particularly, as I say individually, there may be attempt to 
over treat some people. There may be inappropriate things such 
as investigating people in their 90s and very late in life and 
treating them for things that aren‟t appropriate. But mostly you 
know that that‟s not appropriate for the individual patient 
because it makes such little difference individually, their ticking 
the box, then I think we‟re unlikely to do that just for financial 
reasons. Mostly the QOF is quite sensible. Most of it‟s based on 
relatively sound medical principles although, outcomes I‟ve no 
idea about (PC.D4). 
From an organisational perspective, with standardised procedures and protocols, 
QOF was perceived to add a sense of bureaucracy to clinical activities.  
It‟s still very much about seeing patients when they want to see 
us. We do send for people who are on regular medication. We 
do send for them regularly. What QOF has done has introduced 
a layer of bureaucracy if you like (PC.D4). 
Informants asserted that at its initial implementation, people were enthusiastic 
towards QOF and how it was expected to help improve performance. However, 
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such enthusiasm shifted into disappointment, associated with the constant changes 
to QOF indicators. In fact, partner informants acknowledged that it became 
unlikely to achieve maximum QOF points with indicators continuously changed.  
Unfortunately, what seems to have happened is they keep 
moving the goalposts. You start doing one thing with enthusiasm 
and concentrating on what you're doing but then they move the 
goalposts by removing indicators from the QOF and putting in 
new ones. So, it‟s debatable how useful some of them are 
(PC.D1). 
These findings imply that embedded procedures, required to capture and present 
patients‘ information, were thought to be less motivating as they resulted in more 
bureaucratised ways of working and redundancy of care. At the same time, 
informants understood that QOF assisted the practice in better delivering the 
services. Indeed, the ability of the practice to provide such evidence was critical, as 
it brought financial consequences for the practice. Compared to other financial 
schemes, one partner mentioned that QOF seemed to be the most consistent one. In 
this sense, as QOF was very much supported by a computer-based information 
system, potential fraud by external parties was considered to be negligible. 
It‟s the most consistent. It‟s the one that, although it can be 
managed and manipulated by the Department of Health. There‟s 
little the local PCT can do to interfere with it. The computer 
decides. The computer gives you a score and provided there‟s 
no fraud or anything going on, that score is what we all get. 
Whereas the other income streams can change on a yearly basis 
or six-monthly basis. If the PCT decide not to support a locally 
enhanced service then they can pull it, whenever they wish. So 
it‟s a consistent income (PC.D4). 
Overall, despite some concerns about QOF‘s less favourable consequences on how 
people conducted their activities, it was thought to be a robust system, in a way that 
the practice could prove its ability to provide good services.  
6.4.2.2. ACHIEVEMENTS ON QOF 
For the first two years of QOF, the practices had not been amalgamated, and there 
were still two independent practices working on QOF. Both practices obtained very 
high points in those two years.  The 2006 amalgamation did not weaken the 
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practice‘s ability to maintain its QOF achievement. In total, during 5 years of QOF 
implementation, the practice had achieved an average of more than 99% of the 
points.  
Table 18. QOF Score of Practice C 
Year Achievement 
Maximum Points 
Available 
Percentage 
2004/2005* 
Practice X: 1,042.05 1,050 99.2% 
Practice Y: 1,036.27 1,050 98.7% 
2005/2006* 
Practice X: 1,049 1,050 99.9% 
Practice Y: 1,048.88 1,050 99.9% 
2006/2007 997.89 1,000 99.8% 
2007/2008 998.55 1,000 99.9% 
2008/2009 994.91 1,000 99.5% 
Note : * data before two practices amalgamated 
Source: The NHS Information Centre (2010) 
The practice manager asserted that the slight decrease in 2008/09 was caused by the 
adaptation process to new IT system. 
This year we‟re a bit behind in QOF than we have been in 
previous years and that‟s down to us changing our GP system, 
IT system, from Amis to System 1. That‟s had a lot to do with 
staff training, how the data is entered. Has everybody got to 
grips with the templates? Are we entering the data the way we 
should be? We only went live with that new system last July. We 
had a long period of training for staff coming up to that. [...] I 
think it‟s been the joint thing of the change in the IT system and 
the move to the new surgery. [...] It‟s been really hard work, 
because we‟ve brought the two teams together under one roof 
for the first time. We‟ve had a lot of reorganisation to do. We‟ve 
always had the same method of achieving the QOF and that was 
the recall system, the recording of the data accurately, that‟s 
what we‟ve done to achieve QOF points (PC.A1).  
6.4.3. PERCEIVED CHANGES IN THE ORGANISATION: 
ADDITIONAL STAFF AND NEW INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY SYSTEM 
Along with an internal organisational arrangement including an amalgamation of 
practices and moving to a new practice site, informants confirmed that QOF 
contributed to several changes in their practice organisation. One notable impact 
was that QOF brought a new stream of income for conducting clinical care.  
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QOF was part of a change and there were other major changes 
that went along with it. So, the QOF element is only a bit of it, 
some of the other changes are more, have got more important 
ramifications than the QOF itself. The QOF has changed the 
amount of, if you like, performance related pay, so that we now 
get roughly half our income from things we do. Whereas, before 
that, it was apparently about 2/3 of that we got from just turning 
up for work. Whereas now that‟s not enough, we‟ve got to hit 
the targets [...]. So, there is an element of looking at income 
streams which we never did before, or at least we did less of 
(PC.D4). 
While it brought a significant income flow, it was perceived to be harder to 
achieve than previous schemes. Informants asserted that such differences affected 
how people worked in the practice. They were aware that the previous ways of 
doing things were not enough if they wanted to achieve a high QOF score 
(PC.D4). As the practice realised the difficulties, engagement on QOF also 
encouraged the practice to seek for alternative sources of income. 
Having more funding available meant that the practice would be able to invest 
more in quality services. The practice realised that to be able to receive more 
funding, they needed to work harder than before; yet, informants understood that 
this was a consequence if they wanted to improve their organisational 
performance through QOF. At the same time, they were concerned that their 
intensified efforts did not seem to correlate positively with the amount of QOF 
income. Indeed, the income increased, but it was not significant to counterbalance 
the practice‘s expenses (PC.D1).  
You seem to be running faster and faster, to keep the same 
income going. Of course there‟s been no increase in income 
overall, in fact there‟s probably been a drop since 2004. Plus 
expenses are going up, so you‟re having that battle between 
generating income and expenses and running the business 
(PC.D1). 
In order to cope with the increasing workload, the practice engaged in variety of 
changes. One of them was by recruiting additional staff to execute the work, 
including clinical care and administrative staff (PC.D4). It was asserted also that 
non-clinical work was as important as clinical, especially those related to record 
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keeping and form filling. The importance increased due to the QOF requirement 
that chronic disease patients were to have regular health checks.  
So, from that point of view it‟s increased our workload. It 
hopefully will have increased the actual care of the patient, 
because, if QOF is properly constructed it ought to be about 
good clinical care, so it should be about incentivising the GPs 
and the practice as a unit to look after patients with particular 
conditions better, which will mean monitoring their progress 
better. So, it‟s certainly increased our workload. It‟s probably 
increased the patient throughput (PC.D4). 
For clinical tasks, the major change was related to the delegation of some of the 
chronic disease care from GPs to nurses. This was intended to spread the doctors‘ 
clinical workload. Similarly, some basic routine clinical work was also delegated 
from the nurses to healthcare assistants. 
So, routine taking of blood samples for instance, which the 
nurses used to do a lot of, now it‟s devolved to the health care 
assistants level, which has freed up nursing time to do some of 
the routing call and re-call of patients (PC.D4). 
The practice also developed a better information system to help with patients‘ data 
management. This was necessary to facilitate evidence for QOF assessment.  
Certainly we‟ve got a lot more computerised, so it was a matter 
of integrating that with the packages that were available to keep 
an eye on that; putting alerts up when things needed to be done, 
and then probably doing a general chase-up come January, of 
things that hadn‟t been done through the year (PC.D6). 
In general, the practice noticed that it needed more staff to cope with QOF work. In 
addition, more empowerment through delegation of clinical work was needed, to 
enable target fulfilment. Such adjustments were important for the practice, as a high 
QOF score brought greater financial consequences for the practice. 
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6.5. PRACTICE D: COMMUNITY-BASED PRACTICE 
AND ELDERLY POPULATION 
6.5.1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION  
Amongst the four practices under study, Practice D was the only one located in a 
small town with no other practices within its 3 miles radius, it was established in 
1930s. This practice identified itself as a semi-rural practice and most people 
working in the practice were from the surrounding area. This made them attached to 
the practice and the patients they served. While the largest category of patients was 
those in the age range 35-74 years of age, most informants were concerned about 
the fact that they were dealing with an aging population. The number of patients 
over 74 years was 1,145 people out of 12,254 total patients (9%).  
Figure 12. Age Characteristics of Patients (Practice D) 
 
With such a large covering area, the practice had 10 physicians, 4 nurses, 2 health 
care assistants or support workers, 1 phlebotomy and 17 people working as 
management and administrative staff. Along with those employed by the practice, 
there were also clinical staff assigned by the PCT to work in the practice. These 
included 6 district nurses, 2 health visitors, 1 administration assistant, 2 
community midwives, 1 community psychiatric nurse, and a counsellor. Ten 
informants from different professions took part in the research.  
 
 
0 - 34 years old, 
4582, 38%
35 - 74 years 
old, 6527, 53%
Over 74 years 
old, 1145, 9%
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Table 19. The Characteristics of Informants in Practice D 
No Informants Gender Professions 
Status in 
Practice 
Experiences 
in Health 
Care 
Years in 
Current 
Practice 
1 PD.D1 Female Physician Partner GP 8 years 8 years 
2 PD.N1 Female Nurse Practice Nurse 18 years 8 years 
3 PD.D2 Female Physician Partner GP 10 years 9 years 
4 PD.A1 Female Admin Office Manager 12.5 years 12.5 years 
5 PD.A2 Female Admin 
Practice Mgtm 
Assistant 
11 years 11 years 
6 PD.N2 Female Nurse Practice Nurse 35 years 20 years 
7 PD.HCA1 Female HCA 
Health Care 
Assistant 
4 years 4 years 
8 PD.N3 Female Nurse Practice Nurse 30 years 19 years 
9 PD.A3 Female Admin 
Practice 
Manager 
11 years 5 years 
10 PD.N4 Female Nurse Practice Nurse 25 years 13 ears 
 
6.5.2. THE QUALITY AND OUTCOMES FRAMEWORK (QOF): 
THE PERCEPTIONS OF INFORMANTS AND PRACTICE 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
6.5.2.1. PEOPLE’S PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS QOF 
Informants were aware that QOF was important to help them providing a better 
health care service. It was done through standardising health care services across 
the nation, and it provided performance-based financial incentives for the practice. 
They understood that it was an improvement on how performance of practices was 
assessed. Being able to fulfil QOF targets enabled the practice to get more funds for 
providing better services to the patients. 
As I understand it, the reasons were to provide GPs with an 
incentive to improve the quality of care for patients, but also to 
try and standardise what that quality was, so that people were 
sort of acting within the guidelines of the NSFs (National 
Service Framework) and things and everyone was sort of trying 
to reach the playing field really, and, take it more, I suppose put 
the incentive in to developing good, high quality care instead of 
just looking at the numbers of patients coming through the door 
(PD.A3). 
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Furthermore, QOF was also perceived as a way for improving clinical practices as 
it was evidence-based (PD.D1). It drove healthcare professionals to focus more on 
patient care, especially related to chronic diseases. Also, it led to better patient 
management (PD.HCA1). Fulfilling QOF targets required health care 
professionals to check the state of patients‘ health regularly.  
[...] I think there are good things and bad things with QOF.  In 
some ways it makes you really focus on some of the key things 
that need to be done for patient care, like blood pressures every 
six months, for example, you know whatever the indicator is, 
and I think that's good because it actually gives you a system, a 
reporting system, it gives you something to monitor from a 
management point of view, it gives you something to look at  - 
what's happening at the practice, are we doing the right things 
at the right time?  From a negative point of view, I think that 
can drive you down the route where you might not have actually 
felt it was clinically appropriate, where you needed to spend 
time doing those things, or it may have been more valuable to 
patients or the team to do something else.  Because there's 
money involved, it focuses your mind, shall we say, and 
therefore staff time goes on doing that (PD.A3). 
However, some informants also put forward the potential dysfunctional 
consequences of QOF. One partner emphasised that QOF potentially shifted 
clinicians‘ focus onto certain aspects of clinical care; hence, sacrificed other 
aspects of care (PD.D1). In turn, this was seen to undermine the wholeness of 
care.   
But it depends what‟s in the QOF which is my concern because 
other areas that are highly relevant but you‟re not actually 
gonna get paid for hitting targets for, it almost puts them as a 
lesser value in some respects from how the Government  
perceive the health and the monetary payments associated with 
it (PD.D1). 
These concerns were expressed not only in relation to how QOF would affect the 
way healthcare professionals worked, but also to patients. QOF provided targets to 
measure performance; yet, an excessive emphasis on achieving targets possibly 
might lead to detrimental effects for patients. Patients should become the key point 
of health care services. 
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I think sometimes they get frustrated by it, because they know 
that basically we‟re calling them in for this, this and this, and 
they‟ll say well I‟m absolutely fine and they don‟t think they 
need to come and I mean it‟s good because it helps monitor 
things and it helps us manage disease but I think sometimes the 
patients know that we‟ve got targets and that‟s what drives us; 
that makes them feel like they‟re not individuals, they‟re just a 
disease a number you know. So, I think from that point of view, 
it‟s not good for the patients (PD.N1). 
In general, informants understood that QOF was needed as a way to better manage 
health care delivery; but they were aware of its potential downsides. While it 
supported evidence-based clinical practice, Over reliance on such a system might 
sacrifice other aspects that were not covered by QOF. The practice also realised the 
significance of QOF in providing new income from the PCT and how it encouraged 
the practice to work better.  
6.5.2.2. ACHIEVEMENTS ON QOF 
The practice had been able to achieve 100% of QOF points until the 2008/2009 
assessment, when it only reached 97.7%. The decrease of over 2% significantly 
affected the amount of money received by the practice, because QOF contributed 
almost 25% of practice income.  
Table 20. QOF Score of Practice D 
Year Achievement 
Maximum Points 
Available 
Percentage 
2004/2005 1,050 1,050 100% 
2005/2006 1,050 1,050 100% 
2006/2007 1,000 1,000 100% 
2007/2008 1,000 1,000 100% 
2008/2009 977.32 1,000 97.7% 
Source: The NHS Information Centre (2010) 
However, the practice claimed that such a decrease was acceptable. The practice 
manager stated that they had put in their maximum effort and it was what they 
expected to get.   
I think we assume we will get 95-98% of QOF monies, we‟re 
high performing, we had 100% for many years, then last and 
this year will probably be just below that.  So, although it‟s not 
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something we take for granted because we have to spend a lot of 
time on it, I don‟t think we ever think what will, what won‟t.  I 
think it‟d have to be a big drop before it started affecting the 
practice in the sense of we‟d have to lose staff or something like 
that.  I think that's the overall financial climate and we don‟t 
separate the QOF money, from other income streams in that 
sense.  I think what the QOF has done is, bolstered the GPs, the 
partners‟ profits, which have fallen because of the tightening of 
the contract and everything (PD.A3). 
6.5.3. PERCEIVED CHANGES IN THE ORGANISATION: 
DELEGATION OF CLINICAL CARE RESPONSIBILITIES 
AND RECRUITMENT OF LOWER LEVEL HEALTH CARE 
PROFESSIONALS 
Informants were aware that apart from changes due to QOF, the practice itself had 
undergone major changes as results of both internal events and external 
environment change. The practice stated that there was significant change in its 
surrounding area with new housing developments. This led to an increase in the 
number of patients. Internally, the practice also experienced changes in the 
composition of its personnel. With senior physicians retiring, the practice became 
‗younger‘ as it welcomed new young partners (PD.N2).  
There have been a lot of changes.  The practice has grown quite 
a bit, especially with a lot of new housing being built and, more 
patients, more people coming into the area. We have more GPs 
than we had and it‟s become a younger practice I think, because 
a lot of the older GPs have moved on, retired and moved on, and 
they've got younger doctors coming in, so it‟s become a younger 
practice (PD.N2). 
Practice D also made several adjustments and preparations to accommodate the 
clinical care aspects required by QOF. These included developing teams 
responsible for particular clinical areas and setting up chronic disease clinics. The 
new clinics were run mainly by nurse practitioners. This was especially crucial as 
the practice faced an ageing population. More available clinics also meant more 
access for patients and eventually more patients (PD.D1).  
Whereas we set up clinics which the practice nurses ran, 
because you're picking up more, identifying more, chronic 
disease is actually increasing in numbers as well. We‟ve got a 
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particularly elderly population, so probably are quite skewed in 
that respect. So, that was probably one of the first things that we 
did, was focus on the chronic disease clinics, to make sure 
people were getting the proper recalls, getting invited in and 
things were running smoothly (PD.D1). 
The Practice Manager asserted that the establishment of QOF teams required the 
practice to consider the skill-mix. The practice needed to ensure that there were 
different people with a variety of skills working in the teams. The establishment of 
a team was intended to put everyone on an equal footing and to strengthen the idea 
that it was the practice which controlled quality achievement, not the GPs.  
I suppose, the difference between the old and the new GMS 
contacts, where the old one was very focused on the numbers of 
doctors, and numbers of patients, numbers of jobs, a very 
itemised basis, more of a factory line. The idea with the new 
contract as I understand it, was to go to a more quality driven 
approach to allow the contract to be more driven by the 
practice, rather than the GPs, so you started to be able to get 
into the whole change arena of skill mix, bringing in different 
people to work in the team, and that, the new contract enabled 
you to do that, it wasn‟t just about GPs seeing patients[...], it 
was supposed to give more flexibility and respond to local 
priorities more (PD.A3). 
Both clinical and administrative informants reported that with the setting up of 
chronic disease clinics, they experienced an increase in workload (PD.D1; PD.N4). 
The practice tried to find ways of coping with this issue including recruiting 
additional health care staff and delegation of clinical care responsibilities to lower 
level health care professionals. To address the recruitment issue, the practice 
decided to hire lower level health care professionals and train them up to the point 
where they were qualified to perform certain clinical care activities. For clinical 
work delegation, the work flowed from physicians to nurses and from nurses to 
healthcare assistants and phlebotomists. By delegating some clinical routines, it was 
expected that clinicians were able to concentrate on providing chronic disease 
treatments.  
We wanted to make sure that the G-grade nurses were doing as 
they should be. We‟d never had health care support workers or 
phlebotomists in this practice before. It had always been done 
by our G-grade nurses. Then when we started pushing a lot of 
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the chronic disease work that the GPs had previously been 
doing across to the nurses, we needed to free up their time from 
the more menial tasks by getting appropriate bands in place and 
passing it down through the structure to the phlebotomists and 
health care support workers (PD.D1). 
Informants also recognised the importance of templates and protocols that served as 
guidelines in collecting patient information. These templates and protocols made 
data collection quicker and more complete. However, informants claimed that such 
data collection activity was not novel for the practice, as the practice had already 
had a system in place prior to QOF. The practice just needed to re-adjust the 
existing system to be aligned to QOF and ensure that data was produced as QOF 
required. 
Really all what we‟ve done is adapt our existing templates to 
include anything new that the QOF was asking for. But we 
already had our call system in place. Because when I first 
started, I trained upon the diabetes care, and set up a recall, we 
had a call system, but I adapted it for my use, to ensure that all 
the diabetes patients are recalled regularly, twice a year, unless 
they were not controlled very well, and then they would come in 
more often. But for other patients like the COPD and the asthma 
and things like that, we‟ve already had a recall system in place. 
So, in that respect, we‟ve already had them, but like I said, the 
QOF just gave us more. They were requesting more information. 
So we just included that new information that was needed to our 
existing templates (PD.A2). 
Overall, the findings show that the practice made some changes in its system to 
accommodate QOF. Although its narrative strongly emphasised that the practice 
had already had such systems, QOF directed the effort of the practice in dealing 
with healthcare services.  
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6.6. CONCLUSION 
It was interesting to find that all practices experienced a decrease in their points 
achievement. Figure 13 below shows the trends of the four practices. Out of the 
four practices, Practice D experienced the greatest fall in points, a drop of more 
than 2%. Practices A, B, and D conveyed that the change of indicators during the 
last year of assessment made it difficult for practices to fulfil the target. 
Furthermore, all of them mentioned that it was not because of a lower level of 
performance. The method employed by the government to assess the patient 
satisfaction was considered to be inadequate or unfair, as it did not represent a real 
sample of the practices. For Practice C, the cause of the fall was thought to be 
their internal adaptation, with a new information system and their movement to a 
new site.  
Figure 13. The Trend Line of QOF Points Achievements 2004-2008/09 
 
The findings of this chapter show that QOF contributed to some organisational 
changes in the practices.  These changes were vital in supporting the practices‘ 
efforts to implement QOF. Moreover, QOF was perceived to bring a positive 
influence to patient management. Yet, some informants also concerned about its 
potential dysfunctional consequences.   
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The findings lead to the need to scrutinise how practices conducted changes in 
detail. The next chapters discuss the phenomenon of change by focusing on 
perceived changes in organisational strategy, structure and identity and norms.  
Table 21. Summary of Findings on QOF and its Perceived Impacts on 
Practices 
No Main Ideas Findings 
The practice 
(s) 
1. 
Informants‘ 
Characteristics 
All practices represented by various healthcare 
professionals, including partners and salaried 
GPs, practice managers, practice nurses, HCAs 
and administration staff. Salaried GPs were 
employed only in Practice A. 
Table 13 (A) 
Table 15 (B) 
Table 17 (C) 
Table 19 (D) 
2  QOF Points 
All practices obtained very high QOF points 
(more than 90% of maximum QOF points on 
average) 
Table 14 (A) 
Table 16 (B) 
Table 18 (C) 
Table 20 (D) 
3. QOF Indicators 
Changing of indicators became political 
interference and provided as deterrent for 
achieving a high QOF score 
PA.D1 
PC.D1 
Perception toward indicators that were 
perceived to be irrelevant to clinical outcomes 
PA.D1 
PC.D1 
PC.D6 
Some clinical indicators were difficult to 
achieve 
PA.N1 
4. 
Vision and 
Mission 
Personalised general practice and continuity of 
care 
PA.D1 
Patient-centred care with range of services 
PB.N1 
PB.A1 
Expanding capability of practices PC.D3 
To provide a high standard of care to the local 
community 
PD.D2 
5. 
Perceptions 
toward QOF 
Perceived reason behind QOF development PA.D1 
QOF as a general guideline for standardising 
healthcare 
PA.D2 
PB.N1 
QOF to improve patient outcomes and quality of 
health 
PB.D2 
PC. A1 
PD.A3 
PD.A3 
QOF as evidence and basis of incentives 
PB.D2 
PB.A3 
PD.A3 
PD.D1 
PD.HCA1 
QOF contribution to practice income 
PA.D1 
PA.D4 
PB.A4 
PC.D4 
PC.D1 
Consistent and secure performance assessment 
system 
PC.D4 
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No Main Ideas Findings 
The practice 
(s) 
6. 
Perceived 
Impact of QOF 
Establishment of recall system 
PA.D1 
PD.A2 
Assisting healthcare professional to focus more 
on chronic diseases. 
PA. D2 
Assisting practices to measure and record 
activities 
PA. D2 
PA. N1 
Activities become standardised PA.N1 
Shifted to a proactive healthcare system 
PA.D4 
PB.A4 
Greater accountability PB.D1 
7. 
What Practice 
Do to adjust 
Adjustment on consultation time PB. D1 
Holding regular QOF meeting PB.D1 
Setting up audit team to check and recheck PB.D1 
Extending opening hours PB.A1 
Hiring more staff 
PC.D4 
PD.D1 
Training staff and healthcare professionals 
PC.D4 
PC.N4 
Developing information system PC.D6 
Establishing chronic disease clinics PD.D1 
Adapting the old system to the new one PD.A2 
8. 
Unintended 
Consequences 
Inconvenience for patients  
PA.D2 
PA.D4 
PD.N1 
Distraction to patient-healthcare professional 
dynamics 
PB.D3 
PB.N2 
PB.D1 
Focus on numbers or recording activities 
PB.D4 
PB.A2 
Focus on certain aspects of care  PD.D1 
Over-treating people PC.D4 
Increasing pressures in the workplace / 
increased workload 
PB.N2 
PC.D4 
PD.D1 
PD.N4 
Introducing a layer of bureaucracy PC.D4 
9. 
Perceived 
causes for 
increasing 
workload 
Changes in patients expectations PB.A2 
Additional healthcare services PB.A1 
10. Others 
Reason for merger in practice C PC.D5 
Internal changes of personnel in the practice  PD.N2 
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CHAPTER 7 
ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGY 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter highlights the informants‘ perspectives on organisational 
and individual changes in the practices under study. Generally, most informants 
perceived that QOF brought positive changes on both organisational and 
individual levels. However, they were also aware of some dysfunctional 
consequences caused by QOF.  
This chapter presents the findings on organisational memory and change, with 
particular emphasis on the impact of the QOF scheme on GP practices‘ 
organisational strategy. The findings are presented based on themes that emerged 
during the data collection and analysis, quotations from the interviews are 
presented to illustrate particular points and support the findings. 
7.2. VISION, MISSION AND GOALS OF THE 
PRACTICES 
Chapter 6 showed that each practice had its own characteristics; Practice D 
identified itself as a community-based practice, while the main characteristic of 
Practice B was being a forward thinking practice, the vision for Practice A was to 
provide personalised healthcare services and Practice C saw itself as a modern 
practice. Regardless of those differences, all four practices were committed to the 
notion of patient-centred care, which translated into visions, missions and plans.  
Practice A believed that personalised health care reflected better services, which 
was achieved through ensuring a continuity of relationship between patients and 
practice. The practice‘s mission involved delivering healthcare services to fit the 
population‘s demands and to engage in an educational role.  To fulfil these aims, 
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the practice faced difficult choices over whether to maintain a personalised service 
by remaining at its current size or expanding to cover a wider range of patients.  
Practice B identified itself as a forward thinking practice. This was represented 
not only through its clinical services but also in its practice management. To 
maintain its income, the partners decided to expand the practice, establishing a 
new branch and becoming a medical business practice. As stated by the practice 
manager: 
Our ambition is that we will be a medical business with the 
general practice at its core. So, we see that we will grow to 
become something that is more than just general practice, but 
stays within the medical arena. And the reason we decided on 
that is that we recognise that with the stresses on income for 
general practice would be quite strong.  They have been strong 
for quite sometime and they will remain to be, so, for some 
significant time, […] if you look at the history of the GMS 
contract since it was brought in 2004, there's been no major 
incremental increase in the money since 2004. Compared 
against inflation and the biggest cost was staff cost than actually 
it's added up to, or it could have added up to a loss of income 
over those years. So, the reason we decided to diversify our 
business to become a medical business, is that we recognise that 
through diversification we can maintain our own incomes, but 
also reward our staff, give them career diversification, career 
development, and meet those challenges of the cost-income 
challenges from the basic GMS contract (PB.A4).  
The diversification in providing health service was believed to help the practice to 
cover a wide geographical area and bring in more patients. Such business decision 
also opened up opportunities for staff career development and balanced the cost of 
operations. The practice was proud of itself for maintaining high quality services 
on both sites, by ensuring that patients received a comprehensive quality caring 
service through a patient-practice partnership.  
Meanwhile, Practice C served as an example of a practice that had undergone 
major organisational restructuring. Originally established through a merger of two 
well-established practices, it intended to become a training practice and to provide 
personalised health care services. 
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To give a personalised service if at all possible but knowing 
that, because a lot of us work part-time you can‟t always see the 
GP you want to, depending on the urgency of the medical 
problem, but that we‟re all working as a team  for that patient 
and we can refer on to different members to their expertise if we 
felt like we weren‟t the best person for them to see on that 
(PC.D6). 
The practice recently moved to a new site equipped with modern and accessibility 
facilities. With the merger and a new site, the practice expected to offer a wider 
range of expertise, operate more efficiently and provide better health care 
facilities for patients.  
For practice D, its location in a rural area and staff attachment to the area reflected 
its identity as a community-based practice. The identity of ‗community-based 
practice‘ was articulated by providing a high standard of care that was relevant to 
the local population‘s needs: 
To provide a high standard of patients care [...] to continue to 
provide a high standard of patients care [...] that‟s accessible to 
our local population and relevant to their health care needs 
(PD.D2). 
Although the practice had a large coverage area, it tried to allocate patients for 
appointments within 48 hours. As part of its long term plan, this practice had 
prepared itself for expansion by acquiring a new land. 
It is worthy to note that all four practices engaged in the Investors in People (IiP) 
framework
19
. IiP is an outcome-focused framework that helps organisations 
improving their performance. It provides „tailored assessments designed to support 
organisations in planning, implementing and evaluating effective strategies and is 
relevant for organisations of all sizes and sectors‟ (Investors_in_People, 2010). IiP 
delineates what organisations need to achieve, without dictating rigid ways to 
achieve it, and is versatile and flexible, to accommodate an organisation‘s specific 
                                                             
19 IiP was initiated in 1991 as a non departmental government body and until March 2010, it was 
managed by the Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills (BIS). Since April 2010, IiP has 
been managed by the UK Commission for Employment and Skills (Investors_in_People, 2010).  
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needs. IiP assisted the practices in forward thinking and focusing on the 
achievement of their organisational targets (PA.A2; PB.D1; PC.A1; PD.D2).  
We‟re investors in people, which obliges us to have a certain 
kind of quality in the way we look at things. We try and reward 
our staff and look after them, we try and make sure that through 
investors in people, if they want to kind of progress, if they want 
to go on and do other things, then we will pay for training 
courses for them to go off and „professionally develop(PB.D1). 
Our performance level has increased; I think it has increased 
because of tools like Investors in People, even QOF, because we 
have looked at how we‟re working and moved forward. Looked 
at training and development of staff, looked at the future of the 
practice (PC.A1). 
We‟ve had a mission statement for a long time, which is making 
sure that our services are the best that they could be for the 
patients of the practice, within our funding allowances, and 
that‟s a quality assurance system we‟ve put in place. Making 
sure what we‟re doing is the best it can be. One of the tools 
we‟ve used, alongside the new contract and QOF was Investors 
in People because what we found was, with the new system, 
putting business plans in place for the future and having our 
targets prioritised (PD.D2). 
IiP helps organisations to achieve their needs by focusing on their priorities. 
Figure 14 provides a framework with managing change, the inner ring of the IiP 
standards comprises effective management, culture and communication, 
developing people, managing performance and strategic planning. The outer ring 
represents areas to be chosen when organisations attempt to achieve more than 
those standards (Investors_in_People, 2010). All four practices under study had 
already attained Investors in People recognition. 
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Figure 14. The Framework of Investors in People 
 
Source: Investor in People (2010) 
Interestingly, the interviews found that informants‘ views on strategies were 
varied, especially on how they perceived the importance of organisational strategy 
to the practice. A senior partner from Practice A stated that with the considerable 
interference from the Government, medical contracts were perceived to make 
practices reactive rather than proactive.  
We have no input as to whether there is an increase in funding 
or decrease in funding. We don‟t usually find out, maybe April 
in the financial year, sometimes we don‟t get changes until 
August or September in the year of which some changes are 
taking place. So, it is pointless of having a wonderful convoluted 
strategy about what we want to be, in fact we have to be reactive 
to what get by the politicians (PA.D1). 
While such a perspective shows a different opinion, it also contributes to 
constructing a whole understanding of the dynamic of strategic process in practice 
organisations. 
 
 
 
138 
 
7.3. PRACTICES’ NARRATIVES ON 
ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGY 
Following the descriptions of the practices‘ strategic orientation, this research 
draws on the collected data to discuss the foremost narratives on the practices‘ 
strategies.  
7.3.1. EXPERIENCE OF BEING THE FIRST-MOVER 
Each practice was proud that it had been the first-mover in health care services. 
Although they did not interact with each other, three of the practices, A, B and C 
shared a similar narrative, that being the first mover gave them an advantage 
especially in meeting the QOF challenge.  
We stand very well I think. In fact that we always said that even 
before the QOF come in. We found that we‟re always not the 
first, but we‟re always ahead of the game, that how our voice try 
to do it. I mean, interestingly, recently to do the swine flu 
vaccination, which is not really part of QOF although having to 
attain target, we took it on run with it straight away and found 
we‟re actually ahead of the majority of other practices as 
having dealt with it (PA.A1).   
Well, you always think that you're the best, don‟t you?  I mean, I 
think we do set very high standards, I think we‟re historically 
[...] we've been leaders in many fields in this practice and, 
sometimes to the dismay of some of our colleagues, but if you're 
the first in then often you do have to put up with resistance, but I 
feel we‟re, in a lot of respects, ahead of the game, ahead of the 
game (PB.D3).  
For example, as in weight management because obesity‟s been. 
It‟s a big issue and we‟ve been working on those sort of issues 
for quite a while now. Once it becomes QOF-able, I think we 
will have something in place already because we‟ve been doing 
it previously too. If they decide to put it onto QOF (PA.N1). 
These narratives justified the practices‘ endeavours to cope with QOF. They 
imply that the practices had strong and embedded organisational routines in their 
activities that were aligned with QOF requirements.  At the same time, they 
maintained that the processes needed to respond to QOF were not easy. Various 
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adjustments to working practices had been put into place to prove that the 
practices were worth the QOF money.  
Most informants associated their organisational routine activities as evidence that 
strengthened the practice identity of being the first-movers. Such an identity was 
highly reflected to their day-to-day activities. An example of this related to the 
implementation of IT systems in the practices.  Identifying itself to be as a ‗forward 
thinking practice‘, Practice B was among the early adopters of System One. 
Probably this practice is quite directionally innovative and 
forward thinking, so much as getting the new IT system and 
System One, we‟re the first one to have got that.  More 
innovative when you think about things like research and 
teaching status and things like that.  So we look at opportunities 
that are available and try and pursue those quite aggressively 
(PB.D2). 
Interestingly, Practice C represented a contrasting situation. Although it also 
identified itself as a ‗forward-thinking practice‘, Practice C was one of late 
adopters of System One, as the practice needed a longer time to prepare itself for 
implementing the system (PC.D5; PC.A1).  
I think there‟s been quite a big change over the years. If we went 
back to 2001, we didn‟t even have any computers. My former 
partners were very much against computers, and they only 
latterly came in, we were one of the last practices in [X] to 
become computerised. So, having done that, it was only because 
we were computerised that we could do anything like QOF 
where we can look at results and get information readily at our 
fingertips. Prior to that we couldn‟t do that we had age/sex 
registers and manual registers etc, which is a bit archaic now. I 
think it‟s meant a lot more work, time spent at your computer 
doing that, a lot more. If I go back 10 or 15 years, I had 2 or 3 
hours in the middle of the day free (PC.D5). 
This narrative provides valuable insights into how practices perceived their 
strategic position amongst other practices. Some practices showed an alignment of 
this perceived strategic position with how they identified themselves. However, this 
was not always the case, as evidence presented a contradiction between some 
practice‘s strategic orientation with their previous path of practice.  
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7.3.2. CONSISTENCY ON PATIENT-CENTRED 
ORIENTATION 
As stated above, differences in practice characteristics did not seem to affect the 
practices‘ attitude toward patients. All the informants were aware that patients were 
their priority, and this was part of a widely shared and strongly held value amongst 
the organisations members.  
We‟re just trying to do the best for our patients, and patients are 
the centre of what we are trying to do. Not our position amongst 
other healthcare organisations around us. We‟re not trying to in 
a competition [...] we‟re not looking outward (PA.D1). 
I think this practice is very patient-orientated, and it always has, 
both when we were a smaller practice, we always have been 
centred around the patient and patient-care and making sure the 
patient‟s getting the best treatment and also the best experience 
and that‟s an awful modern word, patient-experience but I mean 
it‟s true in a way but we‟ve been doing it for years, it‟s just been 
given the label now. But especially with the move [...] it‟s not 
just for the staff here. It‟s the big change for patients who‟d 
previously been going to the same place for the last 40 years, so 
we‟ve had to sort of really support the patients in the move as 
well. I think that‟s one of the basic values of this practice is 
looking after the patients (PC.D3). 
We want to give the best service possible for our patients [...] 
and have well-trained staff, give them patient-centred care; 
make sure the patient has their say as well because it has to be a 
contract between us and the patient.  It‟s a very forward 
thinking surgery (PB.N1). 
Specific to Practice C, most informants built their narratives of organisational 
strategy by associating it with the merger, when they elaborated on their responses 
to both QOF and the merger process. This reflected how informants were aware 
that both QOF and the merger were critical to the practice‘s existence. The pressure 
on QOF target fulfilment was intensified, because the practice had to deal with the 
moving-in process and experience the first year of working together under the same 
roof.  
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7.4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRACTICE STRATEGY 
Although the interviews involved participants from different professions, it was 
only partners and practice managers who were able to explain the practice strategy 
in detail. This was due to their involvement in the development of the strategic 
direction process. Financial investment in the practices, especially for partners, 
required them to engage intensively in such a process.  
We have money tied up in the practice, we have invested money 
in the practice, when a partner joins the practice, we pay money 
into the practice, for the building and the stock of the drugs and 
everything we have, so we have a financial interest to make sure 
that the practice works well, and works well as a business 
(PB.D1). 
You‟ve got specific things you have to achieve, which does tend 
to divert your time into those areas, possibly at the detriment of 
other areas because obviously finance is a big important part of 
the practice. Without hitting them and achieving the money, the 
patients suffer as well in that respect (PD.D1). 
For the four practices, the process of defining strategic direction was not easy. 
Practices were bound by the rules and regulations set up by the Government. 
Indeed, it was confirmed by informants that government played a considerable part 
in shaping practices‘ strategic direction (PA.N1; PA.A2).  
We were responding to what the government wants, and we will 
always oblige providing help to the patients (PA.A2). 
We don‟t have a strategic plan, I don‟t think for the next 5 or 10 
years, because there is a lot of uncertainty at the moment, in 
terms of the income that we get from the government, but each 
year, we review our strategy a bit. But I am not sure; I can‟t say 
that we have one overriding strategy. But we have strategies to 
manage with the forthcoming year (PA.D4).  
In general, practices had a strategic plan which covered a period of 2-3 years or at 
most for 5 years. Frequently changed rules and regulations made it less possible for 
practices to establish a long-term strategy (PA.D4). One senior partner in Practice 
A asserted that having a well-defined strategy for the running of the practice might 
not be necessary, due to the continuously changing regulations. Establishing an 
organisational strategy meant that a practice should be able to determine its 
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direction and ways to perform better, which to a large extent, was less possible to 
do. It was argued that the massive political structural arrangement of the NHS 
contributed to such difficulties.  
We don‟t really have a strategic plan, because effectively we 
work in this enormous monolithic structure of the NHS, 
controlled effectively at the whim of the ministers, the 
politicians. Our contract is an Act of Parliament, if we choose to 
break it; effectively we could break the law. If the Government 
decide that they want to change it, they just pass another ACT of 
Parliament and they change it. We can‟t have a meaningful two 
way negotiation. So within those constraints, it doesn‟t really 
matter two hoots our vision is (PA.D1). 
Interestingly, in most practices, while informants were able to explain both the 
strategic process and the direction, they were less sure that it was written in formal 
documents.  
We don‟t have anything written down and one thing we‟re 
actually in the process of doing at the moment is trying to do a 
business plan for the next few years with the partners who are 
going to be here from August. I suppose there are six, say, six 
key actions for the practice over the next year to three years, 
and get a GP to work with so we can kind of manage whatever 
needs to be done under those headings (PD.A3). 
On the question of how QOF influences practices in their strategy development, 
one of the partners from Practice A asserted that it pushed them to think more about 
survivability than before. Changes in QOF measurements made practices think 
harder about how to improve their performance, as it would considerably affect 
their financial situation.  
I think it made us think more about survival. Because the QOF 
points are getting harder and harder to achieve. Because there 
is a financial tool, with which the government can control our 
income. [ ] it‟s harder to get.  So that we know that  there‟s a 
sense of having to work as going on a treadmills, going faster 
and faster in order to justify the same amount of money or less 
amount of money over the last four five years (PA.D4). 
A similar view was shared by a senior partner in practice B who reported that 
considering the potential difficulties in future funding from the Government, it was 
vital for practices to think outside the box. Practices needed to think about the 
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wider environment or ‗market‘ rather than focusing on QOF alone. Practices 
extended their efforts through innovative thinking and entrepreneurial orientation. 
These factors were believed to derive a practice to stand ahead of others.  
[...] because we have to recognise that in the next few years 
there will not be as much money for health care, because of the 
current economic system in the country.  So, we have to say 
„well if our income is going to be reduced because there is less 
money for us for GMS, we‟ll have to go away and look at other 
areas of deriving income‟. So, that‟s probably more market 
driven than QOF (PB.D1). 
We now work a lot more co-operatively, and moving forward 
we‟re looking at enhanced services, looking at the QOF, 
building this place. We‟re looking forward to developing all 
these other services. One problem we keep on coming across is 
the government moving the goalposts. So, we try to set out what 
we are going to do and what we can potentially do (PC.D1). 
In developing their strategic decisions, the practices went through various aspects 
of assessment, including an evaluation of their points of strength and weakness, as 
well as the opportunities and challenges they needed to face in the environment. 
These processes represent how organisations manage changes and ensure that an 
organisation has adapted to the dynamics of change in both the internal 
organisations and external environment, to ensure their survivability. The practices 
took into account their previous achievements and even failures. 
We do accounts each year, we do cash flow predictions for next 
year, to work out what we‟ve got to spend, oh yes, we do all of 
that. We do an evaluation each year, because each year that 
gets finished and you have whatever your points are for the 
year. You have a think about other areas you missed, could we 
have done better on some of them (PA.D1).  
There were times when we knew about what our strengths, what 
our weaknesses, how come we best use these strengths for the 
practice then, and those sort of things, you know, what people 
want to do in the practice (PA.D2). 
Informants compared the current situation with what they had already experienced 
within the practice (PA.N1; PC.D6). The informants were confident about the 
practice‘s achievements, which helped the practices to achieve what they were 
targeted to. 
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We offered a high quality beforehand. I suppose it‟s difficult to 
quantify what high quality is until it‟s set out by something like 
this. But as I say, I think we  perceive if you  do well in your 
QOF  then you're giving a high quality of service, and that‟s 
part of the reasons to try it, as well as financial, is to try and hit 
the targets, is that you want to be shown to be giving a good 
service (PC.D6). 
We look at what it is we‟re aiming to achieve really the patients 
numbers, the size of people, we do searches say for something 
like ischemic heart disease. We‟d do a search on the number 
patients we have with ischemic heart disease in the practice, to 
figure out how much of a workload, how much time commitment 
that is, make sure we‟ve got the staff numbers appropriately 
diverted to that area of access, and just follow it through that 
way(PC.D1). 
In addition, practices reported that the assessment of their internal strengths and 
weaknesses required them to make some adjustments to resource arrangements.  
Practice C, for example, aimed to become a training and research practice. This 
strategic objective enabled the practice to engage more in educational roles for both 
students and nurses. However, the evaluation of internal resources put forward that 
practice did not have the required competence and resources to do so. Hence, the 
partnership decided to recruit registrars to fill the competence gap. More 
importantly, such adjustments also took into account both business interests and 
clinical perspectives.  
The plans we have had have now worked. For the future, we‟ve 
a new GP starting, and hopefully they will start bringing 
Registrars into the practice and become a teaching practice 
again. That‟s been one of the long-standing goals of the practice 
(PC.A2).   
Practices also proactively explored possible ways of meeting patients‘ demands 
through engaging in scanning the external environmental. It provided them with 
opportunities to think beyond the practice boundaries. External environmental 
scanning was seen to support the practices‘ intentions to grow, as stated by one 
informant in Practice B, „you have to grow, you have to look outside‟ (PB.A2).  
Similar to internal resource assessment, practices framed potential opportunities 
and challenges in the external environment through their competences. In this way, 
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they were able to identify gaps between opportunities and what they were able to 
provide.  
A new branch opened in that city. It‟s a big, big thing for us and 
I think we could take our skills over there and do a really good 
job because I think there was maybe a gap in the city for a 
really good, well-motivated team of GPs and nurses. I think 
we‟ve done really well to set it all up in the time that we‟ve done 
it in. We‟ve got staff out there, we have all volunteered to go 
over and help as well if they‟re short because it‟s still sort of 
getting up and running (PB.N1). 
I think we are trying to look at the wider picture in terms of the 
financial climate and the practice based commissioning, and 
what other services we can offer.  I don‟t think we‟re 
particularly advanced in doing that in terms of other practices, 
but I think we‟re starting to go down that route, and think about 
other things we might be able to provide, so it‟s quite,  actually 
really exciting time at the moment (PD. A3). 
A practice‘s ability to scan their external environment was claimed to be 
beneficial in shaping their paths of competence and justifying the services 
provided for patients. Practice B, for example, did not provide services related to 
drug rehabilitation, considering that there was no need for that particular service 
in their patient population.  
I don‟t know anything within QOF that we wouldn‟t offer, that 
we don‟t offer. And other general, enhanced services 
particularly we offer nearly all enhanced services apart from 
drug rehabilitation, because we don‟t have, we‟re not a practice 
that has a high drug problem, inner cities probably would have, 
but we don‟t, we‟re quite a middle class sort of practice really, 
to the patients that we feed (PB.A1). 
A similar view was also shared by Practice D, which was the only practice located 
in a semi-rural area. A practice‘s competence was claimed to be built over time 
through interaction with its external environment. The attention was focused on 
the characteristics of the surrounding population. 
I‟ve grown up in this area so I‟m very protective against this 
village, and I‟ve got very high standards about how we should 
treat the elderly population. So, I know a lot of the patients that 
come in, and I think we‟ve always provided, I know we have, 
quite a good standard of care to patients and I believe that we 
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should continue to do that. Whether it‟s how you measure that 
quality and how you do that. There‟s all sorts of tools that 
people measure things with nowadays but word of mouth is a 
big measure to me when I‟m in the village and it‟s got a really 
good name has this practice. You can‟t say that for everybody 
obviously, but good practice and friendly and a good approach 
and just being open and amenable to patients. Because it‟s 
about them not us (PD.N4).  
Informants also noted that a strong attachment to their practices‘ environment 
meant that the practices were prone to changes in that environment. To some 
extent, such changes were believed to affect a practice‘s identity. On the other 
hand, attachment to the local community meant that significant changes in the 
community might potentially affect a practice. Practice D as an example, 
experienced a huge change in its strategic direction as a result of changes in its 
environment. This also represented a departure from the practice‘s initial 
‗identity‘. Practice D had identified itself as a community-based practice since its 
initial development. This identity was argued to become its strength in dealing 
with the healthcare needs of the local population. However, as the population 
grew larger, there were shifts in the demands for healthcare, which required the 
practice to make adjustments. To some extent, the practice felt that such changes 
and adjustments brought about potential challenges for the practice‘s identity as a 
community-based practice. The impact of QOF on a practice‘s identity will be 
shown in chapter nine. 
I think we‟re in a state of flux really, because for years it‟s been 
a very local practice where the communities it‟s served were 
smaller for a start, and the GPs were here for years and years, 
so you had a very close knit cohesive community, with the 
practice perhaps at the centre of it. [...] A very close 
relationship, everyone knew each other, they all knew the 
doctors and what was happening, and I think there's been a 
period of change where the communities themselves have 
developed in terms of numbers, we have lots of new 
developments, far more social mobility, which affects the local 
populations.  The practice has got bigger, so we‟ve had new 
GPs, and GPs who are not working full time, so they're part 
time, so it‟s harder for the patients to see the same GP, and I 
think as we‟ve gone on, we‟ve probably lost some of the identity 
we had as the really community focused, that I think a lot of 
147 
 
patients, particularly the older patients remember and want, and 
that's a challenge for us, because I'm not sure how feasible it is 
for us to be able to have that identity, or be able to do that at the 
same time as meeting all the needs of everyone who‟s 
demanding certain services, certain targets to be met (PD.A3). 
Hence, the relationship between practices and their environment can be seen as a 
cycle that potentially strengthened or weakened practice‘s strategic strengths.  
While internal resources and vigilance towards the external environment were 
believed to be crucial factors in strategy development, judicious consideration of 
the possibility of achieving a target was also critical. Practices needed to be 
prudent in making strategic decision. Hence, they drew on their intellectual 
judgment to learn from previous experiences and assess the feasibility of 
alternative decisions, to ensure that the benefit outweighed the costs of choosing 
such a decision.  
And it‟s a times to fight between whether we try to achieve it or 
not. But our range is always trying to reach the maximum point 
if we can, although we do look at it and say “look, that‟s totally 
unachievable, we‟re not even gonna try. Let‟s channel our 
energy to some of the parts, like ethnicity for example, we 
struggle to get that question answered correctly, or struggle to 
get it answered all the time, and so we‟ve decided that‟s not 
worth so much, let‟s not even bother, lets lose that point, and 
let‟s go for something that‟s more worthwhile to the patients, 
you know, in a medical way (PA.A1). 
In addition to those factors, some informants also emphasised the necessity of 
organisational size and the role of leadership in strategy development. The fact that 
practices were categorised as large practices brought confidence that they had 
greater resources compared to small-size GP practices. This included physical 
resources (i.e. buildings, facilities) and non-physical resources, such as skills, 
knowledge, and expertise. Indeed, informants tended to associate their 
organisational size with their knowledge or expertise capacity. One partner in 
Practice B asserted that being a large practice tended to be beneficial to cope with 
changes as they had the resources to do so. Having such expertise enabled them to 
tackle any difficulties competently.  
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[...] because we have a lot of people working for us, it makes us 
a very strong, robust, resilient organisation. We feel we are 
better placed perhaps to take advantages of some of the things 
which are available than a smaller practice, where they do not 
have the expertise.  They do not have the number of people to 
actually pick up these new exciting things and drive them like we 
have done in the past 3 to 5 years (PB.D1). 
To support strategy development, informants also cited the importance of good 
leadership. The role of leaders was perceived to be critical in ensuring that 
everyone and all resources in the practice were working simultaneously. Leaders 
should be able to push forward all the efforts as well as manage resources to 
achieve organisational objectives.  
[…] the fundamental thing is to organise anything well you have 
to lead it as well, because you have to understand the balance of 
relationship that [...] that needs.  The balance of the allocation 
of tasks, the balance in the allocation of resources, the balance 
in the consideration of who can be, who‟s good at doing what, 
and a balance in the consideration of individual needs and task 
needs (PB.A3). 
It should be the leader really, it is your leader[...] with a good 
driving force, coupled with one or two of the doctors who are 
always on the ball, just to keep pushing it forward (PA.A1). 
On the whole, the interviews provided valuable insights into how practices 
determined or changed their strategic direction. There was a considerable emphasis 
on the importance of the practices‘ strengths and weaknesses in strategy 
development.  
7.5. PERCEIVED CHANGES IN ORGANISATIONAL 
STRATEGY AFTER QOF  
7.5.1. SHIFTING OF PRIORITIES: CHRONIC DISEASE 
MANAGEMENT  
One of the partners in Practice A stated that the practice vision was to maintain its 
personalised medical service for patients. Its strategic plan was developed in 
alignment with QOF-related works. 
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Our joined vision is really just simply to offer the best 
personalised care that we can. I think the practice is gradually 
changing, with the recognition that and a lot of the QOF work 
(PA.D4). 
Most informants referred to the shifts in how practices were prioritising health 
care services for patients. Virtually, all informants agreed that their practices 
focused more on providing chronic disease-related services than before. 
Yes, there are differences in priorities, yes.  Because we monitor 
things like cholesterol more often and blood pressure more 
often, which is good (PB.D3). 
Shifting priority toward chronic disease was represented through opening more 
chronic disease clinics and nominating clinical leaders for each chronic disease 
area. These arrangements led to a more structured chronic disease management, 
which could not have been possible without QOF.  
I think the first thing that we did was set up more focused 
chronic disease clinics to run alongside with the QOF. Before, 
the patients would just come to certain things and medication 
review and see the GPs. Whereas we set up clinics which the 
practice  run because you're picking up more, identifying more 
chronic disease is actually increasing in numbers as well 
(PD.D1). 
While nomination of clinical leaders made individuals specifically concentrate on 
their responsibilities, informants concerned that this potentially led to a 
fragmentation of care. GP partner informants added that prior to QOF they had 
been more generalist, as they had not just focused on specific diseases or only 
taken responsibility for specific areas. 
In the fact that where we‟re, having nominated leads for certain 
areas, whereas before we were all a little bit more generalist, all 
our chronic disease patients would come in and see us and we 
would overview them no matter what chronic disease area they 
had. Whereas now they‟re getting diverted away from us into 
certain chronic disease clinics, with a different doctor as a lead, 
for that part of their management, and then for another part of 
it. An ongoing problem that isn‟t in QOF they‟ll be coming to 
see the regular GP that they have familiarity with, so it 
fragments the care a little bit. But I still think it‟s probably a 
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positive thing that chronic disease clinics are set up and things 
aren‟t missed really (PD.D1). 
Although priority was given to particular chronic disease areas, physicians 
maintained that they did not neglect other diseases. On the other hand, giving 
priority to the treatment of certain diseases over others might potentially increase 
the frequency of seeing the same patients over several appointments for different 
health problems, rather than treating and working on various different health 
problems in one consultation. In turn, this was argued to lead to an inefficiency of 
operation. 
Because there‟s certain aspects that if we don‟t do it, we don‟t 
get paid. So, you have to perhaps prioritise that over some other 
things that might be a priority or perhaps a clinical interest. So 
there is a balance there that has to be had. We try on other 
projects to look at other aspects. One example would be 
osteoporosis and there isn‟t QOF for that now, whereas there‟s 
talk there might be, so then we‟ve done some of that work under 
prescribing budgets and prescribing incentives. So, we‟ve tried 
to do other work under other hats etc [...] but that‟s always a 
danger that you're seeing one patient three or four times 
because they‟ve got loads of different problems. I suppose that‟s 
another problem as well, how we manage a patient that‟s got 
multiple diseases, whether we do it all in one go or see them 
individually for  each thing (PC.D6). 
7.5.2. SHIFTING OF PRIORITIES: FINANCIAL 
ORIENTATION   
For the practices, the decision to shift direction toward chronic disease, as 
required by QOF was inevitable, as it correlated significantly with financial 
issues. Practices needed ‗fresh money‘ to fund their operations and QOF provided 
the opportunity for the practices to gain a new income stream through linking 
organisational performance with financial incentives. Hence, practices needed to 
ensure that QOF targets were achieved. The QOF contribution to the practice 
income reached between 20% and 30% of their total income.  
QOF is more than one sixth of the practice‟s income, so the size 
will matter. Income, with total turn-over for this practice is 
about £ 1.5 million in running cost. So it‟s £250,000 is what 
QOF contributes, so it is a large amount of money. Effectively, 
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QOF is the new money that we got in 2004. Without it, there‟s 
no new money on the table. So, if you want any new money, we 
have to work on the QOF (PA.D1). 
Along with QOF, practices also engaged in various medical contracts offered by 
the Government. This provided a portfolio of income streams for the practices. 
One informant stated that different contracts contributed in different ways to the 
total income of the practices. Comparing between Practice B‘s main practice and 
its branch practice, the QOF contribution to income was more in the main site 
than the branch.  
It's different from our contracts in that neighbouring city, which 
is Alternative Personal Medical Service contract, APMS 
contract, whereby QOF forms a small part of a range of KPIs.  
So, in that city in fact, the QOF targets are worth only 1% of 
our income compared to here, where it‟s almost 30% of our 
income. Alternatively, however, the APMS contracts have 
introduced a batch of other key performance indicators that add 
up to a total of 15% of our income.  So, there is difference, there 
is disparity in the contracts (PB.A4).  
Virtually, all partner informants highlighted that QOF had pushed their practices 
to think beyond what they had, in terms of income possibilities. Partners looked 
for alternative ways to ensure the sustainability of income for the practices. 
Practice B, for example, decided „to go away and look for other areas of deriving 
income‟. It diversified its services and businesses. The partnership also expanded 
the practice area coverage by opening a branch in a neighbour city. It is worthy to 
note that the practice‘s intention to diversify businesses was less possible to 
pursue prior to the new GMS contract. However, a partner informant emphasised 
that engagement in the diversification of services should be carefully planned and 
conducted. Engaging in private healthcare services for example, might possibly 
affect income generated from NHS.  
Before 2004, diversification was much more difficult and there 
was less pressure to do it, and less incentive to do it. But since 
2004 it‟s been much more possible to look at providing 
alternative services and being able to bid for them and look for 
other lines of service provision. Not only within the NHS but 
also outside the NHS. But you still have to be careful about the 
amount of income you generate from private practice, because it 
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can affect your income from the NHS as well. If you earn more 
than 10% private, then it can affect some of the reimbursements 
you get for things like premises. However, if you run it as a 
separate company, like we‟ve developed a branch, then it 
doesn‟t apply. So by having two parts, by having this practice 
and the branch, it allows us to look at the private sector with 
more freedom (PB.D4). 
In addition to the positive impact of QOF on the practice income, some informants 
expressed that QOF enforced practices to be more money-driven and business 
orientated than before. QOF procedures were perceived to focus more on targets or 
data fulfilment than on the state of patients‘ health. While it was widely known that 
such a shift was necessary for their existence, it caused frustration for health care 
professionals, as they were concerned about undermining the practice‘s priorities 
towards its patients.  
I suppose we always think of one or two others that have always 
been a bit more business-orientated than us and I think there‟s 
been a danger in the past of saying, „oh we‟re not business-
orientated‟ we‟re patient-orientated, but you‟ve got to be both 
these days (PC.D6). 
[...] because our management has become necessarily so scared 
towards finance, our clinical management, sometimes, some 
partners get more dogmatic, more fixed, on that. And they will, 
sometimes, go to a great extent trying to improve the income. 
Sometimes, that can be frustrating to others, because [...]. But at 
the end of the day, it is quite small, but [...] as it changes 
relationship between people. No, I think it would be probably 
the same anyway, some people would concentrate become more 
on money, some people would concentrate more on care. 
Because I think at the end of the day, we probably all accept 
that both are important (PA.D4). 
It became more business orientated I think, although we tried to 
carry on as very much a rural practice.  The GPs at that time 
had been here a lot of years, two of ours nurses had been here a 
lot of years, so you know your patients and it wasn‟t as target 
driven, then I‟d say, it‟s only over the last few years it has 
become more target driven (PD.N3). 
Informants also noted that QOF as a new source of income had rearranged the 
relationship between individuals and the basis of thinking about why activities 
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were conducted. More detail about the impact of QOF on the relationship between 
individuals in GP practices will be presented in the next chapter.  
I think it changed the relationship between the supporting 
mechanism, the other disciplines and the owners, and the GPs.  
The other thing it did was it raised the profile of money, right to 
the forefront.  It basically said „reward is money‟, „delivered 
care is money‟ beforehand it was almost invisible to the 
majority of the practice, they didn‟t really see that. Now they 
know (PB.A4). 
7.5.3. MOVING TOWARD A MORE PROACTIVE HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEM 
QOF rewarded GP practices according to their performance in achieving 
predefined quality measures. As chronic disease patients became the focal point, 
all practices set up recall/appointment systems to ensure that those patients got 
their health checked regularly.  
The establishment of this recall/appointment system changed the nature of how 
health care was managed. Instead of waiting for patients to come to the practices 
when they were ill, this system invited them at regular intervals. If patients were 
not able to come for their scheduled appointment, practices re-sent the invitation 
up to three times. If they failed to attend the appointment, patients were 
considered as exception cases. In this sense, informants expressed that QOF had 
caused practices to be proactive, rather than passively waiting for patients to come 
in when they had health problems.  
The theory behind QOF was to raise the standards of particular 
types of care in general practice, and also help general 
practices move from being a reactive system that dealt with 
patients when they became ill to moving to a system that dealt 
with patients before they became ill. So, it became a health 
prevention system, rather than a reactive system that dealt with 
conditions that had already risen (PB.A4). 
It is clearly got more preventive, proactive. So, I am no longer 
dealing with just illness, but I am also dealing with chronic 
disease a lot more, as we all are. So, I guess it is probably a bit, 
if I am really honest, I think I am probably a bit better [...] at 
being proactive with people (PA. D4). 
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To sum up, this shows how QOF affected how practices planned their strategic 
directions. Shifts towards a proactive health care system, as well as more 
emphasis on chronic diseases, were the most quoted changes in organisational 
strategies. To some extent, organisational strategy was seen as a reaction to a 
financial scheme that practices needed to comply with, as it had a significant 
impact on a practice‘s income. The following section draws a conclusion on how 
GP practices developed their organisational strategy. 
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7.6. CONCLUSION 
The findings conveyed that all practices aimed to provide a high standard of 
patient care. However, the practices defined a high standard of services 
differently, definitions included providing a comprehensive quality caring service 
through a patient-practice partnership, meeting local the population‘s needs, being 
a head of other practices and achieving high QOF score.  
All four practices claimed that the existence of an organisational strategy helped 
them to direct their efforts. However, with intensive regulations imposed by the 
Government, having a complex strategy was considered to be pointless, as 
practices were bound to follow government rules. In this sense, medical contracts 
along with their embedded regulations and procedures were argued to make the 
practices more reactive in defining their directions. 
With the implementation of QOF, all informants agreed that it led the practices to 
think more about obtaining funds. Practices became more target driven and were 
managed as businesses. With less money available in the future, all of the 
practices‘ efforts seemed to be directed to ensuring that maximum targets were 
achieved and funding was secure. In doing so, practices were pushed to shift their 
priorities to chronic disease management as required by QOF.   
To accommodate the shifting of priorities in their strategies, practices established 
chronic disease clinics and tried to find other opportunities to maintain their 
income. Along with this, they made changes in the organisational structure by 
nominating clinical leaders, who monitored target achievement in particular 
disease areas. These additional new posts showed that changes in strategies had 
driven changes in organisational structure. The detailed impact of the QOF 
scheme will presented in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 8 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
As we discussed in the literature review part, changes in organisational strategy 
might lead to rearrangements in the organisational structure and to a re-
stratification of the roles. The previous chapter presented how QOF compelled the 
practices to make several changes in their strategies, based on their organisational 
memory and competence. This chapter shows the impact of QOF on 
organisational structure of the practices, and how the practices tried to pursue their 
strategies and maximize their QOF score by restructuring themselves. 
8.2. THE STRUCTURES OF THE PRACTICES 
8.2.1. STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT 
Again, all practices involved in this study were categorised as large practices, 
serving more than 8,000 patients per year. Practice B, in particular had more than 
19,000 registered patients. Consequently, the practices reported having relatively 
large number of human resources. Practice A, for example, comprised nine 
physicians, three practice nurses, one health care assistant and thirteen 
administration staff. To coordinate people and activities, practices needed to 
arrange their structures effectively.  
Despite the large number of staff, all four practices claimed to have relatively flat 
organisational structures with limited hierarchical layers. All partnerships were at 
the top and shared the leadership of the practices. They were on an equal footing 
in that no single person was dominant over others in the decision making 
processes. Three practices were a mixture of male and female partners; however, 
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Practice D was strongly characterised by female dominion as there were no male 
doctors or staff.  
Based on the interviews, it seemed that all practices adopted a similar structural 
arrangement. In most practices, the practice managers served as the second top 
layer and were directly responsible to the partnerships. The structural arrangement 
up to this layer was very clear, which was in contrast to the structure of below this 
level. The hierarchical relationship between nursing teams and administration 
teams was unclear. Yet, both teams were positioned underneath the practice 
manager level. Lower level healthcare professionals, such as health care assistants 
and phlebotomists, were reported to be at the bottom, but at the same time, were 
included as part of the nursing team. Despite this complex arrangement, they 
worked more as team-based units and had flexible relationships between the 
layers and teams of professions.  
The relationship between GP partners as ‗employers‘ and the practice manager as 
an ‗employee‘ was asserted to be complicated. Practice managers were employed 
by the partnerships, but they had a responsibility to manage and coordinate the 
partners to achieve the practice objectives. 
I work to them, they are my employers, but I also have to 
manage them, which is quite a difficult thing to do and I think 
it's one of the key challenges in the job, in that I have to upward 
manage, so if I know, say, one of them is a lead for something 
but they're not doing it, I need to be able to try and push them in 
the right direction, get them to do things that they might not 
particularly want to do, get them to see points they may not have 
realised(PD.A3). 
[...] off course as GPs we sit uneasily because we‟re both a team 
in ourselves and we sit between or above the practice manager 
because we employ her, but we are a small hierarchy (PC.D4). 
While both partners and managers were considered to be at the top of the 
structure, they did not share similar privileges in the decision making process. In 
practice D, for example, the practice manager practically headed the partners‘ 
meeting and her opinion was sought and appreciated by the partnership, but she 
was not eligible to vote on the final decision.    
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[...] she‟s not actually eligible to take the final vote. She would 
see herself, I‟m sure, as answerable to us. But we very much see 
her as managing us in respect to our workload, our time, our 
clinics, how we‟re structured. She‟s our manager in that 
respect. As a manager is, we‟re not managers, we‟re GPs 
(PD.D1). 
In Practice B, the relationship was even more complex as the practice manager 
was also a partner. The practice manager came from a non-medical background 
and also acted as a managing partner for the partnership-owned company. The 
new GMS contract made it possible for practices to share partnerships with non-
practitioner individuals. 
[...] but not unrelated to business change, was the thing that 
introduced QOF, was the new GMS contract which came into 
being in 2004-2005, and that, allowed general practices to be 
owned by people other than the general practitioners. That had 
been the case before, but it was slightly difficult due to the way 
the pensions were paid and calculated (PB.A4). 
In general, practice managers acted as an interface between staff and partners as 
well as hubs in linking the practices to local communities. They were responsible 
for scanning the demands of the local community and bringing such information 
to be followed up and accommodated by the practice.  
In terms of general linking with local services, that‟s where the 
practice manager also comes in and she goes off to practice 
manager meetings to find out what the practice should be doing, 
what are the index locally and nationally, and then she‟ll feed it 
back to the group as a partnership, pass that information to the 
others either through practice meeting or with emails (PA.D5). 
For nursing team, the arrangements were relatively different. Most practices 
pointed out that nurses and HCAs had a leading or senior nurses to report to. Lead 
nurses were responsible to the partnership; but, in essence, their line managers 
were the practice managers. Hence, for administrative issues with nursing teams, 
lead nurses reported to the practice managers. Alternatively, for clinical issues, 
they reported to the GP partners responsible for particular areas.  
Regarding the internal team arrangement, nurse informants reported that they had 
certain procedures which they needed to go through before an issue reached the 
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lead nurses or nurse manager. Initially, individual nurses consulted their nursing 
team when an issue occurred. When unresolved, advice from senior nurses was 
sought before issues reached lead nurses or nurse managers.   
If I had a problem, I would go through my nursing team first 
and then I‟d go to the senior nurses and then maybe nurse 
manager. I think that‟s how they prefer it, because if we do have 
a problem and if it‟s a nursing problem, the nursing team would 
probably look after it and help sort that out (PB.N1). 
[...] as for clinical issues, we would report it to the doctors of 
whatever specialist area. We do have doctors with specialist 
knowledge in certain areas, diabetes, if we were concerned 
about a patient‟s care, I would first approach the specialist 
practice nurse for advice and possibly the doctor whose area of 
expertise that was (PC.N2). 
Compared to the other practices, Practice D had very different arrangement on 
how teams were coordinated. While other practices had team leaders or deputy 
team leaders for groups of professions, practice D did not have any such posts, but 
were at the point of considering having them.  
Do you have team leaders? No, not yet, we're considering it, 
we're thinking[...]we're trying to get different teams, at the 
moment everybody in the office does everything, some of the 
staff are pretty new, member of staff have just started and we‟re 
thinking about that, because it‟s just so much to learn, we‟re 
trying to break it to be different teams. And we're in the process 
of thinking should it be a team leader for each team or whether I 
can run it all, we're in discussions at the moment (PD.A1). 
Related to reporting arrangements, whenever there was a clinical issue within the 
team, nurses in this practice raised it with the partnership. Conversely, if there was 
administration related issue or a complaint from a patient for example, the practice 
manager was consulted. Interestingly, none of the nurses in Practice D had 
reservations about not having a lead nurse. The reason was that all nurses were the 
same grade and historically it had always been like that. However, they also 
emphasised that they would not mind having a team leader, whose would 
preferably be from outside the team and has a nursing background, because a 
nurse would understand nursing roles better than if it was a physician. 
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I think a nurse would be better, because they understand your 
role and your workload and I think as a GP you work very 
differently to a nurse, it‟s a different role, so I think somebody 
who manages you who understands your role has got to be 
better than someone who sees it from a different point of view 
(PD.N1). 
All four practices reported to have a similar arrangement for the administrative 
staff. The administration team, including receptionists and clinical data manager 
were answerable to practice managers. This means that any reception or front-
desk related issues were reported to the practice managers. Practice D, had a 
slightly different arrangement as it had added the position of practice management 
assistant and office manager, whose responsibilities were spin-off tasks of the 
practice manager.  
To sum up, although all practices claimed to have a flat structure, hierarchical 
arrangements existed to some degree, which served as unique characteristics of 
the practices. There were similar reporting mechanisms, with two different ways 
of reporting. When an issue was related to administration or management, the 
practice managers were the ones to report to. Whereas, when there were clinical 
issues, health care professionals discussed them with the partners responsible for 
particular clinical areas.  
8.2.2. BASIS OF JOB RESPONSIBILITIES 
It is beneficial to explore how job responsibilities were assigned in the practices, 
as it potentially contributed to how people perceived their roles as either different 
or convergent with others. There were key factors to consider when practices 
distributed responsibilities. One of them was the number of employees needed for 
certain positions or particular responsibilities. This was worked out through 
assessing the practice‘s situation. One partner in Practice D underlined the 
importance of taking into account every aspects of the practice, such as the size of 
population and the number of patients with certain diseases. This was crucial for 
estimating the potential workload for each health care professional, as well as the 
possible time needed for consultations.  
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We look at what it is we‟re aiming to achieve, the patients 
numbers, the size of people, we do searches say for something 
like ischemic heart disease. We‟d do a search on the number of 
patients we have with ischemic heart disease in the practice, to 
figure out how much of a workload, how much time commitment 
that is, to make sure we‟ve got the staff numbers appropriately 
diverted to that area of access, and just follow it through that 
way (PD.D1). 
Other factors considered were qualification, expertise and skills. All partner 
informants confirmed that the distribution of responsibilities was conducted in 
alignment with the competences of the staff; in particular for clinical 
responsibilities, the practices had to ensure that nurses and HCAs were qualified 
and trained well to perform particular clinical tasks.  
Expertise and qualifications, so starting with the senior practice 
nurse down to the health care assistants being the least senior. 
But all valuable members of the team. I don‟t believe in having 
this complex of senior people. It depends on their degree of 
expertise. But now we have got someone in a more senior 
position, because of her specialist expertise (PC.N2). 
We‟d never let nurses in this practice.  You know there's the [...] 
the clinical  governance, we're very strong on clinical 
governance and you know we have a very strong training and 
mentoring process here, so until people are fully trained and 
capable, we don‟t let them on their own (PB.D3). 
Aligned with all four practices‘ intentions to ensure quality health care delivery, 
they supported staff development through providing training, as well as 
accommodating career progression. Practice B, for example, decided to invest more 
in the supervisory management team, which implied that most managers or team 
leaders were developed internally. This decision also intended to support personal 
development as well as career paths, which reflected the practice‘s commitment to 
the process of learning and ongoing skill development.  
[...] the senior nurse has been promoted to nurse manager and 
because that takes her more off the clinical skills side because 
she‟s got a team to run now, it means that the other nurses, we 
like inherit roles. So, if we decide that if one of the nurses wants 
to do nurse prescribing, she can do that. She can go ahead and 
do that because there are other nurses that can take her role 
and learn her skills so it‟s definitely onward going all the time 
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but nursing‟s like that anyway.  It‟s not something that sits still 
constantly. You‟ve got to have proof that you‟re learning; 
you‟ve got to have proof that you‟ve got the qualifications, the 
skills and it‟s something that‟s ongoing all the time. Sometimes 
it‟s a bit difficult but you try to keep up with it all (PB.N1). 
These staff development programmes and career progression opportunities were 
deemed to be good motivators for staff and were perceived to reduce the possibility 
of memory loss due to staff leaving the practice for a better career elsewhere. 
We need to go on training courses and keep up with updating 
our skills […], because we‟ve got to have specialist knowledge 
and expertise now in these areas (PC.N2). 
I think my role‟s changed a lot since I came to work here. I felt 
that when I came at the beginning it was much more doing 
dressings and treatment room work and as time‟s moved on I‟ve 
done courses, I‟ve had to do courses so that I can see the 
patients for reviews. So, I think that‟s changed I think my role‟s 
increased from what it was when I came to work here, and I like 
to work here (PD.N1).  
In addition, practices also emphasised the contribution of years of experience in an 
individual‘s knowledge and skills. As individuals were continually doing similar 
tasks or activities, the routines enhanced the level of individual knowledge in a 
particular task. Thus, individuals became so highly skilled in conducting tasks that 
they did not need additional effort to do so.  
When I first started I‟d not done practice nursing before. Now 
I‟ve learnt to do all the things required, all the chronic disease 
management, wound care and things like that, so, obviously my 
responsibilities have increased and my skills improved. I 
manage my own wound care, I do my own Doppler. I recall my 
own patients (PC.N1). 
8.2.3. SPECIALISATION AND ALLOCATION OF EXPERTISE 
Being large organisations, all four practices had advantages of having more 
resources and expertise compared to those of smaller practices. Informants argued 
that a wider range of resource and expertise enabled the practices to engage in 
various activities, both clinical and administrative.  
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A lot of things that other practices possibly wouldn‟t take on 
board, we do.  But we are a bigger practice, we've got a lot of 
admin staff, I believe other practices are half our size in patient 
numbers, so of course they haven‟t got the administration that 
we've got, so you can't implement. To some extent, they're more 
selective in what they offer to their patients, whereas we offer 
everything really (PB.A1). 
Consequently, practices needed to deal with the allocation of expertise. This was 
important as they needed to deal with the extent of knowledge and capabilities 
employed to do particular clinical tasks.  
Although GPs tended to be generalists, each had an interest in a certain area or 
sub-speciality. Such competences supported the practices‘ endeavours in offering 
a wider range of healthcare services for patients. Indeed, this was considered to 
contribute to the strengths that resided within people working in the practices. 
Interestingly, although no formal directory of expertise existed in the practices, 
informants were relatively well-informed about their colleagues‘ expertise. This 
kind of expert knowledge helped them to meet patients‘ preferences by referring 
patients to clinicians with a particular expertise.  However, due to time limitations, 
the number of patients, and the nature of working patterns (part-time/fulltime), the 
intentions to meet patients‘ preferences were not always realised.  
In the fact that we‟re having nominated leads for certain areas 
whereas before we were all a little bit more generalist, all our 
chronic disease patients would come in and see us and we would 
overview them no matter what chronic disease area they had. 
Whereas now they‟re getting diverted away from us into certain 
chronic disease clinics, with a different doctor as a lead 
(PD.D1). 
 
As equal partners with their own sub-specialities within it, that I 
might refer people on to if they came with a certain condition, I 
would say I‟ll probably ask you to go and see somebody else for 
an opinion on that. [...]. So, each one has their own little role 
really, or big role (PC.D6). 
This specialisation also led to an increase in role expectation. As physicians became 
more specialised, they were perceived to be more competent than others. In turn, 
the knowledge embedded in particular roles was also expected to increase, so that 
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they became sources of information or points of reference when other health care 
professionals needed information on related cases.  
It depends on what the area is, because we all appreciate we‟ve 
got different skills in certain areas. If we were wanting further 
information on a certain area, we would probably look to that 
partner, knowing they knew more, to give us guidance and 
information (PD.D1). 
A similar specialisation-based arrangement was also experienced within nursing 
teams. Nurses were assigned to deal with particular diseases based on their 
competences. They were assessed through both qualification and skills.  
Yes, both (qualification and skills), and time, because it‟s a big 
team and there‟s lots of work and lots of things crop up at 
different times. [...] I suppose if it was out of my skill, then they 
probably wouldn‟t ask me to do something (PB.N1). 
Now we have got someone in a more senior position, because of 
her specialist expertise. Prior to that we didn‟t have a Senior 
Practice Nurse. It wasn‟t deemed necessary (PC.N2). 
Although healthcare professionals possessed different knowledge and skills, they 
were not less appreciative of others. In fact, such differences made them understood 
that collectively, they contributed to the practice‘s successfulness in providing good 
clinical services to patients. 
Everybody has different skills; everybody brings different things 
to the practice, so I couldn‟t walk into a receptionist‟s job and 
do their job. And same as they couldn‟t do my job either, so I 
think we all know our professional boundaries and we all know 
what we do and how we do it. We stick to our roles, so we 
wouldn‟t sort of go encroaching, trying to think, „we can do 
your job‟. I certainly wouldn‟t like to see myself as a 
receptionist. I don‟t think I‟m brave enough to take on the 
patients that they do. I think everybody knows their roles and 
professional. I totally appreciate the work that they do (PB.N1). 
I respect our nurses and I think they‟re all very good at their 
job. I don‟t think we‟re better at what we do. We do a different 
job. In the same way my secretary‟s extremely competent in 
what she does, that doesn‟t mean I look down on her or anything 
(PC.D5). 
We all work together in a way, but they all have specific roles 
and job responsibilities, so when it comes to a certain areas, 
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they would be responsible for that and they would disseminate 
information to assist us if we need to do anything to trying to get 
there. Information is on the computer as it needs to be (PA.N1). 
The informants were aware of their significant contribution to service delivery and 
asserted uniformly their commitment to work as a team.  
I think I'm a valuable asset to the practice, with all my years of 
experience that I've had.  And I think I  provide a good service 
to the patients, and to the GPs, and the knowledge and skills 
that I've got, I think I perceive myself as a good (PD.N2). 
However, most partners emphasised that work in the practices was mainly 
conducted through multidisciplinary teams that comprised individuals with 
different expertise and skills. Regardless of differences in competence or 
specialisation, informants realised that they needed to work together to achieve 
the objectives of the organisations.  
We work in a multi-disciplinary team, so you have lots of people 
working towards the same objective.  Every person in that team 
has different skills and different things to contribute, but all 
working towards, the common aim of trying to provide good 
health care to the patients (PB.D2).  
[...] such as say diabetes, we have a multi-disciplinary team, so 
the diabetic meetings will be run by the lead clinicians, the lead 
nurse or the 2 nurses involved with diabetic care, and the office 
manager and the lady in the office who‟s responsible for 
sending out the appointments to all the diabetics, to coordinate 
how they do the recalls, when they do the recalls who needs to 
come in and make sure that it runs smoothly (PD.D1). 
In sum, practices confirmed that clinical tasks were mostly distributed based on 
both qualifications and skills. In addition, practical considerations, such as time 
availability, were taken into consideration when distributing responsibilities. A 
higher degree of specialisation means that people get more competent over time by 
having a particular responsibility. That degree was shown to lead to a more efficient 
working arrangement. A higher degree of specialisation also increased 
organisational complexity; hence, requiring organisations to manage it effectively.  
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8.2.4. COMMUNICATION MECHANISMS  
The findings in the previous sub-sections provide evidence that all four practices 
distributed jobs and responsibilities based on competences. While this helped to 
allocate tasks effectively amongst staff, practices needed to ensure that there were 
no knowledge or information gaps. Such a necessity became more central as all 
practices were large in size that unity of action was important to ensure smooth 
operation. At this point, the practices tried to engage in good communication 
mechanisms. Communication mechanisms were believed to be an important factor 
in coordination, as well as assisting the practice to enhance the process of sharing 
knowledge.  
We work cooperatively, support each other, share ideas and meet 
regularly (PD.D2). 
It has meant that there have been other things that we have to 
liaise with each other about. I mean, It requires some 
coordination to organise ourselves (PA.D3). 
The communication mechanisms came in different forms. Practice A for example, 
represented it through strong involvement of people in the system. The practice 
believed that people‘s involvement meant ensuring that all members of the 
organisation knew what was happening in the practice. It also helped to assist staff 
dealing with particular events or issues. More importantly, involving staff in 
relevant processes was expected to increase their commitment to the practice‘s 
policies and decisions. To achieve this aim, some mechanisms including reports, 
meetings and feedbacks were considered necessary, to create sharing of 
information and knowledge in the practice.  
Well, it is important that people are involved, for example we 
are looking questioning why we are, we know why we use to put 
significant events, everything is shared.  So, I don‟t make the 
decision, I go to the girls then I ask, what do you think about 
that, then  I talk to the lead GP, what do you think, what are the 
implication, what would be the consequences if we change that. 
So, we talked in a teamwork. We think it through, is this a good 
idea, review it at staff meeting, once we have decided what we 
are going to do, review it with the doctors first. Look, this think 
of changes in this particularly thing, what do you think and they 
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say, yeah that‟s fine. And we go to the girls, so communication 
and the sharing the ideas are absolutely crucial (PA.A2). 
A similar opinion was also shared by one senior partner in practice B who 
emphasised that communication was important in the practice‘s life. He asserted 
that regular meetings were used as a medium to gather and share important 
information. Dispersion of knowledge was conducted as a review process and 
feedback session (PB.D1; PA.N1). At this point, people learnt from what they had 
achieved as well as from other experiences as a base for improvement. 
If you have somebody who‟s kind of working in a little room and 
they don‟t really know what everybody else is doing, then you 
can't really expect them to help the practice achieve its goals.  
So, a lot of it's about communication, and the practice does 
communicate very well, they have regular meetings, they have 
away days, the practice has away days for the staff, away days 
for the doctors, away days for the salaried doctors as well, so it 
is very much about communicating what you want your staff to 
do, to make the practice successful (PB.D1). 
Another way to share information and knowledge amongst practice members was 
through job rotation. It provided the opportunity for individuals to work with 
different people, understand different work setting, and thus, enabled them to have 
wider experiences. Job rotation also helped the practice to ensure that they had the 
stock of knowledge and skills needed for back-up in case of an emergency 
situation.  
We alter that every 6 months, we do a 6 month rota and we just 
take it in turns [...]. If, say, somebody needed a day off for 
something important and they were supposed to be working, we 
would cover that person.  We‟ve worked together long enough to 
know there has to be some give and take so we‟d do it for each 
other.  If somebody‟s off sick, we cover it between ourselves 
(PD.N3). 
This implies the need for a sound mechanism to ensure that they complement each 
other, given their embedded advantages and disadvantages. On these grounds, one 
of the informants shared her opinion about the importance of managing such 
interactions through structure.  
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We had to have a lead, we set up a structure for returning the 
points there, so every time a new disease register comes on, we 
have that sort of that pyramid structure, of knowing who we can 
go to, who we can ask questions of, and having meetings to set it 
up (PB.A1).  
In addition to the formal mechanisms, informants underlined that their interactions 
were managed more by norms. They asserted the critical role of the norms and 
values held in the practice to support information sharing, as well as knowledge 
dispersion process. This issue will be discussed in-depth in the next chapter  
8.2.5. SIZE AND FORMALISATION 
Based on the assumption that large-size practice organisations tend to possess 
organisational resources that enable them to perform better than their small-size 
counterparts (See Page 44 and 88). Informants confirmed that they had some 
advantages of being large practices, including more staff, more expertise and the 
ability to offer a wide range of services. Thus, it was interesting to explore the 
imperative of size in organisational structure. More importantly, it was necessary to 
investigate how the practices dealt with managing resources given their large-size.  
Responding to the question on how practices governed and formalised people‘s 
behaviour, there were two main focuses. The first related to day-to-day clinical 
activities, and the second related to managing relationship amongst individuals in 
the practices. 
For clinical-related activities and behaviour, informants confirmed that they were 
‗regulated‘ through the organisation‘s policies and procedures. This was intended to 
maintain a standard level in delivering services.  
Because I have policies and procedures, that are written out for 
me, I can‟t step over those boundaries, so I know what my 
guidance is and where I can work within (PA.HCA1). 
Amongst the four practices, Practice C put more emphasis on the importance of 
policies and procedures in assisting the practice to share knowledge. This was 
crucial considering their previous merger activities.  
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It‟s been difficult for the practices coming together and getting 
the two teams working together. The merger has really helped 
us to share good practice that both practices might have had, 
putting in policies and procedures that benefit all of us (PC.A1). 
Although the merger itself was done in 2006, the two practices had only worked 
together under one roof since November 2009, so that it became vital for them to 
ensure that people from different sites learnt and shared information. Putting 
policies and procedures in place was expected to help the process of transferring 
knowledge and good practices. To strengthen such efforts, the existence of formal 
documents, such as job descriptions was said to help the process of learning 
expected behaviour.    
All the staff are managed, have their job descriptions and know 
what they‟re doing and are trained, all the systems and 
procedures are in place, so that the day to day management of 
the practise works smoothly (PC.A1). 
[...] it‟s very family, we‟re all part of a big team and we all like 
to work together and learn from each other.  We do have clear 
policies, procedures and expectations (PC.N1). 
For all practices, aspects embedded in the structure such as job descriptions, 
provided members of organisations with information on how they should do their 
work and deliver care (PC.A1; PB.D3). This kind of knowledge was preserved in 
the structure and was accessible for everyone and could be used repeatedly.  
People know their responsibilities from their job description and 
from their day to day meetings, we have regular meeting, team 
leader meetings, practice meetings, partner meetings, so it's 
very clear I think, people know, people definitely here know 
what their job is (PD.D3). 
In managing the relationships amongst individuals, practices emphasised the 
importance of widely shared norms and values in governing them. People shared a 
similar understanding that they worked as teams, and enhanced by the fact that 
they had been working together for a relatively long time. Hence, although there 
were no clear rules directing how they had to work as teams and share 
information, people held on to the values and reflected them back through their 
behaviour.   
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We understand these things, because we work together for all 
the times, and not because it is written down in such a corporate 
message (PA.D3).  
So, even though we‟re big and we‟re professional, we‟re still all 
approachable, whereas in a small practice you‟ve got maybe 
just like two GPs and maybe one practice nurse. They probably 
get quite close and work together. I don‟t see that as a negative 
point with being a big practice because there‟s so many of us 
around all supporting each other (PB.N1). 
Thus, instead of depending solely on rules and procedure-based formalisation, 
practices also relied on the strength of shared values and norms.  However, 
considering the size of the practices and their future development, it was deemed 
to be necessary for rules and procedures to exist.  
Well, there is, we work as a team, there is almost a sense of 
family. [...] I think we do, we are, interpersonal cohesion.  
Commitment, morale, we do try and keep although it‟s quite 
hard sometimes, but I‟ll go into the order, rules, regulations. 
there's bits of both isn‟t there?  We have to have a bit of that to 
achieve that I think.  You have to have some of the regulations 
[...]. Bit of the hierarchy because, otherwise as a huge, we're a 
big practice and we just wouldn‟t be able to do it if we didn‟t 
have a little bit of that (PB.A2). 
8.2.6. DECISION MAKING MECHANISM 
With regard to how decisions in the practice were made, all informants answered 
that it depended on what kind of decision that had to be made. All practices 
confirmed that there were two general types of decisions, strategic or business and 
day-to-day decisions.  
All informants mentioned that business level decisions were made in partnership 
meetings, which were usually attended only by partners and practice managers. 
Examples of strategic or business level decision included improvement of the 
premises, taking a new partnership, engaging in a new medical contract and 
deciding to recruit additional staff. Most decisions were made through 
discussions, and less on voting mechanism. For all practices, each partner had 
equal right for voting regardless their part-time or full-time work status. 
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For strategic and planning purposes, that‟s very much the 
partners getting together to see and sitting down and it‟s done 
as a discussion to come to a conclusion. We don‟t take votes as 
such. So that‟s the prime decision-making process (PC.D4). 
Most informants confirmed that the decision making process was not easy and 
was time-consuming, particularly important decisions. An example was given by 
Practice B, related to the process it went through for deciding the practice‘s 
participation in the new GMS contract. A very thorough assessment on the 
potential implications of the contract and the resources needed to implement it 
became major considerations for the practices.  
The first thing was for the partners to analyse the 
documentation before the contracts were signed. We spent a lot 
of time meeting and poring through the documentation, to 
compare it to the existing contract and considering the 
implications.  We then had further days when it was agreed to 
implement it to decide how we go about the organisational 
sharing out of tasks, and how the business should be organised 
to meet those new tasks.  Simple decisions were made, such as 
investing more staff time and training into the audit function, 
because, whilst QOF is good clinical care, we recognised that 
the measurement of performance, and proof of that performance 
was going to be imperative to meet the higher standard of 
targets and also to prove that we were worth the money 
(PB.A4). 
Rather differently, Practice D tended to take its strategic or business level 
decisions by means of a democratic vote between partners, to come out in a 
majority decision. However, for some predefined areas, depicted in partnership 
agreement, decision making was still conducted through discussion until they 
reached a unanimous decision.  
Democratic vote with the partners. To decide on something 
different within the practice we all have a vote and we go on a 
majority decision, unless it‟s a specific area which is written 
into the partnership agreement that it has to be a unanimous 
decision (PD.D1). 
In terms of the frequency of meetings, each practice reported different procedures 
in holding partnership meetings. Practice B held its meeting once a month, while 
Practice A had its partnership or doctors meeting fortnightly.  
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For day-to-day decision, the process was generally conducted at lower managerial 
level meetings and involved different levels of employees and professions. 
However, given the urgency nature of the situation and the necessity to act 
immediately, some decisions were not taken through meetings.  For Practice A, if 
there was an immediate issue which needed to be dealt with, the staff directly 
contacted one of the partners to consult and make decision.  
In this practice, everyone gets very well actually. And if there 
are any issues, then they‟re dealt with very quickly. All the GP 
partners are very approachable, so [...]if there is any problem 
and needs immediate decision. You know, I‟ll go the lead GPs. 
After all the places that I worked, this is one of the practices 
where it has a very strong work ethics where everyone is pulling 
on the right direction (PA.D2). 
While in Practice B, the decisions were made in teams, in which they discussed 
their issues and proposed solutions to their team leaders who passed the 
information to the partnership.  For some minor decisions, approval from the 
practice manager was sufficient, without having to consult the partners. The same 
process was followed by Practice C:  
For day-to-day things, most of those are made between the 
practice manager and the lead GP for that area, or the practice 
manager herself if it‟s a more minor thing. Then there are lots of 
day-to-day decisions that get made all the time of course. 
Individual people have got areas of responsibility that they can 
decide on (PC.D3). 
In Practice D, business level decisions and day-to-day decisions were said to be 
overlap at some points.  
There's quite a lot of overlap probably in the meetings, so we 
might make decisions in the partners meeting and then fell down 
through the management meeting and some more day to day 
work about running the practice wouldn‟t come to the partners 
might be dealt with management meeting (PD.D2). 
When some decisions from the lower level meetings needed to have approval 
from the partnership, they were brought to the partnership meeting to be finalised. 
This was confirmed by all practices, and one senior partner gave an example. 
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So, if there is a decision that we need a new health care 
assistant for example, there‟ll be a process which will involve 
one of the partners, the practice manager, the nurse team 
leader, and they will have a decision about whether we need to 
have another nurse. If that decision is approved then it goes to 
the practice meeting for a final decision.  That is approved, so 
all the important decision making goes through the practice 
meetings, goes through the partners essentially (PB.D1). 
Despite different arrangements in the decision making process, all informants 
agreed that all decisions should reflect the interests of the practice. More 
importantly, decisions had to be aligned with the partnership policy.  
Once a decision was taken, it obliged every member of staff in the practices to 
follow it, regardless of any disagreements that may previously have emerged 
during the process. To eliminate such disagreements, informants emphasised to 
involving people whom were potentially affected by the decisions and to 
increasing the awareness of what was happening in the practice. The participation 
of staff in the decision making process was vital, as they knew their job-related 
matters.  The involvement itself was perceived to bring transparency to the 
decision making mechanism and contributed to a thorough understanding of 
things happening in the practices.  
In terms of decisions that are made and including people, I think 
we are quite good, I wouldn‟t say great, but quite good at 
involving people and letting people know what‟s happening and 
what's going on (PD.A3). 
We work in teamwork, so each decision is an involvement. 
Decision is what people perceive, it is not what I tell them. It is 
how I act, it is how a senior receptionist act, how‟s a practice 
nurse act, how the doctors act […] (PA.A2). 
The involvement mechanisms were argued to improve the quality of the decision 
making processes, especially in large practices. One of the partner informants 
asserted that no one could make a decision solely on their own, and thus, the 
involvement of others was important.  
We've got a large number of partners in this practice, much 
larger than most other practices, so you've got to have quite a 
dynamic form of decision making process, otherwise you could 
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end up having different camps and different opinions.  Now I 
think obviously practices employ people who are like 
themselves, but we are quite fortunate in this practice that we 
can reach decisions even through a large number of people 
quite quickly. We do that really by involving everybody, you 
know for a major appointment that we employ somebody, we 
discuss it with everybody, make sure everybody has an input into 
it.  Really we‟re quite good at making decisions quite quickly.  
We go round the room and see what everybody‟s opinion is and 
involve that opinion in the decision (PB.D2). 
Specific to clinical-related decisions in nursing teams, all practices reported 
similar mechanisms. Nurse informants reported that they were given a certain 
degree of autonomy for making relevant decisions appropriate to their profession. 
One nurse in Practice C shared her opinion. 
We make decisions ourselves, we assess the patients‟ progress 
and if there are any problems we go to Specialist Practice Nurse 
or the doctor. Otherwise, with our experience we can make 
decisions about how to forward the treatment ourselves. With 
the new treatment plans, if we were worried about how someone 
was progressing, for example if a wound wasn‟t healing, then 
we would refer them to that specialist area, if it was out of our 
expertise (PC.N2). 
In general, for the nursing team, when the decisions related to non-clinical, 
administrative and management issues, they discussed it with either office 
managers or practice managers. For clinical matters, the processes were conducted 
within the nursing teams. In addition, for issues that raised needed further 
concerns, they were brought to practice meeting, or probably to partnership 
meetings for approval or consultation.  
8.2.7. POWER DYNAMICS 
The interviews identified two streams of relationships in the discussion about 
power dynamics. The first one was related to the relationship between the 
practices and the Primary Care Trust (PCT) and the second one was power 
dynamics within the practices. Both were considered important to give a complete 
picture of the power dynamics in the practice organisations.  
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On the relationship between the practices and the PCT, informants understood that 
the PCTs had a strategic and political position, as they were the only bodies 
through which the Government distributed funding for primary care organisations. 
Accordingly, informants were aware of how PCTs controlled the practices.  
They have (PCT) purchaser power and can take a stance about 
things that forces us to take action - largely through money 
(PB.A4). 
All the power rests with the PCT, because they‟re the 
government representatives in the area. They have all the stack 
of duties, they have complete control of the income that moving 
around, so the power rests absolutely with them (PA.D1).  
Most informants asserted that the discussion about their relationship with the PCT 
was an integral part of the relationship between the PCT and the Government.  At 
one point, the PCTs held power over practices, but they only did what the 
Government asked them. The performance of the PCTs was also assessed by the 
government, which made PCTs come under pressures. PCTs needed to show that 
they had performed well in delivering government policies, which in turn, urged 
them to ensure that practices achieved their target goals. PCTs relied very much 
on government orders in their programmes.  
If it wasn‟t the government „must-do‟, then the PCT wouldn‟t 
bother. If it is not something that they wish being judged, even if 
it is good for clinical practice, and it is very sensible around 
here you aren‟t got to do it (PA.D1). 
If they want something like world class Commissioning Group, 
then our leverage is to use opportunities like that.  They wanted 
System One delivering, it will save the NHS a lot of money, so 
we used the delivery of System One as an opportunity to 
leverage things that we wanted from the PCT (PB.A4). 
To deal with their corresponding PCTs, GP practices set up a Practices 
Commissioning Group, which acted as lobbying body to support primary care 
practices in dealing with PCTs. All practices under study were under the same 
PCT, which was one of the largest PCTs in England. Practices A and B 
contributed to the establishment of the GP Commissioning Group.  The GP 
Commission Group gathered opinions from practices and used the input as a basis 
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to deal with the PCT. The Commissioning Group stood for the interest of 
practices and to ensure a relatively fair relationship with the PCT. 
If we can mobilise all GPs to take a combined similar stance. If 
you pick the right subject, you can make the PCT change. But 
you have to pick the subject which is one that they‟re being 
judged on that they must do. So, every year the government sets 
the PCTs various targets that they have to hit (PA.D1). 
But there is a practice-based commissioning group, they 
represent all the GPs in [X] that is negotiating with the PCT, 
with some successes organising new services...to try to improve 
services and also to make us more efficient (PA.D4). 
There are particular difficulties in this PCT.  So, [...] the last 
three or four years have been very fraught as a result of that.  
But we‟ve worked very well with them, Practice-Patient 
Commissioning Group is very strong here (PB. D3). 
Informants reported that PCTs influenced the practices through different 
mechanisms. The first mechanism was through providing suggestions to practices; 
the second was by forcing practices to act on some activities; and the third was 
through approval mechanisms on certain organisational issues.  
Several informants mentioned that the PCT often gave suggestions on what the 
practice should do. These suggestions were seen to be dictating to the practices, 
which in turn, led to the second mechanism which was to force practices to 
implement certain things or take certain actions. 
The PCT now dictates what we do, where the money goes, what 
they want for their enhanced services etc. They hold the purse-
strings, really. They dictate to a greater extent what we do. But 
it doesn‟t make for a great relationship and I don‟t, they annoy 
me no end. If you go back, 5 or 6 years ago, I felt we had a 
reasonable working relationship with the powers that be, then. I 
think that‟s disappeared. It‟s not personal any more (PC.D5). 
Informants stated that sometimes this caused disagreements or conflict between 
the practice and the PCT. These conflicts of interests occurred because they each 
had different points of views on certain matters. One of the senior partners in 
Practice B attributed that to the PCT‘s financial issues.   
I've always tried to understand the PCT problems that they 
have, so we have a lot of professional disagreements, but the 
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PCT or a similar body are necessary.  There's always been a 
potential conflict of philosophies between Primary Care GPs 
and PCTs, they have the money to balance, we have the patients 
to see, so it's this compromise between the two. Our desire is to 
give good patient care and not to worry about the finances and 
their desire to have a budget to control (PB.D3). 
Similar responses were given by partner informants from all four practices. They 
realised the difficult money situation faced by the PCT. It caused the PCT to 
emphasise cutting budgets more than programme implementation. One informant 
stated that the PCT was categorised financially as the second worst in the country 
and had experienced underfunding for the last 3-4 years. 
There are particular difficulties in this PCT, as you probably 
know they're in debt.  So, the last 3 or 4 years have been very 
fraught as a result of that.  But we‟ve worked very well with them 
(PB.D3).   
A partner in Practice C added that because of having a large area to cover, while 
at the same time only serving a relatively small population, the PCT had to face 
high costs.  
It is one of the biggest counties in England but has a relatively 
small population, so providing services to a small population in 
a big area will cost more than if everyone was all together in a 
metropolis like London, because everything‟s compact, you can 
cover things easier. So, there are all sorts of arguments about 
funding per patient (PC.D1). 
The PCT was also argued to influence some practices‘ decisions. Although the 
relationship was claimed to be distant, practices needed to obtain PCT approval on 
some matters. From the practices‘ perspective, this was a one-way negotiation and 
brought little for them.  
The government and the PCT, how would it gain us anything as 
a practice, how would it  allow us to change the system in which 
we work, because effectively we work in this enormous 
monolithic structure of the NHS, controlled effectively at the 
whim of the ministers, the politicians. Our contract is an Act of 
Parliament, if we choose to break it; effectively we could break 
the law. If the Government decide that they want to change it, 
they just pass another ACT of Parliament and they change it. 
We can‟t have a meaningful two way negotiation. So, within 
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those constraints, it doesn‟t really matter two hoots our vision is 
(PA.D1). 
This put practices in difficult situations, especially when they needed to 
implement decisions immediately.  
[…] as a practice sometimes it‟s very difficult to get a decision 
out of the PCT. So, for instance, if we want to develop a service, 
an additional service it takes a lot of meetings, a lot of 
correspondence, before the PCT finally come around. So, it may 
take a year, 18 months, far too long to get a decision about 
something. So I suppose at times it makes it difficult. [...] There 
are things we disagree about but they have to do their job and 
we have to do ours. But the decision making process can be very 
slow sometimes (PB.D4). 
Informants also reported that in some cases, the PCT was not supportive of the 
practice. An example was given that the way PCT dealt with the practices was 
sometimes contradictory to how it handled patients, which in turn, brought 
inconvenient situations for the practices.  
They‟re not very supportive. Recently they asked us not to 
prescribe certain things, so we don‟t and then patients write to 
them asking for the drugs and they agree. So, they not very 
supportive of us implementing their decisions (PC.D2). 
 
The PCT in [X] do not have a lot of money, they are quite tight 
with money, ok, compared with some areas like […] they have 
more money, ok.  And they are always aiming to save money.  
Sometimes the PCT you feel they manage things in a way which 
is not good, but they would argue because they do not have 
enough money.  So, it is money which is the main driver ( 
PB.D1). 
This created a negative perception of the existence of PCT for the practices. One 
of GP partners claimed that the existence of the PCT added nothing of value, and 
that it would have been better to take the PCT away from health care system 
(PD.D1). 
Regarding the power dynamics within the practice, informants asserted that their 
structures only reflected formal arrangements in the way that individuals and 
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functions related to each other. However, power embedded in such relationships 
could be different or less formal.  
At the partnership level, each partner had equal power from one to another, which 
gave each of them equivalent footing in the decision making process. Hence, each 
had comparable rights to engage and influence actively in the decision making 
process, regardless of their status of being part-time or full-time practitioners.  
[...] we all work as partners. So, no one is boss and you all have 
to get on. We all have financial investments in the practice and 
take a profit out of it. So, we have to be able to work together 
and also have to be happy functioning in the place (PA.D1).  
The list of part-time and full-time statuses is presented in Table 22.  Each session 
is averagely 5 hours. Full time is based on 9 sessions working in practice, which 
takes a total of 45 hours/week. Less than 9 sessions is considered to be part time. 
However, as noted by RCGP, the measurement of Full Time Equivalent had 
become more difficult under the new GMS contract.  „The BMA stated it would be 
difficult to calculate FTE figures after the introduction of the General Medical 
Services (GMS) contract in April 2004, as the contractual arrangements which 
permitted FTE to be estimated no longer exist.‟ (RCGP, 2006). 
Table 22. List of Partnership Status 
No ID Gender Partnership Status Fulltime/Part-time 
1.  PA.D1 Male Senior Partner Full Time 
2.  PA.D3 Male Senior Partner Full Time 
3.  PA.D4 Male Partner GP Full Time 
4.  PB.D1 Male Senior Partner Full Time 
5.  PB.D2 Male Partner GP Full Time 
6.  PB.D3 Male Senior Partner Full Time 
7.  PB.D4 Male Partner GP Full Time 
8.  PC.D1 Male Partner GP Full Time 
9.  PC.D2 Female Partner GP Part Time 
10.  PC.D3 Female Partner GP Part Time 
11.  PC.D4 Male Partner GP Full Time 
12.  PC.D5 Female Senior Partner Part Time 
13.  PC.D6 Female Partner GP Part Time 
14.  PD.D1 Female Partner GP Part Time 
15.  PD.D2 Female Partner GP Part Time 
Salaried GPs employed by the practices did not have the same rights as the 
partners. Their involvement in strategic decision making was different as were 
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their responsibilities towards the practices. This represented the power difference 
between employee and employer.  
I haven‟t got the responsibilities the same as the partners have 
got. They are very competent to sort out their areas (PA.D2). 
All doctors reported that their day-to-day working relationships were not affected 
by the differences of being employees and employers. Partners were perceived to 
be very approachable. However, such differences were noticeable in terms of 
profit distribution.  
I just wanted to make sure, that I wasn‟t going to be abused by 
taking on too many clinical responsibilities, without getting any 
necessary payment for that or “power” , power opportunities of 
being partners, being involved in management decisions. If they 
were to be continued like that for five ten years, not offering a 
partnership and just hire more and more salaried or retainers, 
then It would be a bit more power difference (PA.D5). 
Meanwhile, on the relationship between partners and other teams, such as nurses 
and administration staff, all informants agreed that it was only a representation of 
formal power. This also related to the status of being employees and employers. 
Being employers, the partners had the power to require members of their practice 
to answer and report to the partners. Yet, it was argued not to disturb how they 
worked as teams.  
I mean as a partner you‟re employing the other members of staff 
so you are the employer in one respect.  But from our day to day 
work it goes very smoothly, so you don‟t ever need to go down 
or think really like that. You come to work and everyone‟s very 
professional and they know their role and their job, and they do 
it themselves and we do it ourselves (PB.D2). 
With regard to power differences derived from previous medical qualifications 
and training, it did not become a concern in the relationship between physicians 
and nurses. When working in teams, such differences did not make doctors more 
powerful than the nurses. It was a matter of different skills and teamwork was 
about pulling all the skills together. In this case, physicians would not have been 
able to do what nurses do, and vice versa.  
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In my opinion, the partners should be the people that are 
responsible and leading by example, and other members of the 
team are responsible to the partners. They should be over-
seeing their work. We don‟t really have a hierarchy as such. My 
belief is that we work in teams. Teams with specialist interests, 
specialist groups, I couldn‟t do the nurses‟ job they couldn‟t do 
my job. That doesn‟t make me above them, doesn‟t make them 
above me. It‟s just different areas, different skills, but it does 
need somebody at the top pulling it all together, which is the 
partners and the practice manager (PD.D1). 
Within the healthcare professional teams, there were differences in how power 
was pictured in the practices. Practice A had a nursing team comprising three 
practice nurses and one senior HCA. The nursing team in practice B included the 
head of the nursing team, three senior practice nurses, three practice nurses and 
four HCAs. As for practice C, after the amalgamation, it had five practice nurses 
and three HCAs. For practice D, its nursing team comprised four practice nurses, 
two HCAs and one phlebotomist. Partners perceived that nursing teams were 
different in a way that the relationships amongst nurses were relatively 
hierarchical. This was confirmed by nursing teams from Practices A, B, and C. 
While they worked as cohesive teams; in terms of reporting, they needed to report 
to the heads of nursing teams. They were required to consult the head nurses 
whenever an issue emerged. However, apart from this formal power, no other 
representation of power differences reported to exist.  
Different from the other three practices, Practice D did not have a head nurse on 
the nursing team. All four nurses were on same qualification grade and worked 
part-time in the practice. Each nurse had a different responsibility, but they 
worked as a team. 
We don‟t have one nurse in charge overall, so we all have our 
areas of responsibilities that the practice wanted us to take on a 
role, so that helps us look after certain things. So, one nurse 
might look at all the protocols, one nurse looks at holidays and 
sickness and staffing levels, and different things like that. But I 
think we all work as a team. Sometimes it‟s difficult because 
there‟s not one person in charge, but sometimes it works well 
because we all take on our own responsibilities and deal with 
them. I think we‟ve got a good working relationship (PD.N1). 
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As for administration teams, good working relationships were reported in all 
practices. There were no frictions or conflicts caused by power differences. 
Similar to the nursing team, all administrative staff agreed that if such difference 
existed, it mainly stemmed from the formal power attached to the status of 
partnerships. In addition, they also mentioned that years of experiences and 
qualification possessed by individual professionals also became a source of formal 
power.  
All the team leaders are listened to because we have the 
experience of what we‟re supposed to do.  So he‟s (practice 
manager) created us if you like, so if he's not going to listen to 
us, then we might not as well be here.  We inform him what's 
going on, we discuss things.  I think everybody, there's a lot of, 
it‟s shared a lot, but it‟s specific to what you do. I have no 
power in other departments if you like, other than, if something 
major goes wrong then if I'm the only manager here I deal with 
it, but no it‟s shared. I think if something goes wrong, then 
you've got the senior people will take over if you like, and try 
and sort it out, but generally, we all have power, we‟re all 
empowered to do whatever is necessary (PB.A2). 
Finally, a general remark about power was made by a senior partner from Practice 
A, suggesting that some people probably had an unconstructive senses of power 
and reflected this back to their relationships. Yet, the relationships in the practice 
were less formal. People did their jobs as parts of their roles, instead of being 
influenced by others. 
Our relationships are more informal than that, and in general, 
we‟re not influenced by someone else‟s power, we‟re influenced 
by feeling that we want to do the right things for the practice 
and for the patients. We‟re not working to please someone who 
has more power, and the staff aren‟t doing something. They 
wouldn‟t otherwise they have chosen to do because we have 
power over them. But they do because it is part of their job, and 
they understand that it‟s their role to do certain things (PA.D3). 
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8.3. PERCEIVED CHANGES IN ORGANISATIONAL 
STRUCTURE 
Most informants in the four practices stated that changes in structure aimed to be a 
modification for a better implementation of QOF.  These structural changes were 
as the follows: 
8.3.1. EXPANDING STRUCTURES: NEW POSTS 
As stated earlier, practices shifted to give more priority to chronic diseases. To 
accommodate this change, practices reported to adjust their structures. Informants 
acknowledged that new posts were created through nominating team leaders, for 
both clinical and administrative teams.  
What it does on the clinical side, from my point of view, we have 
divided the tasks of each of the QOFs into leaderships [...]so, 
the clinical GPs are responsible for particular areas, let‟s say 
mental health, we‟ve got GP for mental health. We‟ve got GP 
for hypertension, and heart failure (PA.A2). 
Now we have various leads [...] partner leads for various 
diseases and we've got the team leaders, and then we've got the 
deputy team leaders (PB.A1). 
The assignment of clinical leads and team leaders were aimed to ensure that 
practices worked efficiently. As referred to by several informants, efficiency 
meant that people did their jobs according to their roles and qualifications. 
Although it seemed to be reactive, the decision of assigning managers was critical 
if the practice wanted to obtain a high score.  
I think we‟ve refined very well is allocating responsibility to the 
right people.  So, as I said, health care assistants, nurses, 
employed doctors all carry aspects of responsibility for 
performance delivery [...] so rather them, than a partner GP 
doing it.  Or maybe rather them than a GP if they're a nurse or 
a health care assistant.  So efficiency is the way to do it (PB.A4).  
On the other hand, while this was important for QOF implementation, it means 
additional responsibility for partners apart from their clinical duties (PB.D1; 
PD.D1).  
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And the other thing we did is that we had a series of meetings 
about what we were going to do about QOF, so each everybody 
in the practice was kind of allocated a QOF, an area of QOF, a 
responsibility, and that person was then made accountable for 
the performance of that area of QOF (PB.D1). 
Informants also pointed out that these adjustments were meant to assist in 
channelling reports or dealing with QOF-related issues faced by staff; hence, they 
assisted practices in achieving QOF targets. In practice C, however, while such 
arrangements formalised structures, the activities involved were not novel for the 
practices.  The practice had already appointed clinical leaders prior to QOF, and 
QOF was just perceived to make it more formalised.  
We always had a clinical [...] hats on, leads on things. Probably 
QOF formalised it a little bit (PC.D6). 
As well as clinical posts, new non-clinical posts were also established, including IT 
support system and data quality management. This became critical, as QOF 
emphasised the accuracy of data in supporting evidence of care activities. Practice 
A for example, decided to employ a data manager and modified its existing 
department, which formerly dealt with the patient data base into a data management 
division. This division worked to support coding and data management so that 
clinicians were able to focus on clinical care without inconveniently dealing with 
how to update or change template arrangements in the system. Indeed, all practices 
reported that they had assigned data specialist to work on this. In Practice B and 
Practice C, one of the partners was responsible for the running of IT system. The 
assignment was based on the competence possessed by the particular partners as 
well as their interests.    
[...] so we brought in another member of admin staff who 
worked closely with me, looking at the IT and trying to get 
everyone working together to set up the IT so we could look at 
and monitor the QOF, to get consistency over the whole 
organisation (PC.D1). 
While all four practices had similar responses to IT, their adoption of IT systems 
was different from one to another. Practice C, for example, admitted it was a late 
adopter of the system. At the time of the interview, the practice had just finished 
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installing the System One, the new IT system. Informants acknowledged that the 
practice was the slowest mover to adopt the system. Several adjustments were put 
in place to ensure that the transition from the old to the new system was smooth. 
This involved training staff to make them ready to run the system. 
However, the new posts arrangements were said to make the structure of the 
practices more formalised than before. In Practice B for example, even though 
there had been a structure prior to QOF, it had been implemented very loosely.  
After QOF, it became clearer who reported to whom. 
Definitely it is more organised. As well as the structure and 
having leads for specific disease registers, so especially my 
department, the department I'm in which is audit and data, we 
know who to send our queries to, which GP is responsible for 
each disease register and we can ask queries of them.  When a 
new disease register comes online into QOF, which this year 
was the CVD register, we had to nominate a lead, and we had to 
set up a structure for that.  Sexual health was set up last year for 
08/09, and again we had to have a lead, we set up a structure 
for returning the points there, so every time a new disease 
register comes on, we have that pyramid structure really, of 
knowing who we can go to, who we can ask questions of, and 
having meetings to set it up really (PB.A1). 
The formalised structure was also seen to give the practices more sense of focus. 
At the same time, such structures were perceived as having a drawback as they 
potentially led to inflexibility. Formalised structure was seen to cause rigidity in 
coordinating activities.  
It‟s made it more structured. But that‟s not always a good thing. 
Because it‟s good to have flexibility within the service as well. 
Yes, it‟s given us something to focus on, a point of achievement 
when you get there, team-working, but rigidly (PD.D1). 
In Practices B and D, most informants perceived that such changes were not only 
caused by QOF, as practices also experienced significant changes in partner 
composition that were said to have had a significant effect on how organisations 
were structured.  
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8.3.2. EXPANDING THE STRUCTURE: RECRUITING 
ADDITIONAL STAFF  
Another change in the structure of all four practices was recruitments of additional 
staff. In clinical areas, partners mentioned that practices had decided to recruit 
more staff to cope with the additional QOF-related workload. Those additional 
staff included physicians, nurses, health care assistants and phlebotomists.  
Things are obviously improved, we have a bigger nursing team 
now than we used to. We have to employ more nurses. we have 
more appointments now, that‟s better, that‟s the improvement 
(PA.N1). 
The practices also pointed out that recruiting nurses and HCAs was considered to 
be the most notable decision for them. As the increasing workload urged the 
practices to think more about allocating tasks efficiently, recruiting HCAs was 
perceived to be more cost-efficient than hiring more nurses or salaried doctors.  
We didn‟t have health care assistants. We had the same 
structure apart from HCAs. We started them to try and relieve 
some of the burden off the nurses, so the nurses can take more of 
the chronic disease management, but now we‟ve got to develop 
that a bit more as well. Because a lot of the chronic disease 
management is still being done by GPs (PC.D3). 
So, when we look through it to the future, and we wonder about 
whether we‟re going to employ new doctors, we also think that 
instead we‟re going to employ any nurse, or healthcare 
assistants. Because we obviously got to balance income against 
[ ...] who can do the works, and who would be the most cost 
effective ( PA.D4).  
Informants in Practice C also mentioned that the number of nurses was twice that 
of previously. However, this had resulted from the amalgamation of practices 
rather than QOF.  Consequently, such a merger also instigated a larger number of 
patients to deal with.  
The practices also recognised that additional administration staff were needed, 
because of QOF, to incorporate sending invitation letters to chronic disease 
patients to visit the practices for regular healthcare checks.   
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We have recruited more people, the teams have increased, and 
people are more specific in what they do [...].  We have specific 
teams now that deal with specific things, rather than it being 
general (PB.A2). 
 As with regard to the admin staff, we have to sort of 
cooperating more admin staff to help sending out the reminding 
letters, and all the different admin sides of it. And from my point 
of view, there‟s always just been more works since that and 
slightly under pressure to achieve it (PA.A1). 
In addition, all practices also confirmed recruiting of data processing supports. 
Even if it was not only related to QOF, the existence of a data processing unit was 
considered necessary to keep up with the increasing number of patients registered 
in the practices.  
While the expansion of teams was considered beneficial for QOF target 
achievement, it was also perceived to have slight drawbacks.  
Well it has because when they became team leaders and team 
managers, that certainly changed the structures and changed 
who was doing what and who was where, and for those people 
personally, they had their own issues and own agendas, so they 
all had to manage their own little teams, suddenly there was 
more of a name to a team, and it was „them‟ and „us‟, and even 
there's  „the people in area A‟ and „the people in area B‟ and yet 
we're all the team (PB.N2). 
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8.4. PERCEIVED CHANGES IN JOB 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
Most informants agreed that QOF brought changes to their job responsibilities. 
However, they emphasised that QOF altered job processes instead of job content 
as follows:  
8.4.1. RELIANCE ON COMPUTER-BASED TEMPLATES 
One of the senior partners in Practice A asserted that the main impact of QOF 
could be seen in how it altered the processes of service delivery. A significant 
example of this was the use of templates and protocols to help clinicians, nurses in 
particular, ensure comprehensive clinical data collection.   
We have little pop-up in our screen that reminds us that this 
patient needs this and this for QOF. So, there‟s always 
something that to remind the staff that something need doing for 
QOF (PA.HCA1). 
We‟ve got screen messages on the computer to say when this 
patient comes in, a pop-up says „this patient needs this doing‟, 
or we put messages on prescriptions when people ask for repeat 
prescriptions to say „please make an appointment with the 
doctor or nurse because you need this, this or that‟ (PD.N2). 
QOF pushed practices to reach quality targets, which determined the amount of 
financial reward received by the practices. Thus, practices needed to ensure that 
their staff were working in accordance with procedures, templates and protocols 
as required by QOF.  
They want to reach the targets so they get the financial rewards. 
We have staff who help monitor and run searches and look at 
how we‟re doing. It‟s looking at the targets and making sure 
that the work we do, that we fill in templates, so that we reach 
the targets that we need to do to get the payment. That‟s where I 
say our work‟s structured like that, because most things we do 
it‟s all set out on a computer for us, so we don‟t miss anything, 
don‟t suddenly remember that we should have been asking this 
to all our patients that we‟ve been seeing (PD.N1). 
QOF assessed a practice‘s achievements through evidence presented in data form, 
so that practices needed to invest in a robust information system. In this sense, 
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QOF ensured the use of a computer-based system of data entry. This was not only 
essential for QOF-related reports and activities, but was also helpful as a 
convenient medium to share information with other healthcare professionals.  In 
turn, this was considered to help practices in eliminating information gaps 
between one professional and another, especially when they needed to deal with 
similar cases, as well as to keep up to date with clinically important information. 
QOF is a learning resource, specially for new doctors, like me 
for example, I am always learning and I am always obeying. I 
might not know the rough guidelines for when a patient for 
example, needs to be having a blood test, I do know the answer. 
I mean, if there is a little box in your computer, saying things 
like QOF point 4.2 needs doing, and you say oh yeah yeah I 
forgot about that or I didn‟t know any disease is happen […] so, 
it kinds of actually be good in some ways, because for 
learning[...]what those guidelines are[...]but you shouldn‟t miss 
those all guidelines to be guide guided (PA.D5). 
 
I think QOF improved our performance in many ways, yes, I'm 
better at preventative medicine, definitely. Because I get 
guidelines and things and it helps me, you know, it‟s the 
benchmark really, the benchmark of good medicine (PB.D3). 
We are now a lot more education orientated, up-to-date with 
clinical protocols, guidelines etc, to cascade them down to the 
rest of us, more focused on protocols work really (PD.D1). 
In contrast, using protocols and templates along with obtaining QOF data had 
been reported to affect patient care negatively. Some doctor stated that focusing 
on the protocols and templates was time consuming and might divert their 
attention away from the patient.      
I have to spend lots and lots of time, asking patients questions 
which are not to do with patients care. So, it affects my patients 
care, it gets in the way of me caring patients. I have to take time 
out of practice, to looking through pages of statistics, trying to 
analyze what QOF statistic means. Which means that I have less 
time to looking after people (PA.D3). 
I think you have to spend time collecting the information that as 
a good clinician you would be collecting any way if relevant. 
And unfortunately the QOF is a lot about gathering the data and 
then it‟s nothing to do with that data really, or how that 
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influences the care of the individual patient, so you will spend 
less time with the patient (PD.D2). 
8.4.2. INCREASE A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD 
JOBS 
All informants asserted that they were aware of the financial consequences of 
QOF for their practice. For that reason, people became more attentive of their job 
responsibilities than before. More importantly, they were more conscious of how 
their colleagues did theirs. Informants mentioned that they felt more attached to 
the job, as well as more responsible for their practice‘s performance than prior 
QOF period.  
In fact, QOF was perceived as a positive development, as people became very 
aware of the collective organisational effort to achieve the QOF targets. At this 
point, QOF was perceived as providing clear expectations or measurements for 
performance, which were used to check whether healthcare professionals had 
accomplished their tasks. The side effect, however, was more pressure of work. 
Informants became more aware of the targets and the impacts on their practice, so 
that they tried very hard not to fail the practice.  
I don‟t want to be the one who keeps missing reminding people 
and reminding patients of certain things that need to be done. I 
don‟t want to be the doctor who doesn‟t capture whether they 
are smoker or not. I don‟t. Anyway, if they are overdue the 
smears, I want to write in or remind her to cervical smear. Yes, I 
want to be that one. But I don‟t want to be the one who missing 
off capturing information that is needed for QOF (PA.D2).   
Everybody in the practice was kind of allocated an area of 
QOF. That person was made accountable for the performance 
of that area.  So, if you didn‟t do what you should be doing, then 
the senior partners, or the manager would say „why aren't you 
doing this, this is your role, you've got to get on with it‟ so there 
was kind of a greater degree of accountability and pressure 
(PB.D1). 
Informants also reported that there was an increase in the sense of belonging, so 
that people were willing to work harder. It created strong ties amongst people and 
groups as results of working closely with each other.  
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I think that can be quite helpful, that doctors, and receptionist, 
and audits staff and everybody works [...] they have more of an 
understanding about where the practice is going, and it 
increases their level of responsibility and you get trust between 
kind of people as well.  I think as an organisation, it was 
probably good for us, it wasn‟t negative (PB.D1). 
Being responsible for a specific task meant that the informants felt they were 
contributing significantly to their practice job cycle. It also implied that the 
pressure was spread over everyone as part of the team work. To some extent, 
taking the responsibility personally also meant that people needed to make sure 
that things were going well in other parts of the system, as that might affect their 
work as well.  
Because you want to work as a team, you want to feel that you 
have got the cohesiveness, but at the same time, you are trying 
to be competitive. So, therefore, it might cause you to have to do 
things, to ask questions, which actually you do not want to do, 
and you wouldn‟t have done it if it hadn‟t been for QOF. 
Because of QOF, you know you‟ve got to say to somebody that it 
was incorrect, or we must do this correctly or something like 
that. So it makes you a bit of battle actually at times (PA.A1). 
8.4.3. CHANGES IN WORKING PATTERNS 
In order to accommodate QOF, most practices under study made some 
adjustments to their opening hours. This spread the workload to make it more 
manageable. It also provided more access for patients, so that the appointments 
were able to fit in with the time they were most available.  
We have extended hours now, we open Wednesday nights, that's 
part of it as well, and Saturday mornings.  We have more 
understanding, I think all the staff have a better understanding 
of patient care (PB.A2). 
Along with making an adjustment to the opening days and times, some practices 
also adjusted their allocated consultation time. Practice B for example, extended its 
consultation time from 10 minutes to 12 minutes. This was believed to help 
clinicians cope with the administrative work of QOF such as capturing patient data 
on the computers.   
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We couldn‟t accommodate QOF in our standing, in our working 
day without actually making an allowance for it within the 
consultations. So, we extended the appointment length by 2 
minutes; that's what we decided to do (PB.D1). 
However, a different pattern was reported in Practices C. Although physicians 
experienced patient consultations taking a longer time to finish than before; the 
practice did not extend their consultation time slot. Instead, it was decided to 
delegate some of the routine work to lower level health professionals, such as 
nurses and healthcare assistants. A similar pattern was reported in Practice D.  In 
other words, the practices started spreading the workload amongst other healthcare 
professionals to free up the GPs to see more patients; more detail about work 
delegation will be presented in next section. 
Well, we are a bigger team than we were in 2002 or 3 [2003]. 
There are more people. So, I suppose we accomplish them by 
increasing the number of people to do the job. We accomplish 
them by making people focus on their own skills, their own 
strengths. So, the nurses for instance, don‟t do very much of the 
routine checking blood pressures, taking blood samples, 
checking urine samples, because that can be done by the health 
care assistants. Who don‟t need the same amount of training. 
Similarly the routine checking of patients‟ coronary heart 
disease indicators is mostly done by the nurses, because you 
don‟t need a doctors training to do those things. So those are the 
structural changes we‟ve made to try and address QOF 
(PC.D4). 
I think because the GPs have got more work, because of QOF 
the GPs have had more work for themselves to do, so they've 
now passed a lot of the routine chronic disease management on 
to us (PD.N2). 
In addition, it was reported that health care professionals, both clinicians and 
administrative staff, spent more time outside their official working hours working 
on QOF related tasks. Although this was not clearly stated as a practice‘s policy, it 
showed that people took on the responsibility of supporting the practice in 
conducting change (PD.D1; PA.D4).  
Even the staff you‟ll find that are in way over hours that they 
should be, just doing work that you just wouldn‟t expect normal 
employed staff to do, almost as if it was their business (PD.D1). 
193 
 
8.4.4. DELEGATION OF TASKS TO LOWER LEVEL HEALTH 
CARE PROFESSIONALS 
All physicians reported that they had additional QOF related administrative 
responsibilities. This caused them to deal with patients‘ problems during 
consultation time and to do administrative work, including updating patients‘ data, 
simultaneously. To cope with these responsibilities, most informants agreed that it 
was only by working harder that they could balance both the clinical and 
administrative sides of their jobs.  
Surgeries have got longer, patient demand has got, so that even 
individual consultations have got longer as well, to try and 
cover all the different areas, during the, we don‟t get all the, we 
still only have a 10 minute appointment but I tend to run pretty 
late now, which I didn‟t used to do in the past. But we try to feed 
some of that work through to our practice nurses as well, so I 
think some of the practice nurses have noticed a bigger increase 
in their workload. They were doing it before but looking after 
asthmatics and the diabetics, sort of routine work and then if 
there‟s a problem feeding back to the partners. So, clinical 
work, there‟s more involvement with the nurses. Likewise with 
the nurses we‟ve employed health care assistants to try and 
make help with their workload as well (PC.D3). 
This development also extended consultation time, as stated in the previous 
section. Sometimes, people needed to work out of their clinical hours as they 
chose not to do the administrative work during the patient consultations. 
However, the drawback was a possibility of missing key or crucial information.  
It is more work, more time.  And in the practice, certainly more 
time, we spend time, sometimes, out of our non-clinical hours, 
going through the QOF stuff and checking which patients have 
not met the criteria, going through those patients (PA.D4). 
There's a lot more things that are target driven, things where 
probably have 20 minutes to do our work, we fought hard to get 
longer appointments to do our work, because it‟s not just ticking 
boxes, and if we‟re not careful we‟re going to lose something 
important. Patients come in and they expect […] its patient‟s 
expectations I think, we have to answer those expectations 
(PD.N3). 
The increase in workload pushed clinicians to delegate some of their routines 
work. Nurses reported that they were now responsible for some clinical routine 
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work that was used to be performed by doctors. This delegation was seen to 
enable physicians to deal appropriately with major illnesses, while allowing 
nurses to deal with minor illnesses.  
We looked to see how much of the QOF we would cover, without 
making any changes, because quite a lot of QOF is simply data 
collection and a lot of the patients we were seeing regularly 
anyway. But the conclusion was that if we wanted to score 
above 90% we would have to change the nurses‟ role and bring 
in extra staff in the back room to tick all the boxes (PC.D4). 
As nurses engaged in the delegated works, they also reported delegating some of 
basic nursing work, such as measuring blood pressures, ECGs and wound 
dressing to health care assistants and/or phlebotomists.  
For the practice management, the issue of delegation became an important 
consideration in staff recruitment. As stated early in Chapter 8 Section 8.3.2., 
partners asserted that recruiting health care assistants was more favourable than 
hiring more nurses or salaried GPs, as it was cost-effective and enabled the 
practices to allocate work more efficiently.  
The nurses have taken on more chronic disease management, 
more advanced things. Health care assistants have taken over 
from them. Freed them up by doing the easier things, the blood 
taking, the more routine services (PC.A1). 
Apart from the idea that delegation of work would enable healthcare professionals 
to deal with the workload better, such a decision was also claimed to be a form of 
appreciation of clinicians‘ qualifications and experience. It was deemed 
unnecessary to train doctors, for example, to do routine checking on Coronary 
Heart Disease indicators.  
I think our restructure of nursing team was directly in relation 
to QOF. We wanted to make sure that the G-grade nurses were 
doing as they should be. We‟d never had health care support 
workers or phlebotomists in this practice before. It had always 
been done by our G-grade nurses. When we started pushing a 
lot of the chronic disease work that the GPs had previously been 
doing across to the nurses, we needed to free up their time from 
the more menial tasks  by getting appropriate bands in place 
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and passing it down through the structure to the phlebotomists 
and health care support workers (PD.D1). 
While the delegation decision seemed to be inevitable, practices still ensured that 
work was delegated to competent individuals. Partner GPs asserted that delegation 
of work did not take place unless nurses were ready and competent to perform 
clinical work. Sending staff to acquire more advance skills ensured that lower 
level healthcare professionals were able to deliver a high quality of care; hence, 
maintain patient satisfaction with the services, as well as representing the 
practices‘ strength in managing clinical governance.  
We‟d never let nurses in this practice do something that they are 
unqualified to do. The clinical  governance, we're very strong on 
clinical governance and you know we have a very strong 
training and mentoring process here, so until people are fully 
trained and capable, we don‟t let them on their own (PB.D3).  
Staff development programmes were mostly reported by nurses and health care 
assistants (PA.HCA1; PC.N2; PC.A1). Besides sending staff on external training, 
Practice D reported that the partnership also provided internal training sessions for 
them. This was beneficial in sharing knowledge about practice-related contexts.  
I‟ve done diploma level courses for the chronic diseases that I 
deal with and in-house training from the GPs as well, we‟ve had 
things like that (PD.N1). 
An interesting point was raised by the informants in practice B. It was widely 
understood that upgrading skills was critical to ensure that healthcare professionals 
were up-to-date with the latest knowledge in the field. Moreover, the practice 
management believed that such investment contributed to building the practice‘s 
competence, as well as to preparing staff for career development. It also improved 
the level of loyalty, which then, reduced the possibility of staff turnover. In this 
way, it helped to confine practice‘s valuable knowledge and sustain it within the 
practice.  
We invest in them, we invest in their career, so they‟ve got a 
career structure to feed into and improve, they have targeted 
pay rises, so if somebody‟s doing particularly well, takes in a 
new role, new responsibilities, they get a greater pay rise.  We 
have a career structure within in each grade, so they have[...] 
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the team leaders in charge of different sections of the 
organisation, so they've got a promotion structure as well.  And 
another thing I think is increased number of holiday days they 
have a year, as they've been more senior in the organisation 
(PB.D2). 
We have very good loyalty to the practice, we do not have a big 
turnover of people within the practice, so we would feel that 
because of […] a mutual respect and trust and shared goals 
within the practice (PB.D1).   
8.4.5. EXPANSION OF ROLES AND SKILL MIXING 
One of the positive impacts of task delegation to lower level healthcare 
professionals was an expansion of roles. From the perspective of the nurses, their 
roles were expanded and this development was considered to be accelerated after 
QOF was initiated.  
I think my role‟s changed a lot since I came to work here. I felt 
that when I came at the beginning it was much more doing 
dressings and treatment room work. As time moved on I‟ve had 
to do courses so that I can see the patients for reviews. So, that 
I‟ve done an asthma course, I‟ve done a diabetes course, I‟ve 
done a COPD course to enable me to be able to do the reviews 
effectively. So, I think that‟s changed I think my role‟s increased 
from what it was when I came to work here (PD.N1). 
As well as the expansion of roles, nurses and HCAs reported that they had 
experienced skill mixing in a way that they were expected to be able to establish a 
variety of skills needed to perform clinical task. From the partners‘ perspective, 
skill mixing also emerged as an indirect consequence of QOF. To ensure that all 
the required activities were attended to, practices required nurses and HCAs to 
participate in medical courses and training programmes.  
Because if we knew something was coming like we need to do 
more with diabetes, then we need more nurses to be trained to 
do the diabetes, which is what happened.  Or minor injuries was 
suddenly part of another service, so we needed nurses to train, 
trained as minor injury, so you know, I know that's slightly 
separate from QOF, but they're all little areas that feed in and 
why the minor surgery and the insulin starts, you know lots of 
things that were secondary care became involved in the primary 
care, you know, in coronary heart disease, I went to train to do 
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that, more diploma level, you know so that's the impact, and of 
course while you're away, somebody needs to be here (PB.N2). 
At this point, most nurses and HCAs reported that they were pleased with their 
expanding roles. They asserted that the training provided for them to enhance their 
competence helped them in performing their jobs better.   
[...] I enjoy my position and my grade and the responsibility that 
I have.  As I say, there‟ll be a lot more training to come in the 
future so I know I can progress (PB.N1). 
I‟ve done smoking cessation course to do the smoking, and the 
injection course to do flu injections, and pneumonia injections 
and also to give vitamin B12 injections. So, I have been on 
courses, and it has been helpful within my job (PA.HCA1). 
QOF has changed a bit the way we work within the practice 
because we have specifically trained nurses to do some specific 
QOF assessments, looking after patients with chronic 
respiratory illnesses. Doctors wouldn‟t have had the capacity to 
do that, so our nurses do that. It has meant that we have moved 
some of the work that the nurses have done down to health care 
assistants. Routine blood samples for instance, which the nurses 
used to do a lot of, now it‟s devolved to the health care 
assistants level, which has freed up nursing time to do some of 
the routing call and re-call of patients (PC.D4). 
The partners recognised that the nurses and HCAs were happy and more confident 
with their new expanded roles and responsibilities. For the partners more 
delegation of work meant more income for the practice.  
I think they... a lot of them are enjoying their new role and find 
it rewarded and their experienced therefore, it‟s a more 
rewarded role. in this practice we've had chat to take off a lot of  
activities they used to do and give them to health care support 
workers, therefore freeing up time for them to do chronic 
disease management, for example. So, we would hope that  
although their work has changed their workload may not have 
changed much (PD.D2). 
I think because of the increased work load and more 
responsibility, I think I have more confidence than I did have.  
But other than that, I don‟t think my personality has changed at 
all (PD.N2).   
I feel more confident than before, I feel that I'm doing a good 
job (PD.HCA1). 
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Moreover, with their updated competence, nurses felt that they contributed by 
filling out the skill gaps in clinical care.  
You‟re looking at what clinical skills you've got, aren't you, so I 
had a lot of skills , so you look where the gaps and so you fill the 
gaps if you can, and that's what I was saying, you can't always 
fill the gaps because practice nurses tend to be older. It isn‟t 
something that newer, younger people come into.  Although they 
are nowadays because nursing‟s changed as well, so it‟s 
become more recognised as being important. So, you look at the 
gaps and fill it. And you looking at how much money is in the 
box, what kind of staff you can get and what they can bring in it. 
I'm enthusiastic, and I‟m also happy to do lots of things 
(PB.N2). 
On the question of whether this led to extra work and increased the workload for 
those professionals, one partner argued that nurses did not really engage in any 
extra works. The nurses‘ expanded roles were still conducted during duty hours so 
that it should not be counted as ‗extra work‘.  
They‟re not really doing any extra work because they‟re just 
working their contracted hours. But instead of doing dressings 
they‟re doing other things and a lot of them seem to enjoy it 
more (PC.D2). 
On the question how the delegation of work and expansion of roles potentially 
affected patients, one senior partner in Practice C stated that the main aim of this 
adjustments or changes was to improve services for patients. Although there was 
no any formal assessment of the impact of clinical delegation, patients were 
probably enthusiastic about being met by nurses during a consultation.  
Because then you‟ll have a nice good half hour appointment, 
where the patients get more feedback rather than trying to 
squash it into a ten minute doctors appointment, where we‟re 
just rushing through everything, and don‟t really have the time 
to you know give the patient the background on say extra dietary 
advice or exercise advice you know all the other little bits and 
pieces which are good for the patient (PC.D3).  
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8.4.6. MORE FORMALISED AND ORGANISED WORK 
In comparing before and after QOF, some informants reported experiencing more 
formalised and organised work.  
So, we have to make sure that every year, that organisation is 
care to maximise income through the QOF, and that means that 
we need to make sure that we got the nursing staff and health 
care assistant staff organised in order to make sure we see 
patients who have relevant illnesses or sometimes rather than 
things like smoking (PA.D4). 
Probably more organized really, it‟s a bit more organised, 
things get done a little bit quicker than what did it when I first 
started (PD.N3). 
Along with the QOF, informants also pointed out that this might be attributed to 
changes in personnel in their practice. In Practice D, for example, the appointment 
of a practice manager was said to make work arrangements became more 
formalised. 
But then we‟ve the practice manager, I can‟t remember how 
long she‟s been here now, 5 years, she‟s made a massive 
difference to the practice. Completely re-organising a lot of 
things, making sure that it runs effectively, putting things in 
place that were never put in before. Because it was probably 
more of a family orientated, before where people just came to 
work and floated, and did what they needed to do. Whereas now, 
it still is, because we‟ve still got the same staff, but there‟s a lot 
more order come into it as well (PD.N4).  
8.5. CHANGES IN DECISION MAKING  
With regard to the decision making process, informants claimed that QOF did not 
seem to significantly influence or alter the process. It did not change the 
mechanisms which the practices had undergone.  However, as QOF contributed to 
the formation of new structural positions, such as clinical team leaders, it signified 
the involvement of clinical team leaders in the decision making process.  
The decision making process started by pulling together various inputs from 
professionals within teams. Team leaders usually led such processes and 
facilitated teams to take the relevant decisions on particular issues. As Practice D 
200 
 
was the only one amongst the four practices that did not have team leaders in its 
structure, final clinical decisions were taken to one of the partners.  
Well, if there is any GP lead for that clinical area who decides 
with input from the nursing staff how the area is going to be 
dealt with. It is obvious from QOF what information is needed. 
Once a system has been decided, then everyone is expected to 
follow that system to make sure the information is captured 
(PA.D2). 
In all decisions, the practices noticed that QOF had become a central factor to take 
into consideration. It guided the practices to think about funding and how to use it 
in the practice‘s favour. 
The new contract made people think about money more and the 
best way of using that money. Looking at the provision and how 
we can move work around the practice, so we‟ve got the right 
people to do the right jobs and the people were properly trained. 
But that would have come anyway. The decision making has not 
changed. The doctors and practice manager meet and we put 
forward the figures and we discuss how the future of the 
practice is going to look (PC.A1). 
Informants reported that with the implementation of QOF, practices had tried to 
involve staff members in decision making and provide clear guidance for them. It 
was a part of the practices‘ support to ensure that the change process triggered by 
QOF took place in at all organisational levels. Regular reviews and meetings were 
conducted regularly to provide clear objectives.  
Support, clear objective [...] understanding and making sure 
that there is review [...] for example, nurse team meeting, every 
two weeks. I have a nurse meeting where we discuss things, for 
example QOF changes, right? (PA.A2). 
All four practices reported that being very active in ensuring that everyone was 
involved in the change process. Informants pointed out that practices engaged in 
intensive communication to make people understand why change was needed and 
what they were required to do.  
We‟re a very forward-thinking practice and I think the 
management want to that rubs off on everybody, because we 
know if there‟s any change, because management know what‟s 
coming.  If they tell us, they can say to us, „Right, well this might 
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be coming up,‟ and they know that we‟ll support them because 
we want the practice to progress, we want the whole, we want 
our teams to progress (PB.N1). 
In addition to QOF, informants in Practices B and C pointed out that change of 
key personnel, including practice managers and partners, also contributed to 
changes in decision making mechanisms. In practice B, the practice manager, who 
was also a partner, had similar rights to GP partners in the decision making 
process.   
It hasn‟t changed because of QOF, it has changed in the last 6 
years, because people are more accountable and these kinds of 
structures are more overt.  Before QOF and maybe before the 
new practice manager, it was kind of more nebulous.  People 
knew what they were doing, but there wasn‟t really quite the 
same structure in place to make everybody accountable for what 
they were supposed to be doing, but it wasn‟t really QOF, the 
new practice manager changed that (PB.D1). 
There‟s more involvement of the practice manager. We‟ve had 
to have that since 2004 because there‟s just so much more 
paperwork and everything coming in. We‟d never cope with it 
(PC.D3). 
8.6. PERCEIVED CHANGES IN POWER DYNAMICS 
8.6.1. PERCEIVED CHANGES IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN PRACTICES AND THE PCTS 
In discussing external dynamics, informants emphasised the practice‘s 
relationship with its external systems, such as the PCT and the Department of 
Health (DoH). QOF was perceived to bring significant change to the practice‘s 
position towards those two bodies.  
With the implementation of QOF, the PCT was positively perceived by most 
administration staff to be fairly supportive.  
If you‟ve got any query, you got a lot of contact numbers to ring, 
there‟s support for the IT side of things, and well, partly data 
quality meetings, which is to do with QOF and then 
coordinating things to do with QOF. What‟s PCT organised? I 
mean they do have certain meetings and things that they 
202 
 
organised depending on certain things and what is happening, 
such as Swine flu last year (PD.A2). 
Interestingly, from the viewpoint of partners and managers, QOF made them more 
disempowered than before. Although it was perceived to bring a positive clinical 
impact to patients, QOF was considered as interference in clinical care by the 
DoH through the PCT. Practices were bound to have their performance assessed 
by those bodies if they needed to have fresh funding.  
I think most of the practices feel to be disempowered by the 
QOF. We felt particularly that the Department of Health or 
whoever is setting the QOF targets is interfering with our 
clinical care. So, power is being removed from us (PA.D3). 
No, I think it‟s (power of practice) been diminished. The PCT 
now dictate what we do, where the money goes, what they want 
for their enhanced services etc (PC.D5). 
The disempowerment was represented by control over several administration and 
clinical aspects. These included finance, evidence-based assessment, and the 
interference of the PCT into some medical decisions related to a patient‘s 
treatment.  
1. More control over the finances. Informants perceived that there was a 
growing control over the practices‘ finances compared to the period before 
QOF. An example for the arrangement was enhanced services. The new GMS 
contract binds practices to providing essential services for their patients. In 
addition, they can also negotiate with their PCTs to offer services other than 
the essential ones. Such enhanced services are categorised into three key 
types, which are: (1) Directed Enhanced Services, (2) National Enhanced 
Services and (3) Local Enhanced Services. Directed Enhanced Services are 
obligatory for all PCTs but the participation of practices is not obligatory (i.e. 
child immunisation). National Enhanced Services depend on the PCT‘s 
decision to serve local needs. While it is not obligatory for PCTs to 
participate, if they choose to do so, they need to comply with national standard 
and prices (i.e. minor injury treatment). As for Local Enhanced Services, it is 
fully under the control of PCTs as they have ‗freedom to design, negotiate and 
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commission any other services‘ that are needed in their areas. In designing this 
service, the PCT may also use national standards or negotiate prices locally 
(NAO, 2008). 
Practices might provide enhanced services for their patients, however, whether 
they were able to obtain financial incentives for these services depended on 
the PCTs‘ decision. If PCTs chose not to provide the services, then practices 
would not be able to get access to any money.  
So, the so-called enhanced services, they can choose not to 
provide a locally enhanced service, in which case, we don‟t 
have access to the money for it. They can choose not to put 
money into Practice-based commissioning, which they‟ve done 
largely locally. So they‟ve certainly got more power than they 
used to have (PC.D4). 
2. More Control through Evidence and Inspections. Informants agreed that 
QOF was an evidence-based mechanism to assess a practice‘s health care 
service performance. This also increased practices‘ awareness of the need to 
provide robust evidence, as they were subject to fraud checking. Based on the 
submitted evidence, PCTs conducted the process of appraisal and visits to 
inspect practices. In addition, practices were also visited by a PCT fraud squad 
to check whether there were cases of rule breaching. To some extent, this was 
perceived to undermine the clinical professionalism of the clinicians.  
These processes gained unenthusiastic interest from practices. Informants 
stated that the PCT disbelieved them and acted with suspicion that practices 
had cheated to obtain extra money.  
They didn‟t think we could do it, but then we did it, but actually 
we do and we can. So, that information has been given to the 
PCT, which then scrutinized it, and then they send someone 
around to appraise, and pick up the clinical things that we want 
to look at and they question you about why you do this, how to 
do that, how did you do that, and what‟s happen there. We also 
get every few years inspected by a fraud squad, which is a 
second visit to see where we‟re cheating because the 
government thinks we do. They think we don‟t run well because 
the exception code for all patients. If you have to process them, 
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if you don‟t produce the data, you got penalised, unless you put 
of what we call an exception code (PA.D1). 
With all of the procedures and documentation required, QOF was thought to 
be bureaucratic and tended to put document availability as a priority rather 
than health care services. 
3. Less referral possibilities for patients. Interestingly, most informants were 
aware that the PCT were experiencing a difficult financial situation.  
We have the PCT that has one of the highest debts in the 
country. There are various reasons for that.  One of the reasons 
is that one of the hospitals has been employing a lot more and 
more consultants and taking a lot of money. They are not being 
able to control the hospital output, but another reason is that we 
are paid less in this area, because we have a higher index of 
deprivation. It is a different index, we are supposed to have a 
more healthy population, than somewhere like [X]. So, we are 
paid less per patient. So the PCT is wanting to reclaim money as 
much as possible, so we‟re always to look ahead, trying to 
negotiate more money and things if they‟ve paid us for things 
that we‟ve done. So, it‟s a bit of struggle (PA.D4). 
They pointed out that this situation resulted in less referral possibilities for 
patients, which brought potential detrimental effects on the practice. 
One example is we can‟t refer anyone, or we couldn‟t, up until 
about a month ago, for IVF, but if you register with that medical 
practice which belongs to other PCT, two miles down the road, 
you can be referred for IVF.  Now a patient can register with 
either practice, that kind of inequity within the system, just 
because of the PCT you're aligned to is frustrating in the very 
least, and you know, does leave a very bitter taste, particularly 
for GPs who are kind of having to deal with that really.  So, I 
think in that sense, relationships can be quite strained, because 
there‟s that divide between the GPs trying and want to do the 
best for their patients and the PCTs trying to manage a budget 
of [X] which is hideously overspent (PD.A3). 
Practice D claimed to be mostly affected by this situation. Being located at the 
boundary of the PCT‘s coverage area, its location position was side by side 
with a different PCT area. In most referral cases, they had to refer to the closer 
hospital, which was under a different PCT, rather than its own PCT.  
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It‟s often been quite difficult because we‟re working over 
boundaries, which we don‟t really feel the PCT always 
recognises and helps us with, and it‟s basically a problem for 
patients and a problem for us, and the people who set these 
areas up don‟t seem to recognise the problems you have if 
you're out on the boundaries, so that causes frustrations 
(PD.A3). 
This situation caused pressures and frustrations as the practices‘ intentions to 
provide better health care services were strained by such situation. For 
Practice D, it was perceived to get worse when things were commissioned and 
put in place without any discussion with the practice. The partners felt that 
they were overlooked as a practice.  
We‟re a small patch of a huge area, and it‟s sometimes difficult 
to get your voice heard I think, when you‟re trying to put 
changes and proposals in place. We have different systems to 
other larger areas and commissioning groups. We feel we get 
overlooked quite often which is a high level of frustration. 
Things get commissioned and put in place over our heads 
without any discussion with us as to whether it‟s actually what 
we want, so we‟re forever fighting and trying to say just run it 
by us first maybe we can suggest something different, maybe we 
don‟t need that. Just because they need it in such-and-such an 
area doesn‟t mean we need it in this area. So frustrations I think 
probably is the biggest thing to pick up on (PD.D1). 
Sharing similar perceptions, Practice B tried to increase the practice‘s bargaining 
power with the PCT through working as consortium. While it was understood that 
the power position was unlikely to improve for the practice, the consortium helped 
the practice to voice its need in a collective manner.  
[...] they certainly control the purse strings more than they used 
to. I find it hard to answer... I think... the PCT is no longer local.  
So, it‟s changed because the PCT is now regional, and with 
20,000 patients we were 10% of the city, so you had much more 
leverage with the PCT then, whereas now, we‟re 20,000 patients 
out of a county that's the size of Belgium, we have much less 
leverage with them, which is why we work as a consortium, in 
terms of more or less power, I don‟t think it‟s changed (PB.A4). 
While this dynamics affected the practices, informants tried to understand the 
reasons underlying such changes; for example, the PCT was seen to act on the 
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Government‘s orders and it also faced a pressurised situation following and 
implementing orders. Informants also emphasised that the PCT had gone through 
major restructuring that made it a regional-coverage body that was bigger in size 
than before. The change in size was also argued to make it more hierarchical, 
which affected the level at which the practices interacted with the PCT. It affected 
a practice‘s access to contact the PCT, especially when they needed advice on 
certain issues. This was perceived to weaken the relationship between the PCT 
and individual practices. Informants felt that it was easier to communicate with 
the PCT prior to restructuring. 
[…]it became the „vast bureaucratic beast that it is, feeding 
reports and targets to the government‟ it was a very different 
relationship, basically coming in and saying, you know „we need 
to save money, can you cut your prescribing, can you cut your 
referrals‟ and things. And I think it‟s carried on like that for a 
while.  In terms of how it is at the moment, there has been a 
change of personnel in the PCT which again, you lose expertise 
and contacts which is hideously frustrating if you're here trying 
to solve a problem and you don‟t know who to contact and 
nobody at the PCT knows what's happening (PD.A3). 
8.6.2. PERCEIVED CHANGES OF POWER DYNAMICS 
WITHIN THE PRACTICES 
Within the practices, informants did not notice any significant impact of QOF on 
power dynamics amongst healthcare professionals. For part-time partners, QOF 
did not affect their power equality. They might have had different shares of QOF 
money, but it was fairly distributed based on the hours they worked as part-time. 
Moreover, their status in the practice as part-time GP partners did not make them 
different in the decision making process as they still had equal voting with the 
full-time GP partners.  
It is all pro-rata, so if you are a full time partner, generally, you 
have twice as much as the work of a part-time worker, 
depending on exact time or number of sessions, but you still 
have equal decision, so I don‟t have twice as much power 
because I work twice as much as time, I‟ve still got the same 
amount of authority. But they might have as much as twice 
clinical QOF points to look up, but then rightly get twice as 
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much money as I have been doing twice as much of the work 
(PA.D5). 
The relationship between partners and salaried GPs was considered to be the 
same, pre and post QOF. However, there were some mixed responses to the 
question on whether QOF might have caused changes in the relationship between 
the physicians and the nursing team. This was mainly due to the delegation of 
some clinical works from physicians to nurses. 
From the practice management‘s perspective, QOF was perceived to be just a 
trigger for the changes in job responsibilities, which led to a different way of 
managing the nursing team from what practices used to do previously.   
For us it was QOF that triggered it; for other practices, they 
may well have already had their G-grades having more power 
than we do here. Historically we haven‟t managed our nurses as 
well as we should do. We had a lot of the G-grades not doing G-
grade work which means that they‟re not having to take on the 
roles and responsibilities appropriate to their grade. Whereas 
now it‟s a lot more focused that the workload that they are 
doing is appropriate to their grade so they take on the 
associated responsibilities with it as well (PD.D1). 
It was interesting to find out that the practice managers tried to use QOF 
indicators as a means to manage the clinicians in their practice, in particular the 
GPs, and this might give them power over the GPs as well. 
As a practice manager I certainly learned more about the 
clinical and the data quality compared to before. Beforehand 
probably it would have been more around the items of service 
which was like form filling in, counting and things like that. 
Practice managers would have been very focused on [...] 
income but it was just in a different way. When QOF came in we 
had to learn more about the clinical issues, like for the targets 
and how they worked out and what nurses needed to do. What 
training was needed and where the funding was going to come 
from for that training. There was a lot more around getting the 
clinical aspect of it all in place, rather than just saying that 
form‟s been signed and getting a set of signed forms, bundling 
them off. We looked at how we could track and keep ahead of 
the game really as regards getting people in for their annual 
reviews and things like that (PC.A1). 
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QOF actually gives me a road into clinical management, 
whether that's appropriate or not, but you know previously I 
would have nothing to go to them really to say „oh, you should 
be doing this in a consultation‟, they‟d have been „don't be 
ridiculous you've not got a medical degree‟ […] whereas now I 
can say „ok, QOF indicator is this, you're not doing it, that 
means this practice will lose £2000‟, it suddenly gives you a tool 
and they go „oh, ok‟, […] it has given me that platform to 
challenge them for the clinical side of things, and for the 
management side of things, they know a lot of thousands of 
pounds are determined in the management indicators, by what I 
do as well, so yes, I do think it has (PD. A3). 
Most partners did not recognise that there was a change in the relationships in 
their practice. Interestingly, they were aware of various studies mentioning that 
there was disappointment among nurses regarding their QOF assignments, 
especially related to the incentives that they should have received. Whilst, some 
agreed that changes in the power dynamics probably had taken place, there was no 
significant evidence of that. Partners only pointed out that the delegation of work 
had expanded the role of the nurses, rather than giving them more power over 
other teams in a working relationship setting.  
Whilst the nurses recognised that there was significant delegation of clinical work 
from GPs, they did not object to it. Indeed, they asserted that such delegation did 
not result in a shift in power dynamics. They reported to respects the GPs 
decisions to delegate some of the work. The delegation of work was perceived as 
something that had to be done to ensure effective running of the practice.  
Certainly, I‟ve got respect for the GPs. They're my employers 
and they pay me so I‟ve got to say that! But yes, of course I‟ve 
respect for them. The same way I hope they‟ve got respect for 
what I do for them, and for the girls down in the office as well. I 
think if you don‟t have that respect and don‟t realise what 
everybody does, a team can‟t be run effectively really (PD.N4). 
Taking all cognisance, informants perceived that QOF did not cause a significant 
shift in the power dynamics inside the practices. People maintained good working 
relationships in spite of the significant increase in workload. The delegation of 
work expanded the roles of nurses in clinical care, but it did not seem to give them 
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more power in the practices. People realised that they had different roles and thus 
contributed differently to the achievement of the practices‘ objectives. 
8.7. THE NARRATIVE OF ‘NO  CHANGE’ IN 
STRUCTURE 
Finally, while there were visible adjustments to various aspects in the practices, 
informants still maintained stories of ‗no change‘ in their structural arrangement 
or designs. 
Well, it‟s a small difference, you know, but part of it is obviously 
we have a team that, you know, spend more time watching QOF, 
so that takes that team away from other things.  But we still have 
a, you know, we still have the same structure; there's no 
difference in the structure.  QOF happens and we deal with it‟ 
(PB.D3). 
2004 marked obviously the beginning of the QOF. It marked the 
end of our contractual obligation to provide out of hours, so 
most GPs have withdrawn from that although I‟ve carried on 
and so have 2 or 3 of the others. The QOF was another set of 
hurdles to jump over. Financially more important than the ones 
that went before it. But apart from a bit of extra employment and 
some re-deploying of, or re-appraisal of staff roles, I don‟t think 
there‟s been any major structural changes in the practice to 
accommodate QOF (PD.N1). 
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8.8. CONCLUSION  
Although there were some considerable differences in their size, all four practices 
claimed to have a structure with a limited number of hierarchical layers. It was 
asserted that the relationships between the layers as well as between different 
professions were relatively flexible and open. The partnership, which in the case 
of Practice B included the practice manager, was described as a ‗bubble of equal 
partnership‘ and was positioned on top of the managerial structure. The 
managerial layers acted as the infrastructure that supported the partnership.   
The relationship between people in the structure was complex, reflecting both 
vertical and horizontal interactions. It enabled those on top of the structure to 
engage in shop floor issues.  Thus, it would have been very difficult to draw an 
organogram for the structure. Job responsibilities were assigned mostly based on 
qualification, expertise, and skill. For clinical jobs, people‘s interest was the main 
concern in setting specialisations. In the decision making process, all four 
practices confirmed that in general there were two different levels of decisions, 
one was at the business level and the other was day-to-day decision making. More 
importantly, it was revealed that the channel of reporting was similar to decision 
making, in the sense that clinical issues were separated from administrative issues. 
The most debatable change caused by QOF was about the delegation of work to 
lower level health care professionals. Nurses and health care assistants had been 
prepared to take more complex responsibilities, which were thought to be 
appropriate for their levels of qualification. Interestingly, most nurses reported 
that they were happy with the new assignments, and they felt that it did not give 
them more power to deal with others, especially with physicians. 
The findings also showed that the decision making processes were still similar to 
those in place prior to QOF. The only difference was that QOF now became a 
reference for making decisions. Considering the contribution of QOF money to 
practice income which was about 20-30% of total income, practices had shifted 
their priorities and used QOF as a critical reference to justify their decisions.  
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Related to the relationship between the practices and external bodies, such as the 
PCT and Department of Health, findings showed QOF brought more power to the 
PCT, and thus, disempowered the practices financially. To some extent, it drove 
practices to be oriented toward the fulfilment of QOF targets rather than focusing 
on patient care. Target driven behaviour was also perceived to undermine the 
clinicians‘ professionalism.  
Internally, the findings reported no significant difference in power between 
people. Members of all four practices still had good working relationships and 
there was no friction among teams. Instead of seeing delegation as a power 
exercised by one profession or one hierarchy to another, it was seen as an 
unavoidable effect of QOF. In all cases, people perceived that there was an 
embedded power in their structural position and everyone seemed to respect the 
power of the partnerships and enjoy their work accordingly.  
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CHAPTER 9 
IDENTITY AND NORMS 
 
 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the findings on how individuals perceived identity of the 
organisation where they were working and their role as either health care 
professionals or administration staff. The previous chapters showed that changes 
in both strategy and structure were evidenced in all practices. While practice 
identity and norms were less visible, understanding changes in both aspects 
provides a complete picture of how QOF potentially altered the framework of 
practice organisations. The findings are presented based on the common themes 
which emerged during the interviews.  
9.2. ORGANISATIONAL NORMS AND VALUES 
Informants highlighted important points about the importance of organisational 
norms in running the practices. They argued that they had strong organisational 
norms that were perceived to affect how they dealt with patients, to influence their 
day-to-day informal interaction and also to govern their working behaviour.  
9.2.1. PATIENT-ORIENTATED NORMS 
In dealing with patients, all informants involved in the study confirmed that they 
shared similar norms which emphasised the importance of patient-centred care. 
These norms guided them during their interaction with patients, who were seen as 
the focal point of healthcare. 
So, we‟re seeing patients, we have to do the problems that they 
are bringing in, rather than what we want to get out of them in a 
way, the process and the information in order to make it work 
(PA.D1).  
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It‟s patient-centred care all the time ultimately. We want to give 
the best service we can within the budget and within our 
capabilities really. So, it‟s always patient-centred care and I‟ve 
not come across anybody who says anything otherwise. And 
that‟s how I feel. It‟s patient-centred (PC.D3). 
This value was widely shared by all professionals in the four practices, both 
clinical and administrative staff. They confirmed that quality of care was their 
priority.  
Patients are paramount; patients are the first port of call, are 
our priority.  We have to try and give our patients the care and 
the quality of, that they need, right from reception, right through 
to clinicians, and when we take enquiries on the phone.  We try 
our best to meet the patient‟s needs.  If we can‟t do it, we pass it 
over to a clinician. Patients are our bread and butter, that's 
what we‟re here for (PB.A1). 
We aim to offer the best health-care service that we can provide 
with the patients, in mind of their needs as well, and 
expectations (PD.D1). 
In addition, to support their staff in delivering services, all practices emphasised 
that it was a part of their organisational norms to ensure that staff were given the 
opportunity to learn. The practices supported both clinicians and administrators by 
sending them on training courses, as well as encouraging them to learn through 
their own experiences. 
We try and reward our staff and we try and look after them, we 
try and make sure that through Investors in People, if they want 
to kind of progress, if they want to go on and do other things, 
then we will  pay for training courses for them to go off and 
„professionally develop‟.  And that is very key to the 
organisation.  If a person comes in as a receptionist, but then 
wants to go on to do something else, we will say „yes, if that fits 
with the practice, then we‟ll pay for you to go on that course, 
you acquire those skills‟ and then they‟ll say well that‟s really 
good, I want to go off and do something else now‟ and as long 
as it fits with the aims of the organisation, we will try and help 
to do that.  So, some people will come in, they will do a number 
of years with us, and then they will go on to do bigger things, 
better things, which is good. For the salaried staff, we have 5 
salaried staff, one is going to leave, he's been a salaried staff for 
5 years and he's gone on to be a partner in [X], just been offered 
a partnership last week, he has been very good for us, he has 
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worked very hard, but we have also helped him to develop so 
he's in a position to be able to say to people I'm very good, I 
want to be a partner‟ so it works both ways (PB.D1). 
Practice A and Practice B claimed that they had a very supportive ‗blame-free‘ 
norm.  Instead of blaming individuals for making mistakes, practices approached 
it differently, through reviewing and improving the supporting systems to 
eliminate potential future mistakes.  
It is blame-free, but we have systems in place, which enable like 
significant events. So, it‟s praised, as well as various areas that 
need improving. So, it‟s a question of review, review the 
systems, review the procedures, and then review the staff, and 
then appraisal of people, which is very important. The people, 
procedures, but that is teamwork, that has to work in total 
harmony.  Has to work in harmony, because if there is no 
support and no movement of change, then you are static and you 
get left behind. So that is the culture of improving if it needs to 
be done (PA.A2). 
The value is, is a sort of that(professionalism and trying to treat 
each other with respect, and listening to other peoples‟ 
opinions), the members of our work force are our strongest asset 
and what we try and do is try and promote those people and 
help those people in order to provide the best service we can.  
Because it‟s very much a team based organisation, very much a 
people orientated organisation, that's why we‟ve got things like 
„blame-free‟ culture „cause what we‟re trying to do is [...] trying 
to invest in the people who work here, to try and make them as 
good as we can, in order to provide the best service to the 
patients that we can (PB.D2). 
Practice B also had formal values understood as ‗Professionalism, Unity and 
Balance‘. According to senior partners, these were strongly held values which 
were claimed to be the anchors for the organisational practices that were brought 
up in every meeting. 
[…] these values can be understood as, to work together to 
provide a caring quality service for all our patients, so we strive 
to, within the practice, we strive to work towards 
professionalism, and also we have to have a balance in our 
lives, but above all else we have to have unity in the practice.  
It‟s very important that we look after each other.  So that, that's 
our, that's the practice philosophy that I try to bring forward 
(PB.D3). 
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Interestingly, the values were manifested differently from one person to another. 
Nurses held these values through „treating everybody as you would yourself‟  
(PB.N1), and „ having high standards and high expectations‟ (PB.N2); while most 
partner informants asserted that such values were evidenced in their commitment 
to investing in people, openness and sharing, listening to others and respects.  
It‟s just the professionalism and trying to treat each other with 
respect and listening to other people‟s opinions and trying to 
take other peoples‟ thoughts into consideration when you‟re 
actioning things (PB.D2). 
Practice C also emphasised the supportive and openness norms. People learnt 
together through open discussions and meetings. The partners pointed out that this 
was also represented in how management involved staff in the decision making 
process.  
We‟re a practice that likes to look after the patients, that is 
providing a friendly service, and we‟re an open and a learning 
organisation. In the sense that we have regular meetings, we 
discuss problems that arise, if something goes wrong, it‟s talked 
about, we don‟t try and cover it up, we try and learn lessons 
from it (PC.D4). 
Practice D put emphasis on having an efficient manner and not being money-
orientated in providing quality healthcare as its organisational norms. For this 
practice, the norms strongly supported its identity as a community-based practice. 
We aim to offer the best health-care service that we can provide 
with the patients in mind of their needs as well, and 
expectations. We‟re not just out there to get as much money into 
the practice as we can. We‟re not high-flyers in that respect; it‟s 
more the cultural, spreading our knowledge as well with the 
education base as well. Trying to provide general practice good 
grass roots for the future and work as a team really (PD.D1).  
From these findings, it is apparent that all four practices had similar strong norms 
of patient-care; yet, each of them had its own characteristics to distinguish it from 
the other practices. 
To ensure that all individuals in the practice shared the same norms, a good 
communication mechanism was perceived to be beneficial to foster such norms in 
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staff. Informants confirmed that their practices ran an induction process which 
introduced organisational norms to new members as part of it. 
You bring somebody in new who has never worked in general 
practice before, it doesn‟t matter what department they're in, 
they‟ll have an induction, and then they will have a period of 
weeks or months training, and they may go, have training in 
house, they may train outside as well, it's usually a bit of both 
and it‟s not until they quite... they will also have reviews 
(PB.A1). 
We would look at the programme of work for an induction for a 
nurse and we would be involved a lot more with that. GPs would 
probably leave us to sort that out, us and the practice manager. 
When we‟ve had new nurses we‟ve planned what their work and 
responsibilities would be together (PD.N1). 
And then in terms of the culture of the nurses, they share  
similar norms and values, but different, and they have been 
stimulating to our practice norms, and partly by kind of [...] a 
process of induction and just by working out how we do things, 
which could be different in every practice (PA.D4). 
Informants also expressed that Investors in People helped practices in enhancing 
organisational norms through people development. The practice manager and one 
of the partners in practice B stated: 
We spend a lot of money on training, investing in people 
(PB.A4). 
Yeah, I mean we invest in all our staff, so we have like an 
investors in skills, Investors in People status.  So what we do, 
with all our workforce, we try and invest in them and move them 
forward in their career, so they have more to contribute to the 
company and to the practice (PB.D2). 
Another practice manager added: 
I think performance has increased because of tools like 
Investors in People, even QOF, because we have looked at how 
we‟re working and moved forward. Looked at training and 
development of staff, looked at the future of the practice 
(PC.A1).  
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9.2.2. NORMS GUIDING RELATIONSHIPS AMONGST 
PEOPLE 
Norms can be seen to guide relationships between people; it is interesting to note 
that some informants closely associated the norms with power dynamics. This 
especially related to how people perceived both formal and informal relationships. 
While formal relationships between people have been discussed previously 
(Chapter 8 – Power Dynamics), this section presents only the findings related to 
norms guiding informal relationships within the practices.  
As presented previously, more than half of the informants had been working in the 
practices for more than 10 years. Given the long years of interaction, people 
noticed that they were close to one another in varying degrees. This was said to 
help them manage their relationship in the work context and outside the practice . 
In practice D, for instance, many of its employees originated from the same area. 
People worked together and became friends outside the context of the workplace. 
The relationship developed over time and bound them together. 
We‟ve worked together long enough to know there has to be 
some give and take so we‟d do it for each other.  If somebody‟s 
off sick, we don't go to the practice manager and say „can you 
sort out some cover‟ we cover it between ourselves.  So in effect, 
we manage ourselves but we‟re responsible (PD.N3). 
Well certainly, there‟s a very, team work, sense of family that in 
a way, because it‟s a close practice and because people have 
stayed here for quite a long time, people know each other very 
well. People have gone through a lot of personal stuff with each 
other (PD.N4). 
This improved their performance in their work, as they learnt and shared 
experiences/information. The relationship itself, which was developed through 
years of experience, can be seen as a strength for the practice.  
We've all had times, we've gone through some really bad times, 
through illness, each of us, and we‟re good friends.  We keep in 
touch with each other and we have socialised in the past with 
each other, and I would say most of our work, we actually get on 
very well together.  Work situation, we run our own clinics, if 
one of us is behind and the others are working, you pick each 
other‟s work up, so you can try and get through (PD.N3). 
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Such relationships were not only expressed through the relationship between 
colleagues within the work setting. Informants also kept with them a history of the 
relationship which possibly helped them in dealing with patients. For the practices, 
knowledge embodied in their members provided them with more understanding of 
the patient health care behaviours and patient status. This in turn, contributed to 
efficiency in performing medical activities, as clinician and patient were acquainted 
with each other.  
And I have seen families and people evolving like that for 
thirteen year [...] because I know the whole family, we can have 
a much more productive discussion and we don‟t bother so 
much about confidentiality, as I know them and they know me. It 
is a conversation between friends and people who know each 
other (PA.D1). 
Continuity brings efficiency. If you know somebody and you 
know their history and their family you know their problems, 
you're much more likely to be able to deal with them quickly, 
than if it‟s a stranger (PB.D4). 
For most informants, the harmony in working together seemed to be very 
important, especially when they needed to respond to changes. It was further stated 
that integration between people and procedure must exist and the team needed to 
work in harmony. It was essential for them to support each other, to ensure that 
organisations caught up with changes.  
The people, procedures, but that is teamwork that has to work in 
total harmony.  Has to work in harmony, because if there is no 
support and no movement of change, then you are static and you 
get left behind. So that is the culture of improving if it needs to 
be done, on reflection (PA.A2). 
Our norms and values try to be about the common 
understanding of goals, about delivering a good service, about 
openness and sharing and not being too hierarchical, whilst 
needing structure to work. So, as I said anybody really can come 
to any of us with their problems. […] we try to be cohesive, 
involve people, work as a team, be part of a family, we‟re all 
doing the same thing, and again tend to be this sort of style, 
(mentor and facilitator), but also, you know, trying to think, to 
look after your staff you know. There‟s a lot of this, particularly 
loyalty, maybe less tradition, and very much about developing 
people, training and trying to make - as you know we have a 
Human Resources person who is very, very good (PB.D4). 
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Another strong norm shared within the practices was respect for others. Several 
informants asserted that they needed to have respects for other healthcare 
professionals regarding their work. It was said that effective team working would 
not work without appreciation toward others (PB.D1; PC.D5; PB.N1).While there 
were no rules regulating such behaviour, people respected the role of others and 
their knowledge, as they wanted others to respect them in returns. More 
importantly, informants also argued that the interaction between them expanded 
their knowledge scope, as they were able to learn from the experiences of others. 
All the team leaders are listened to because we have the 
experience of what we‟re supposed to do.  So he‟s created us if 
you like, so if he's not going to listen to us, then we might not as 
well be here.  We inform him what's going on, we discuss things.  
I think everybody, there's a lot of, it‟s shared a lot, but it‟s 
specific to what you do (PB.A2). 
There‟s a general respect for everybody in the practice, whether 
you're a [...] the doctors respect the lowest, it works throughout 
and I think everybody tries their best to support each other 
through whatever you get (PB.A2). 
9.2.3. PERCEIVED CHANGES IN ORGANISATIONAL NORMS 
Some informants claimed that they had not experienced any changes of norms in 
their practices, while others noticed that there were relatively evident changes in 
practice norms. Those arguing that there were no changes associated it with 
patient-related norms. However, those agreeing that there were some noticeable 
changes commented that there were various factors contributing to those changes.   
9.2.3.1. ENVIRONMENT CHANGE AND SHIFTING OF NORMS 
Informants identified a change in practice norms, which especially related to 
changes in the surrounding community.  Another informant also pointed out that 
the practices needed more staff to cope with the growing demands and 
expectations of the population. As more new people have been recruited, it has 
been seen to contribute to shifting practice norms, especially relating to both 
clinician-patient relationships and doctor-nurse relationships. By comparing ‗old-
school‘ GPs and ‗new-school‘ ones, a senior practice nurse asserted that the 
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relationship between professions, as well as between clinicians and patients, had 
become less formal. She perceived that the old tradition of addressing clinicians 
as ‗Dr. or Sister‘ is now old-fashioned.  
Well, you‟ve probably heard the word [expression] “old-
school”. There‟s a lot of “old-school” trained GPs that were all 
the senior ones that are leaving. A lot of the ones were trained 
where they weren‟t called by their name, it was always Doctor, 
and the same in hospitals with the Sisters, first names were 
never used and they're all going now and newer doctors where 
patients call them by their first name, and it‟s all just a new 
thing and it‟s whether that‟s a good thing, whether 
professionalism should take a little step back and say, yes you 
have come to see the doctor, I‟m not your friend I‟m your doctor 
and[…]that‟s just a very small thing but I don‟t know. There‟s a 
lot changed and I‟m not sure if it‟s always good for that 
(PD.N4). 
9.2.3.2. CHANGES OF STAFF PROFILE AND FORMALISED WORKING 
RELATIONSHIP 
Informants highlighted that it was not only QOF that caused changes in 
organisational norms. Different staff profiles were argued to significantly alter 
how practice norms were set up.  
Informants in Practice D noticed that the appointment of the current practice 
manager had brought about significant changes to working relationships. 
Previously, there had been fewer formalities in the practice, in terms of 
procedures or regulations relating to routine activities. It changed the norm of 
‗give and take‘ between colleagues, to become more formal working 
relationships.  
I think because it was a smaller team, we‟d less, we‟d five GPs, 
they all got on well together, they always fell out but everybody 
was a[...]  you looked after each other like a family, everybody 
knew everybody else, the management side wasn‟t particularly 
organised, it did the management as to how it was then, there 
was a lot less work then, the practice manager was somebody 
who started in the office and worked her way up, we didn‟t have 
all the policies written down, there was a great deal of loyalty 
[…]  I think the loyalty has gone a little bit because there's less 
give and take, it‟s seems to be coming down „this is how it needs 
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to be‟ „this is how we have to have it‟ „this is how the directives 
say‟, there was always a lot of give and take. If you worked late, 
it didn‟t matter, if somebody needed dealing with, something 
needed doing, you did it, it didn‟t matter, you took the time back 
another day, if you didn‟t have a meal break it didn‟t matter 
because when it was quiet you went home, you don't have the 
quiet times anymore, and you‟re expected to do a little bit, and 
so to me, there's no give and take (PD.N3). 
9.2.3.3. PRACTICE RESTRUCTURING AND CHANGES IN WORKING 
NORMS 
A rather different narrative was extracted from Practice C. Its informants reported 
that they had experienced a change in working norms, which was mainly caused 
by the amalgamation of two practices. The practice manager asserted that it 
related to how to accommodate the two different working norms of teams from 
two formerly independent practices. Moreover, differences in staff demographic 
patterns also became a concern, as the two teams were very different in age range. 
Indeed, some difficulties did occur but were sorted out, especially with the 
administrative teams. 
There were quite a lot of worries about how the two teams 
would work together, particularly the receptionists. The group 
from one practice are all in their 60s and had worked together 
for 25 years, they were best friends as well as colleagues. The 
reception team from the other practice was younger, but they 
have worked brilliantly together. The two teams have merged 
really well. It has been more difficult with the admin teams 
because they worked differently so they‟ve had more changes to 
make, regarding all working in one room instead of having an 
office each, working together, sharing the work more. One in 
particular is having problems. She used to work for 2 GPs now 
she works for 8 GPs and she‟s finding that more difficult. But I 
think that‟s normal and we‟ll work it out (PC.A1). 
Thus, it can be seen from the findings that there were some changes in 
organisational norms. While there were no significant changes in norms 
regulating patient-staff relationships, there were considerable shifts of norms in 
working context and relationships. However, rather than being caused by QOF, 
the changes were more associated with changes in both the internal and external 
practices‘ environment.  
222 
 
9.3. ORGANISATIONAL IDENTITY 
This section presents the findings on how individuals perceived the identity of 
their organisations and their roles as either health care professionals or 
administrative staff. Informants were asked whether they were aware of their 
practice‘s identity. Interestingly, the responses were varied. Some informants 
argued that identity was not an issue for their practices. One of the partner 
informants in Practice A commented that the practice should not put itself in a 
position to be compared with other practices and to compete with them in a 
competitive market. This was seen as out of the scope of the practice‘s ethos. He 
asserted that as a practice, the priority was to focus on patient care.  
I don‟t think that‟s an issue, I don‟t think we try to position 
ourselves amongst other practices. We‟re not the best or the 
worst, we don‟t compare ourselves with other practices. No, it 
just misses the points, it is not part of our organisational ethos, 
we don‟t position ourselves among other healthcare 
organisations, it‟s not like Tesco, where we‟re trying to corner 
some market which Sainsbury doesn‟t have. We‟re just trying to 
do the best for our patients, and patients are the centre of what 
we are trying to do. Not our position amongst other healthcare 
organisations around us. We‟re not looking outward to see what 
other practices are doing in order to jostle and manoeuvre this 
practice amongst others (PA.D3). 
Taking a similar stance, the practice A manager mentioned that it would be 
difficult to see that a particular practice was different from others, as they all 
worked in the same sector. In fact, she argued that instead of trying to be different, 
they were all trying to facilitate for each other. 
We don‟t like competition [...] we don‟t, and that‟s the worst 
thing that the government has ever thought of [...] creating a 
competition in an environment that primarily attracts people 
that actually care how they do the jobs [...] .and it is not QOF, 
it‟s how I could go on, and I feel very strongly about people 
trying to compete. It‟s absolutely nonsense. That has happened, 
but government is way out [...] of how is it in reality. We are 
here to help, I mean, we are here to facilitate, so that the 
patients can come and see us, and they get good care, and they 
see us when they need to (PA.A2). 
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9.3.1. PERCEIVED ORGANISATIONAL IDENTITY 
In general, the interviews were able to gather how informants perceived their 
practice identity. As organisational identity has close associations with 
organisational images, some informants might have overlapped their descriptions 
on identity with images. At this point, informants tended to explain their 
organisational identity by comparing their practice with others. Moreover, some 
informants also attached several identities to their practice. Thus, the identities are 
not mutually exclusive to each other. 
9.3.1.1. PATIENT-CENTRED PRACTICES 
All practices asserted that their priority was to provide high quality care for 
patients. Patients were seen as their centre of operation, as well as a primary 
source of practice identity. Hence, having established that being patient-centred 
was its core orientation; informants described how such an identity was 
represented in their daily operations. One example was how patients were treated 
with care. This identity could also be presented through how practices offered 
various healthcare services to cater for different patients‘ needs. Informants also 
claimed that their practice always attempted to fulfil a patient‘s preference to get a 
high quality treatment from health care professionals in the practice.  
They're constantly; I think the partnership are constantly 
looking for other ways to meet patients‟ expectations and 
demands, and to provide a better service (PB.A1). 
[…]to provide a high standard of patients care[…] to continue 
to provide a high standard of patients care [... ] that‟s 
accessible to our local population and relevant to their health 
care needs(PD.D2). 
Practice A, for example, asserted that its patient-centred identity was reflected 
through its cautiousness in delivering care, as well as in managing the practice. 
Although income was considered to be important, it was argued not to be the 
thing the practice was oriented towards.   
We‟re slightly larger than the average in the UK. In terms of 
organisational structure, organisational culture, I think we 
probably still have a little bit higher value [...] places higher 
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value still on patient care, and expert being the people to deliver 
that care. And other practices, probably, at least some of them, 
have a higher value on the income and innovation towards 
getting a greater income [...] It is not to say that all of us as 
partners feel that way, but that is the way that we‟ve tended to 
carry us as a team so far (PA.D4). 
9.3.1.2. FORWARD-THINKING AND STAND-AHEAD OF OTHERS  
Another leading identity cited by informants in Practices A, B and C was being a 
forward-thinking or stand-ahead practice. The basic narrative of this identity was 
based on how each practice always tried to offer something new for better patient 
care, even if it was not required by the government or previously initiated by other 
practices.  
We‟re a forward-moving organisation, and I think that‟s how, 
we‟re thinking, we‟re doing the training and things next and the 
research. Now we have got a nice building we are all on one site 
so we can share the work and the stresses and there are ways of 
moving forward. So, I think we‟d like to be thought of as a 
practice that‟s moving forward really (PC.D6). 
I think it‟s the forward thinking and the moving forward. [...] I 
do just feel that anything that is new to patient care, is, we do 
implement, we move forward with it all the time.  A lot of things 
that other practices possibly wouldn‟t take on board, we do.  But 
we are a bigger practice, we've got a lot of admin staff, I believe 
other practices are half our size in patient numbers, so of course 
they haven‟t got the administration that we've got, so you can't 
implement.  To some extent, they're more selective in what they 
offer to their patients, where as we offer everything really 
(PB.A1). 
Most informants maintained that it was important to think out of the box or think 
beyond what the practice could usually do. This was argued to be one of the ways 
for practices to keep moving forward. In that sense, the practices always tried to 
be proactive. Moreover, innovative thinking and entrepreneurial orientation were 
professed to push organisations to stand ahead of others.  
I think that practices have had to look outside their little boxes I 
think, especially here, you can't just become the little [... ] just 
sit there and wait for the patients to come into you, you've got to 
develop into other thing that provide a much better service.  The 
things we do now, I think like the vasectomies, the carpel 
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tunnels, the minor surgeries, they save the patients, they come 
into a familiar environment, they see the doctors they know, 
they're not having to go to the hospital and I think, as a practice, 
we‟ve done that pretty well, so, you have to grow, you have to 
look outside (PB.A2). 
In order to sustain this identity, they kept moving forward, all practices invested 
greatly in developing the skills and capacities of their members through training 
and courses. This strengthened the idea that people-oriented practices were not 
only concerned about patients but also about their staff‘ interests.  
I think forward thinking and prepared to do something different, 
prepared to train doctors, we do a lot of training, prepared to 
have minor surgeries done in our practice.  Also prepared to 
spend money to make the place better for patients if we can, for 
our own buildings anyway (PB.A2). 
We‟ve had a lot of changes, a lot of upheavals, you know with a 
change in structure and it sort of […] it moves everything along 
a step, so whereas like, I‟m sort of a junior practice nurse, it 
gives me the chance to move up and learn more skills and the 
whole team moves up and moves along. And ultimately, that 
benefits the patients as well because there‟s more qualified staff, 
more well-trained staff and people who want to move on and 
want to learn more are getting the roles and the training and 
doing what they want to do as well. It benefits them and it 
benefits the practice (PB.N1). 
9.3.1.3. GOOD GP PRACTICES 
Fifteen people from all four practices identified their practices as a good practice. 
Interestingly, they pointed out different contributing factors associated with ‗good 
practice‘. These factors included the expertise of health care professionals, the 
high loyalty of staff, high quality standards, hardworking staff and practice 
efficiency.  
One senior partner in Practice B associated ‗good practice‘ with the resources 
available in the practice. Practice B was a large practice and it had reliable 
resources, facilities and expertise. This was believed to enable the practice to gain 
economies of scale, which in turn led to efficiency. Furthermore, as the practice 
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had a large number of human resources, it also reflected a possible wide range of 
clinical expertise, compared to those of smaller practices.   
We‟re a good GP, with good access. We‟ve re-branded 
ourselves into the [X] Practice with logos etc. We are also 
Investors in People, and providing good quality and efficient 
service to the patients. [...] well because we are big, a big 
practice, we have a lot, we can have economies of scale in terms 
of what we do, and because we have a lot of people working for 
us, it makes us a very strong, robust, resilient organisation, we 
feel we are better placed perhaps to take advantage of some of 
the things which are available perhaps than a smaller practice, 
where they are more[... ] they do not have the expertise.  They 
do not have the number of people to actually kind of pick up 
these new exciting things and drive them like we have done in 
the past 3 to 5 years (PB.D1). 
Similarly, Practice A was identified by its informants as a good practice on the 
basis of staff quality. A high quality of healthcare services could not be achieved 
unless a practice had good quality staff. Moreover, a salaried doctor stated that 
Practice A had a very good work ethos and staff worked cohesively as teams, 
which could be used as a sign of good staff quality. She asserted that these aspects 
showed a sense of belonging to the practice, as well as how they worked 
seamlessly together.  
Because the staff are very good, in terms of attitude, how hard 
they work, and the fact that they got their responsibilities and 
they want to fulfil those responsibilities, and they do a good job. 
Everyone working towards the same aim, really. We‟re not 
relying on one particular person, everyone especially with 
receptionists and admin staff, they‟ve all got more than one job 
to do. So, they might be on a reception desk, but then they have 
a few hours doing cervical cytology. They‟ve all got their own 
little individual areas of expertise they want to be in charge of, 
whatever, that people can ask them about. So, we don‟t have a 
group of receptionists, a group of admin staff, a group of nurses 
or doctors. People are sort of more a mixture round with the 
admin and the reception staff. [...] So, here, with the receptions 
having different small area to look after, things are generally 
smoother. And they got their own little area that they keen to 
look after and make sure that everybody just does it right. This 
is more ownership in their area (PA.D2). 
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Rather differently, informants from Practice D associated a good practice with 
how much the practice was concerned with high quality standard of service 
delivery. This can be seen through how the patients were happy to stay with the 
practice.  
Anything I can say about that is that we‟ve got a lot of patients 
who move out of our area and don‟t tell us because they don‟t 
want to leave us. Because we must be good. We must provide a 
service that they like (PD.A2). 
9.3.1.4. COOPERATIVE / FRIENDLY PRACTICES 
Some informants identified their practices as friendly practices. They associated 
this characteristic with the idea of being patient-centred. It became the practice‘s 
priority to provide quality health care for patients; thus, it was vital to maintain 
amicable relationships with patients.  As an example, Practice C, believed that 
being a friendly practice meant that staff were becoming more accessible for 
patients. In this sense, the practice made every effort to customise its services by 
opening for late evening appointments and having friendly staff and clinicians to 
assist patients. 
Friendly, approachable, we offer late evening services. We‟ve 
got nice approachable GPs, flexible appointments working 
hours, very efficient nurses, health care assistants. We‟ve got a 
phlebotomy department downstairs. Nice friendly reception 
team. I think we‟re more approachable and friendly and willing 
to help, assist people. You hear of some practices [where] say 
the reception staff are a bit frosty and things (PC.N1). 
A similar perspective was also shared by Practice D. Being the only practice in a 
radius of 3 miles, it was essential for the practice to sustain good relationships 
with patients. This became more important as the practice believed that its 
existence very much depended on patients. It was all about the patients, which 
was the reason for being a patient-centred practice. 
Meanwhile, some informants expressed the importance of looking inward at the 
welfare of their internal staff, as well as that of patients. Friendly practices could 
also be represented through the ways in which they facilitated their staff with a 
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good working environment. Practice B, for example, asserted that they exert a lot 
of effort in ensuring that the practice was cooperative with both patients and staff. 
Yeah, I think it's very much we‟re a practice of, we‟re a friendly 
practice and if you've got a problem basically, let your team 
leader know and it can be sorted out. We‟re not ones for 
blaming, we don‟t run a blame culture, if something goes wrong, 
it‟s human nature, we move forward and we learn from it 
(PB.A1). 
In addition, one of the partners in Practice C perceived a friendly and cooperative 
practice in terms of how the practice managed its relationships with other 
practices. He maintained that Practice C was a cooperative practice, in a way that 
it was willing to work together with other practices. While he asserted that there 
was no need to compete with others to gain more patients, he agreed that the 
practice would suffer if they lost patients.  
I think we‟re cooperative, that‟s what we want to be a practice 
that cooperates with other practices. We‟re not really in 
competition although if patients all decide to go elsewhere we 
would suffer. But there‟s much more to be gained through 
working with other practices than competing. I think we would 
like to be seen as a stable practice that is reliable and has a 
welcoming identity (PC.D4). 
9.3.1.5. PRACTICES WITH EMPATHY / CARING PEOPLE 
Practice D was the only practice identifying itself as a practice with empathy and 
caring for people. It highlighted the need to have both clinical and administrative 
staff with empathy, who were willing to care for others.  For Practice D, it was 
vital to have good staff, who would be able to produce better services  The 
practice strongly underlined the importance of empathy in dealing with people, 
both patients and colleagues. Staff were expected to treat patients properly and 
tried very hard to fulfil their preference of care.  
I would think the main one is empathy. That means that we still 
think about our patients as human beings and we have [...] we 
don‟t just do [...] we don‟t just say to them we can‟t do that 
because we feel that doesn‟t need to do something, then we will 
[...] we will do it (PD.A2). 
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9.3.1.6. COMMUNITY-BASED / TRADITION-ORIENTED PRACTICES 
Amongst the four practices, only Practice D was located in a semi-rural area. All 
informants in Practice D confirmed the practice‘s strong attachment to the local 
environment and people. Besides the close relationship with patients, most staff in 
the practice came from or lived in the area. Based on this fact, Practice D 
identified itself to be a community-based practice, as well as tradition-oriented 
practice.   
I would say they liked the practice, it was a big part of their life, 
it‟s a big part of the village, the GPs are all local, half the staff 
were local, and people knew everybody else (PD.N3). 
Informants also asserted that it was not only location that contributed to practice‘s 
identity as a community-based practice, but also staff and the organisational ethos 
that strongly differentiated Practice D from other practices.  
I suppose location is one of the things unique to the practice. 
The fact that we‟re semi-rural, makes us a little bit more 
individual to some of the other practices around. But the 
practice isn‟t the building or the location, it‟s the team and the 
ethos of the practice and the people working within it, which 
create the identity; because if you pick  another practice, 
another team another way of working and put them in here 
you‟d get a different practice and I‟m sure the patients would 
pick up on that as well (PD.D1).  
9.3.1.7. MODERN PRACTICES 
Practice C informants identified the practice as a dynamic and modern practice. 
This identity was associated with the practice‘s new, modern facilities. Equipped 
with such facilities, the practice expected to be able to meet a wide range of 
patients‘ needs.  
A dynamic, forward thinking, upmarket practice modern. I‟d like 
to think we are appreciated, the patient‟s expectations are met. 
We‟ve got bright new, modern surroundings, comfortable, easily 
accessible, a lift for the elderly. I hope people see us as a new, 
innovative venture in this area. As opposed to being in an old-
fashioned building with limited facilities (PC.N2).     
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9.3.2. PERCEIVED CHANGES ON ORGANISATIONAL 
IDENTITY 
Most informants expressed that even if there were some changes, they did not 
significantly change the way they perceived their practice‘s identity. They pointed 
out that QOF was not the only factor that affected organisational identity, as the 
wider organisational environment was also perceived to contribute.  
9.3.2.1. STRENGTHENING THE IDENTITY OF BEING FORWARD 
THINKING PRACTICES 
For some informants, QOF was perceived to strengthen the identity of the practice 
as being a forward thinking practice. This was justified through relating the 
practice performance with the QOF score obtained for the last 5 years.  
For example, for the first year, we already got the top mark, 
because we are a forward looking practice, we always had 
senior GPs, pretty much care about clinical governance, care 
about patients. If you don‟t have the right people, you cannot 
have the best QOF. It is written by somebody else, but if it is not 
implemented then it will not happen (PA.A2). 
QOF was perceived to strengthen a practice‘s identity through formalising what 
the practices had already done prior to QOF, for example, establishing chronic 
disease clinics.  
But QOF has replaced what was there before, in the different 
format, certainly evolution of the care of the patients in a 
differently formalised way (PA.A2).  
 
They had to learn how to enter the data so we could record it. 
And bringing patients in we had a lot of training for nurses 
especially on chronic diseases; diabetes; asthma; COPD, so 
that nurses could do a lot of the base work of these checks and 
we put things into a more formalised fashion. They would have 
been done in the past but not in such a formalised fashion more 
organised way as we did once QOF came in (PC.A1). 
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9.3.2.2. NEW WAYS TO DEFINE ‘GOOD PRACTICES’ 
While informants had already identified their practice as a good practice, QOF 
pushed them to redefine the meaning of a good practice. In fact, informants 
asserted that with the QOF implementation, the identity of a good practice could 
be associated with a practice‘s ability to achieve the QOF targets.  
It‟s not so much that you want to get the targets for the money, 
you want to be seen to be a good practice and if you‟ve hit your 
targets, it‟s implied that you're a good practice. That‟s the only 
way the people can mark it apart from personal experience. So, 
somebody looking on the outside, from the PCT, might look at a 
practice with a lower QOF who were working very hard in other 
avenues and were doing some other very good work that‟s not 
QOF related and not hitting their QOF targets, but on that they 
wouldn‟t look such a good practice. So, it‟s partly you want to 
be seen to be being a good practice I suppose. It‟s implied if 
you‟ve got all your QOF you‟re working hard and looking after 
your patients well (PC.D6). 
More importantly, QOF could also be seen as a tool to measure whether a practice 
was really a good practice. Through achieving the QOF targets, it was easier for 
practices to justify and strengthen their identity of being good practices.  
The patient questionnaires and surveys that we‟ve had done, 
we‟ve always got really quite favourable reports about the staff, 
the receptionists, the nurses and the GPs. There‟s been little 
fault there at all, but what they haven‟t liked is the booking of 
the appointments, the access, the phone system, so we‟ve tried to 
address that as well, with how they can make their 
appointments. But generally I think the patients, supported by 
survey results, feel that it‟s a good practice with caring people 
(PD.D1). 
Although agreeing that QOF probably changed the definition of good practice, 
one informant in practice D expressed that it did not necessarily reflect an actual 
good practice. She personally felt that they might not be as good as they were 
before QOF. She emphasised that it was more important to know about a 
practice‘s image from the patients‘ perspective, rather than its identity from her 
perspective as an employee.  
I think they see that we provide a good service.  But I think that's 
changed.  I don‟t think they think it‟s as good and we provide as 
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good a service as we have done in the past.  [...] I just think 
because of the changes, they have to wait longer for 
appointments, the telephone system, they're not happy with the 
telephone system we have at the moment, there's a lot of things 
patients aren‟t happy with. One patient said to me recently that 
the surgery didn‟t have any empathy anymore, or any caring 
aspect to it, and I think a lot of patients feel like that (PD.N2). 
9.3.2.3 FOCUSING MORE ON THE DEVELOPING THE PRACTICE’S 
INTERNAL CAPACITY  
Referring back to the findings in the chapter of organisational structure, it was 
found that QOF contributed to the workload increase in most practices. The effect 
of this was a tendency to delegate more clinical work to lower level health care 
professionals. Consequently, such delegation required competent staff to conduct 
the tasks. Thus, it can be said that QOF enhanced the practices to focus more on 
developing staff‘ skills, both clinical and administration /IT -support skills. In line 
with this, some informants stated that their practice‘s involvement in the Investors 
in People framework helped to lock the value of appreciating the importance of 
people for the organisation. Through this, staff were expected to reflect the values 
to outsiders or establish the organisational image.  
Oh we‟ve got investment, we‟ve sailed very easily through 
Investment in People, which that, where the real culture 
examination happens, and it has been revalidated for three 
years. So, that is a thermometer where people have an 
opportunity if they wish from outside to tell an outsider (PB.D1). 
I think that we do have this ethos [...] this family sense is very 
strongly, equity of partnership, the partners being equal. In 
many practices it is quite hierarchical. But to me that‟s the 
strength of general practice is this family thing. You‟re doing 
things together and reacting together, so we‟re a bit different in 
that respect. But there are plenty of other practices which are 
like ours too. So, I think you probably have those practices that 
are rather hierarchical and have a clear management structure 
and then you have practices more like this, that have an open, 
inclusive, developmental approach to the work and the staff 
(PB.D4). 
In sum, QOF not only drove the practices to develop people skills and knowledge, 
but also encouraged people to work cohesively together to fulfil QOF targets. 
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These aspects were perceived to strengthen a practice‘s identity as a people-
oriented organisation and as being a good practice. 
9.3.2.4. THREATENED IDENTITY: COMMUNITY BASED PRACTICE 
Some informants put forward an important point, that the changes experienced by 
the practice organisations might not only be caused by QOF; in fact, environment 
was also perceived to strongly affect the practices. For some informants, changes 
in the practice environment were seen as challenging the practice‘s identity rather 
than strengthening it. This related especially to the community-based practice 
identity.  
I think we‟re in a state of flux really because for years it‟s been 
a very local practice where the communities it‟s served were 
smaller for a start, and the GPs were here for years and years, 
so you had a very close knit cohesive community, with the 
practice perhaps at the centre of it, which was, I wouldn‟t say 
accountable, but open [...] that's probably the wrong word as 
well, but had a very close relationship, everyone knew each 
other, they all knew the doctors and what was happening, and I 
think there's been a period of change where the communities 
themselves have developed in terms of numbers, we have lots of 
new developments, far more social mobility, which affects the 
local populations.  The practice has got bigger, so we‟ve had 
new GPs, and GPs who are not working full time, so they're part 
time, so it‟s harder for the patients to see the same GP, and I 
think as we‟ve gone on, we‟ve probably lost some of the identity 
we had as the really community focused, that I think a lot of 
patients, particularly the older patients remember and want, and 
that's a challenge for us, because I'm not sure how feasible it is 
for us to be able to have that identity, or be able to do that at the 
same time as meeting all the needs of everyone who‟s 
demanding certain services, certain targets to be met (PD.A3). 
This case was strongly evidenced in Practice D. Informants claimed that the 
practice was very attached to its community and that any changes in the 
characteristics of the community would affect the practice considerably. As the 
community develops, it demands more services; unless the practice enlarged its 
capacity, it would not be able to meet these demands. Such decisions required the 
practice to equip itself with more expertise, which meant hiring more competent 
people. While this was considered necessary to accommodate the demands and 
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QOF, it also potentially eroded the practice‘s close attachment to the community, 
hence, weakening its identity as a community-based practice.  
[...] whereas now they come in and say „oh I don't know who 
that doctor was‟ or „I've never met that doctor‟, or we've got a 
lot more staff turnover than we ever used to have (PD.N3). 
I think we have got a lot of nursing homes around because many 
are older populations, but certainly people come knowing that, a 
lot of patients have known the old-school GPs, because we‟ve 
had such a massive change in GPs with all the older GPs have 
known a lot of the patients for a lot of years, so they‟ve always 
had a family doctor. I think that‟s going to change quite a lot 
because now, the younger GPs, who don‟t work as long hours as 
the older GPs did, they might not be able to get in with their GP, 
their waiting times are longer. I think things have changed, not 
necessarily with QOF but with the big changes that have 
happened with the GPs. I think people‟s perceptions are that, it 
is a good practice and hopefully they‟re happy with it. The 
patients surveys that they‟ve done, we‟ve got quite good results 
on those, by how quickly they can get appointments, how 
accessible we are and things. I don‟t know, I think there might 
be some changes over the next few years, when the last our 
senior partners retire. Might be good might be bad, don‟t know 
(PD.N4). 
To sum up, these findings show how informants perceived their practice‘s 
identity. Although QOF was acknowledged to contribute to changing the identity, 
it was not the only factor. Changes in the practice‘s internal and external 
environments were reported to be influential in altering the identity of the 
practice. 
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9.4. CONCLUSION  
It is apparent that QOF had brought about changes in organisations. Although 
QOF was not the sole cause of changes, it contributed significantly to some 
points. In terms of organisational norms, it can be seen that people respected each 
other in the previous context of power and the structure was a reflection of their 
strong bonds. This came about as a result of working together for long period of 
time. Dynamics in both the external and internal environment also contributed to 
how norms were changed in the practices.  
With all those shifts, it is interesting to know how the external environment, also 
affected the practices‘ identity. Informants identified their practices on the basis of 
various reasons, either intangible or tangible. Moreover, in conducting the process 
of identification, informants not only referred to their internal framing but also 
referred to how the images of the practices were captured by patients. Finally, in 
constructing a practice‘s identity, the basic reference lay with the patients; most 
informants identified their organisations as being patient-centred practices. 
Having this as the main identity, practice staff would like to be as the title of their 
practice. 
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CHAPTER 10 
DISCUSSION 
 
10.1. INTRODUCTION 
This research study is based on an in-depth qualitative case study approach in four 
GP settings in the north of England. The primary aim of the study was to 
understand how and why QOF has influenced GP practices in implementing 
organisational change. More specifically, the study has attempted to explore the 
phenomenon of change in terms of direction and the level of change. 
The framework of the research was built based on two bodies of theories; 
organisational change and organisational memory and competence. Three main 
analytical propositions were developed to guide the study and eventually answer 
the main research question: how and why does organisational memory contribute 
to the development of organisational competence in GP practices, and how do 
these competencies affect organisational change in such practices? The 
analytical propositions and the research framework were tested by using data 
collected through semi-structured interviews.  
This chapter discusses the findings derived from the interviews and interprets 
them based on the literature. It starts by discussing sample characteristics, 
followed by a discussion on the key findings based on the working hypotheses 
and the analytical propositions. 
10.2. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLES 
The study was conducted on four large practices in non-deprived areas. Although 
Practice C was only formally established in 2006, it was created from merging 
two well-established practices; so, all four were long-standing practices. Practices 
A, C and D had more than 10,000 patients on their registered lists; Practice B had 
more than 19,000 patients. The study was conducted on large practices with the 
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assumption that they would have more resources to deal with QOF. Moreover, the 
justification for dealing only with four practices was a response to the review of 
the qualitative case study literature, which suggested that 2-4 GP practices are 
enough to obtain meaningful and consistent results. 
Each practice had its own characteristics, especially in terms of location and the 
nature of the partnerships. In terms of location, Practice A was located in a city 
centre, while Practice B was located in one of the outer suburbs of the same city. 
Practice C was located in a town, and shared its practice site with another 3 
practices. Practice D was the only practice located in a rural area, and its 
catchment area bordered an area managed by a different PCT. In terms of 
partnerships, Practice B was the only one that had a partner with a non-clinical 
background, who was the Practice Manager. Practice C was a merger of two 
independent practices, with a merged partnership and no salaried doctors. The 
partners and the staff who were working at Practice D were all female. 
Although it was planned to have ten to fifteen participants per practice, only thirty 
nine informants were willing to participate in the study, with ten from three of the 
practices and nine from Practice A. As an understanding of the subject matter was 
important, Practice A decided to have only nine people taking part, on the ground 
that there were no other people in the practice familiar with or having an 
understanding of the QOF context. 
In order to draw a comprehensive picture of the direction and level of 
organisational change that was undertaken after the introduction of QOF, the 
research gathered information from various members of staff, comprising 15 GP 
partners (38.46%), 2 salaried doctors (5.13%), 4 practice managers (10.26%, 
including 1 admin partner), 9 nurses (23.08%), 2 healthcare assistants (5.13%) 
and 7 administration staff (17.95%). During the interviews it was noted that there 
were two main clusters of informants. On one hand, there were partners and 
practice managers and on the other, there were nurses, HCAs and administration 
staff. The key difference between these streams lies in the way they responded to 
the questions. While the first stream was more able to give information and 
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comment on changes at the strategic level, those in the second stream provided 
evidence of their practice‘s engagement in the change process at the operational 
level and in the day-to-day work activities. 
Finally, from an organisational memory and competence perspective, years of 
experience played an important role in two ways. Firstly, informants with long 
years of experience were able to give a longer time frame in comparing the 
present and previous practice contents. Secondly, they contributed more in 
providing detailed descriptions of contextual changes that occurred after the QOF 
than those with fewer years of experience. However, it was not surprising to see 
that in developing competence, practices did not use length of employment to 
prioritise people for training and courses. This indicates that everyone had a 
similar opportunity to develop their skills and contribute to the practice‘s memory 
capacity. 
10.3. QOF AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE  
10.3.1. PERCEIVED IMPACTS ON PRACTICES 
To some extent, the four practices were evolving analogous organisational forms 
in response to the QOF. The perception of healthcare professionals towards the 
impact of QOF on their practice was interesting. GPs widely understood that QOF 
had helped support ‗evidence-based practices‘; they have reached the idea that the 
quality of their services can be measured and the presence of guidelines and QOF 
targets are perceived by many as helping them to deliver a better quality service. 
A similar view was reported by McDonald et al. (2009) and there has been an 
increasing interest in the ‗evidence-based medicine‘ in the UK since the1990s 
(Checkland, 2004b). On the other hand, QOF has been perceived as a way of 
justifying the Government‘s decision to provide financial support for GP 
practices. While it was necessary to support primary care practices financially in 
providing health care services, the Government needed a device to measure a 
practice‘s performance, to determine the amount of funding they merited.  
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QOF can be conceived as a standardised instrument to improve the quality of 
healthcare services by fulfilling predetermined targets set up by the Government. 
This means that QOF as a robust computer-based system can be used by practices 
to prove their ability to provide a quality service without any apprehension about 
potential fraud by other parties. In contrast, it also represents increasing control 
from the Government over GP practices. As shown in Chapter 6, QOF contributed 
to about 20-30 % of the case study practices‘ income. Although participation in 
QOF is voluntary, practices considered fulfilling QOF targets to be a source of 
fresh funds to help them in running day-to-day operations and meeting increasing 
patient needs and expectations.  
Considering the importance of QOF in both financial and service performance, 
and the task of implementing the new QOF related work, it was unsurprising that 
practices invested extra resources, in both clinical and administrative areas, to 
achieve maximum QOF points. This in turn meant that practices maintained their 
income and staffing levels. Such investment included staff development 
programmes, setting up new Information Systems and setting up chronic disease 
clinics. Congruent with previous literature, the findings also revealed that 
practices responded to the QOF by training and recruiting additional nurses, 
HCAs, administrative staff and data management staff (Roland et al., 2006; 
Gemmell et al., 2009).  
The data showed that all four practices achieved high QOF points between 
2004/05 and 2008/09. Yet, all practices saw a reduction in the average level of 
achievement in the 2008/09 year of assessment. Informants attributed this 
reduction in points to the changes in QOF indicators. Some indicators were 
perceived not to reflect clinical performance and were added because of political 
interference. Some others were not considered to be clinically possible to achieve, 
especially when they were related to patient characteristics. GPs also expressed 
concerns about how the indicators were assessed, especially those related to the 
Patient Experience domain, which was considered to be scientifically flawed, as it 
did not represent the whole population of patients. 
240 
 
However, in general, all informants agreed that QOF had helped their practice to 
improve its service performance, represented by improved healthcare facilities, an 
expansion of the services available, and improved staff knowledge and skills 
which enhanced the practice‘s organisational memory capacity. The recall system 
used under QOF enabled practices to engage in proactive patient care, which was 
conducted through regularly inviting chronic disease patients to attend the clinics. 
While this shifted the orientation of practices to do more preventive care, it did 
not really manage healthcare. Van den Heuvel et al. (2010) found that QOF was 
about managing chronic illness, but it did not necessarily lead to managing 
healthcare. This can be understood as QOF dealing only with patients diagnosed 
with chronic diseases and ensuring that those patients have their health checked 
regularly. In other words, QOF helped GP practices in better patient management 
rather than focusing on preventing illness or managing healthcare. Indeed, 
informants reported that patients tended to receive more treatment compared to 
the period prior to QOF. There was also a concern that patients were over-treated 
under QOF. This finding strengthens the idea that QOF tended to shift patient care 
away from holistic care to a more ‗biomedical‘ approach to care. As practices 
were aware that their performance was assessed through QOF targets which were 
‗clinically demanding‘, they tried to cure or treat patients within a certain period 
of time, so that the relevant targets could be achieved (Checkland et al., 2008; 
Checkland and Harrison, 2010). 
This study also strengthens the evidence of the dysfunctional consequences of 
P4P programmes as shown in the literature review (Beaulieu and Horrigan, 2005; 
Maisey et al., 2008; Campbell, 2009; McDonald and Roland, 2009). The 
healthcare professionals confirmed that there has been some disturbance in the 
dynamics of the patient-clinician relationship, caused by the need for clinicians to 
enter patient information into the system and ‗‘chase‘‘ scoring QOF points. While 
it was important to demonstrate performance, obtaining data tended to divert the 
clinician‘s attention away from the patient. To some extent, informants asserted 
that QOF was more about a target-centred approach than a patient-centred 
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approach; the excessive use of protocols and templates led to over-treating and 
added a sense of bureaucracy to clinical activities. 
QOF was also reported to increase the workload, especially for the nursing team. 
Along with changes in consultation room dynamics, the frequency and the 
difficulty of patient visits also added to the complexity of work. As cited in 
Gemmell et al (2009) work load is ‗a complex concept that encompasses hours of 
work, the difficulty of work and subjective feelings of overwork‘(Groenewegen 
and Hutten, 1991). The work complexity is strongly related to the degree to which 
the work performance requires skill, intelligent and personal judgment (Naoi and 
Schooler, 1985). 
This higher workload was due to the fact that the practices needed to manage 
chronic disease patients, ensuring that patients visited the practice and carrying 
out regular investigations as scheduled. Patients, who did not report for their 
scheduled visits, had to be moved to exception case lists. The same findings were 
reported by various empirical studies, which argued that practice nursing staff and 
HCAs had absorbed a high proportion of QOF work and QOF not only led to an 
increase in clinical work, but administrative work as well. While doctors gave 
more attention to complex chronic and preventive care, practices invested nursing 
time in dealing with stable acute and preventive care (Whalley, Hugh and Sibbald, 
2008; Gemmell et al., 2009; McDonald and Roland, 2009). 
On the positive side, the increasing workload was also seen as an expansion of 
roles and responsibilities for the nurses, and they were proud and more confident 
of their new job roles compared to their previous job descriptions.  The practices, 
in turn, had to ensure that their nurses were qualified to do the jobs. The findings 
were consistent with previous research showing that nurses in GP practices had 
been given more responsibilities and experienced enhanced clinical roles as they 
worked on delegated routine clinical work and protocol-driven jobs (McDonald et 
al., 2007; Grant et al., 2009).   
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This study also found that there was a shift in the role of practice managers, who 
had become more involved in the process of decision making, especially related to 
QOF target achievements. They were actively involved in managing, and to some 
extent controlling, how the clinical leaders, who were commonly partners, 
fulfilled QOF targets for their area. Moreover, their increasing role was also 
contributed by the growing importance of the IT/data management division, 
which was usually responsible to the practice managers. This finding corresponds 
to previous studies, which found that managers contributed significantly to 
ensuring that their colleagues fulfilled their responsibility, so that QOF targets 
could be achieved (Grant et al., 2009; Checkland and Harrison, 2010). However, 
this research was able to find a clearer limit to the role of managers. With the 
exception of the manager of Practice B, who was also a partner; managers from 
Practices A, C and D did not have similar rights to the partners in the strategic 
level decision making process.  
It was interesting to find out the perception of the informants of how QOF had 
affected their practice‘s norms and identity. In this vein, the informants‘ concerns 
were related to individualised/personal continuity, coordination of care and patient 
choice. Comparing their previous experience in the practice, informants 
acknowledged that after QOF patients were not able to see their preferred 
physician in the same way as before. The increased workload and large team size 
meant that patient choices had become less possible, and that patients tended to 
see different clinicians during their visits. This situation represents a shift in the 
norms guiding the relationship between clinicians and patients, for example, 
informants in Practice A believed that continuity of relationship with patients 
brought efficiency in providing care. Ensuring continuity meant that clinicians 
understood a patient‘s medical history, so that they would be able to deal with 
them more quickly. Several previous studies also present similar findings, that 
care became less personalised and patients were treated as ‗labelled grouped not 
individuals‘  (Roland et al., 2006; Checkland, McDonald and Harrison, 2007; 
Maisey et al., 2008; Campbell, 2009).   
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In this sense, Roland (2006) asserted that the long-term relationship between 
clinicians and patients has a potential impact on patient health for several reasons: 
1) Trust between patient and clinician develops gradually over time and this make 
both of them more confident; 2) a long relationship helps clinicians to manage the 
patient case properly and more easily; 3) It reduces the chance of medical errors, 
because the clinician is aware of everything related to the patient.  By setting up 
chronic disease clinics that were mostly run by nurses, there was more possibility 
of patients seeing nurse practitioners than doctors. However, the findings reveal 
that some patients were not happy with such changes; even though the nurses 
were spending more time with them in the consultation and giving them more 
chance to talk freely about their health problems.  
Less personalised patient-clinician relationships were also perceived to change a 
practice‘s identity. Practice D, for example, reported that its identity as a 
community-based practice was threatened by this change. However, it was not 
entirely caused by QOF; changes in the external and internal practice environment 
also threatened the practice identity. In addition, the practice reported 
experiencing less close personal relationships amongst healthcare professionals 
compared to before QOF.  
From a more positive perspective, however, QOF was perceived to encourage 
practices to develop their internal capacity. Referring back to the discussion about 
staff development activities as a result of QOF, informants perceived that it was a 
good development for their practice‘s internal capacity. QOF was also seen as 
strengthening the identity of being a forward thinking practice and shifting the 
way to redefine a good practice. Prior to QOF, good practices could be seen 
through the perceived quality of staff, facilities or other internal aspects of an 
organisation. After QOF, as performance was assessed through the ability to 
achieve QOF points, the definition of a good practice might be channelled only to 
QOF related activities.   
In general, all of these findings strengthen the results of previous studies, which 
found that QOF contributed to various organisational changes in GP practices. 
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Evidence from previous studies shows that practices engaged in various changes 
in organisational strategy, structure, identity and organisational process.   
10.3.2. SUMMARY 
From the informants‘ perceptions, it has become clear that QOF had several 
impacts on the GP practices. The findings can be summarised as follows: 
Table 23. Summary of the Findings – QOF Impacts 
No. Findings References Contribution of the study 
1.  
Shift to 
preventive 
care 
(Van den Heuvel et al., 2010) 
QOF shifted practice to become more proactive 
rather than reactive. Although this was a good 
development, literature argued it was still about 
managing illness, not managing healthcare. 
2.  
Training IT 
staff 
(Roland et al., 2006; Gemmell 
et al., 2009), 
Compared to previous studies, this research 
found that practices also engaged in recruiting 
and training staff to deal with IT processes, 
especially in data management. 
3.  
Disturbance 
to the 
dynamics 
(Beaulieu and Horrigan, 2005; 
Campbell, McDonald and 
Lester, 2008; Maisey et al., 
2008; Campbell et al., 2009; 
McDonald and Roland, 2009; 
Van den Heuvel et al., 2010) 
This study confirmed the results of previous 
research that P4P caused disturbance to the 
clinician-patient dynamic. 
4.  
Increased 
workload 
(Whalley, Hugh and Sibbald, 
2008; Gemmell et al., 2009; 
McDonald and Roland, 2009) 
Similar to previous studies, this research 
confirmed that both clinical and administrative 
workload increased.  
5.  
Threat to 
continuity of 
care 
(Roland et al., 2006; Maisey et 
al., 2008; Campbell, 2009) 
Fragmentation of care was also reported by 
informants. This was mainly because increased 
workload meant that doctors delegated more 
work to lower level healthcare professionals 
and made it less possible for patients to see 
their preferred physician. 
6.  
Expansion of 
roles for 
nurses 
(McDonald et al., 2007; Grant 
et al., 2009). 
Nurses confirmed that they had experienced 
expansion of their roles, especially related to 
conducting routine clinical work. While this 
was the case, this study also found that nurses 
delegated some of their clinical duties to lower 
level HCAs.  
Moreover, informants‘ views on QOF provided several critical insights with 
regard to the existence of QOF for the practices. Three key points need to be 
addressed in this matter. 
First, QOF established centrally developed indicators to assess primary care 
practices‘ performance.  While this was meant to standardise care, it also pushed 
practices to think that their performances were now being compared with each 
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other. In that sense, practices were more aware of the need for obtaining a high 
QOF score. This created a sense of competition amongst them, although practices 
tended to think that they were not competing with other practices. Practices 
became more concerned about the money available from the PCT, so that the 
partnership put significant efforts into ensuring that maximum QOF points could 
be achieved. Most informants confirmed that practices had now become more 
‗money‘ and ‗target‘ or ‗business‘ oriented. 
Second, QOF was established in line with the idea of evidence-based primary care 
practice, intended to improve the quality of healthcare service delivery and that 
was understood by the practices. However, while the final goal of QOF is to 
improve the quality of healthcare services, the need to provide evidence seemed to 
shift the attention from care to indicator fulfilment. The intensive use of templates 
and databases in the Information System formed a dual agenda for clinicians, and 
this in turn might have led to a distraction from the patient-clinician relationship. 
In this sense, the study suggests that QOF can both benefit and hinder patient care.  
Third, with centrally developed indicators, templates, and measurements of 
clinical and non-clinical (i.e. patient experience) indicators, practices were pushed 
to work on their healthcare service performance if they wanted to have fresh funds 
available to them. This represented the idea of performance-based payment and 
control from the Government of primary care practices. It was mentioned by most 
partners that with the Government imposing various changes in indicators, 
achieving high QOF points had become increasingly difficult. While it may reflect 
higher expectations of quality, it can also be perceived as increasing control from 
the Government.  
In dealing with the requirements of QOF, practices initiated several changes to 
ensure that they coped with the work. A detailed explanation of how practices 
went through the changes is given in the next section. It is interesting to note that 
although these changes were initiated as a response to QOF, some of them were 
strategic in nature. 
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Apart from the interview content, another insight that can be extracted from the 
findings is related to how informants responded to the interviews. In assessing 
their perspective on QOF, informants tended to recall their own individual 
memories on their experiences prior to QOF and compare between previous and 
current experiences. This reflected the importance of individual memory in 
building knowledge of organisational context and content, as well as how they 
were involved in changing the context itself. The next section provides an 
empirical test of the research analytical propositions.   
10.4. ANALYTICAL PROPOSITION 1:  
ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY AND DIRECTION 
OF CHANGE 
10.4.1. FINDING 1. ROUTINES AND RESPOND TO CHANGE 
As stated early, there is an ample supply of literature available on the 
organisational changes that took place in GP practices after the implementation of 
QOF, such as delegation of work (i.e. Checkland et al., 2008; Gemmell et al., 
2009), expansion and re-stratification of roles (i.e. Checkland, 2004a; Roland et 
al., 2006; Leese, 2007; Griffiths et al., 2010) and staff recruitment (i.e. Roland et 
al., 2006). These changes were captured as results rather than processes, while this 
study has focused on eliciting the processes and reasons underlying practices‘ 
decisions to conduct such changes. The study has attempted to explore the nature 
of organisational change through the four practices‘ organisational competence 
and memory. In the knowledge management and OM literature, routines as a 
memory repository that construct procedural memory can be used to explain the 
processes and results of organisational change (Miner, 1991; Pentland and Reuter, 
1994; Adler, Goldoftas and Levine, 1999; Feldman, 2000; Becker, 2004; Tsai, Lin 
and Chen, 2010). More importantly, routines contribute to competence 
development as organisation repeatedly conducts particular activities and use-
reuses knowledge relevant to these activities (Gersick and Hackman, 1990; Cohen 
and Bacdayan, 1994; Feldman, 2000; Becker et al., 2005).  
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The four practices acknowledged that their organisational strengths were 
developed through routines embedded in their years of experience. This can be 
reflected through organisational and individual experiences. Experiences and 
knowledge owned by individual health care professionals, collectively built up the 
practices‘ strengths. Their understanding of the condition of patients and their 
practice‘s environment contributed to the quality of services provided by the 
practices.  This was aligned to the idea that an organisation does not possess 
memory, as it is the individual or group who own knowledge or skills, yet their 
skills and knowledge, hence competence, are stored in variety of ways, such as 
rules, procedures, databases and/or the people, that are able to be used and re-used 
through dynamic interactions (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Anand, Manz and Glick, 
1998; Cong and Pandya, 2003; Weinberger, Te‘eni and Frank, 2003; Winter, 
2003; Tsai, Lin and Chen, 2010).   
Organisational competence was also supported by the advantage of being the first 
movers and consistently being patient-oriented. Long years of experience 
provided the practices with the opportunity to learn through continuously and 
repeatedly doing things. Being the first mover meant that practices acquired 
certain routines earlier than others, which put them in the foreground in clinical 
practices and strengthened their identity as forward-thinking practices. In this 
study, three of the practices, A, B and C, were relatively strong in asserting their 
identity to be a forward-thinking practice whereas Practice D was more engaged 
in strengthening its identity as a community-based practice
20
. Regardless of 
having different identities to convey, the four practices uniformly believed that 
their strong patient-orientation, which was resiliently embedded in various day-to-
day activities, strengthened their close relationship with patients over time. These 
three aspects (experience, being first movers and patient orientation) were 
intertwined in building the practices‘ routines over time, which generated and 
intensified the practices‘ procedural memory. According to the practices, their 
                                                             
20 Amongst the 4 practices, Practice B and D identified themselves as community-based practices. 
In addition, informants also strongly identified Practice B as a forward thinking practice, which 
was more evidenced in the narratives than the identity of a community-based practice. The 
findings discussed in this particular context do not intend to nullify the fact that the practice was a 
community based practice as identified by some of its informants.    
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routines aligned with QOF activities, which made them felt more confident and 
more prepared than other practices; thus, they responded better to the QOF 
scheme. This finding confirms that routines were formed historically and that the 
time dimension was important. As stated in Chapter 4, the repetition embedded in 
routines means that people call and recall their memory, employing it to help them 
do their jobs, and became more competent (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Levitt and 
March, 1988; Dosi et al., 2000; Becker, 2004).  
The finding also supports the notion of changes in competence usually being path-
dependent (David, 1997). This has dual implications, the GP practices 
consistently developed their competence over time, at the same time, it possibly 
leads to the thought that GP practices were less adaptable to change. Interestingly, 
there was no evidence of inflexibility to change; the study found that the practices 
engaged in the development of new routines which overcame path-dependency. 
The four practices took advantages of their embedded routines; however, at the 
same time, in order to implement QOF, the practices needed to make adjustments 
to their routines, or even develop new routines. Care of chronic diseases was 
previously part of the routine services provided, yet, all four practices agreed that 
before QOF, chronic diseases were not managed formally. With the introduction 
of QOF, practices started to manage these diseases by appointing clinical leads. 
This aligned with Checkland and Harrison (2010) who reported practices 
assigning clinical leads and setting up new chronic disease clinics to cope with 
QOF.  
The findings show that clinical lead roles were assigned to GP partners with 
relevant competencies in a particular area. On this basis, practices found that some 
of the required fields of expertises were not part of their routines or available in 
the practice. This urged partners to change or shift their interests or specialisations 
to fit the QOF requirements. These decisions were associated with the availability 
of expertise, rather than the number of practitioners. Consequently, a disruption in 
routines took place, as practices needed to deal with different paths of routines, 
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rather than with what they had been used to doing. This also proved that QOF 
influenced the practices‘ decisions to fit their routines to what QOF required.  
It is important to underline that the findings contradict the idea that strongly held 
routines tend to hinder organisations from change (Miner, 1991; Adler, Goldoftas 
and Levine, 1999; Feldman, 2000; Becker, 2004; Tsai, Lin and Chen, 2010) . In 
fact, practices were proven to be rather flexible in adjusting their old routines to 
the new ones. In accordance with organisational memory processes, it can be said 
that the practices engaged in the process of ‗unlearning‘, which was actually part 
of the maintenance processes in the knowledge reservoirs (Stein and Zwass, 1995; 
Wijnhoven, 1999). The unlearning process is important to provide room for 
improvement and change to take place in organisations (Stein, 1995; Wijnhoven, 
1999). This was a necessary step if practices wanted to maintain a good 
performance. Furthermore, it implies that the practices‘ compliance with the 
government scheme was necessary to sustain their income. This finding confirms 
the idea that change may occur as organisations perceive it to be a necessary 
action to ensure their sustainability (Levitt and March, 1988; Cohen et al., 1996).  
On the other hand, practices‘ compliance with government regulations through 
QOF confirms what Wilson (1992) argued to be a political process, which 
characterised decision making during the development of change. From this 
perspective, it can be said that practices engaged in emergent change (refer to 
figure 15). 
To sum up, although change in the GP practices is an interplay of history, 
government regulations and organisational competence, the findings strengthen 
the argument that the practices strongly addressed their routines in conducting 
changes as a response to QOF. Thus, these findings strengthen the hypothesis that 
the more a GP practice is involved in procedural memory (routines), the more 
likely it will be competent to implement changes in response to QOF (H1). 
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10.4.2. FINDING 2. MEMORY AND STRATEGIC DIRECTION 
This research associated the direction of change with changes of organisational 
strategy, based on the idea that organisations may anticipate or react to any trigger 
of change from their external and internal environment by engaging in the process 
of re-creation or re-orientation of strategy (Nadler and Tushman, 1989; Iles and 
Sutherland, 2001). Other authors argue that organisational change might refer to 
the effect of the organisational renewal process on their capacities to correspond 
with the internal and external environment (Moran and Brightman, 2000). 
It was intriguing to explore how practices engaged in strategic processes. While 
they had organisational strategic plans, the practices were not convinced of the 
necessity of having such strategies. At one point, it was argued that GP practices 
should not position themselves as competing with each other in a market-like 
industry. This was thought not to conform to the organisational ethos as a practice 
organisation, whose main aim was to provide healthcare services for patients. 
Another perspective was related to the nature of ever-changing policies imposed 
on primary care organisations in the UK. With frequent changes imposed by the 
Government, having clear strategies was perceived to be unnecessary. This was 
due to the fact that GP practice directions are defined by government through their 
policies. Informants asserted that practices did everything that the government 
required them to do. In other words, this implies strong control of the government 
over the management of the practices.  
Some partners added that even though they had a strategy for their practice, it 
would not reflect the practice‘s long-term plans, as there were many uncertainties 
in the practice environment. Related to the discussion in the previous section, a 
practice‘s decision to engage in QOF involved the political process in strategic 
decision making (Wilson, 1992). Practices took the decision on that basis to 
ensure sustainability of income, which was crucial for staffing and running day-
to-day activities. Accordingly, the development of organisational strategy 
emerged as practices adapted to external triggers from the environment 
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(Mintzberg, 1978; Shortell, Morrison and Robbins, 1985; Hurst and Zimmerman, 
1994; Shortell & Kaluzny, 2006).   
While practices were bound to follow government schemes, such as QOF, to 
sustain their income; the findings show that the way they engaged in the 
implementation processes depended on their own decisions. Interestingly, it was 
found that practices developed their own strategies to fulfil QOF targets through 
assessing their competences, as well as the resources available to them. As stated 
above (Chapter 10 Section 10.4.1), routines helped practices to justify what they 
were good at and enhanced their capability in offering healthcare services for 
patients based on their competences. 
Not surprisingly, there were similar patterns on how the four practices developed 
their strategic responses, such as assigning clinical leads, establishing chronic 
disease clinics, recruiting more staff and delegation of work. These support 
previous studies exploring how practices respond to QOF (i.e. Checkland, 2004a; 
Roland et al., 2006; Leese, 2007; Gemmell et al., 2009; Griffiths et al., 2010). 
However, how those strategic changes were conducted depended on a practice‘s 
strengths and weaknesses, hence, their competences.  
In addition, practice decisions were also influenced by their individual situations. 
Practice B, for example, already had a strong audit team, so that when QOF came 
in, the practice was ready for it and merely needed to adapt it to the QOF 
requirements. Another example was shown by Practice C with its IT system 
adaptation. Compared to other practices, Practice C was a relatively late adopter 
of the type of IT system used with QOF. This situation could be traced back to 
pre-merger practice routines, which were not heavy IT users; this in turn affected 
the current practice‘s actions. These examples show that practices elaborated on 
their assessments of what they were good at and also what they were weak at, 
reflecting on both their successes and failures. This process was considered 
important to ensure the feasibility of implementing alternative strategies with the 
practice‘s resource constraints. At the same time, this contributed to their memory 
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capacity, as practices learnt through their previous experiences or activities 
(Aguilar, 1967; Wijnhoven, 1999). 
From a broader viewpoint, the findings also show how partners learnt from their 
experiences of failure or success in managing their practices organisations. One of 
the prominent issues was related to government funding; over time, the four 
practices learnt that it was becoming more difficult to gain funding through 
various medical contracts, for example, the QOF indicators and allocation of 
points were continuously being changed by the Government. While the 
Government argued that such changes were necessary to reflect an improvement 
in quality; for the practices, they were perceived as a hindrance to attaining 
maximum points. To some extent, this potentially de-motivated practices. 
Furthermore, the practices under study realised that there would be potentially 
limited financial resources from the Government in the future. Thus, the practices 
learnt that there was a need to go beyond their traditional therapeutic roles and 
explore other opportunities to find financial resources. In turn, the intention to 
sustain a practice‘s income flow urged the partnership to think and build strategies 
which aided the practices to accommodate changes and deal with them 
appropriately. Practice B, for example, expanded their business through 
diversification and opening other branches. Practice A also ran its operation on 
two sites to include a wider area of coverage. Practices also set up their strategic 
aims differently, by examining their potential market, such as becoming a 
research practice or maintaining a practice‘s long-standing identity.  
Elaborating on the discussions in the previous section and this section, it is clear 
that practices considered what was necessary to comply with government 
regulations to sustain their income. This strategic decision to change depicts the 
political processes model. In addition, as practices obliged in implementing QOF, 
they needed to fulfil the targets set up in QOF. To do that, the findings evidence 
that practices strongly considered their successes and failures to help set up the 
strategies or approaches which best suited them in responding to QOF. This aligns 
with the idea of contextualism in implementing change, which means that 
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„implementation is a function of antecedent factors and processes‟ (Wilson, 
1992). The practices were different in their approach to implementing change, 
considering their histories or experiences. The findings also correspond closely 
with those of Huby et al. (2008), who reported that each GP practice had its own 
story of change, which reflected its different style and ethos.  
Thus, it can be said that the findings support the hypothesis that the more GP 
practices are aware of previous failures and successes and the more they 
integrated knowledge into their organisational memory, the more able they are 
to develop an organisational strategy in response to QOF (H2). This includes all 
preceding factors and processes taking place in an organisation, which also 
implies that each organisation may work differently due to having their own 
experiences and characteristics. 
10.4.3. SUMMARY 
It is important to note that the notion of OM did not only emerge in terms of 
organisational competence which can be built through routines. OM was also 
reflected in how practices narrated their successes and failures. The engagement 
with the context provided richer insights into understanding changes in 
organisations, at both the process and implementation levels.   
As part of the UK healthcare system, GP practices are subjected to government 
control through policies and rules imposed on them. This was a point of concern 
for partners in setting up their practice‘s strategic directions. While participation 
in the new GMS contract was voluntary, the four practices found that QOF 
brought them a considerable financial stream that helped them to sustain their 
service delivery. 
QOF funding was attached to health care service performance, therefore, practices 
needed to maintain their quality of services. They were urged to make some 
adjustments in their routines in order to ensure that areas required for QOF were 
appropriately managed. The ways practices conducted the adjustments reflected 
their own competences. More importantly, they also learnt from their failures and 
254 
 
successful experiences. It was evidenced that informants evaluated QOF and how 
strategies evolved over time through their memories, by comparing their 
practice‘s current situation with the practice‘s previous experiences. This was 
especially strongly held for those who had longer experience working in the 
practice. At one point, it strengthens the path aligned to the previous experiences 
and leads to further exploration of how strategies were developed in the practice, 
by elaborating the ideas of organisational memory into the context. This also 
explains how despite similar patterns found in the way practices responded to 
QOF, the justifications and detailed implementation steps differed from one 
practice to another. Practices employed their memory in helping them construct 
the direction of change; it was found that they referred back to their memories of 
both successes and failures. It is also interesting that strongly held routines or 
memories did not hinder the change process or its implementation. In fact, as 
practices engaged deeply with their organisational memory, it enabled them to 
justify the need to adjust their routines to cope with QOF.  
In general, this reflects an emergent type of change, characterised by the political 
process of making decisions during the process of change, as well as containing 
the idea of contextualism in its implementation.  
Figure 15. A Characterisation of Approaches to Organisational Change 
 
The Process 
of Change 
The Implementation 
of Change 
Planned  
Change 
1 
Logical incrementalism and various 
needs, commitment and shared vision 
models 
2 
Reducing resistance to change (e.g. 
force field analysis) 
Emergent  
Change 
3 
Characteristics of strategic decisions: 
political process models 
4 
Contextualism: 
implementation is a function of 
antecedent factors and processes 
           Source: (Wilson, 1992) 
To conclude, it can be said that practices relied on their embedded organisational 
memory in dealing with change. With strong government regulations shaping the 
practice environment, each practice claimed to strive to sustain their performance. 
They aimed to maintain their existence in the industry through carefully 
developing their strategic direction, which was believed to bring them a better 
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financial performance and better care for the community. Practices found that 
their routines as well as their successes and failures helped them to engage better 
in defining and pursuing their aims. Therefore, the findings lend support to 
analytical proposition 1 that organisational memory of core competences in GP 
practices shapes their organisational strategies in response to QOF. 
Table 24. Summary of the Findings – Proposition 1 
No. Findings References Contribution of the study 
1.  
Routines 
contributed to 
memory 
improvement, 
hence, developed 
competence 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Levitt and March, 1988; 
Miner, 1991; Cohen et al., 
1996; David, 1997; Adler, 
Goldoftas and Levine, 
1999; Dosi et al., 2000; 
Feldman, 2000; Feldman 
and Rafaeli, 2002; Becker, 
2004; Tsai, Lin and Chen, 
2010) 
This study strengthened the idea that 
routines enhanced memory capacity and 
made organisation better prepared for 
change. 
2.  
Routines helped 
practices respond 
better to QOF 
Although Checkland and Harrison 
(2010) reached the same conclusion, 
there were no previous studies in this 
area. This study contributed to initiating 
the perspective that embedded routines 
may help organisations to respond better 
to QOF. Some QOF activities had 
already became a routine for practices, 
although in different forms. 
3.  
QOF possibly 
caused 
disruptions to the 
pattern of routines 
This study also found that QOF disrupted 
embedded routines. Practices seemed to 
decide to engage in different or new 
routines to accommodate QOF and allow 
them to obtain high points. Yet, the 
decision to adjust routines was based on 
the practice‘s assessment of what they 
needed to do to perform better quality of 
services based on their resources.  
4.  
QOF was 
perceived as one 
of the devices 
used to manage 
primary care 
practice through 
performance-
based payment 
(van der Bent, Paauwe and 
Williams, 1999) 
Practices learnt through their experiences 
in dealing with the Government and 
believed that there would be less money 
available for them in the future. This 
became the point of departure in 
pursuing their strategy. 
5.  
Learning from  
previous 
successes and 
failures through 
their memory 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, 
1996; Barney, 1991; 
Parkin, 2009). 
This study strengthened the idea that in 
developing strategy, organisations 
needed to put emphasis on their 
competences.  
 
However, this study also found that 
practices aimed to pursue a particular 
strategy while they did not have a 
competence in a particular area. Indeed, 
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No. Findings References Contribution of the study 
they intended to work on their 
weaknesses to achieve their aims.  
6.  
OM took place in 
two different 
forms, content 
and context 
(Bowey, 1982; Walsh and 
Ungson, 1991; Argote, 
1999; Karsten, 1999; van 
der Bent, Paauwe and 
Williams, 1999; 
Wijnhoven, 1999; 
Feldman, 2000; Checkland 
and Harrison, 2010)  
In analysing how organisational memory 
contributed to change, it was found that 
memory emerged in two ways. First, it 
was embedded in practice routines. This 
represents memory as the ‗content‘ of 
knowledge in subject matter that built 
organisational competence (Wijnhoven, 
1999). 
Second, a practice‘s story was presented 
as a context of memory development. In 
narrating their stories of competence, 
practices referred back to their 
experiences and at some points, 
compared them to their current 
experiences (Checkland and Harrison, 
2010).  
Both together helped to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of how 
competence was developed.  
10.5. ANALYTICAL PROPOSITION 2: MEMORY AND 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The findings discussed in the previous sections provide insights that QOF 
contributed to some changes or shifts in the practices‘ strategies or directions. 
Regardless of the debate about the relationship between strategy and structure in 
an organisation (Hall and Saias, 1980; Burgelman, 1983), several authors agree 
that strategy and structure should be aligned, in order to optimise the performance 
of organisations (Chandler, 1962; Miles et al., 1978; Hardy, 1996; Morgan, 2006).  
However, there were considerable changes in the structure of the practices 
presented in the findings; these related to structural arrangements, job 
responsibility, expansion of roles and skills mixing and power dynamics in 
delivering health care services. For structural arrangements, the practices engaged 
in staff recruitment, especially nurses, HCAs and administration staff to cope with 
the QOF work. This strengthens the findings of previous research, that practices in 
the UK were found to increase the number of nurses and administrative tasks 
following QOF implementation (i.e. Roland et al., 2006; Gemmell et al., 2009; 
Griffiths et al., 2010).  
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The study also found that practices became more concerned about their 
administrative capability and support systems when implementing QOF. This was 
depicted through the practices‘ decisions to recruit or assign IT staff to manage 
patient databases, installing a relevant IT system and establishing a database 
management unit. With the notion of evidence-based practices, a relevant and 
accurate database was important as evidence of a practice‘s service delivery. 
Related to the accuracy of data, QOF introduced data templates which helped 
practices to collect the required patient information.  This aligned with previous 
studies indicating that QOF enhanced the use of IT in a practice‘s system 
(Checkland, 2007; Grant et al., 2009; Checkland and Harrison, 2010). In broader 
terms, this finding also corresponds to Hurst and Zimmerman, who state that:  
„‟The use of the electronic patient-health record, computer-
based decision-support tools, and the health-information 
networks, hospital information systems all linked through 
telemedicine and a plethora of communication systems are 
working their way into every facet of the health system. Without 
even knowing it, implementation of these technologies is 
changing the traditional ways of doing things and dramatically 
affecting the cost, quality, and accessibility of healthcare‟‟ 
(1994).  
In the context of roles and responsibilities, there were significant changes, as 
reported in both Chapters 6 and 8, such as delegation of tasks to lower level 
healthcare professionals. Delegation from doctors to nurses and from nurses to 
healthcare assistants/phlebotomists was intended to manage workload, especially 
QOF administrative tasks. Indeed, there is ample evidence stating that delegation 
of work was notable in many UK practices, as a consequence of the increasing 
workload experienced by clinicians (Roland et al., 2006; Gemmell et al., 2009; 
Grant et al., 2009).  Practices ensured that the delegation did not affect the quality 
of healthcare service provided to patients by providing relevant skills training and 
courses for their staff. Previous research found that the new GMS contract 
provided an opportunity to enhance staff roles through conducting training and 
introducing a quality control system (Leese, 2007).  
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The findings also correspond to the results of previous studies that delegation of 
work brought about several consequences, including increasing the clinical roles 
of nurses and HCAs (Roland et al., 2006; Grant et al., 2009; McDonald et al., 
2009; Griffiths et al., 2010). This was especially evident through the 
establishment of chronic diseases clinics, which were mainly run by practice 
nurses. Moreover, Griffith (2010) states that along with the increasing number of 
nurses, such developments were beneficial to help practices maximise QOF 
points, improving their performance and also benefitting patients. While those 
developments increased the nursing team workload, both nurses and HCAs felt 
that they were content to do it. This brought opportunities for them to learn new 
skills, have more autonomy and improve their careers. This conforms to previous 
studies that nurses experienced more autonomy and satisfaction in conducting 
their jobs (McDonald et al., 2007; Maisey et al., 2008; Whalley, Hugh and 
Sibbald, 2008; Gemmell et al., 2009). 
The findings of this study contradict those reported by Campbell, McDonald, and 
Lester (2008) that there was a ‗de-skilling‘ of doctors as a result of the increasing 
clinical role of nurses. Instead, this study confirms that the delegation of work and 
expansion of the role of nurses was seen as a form of appreciation of skills and 
clinical qualifications. Consequently, a sense of responsibility towards jobs was 
created, practice staff become more aware of their responsibilities, as well as their 
colleagues‘ responsibilities. By delegating routine clinical work to nurses, doctors 
became able to deal with more complex diseases. Thus, this study is congruent 
with Checkland et al. (2008) who reported that delegation of work enabled 
doctors to manage and deal with more complex issues. Similarly, releasing some 
basic nursing work to phlebotomists enabled G-grade nurses to perform clinical 
tasks suitable for their qualification and experience.   
In terms of power dynamics, there were two main streams of findings, the first 
was related to the relationship between the practices and the PCT and the second 
about the relationships amongst different professions in the practices. Informants 
perceived that QOF signified a difference in the balance of power with the PCT, 
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although the difference was also attributed to the PCT restructuring and 
considerably increasing in size, as well as pressures faced by PCTs from the 
Government. Practices experienced a more distant relationship with the PCT after 
QOF. Interestingly, practices learnt from their experiences that in order to deal or 
negotiate their needs with the PCT, they needed to employ aspects that were 
considered important by the PCT and to bargaining collectively.  
Internally, there were relatively stable relationships between the different 
professions. Staff were happy to work hand-in-hand with each other in teams, 
especially in skill utilisation. The relationship was said to be based on trust and 
respect. This was also supported by the practices‘ ‗no-blame‘ values. In turn, this 
seemed to dissolve the power gap between different levels. Indeed, while the 
findings strengthened the idea that some individuals in the structure, such as the 
partners and managers, held more power, (Alexander et al., 2006; Sheaff, 2008), 
the relationship itself was flexible and less formalised. The practices believed that 
this, together with a good communication mechanism and participative decision 
making, helped them in managing people whilst implementing QOF. This finding 
was aligned to the idea that de-alienation of power and involving employees in 
decision making potentially reduces resistance to change (Hardy, 1996).  
Specific to decision making, all practices asserted the importance of the 
communication and involvement of staff in the decision making process. More 
importantly, the study also found that practices noticed the increasing contribution 
and involvement of practice managers in the decision making process after the 
QOF implementation, similar findings were presented by Grant et al. (2009) and 
also by Checkland and Harrison (2010). 
These findings illustrate that practices had undergone various changes, which 
become grounds to explore more about how the arrangement of structure affected 
the practices‘ competences in providing QOF related services. 
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10.5.1. FINDING 1. SPECIALISATION AND COMPETENCE IN 
PROVIDING QOF-RELATED SERVICES 
One of the major dimensions of organisational structure is how work is distributed 
or assigned amongst individuals or groups in an organisation (Favela, 1997; 
Fiedler and Welpe, 2010). The fundamental idea of structure is about managing 
roles and responsibilities resulting from different specialisations of work available 
in an organisation, which refers to the element of differentiation of the structure 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). A higher degree of specialisation means that 
organisations become more complex and thus need to have robust integration 
mechanisms (Zinn and Mor, 1998; Bazzoli et al., 1999; Plsek and Greenhalgh, 
2001; Begun et al., 2003). A higher degree of specialisation can be represented 
through different types of services provided to customers (Luke, Begun and 
Walston, 1994; Bazzoli et al., 1999).  
In structuring their organisations, practices considered both the number of 
potential patients and the competence of individual clinicians. The number of 
patients was used to estimate the workload, so that the practice knew how many 
people they would need for particular jobs or responsibilities. Jobs were 
distributed based on competences. The more functions available in the practices, 
shown through the different services offered, the wider the range of expertise the 
practices owned and the higher degree of specialisation they exhibited. A higher 
degree of specialisation enhances knowledge and capabilities; as people use and 
re-use their procedural or declarative memory in conducting particular tasks, 
organisational competence is built up (Favela, 1997; Postrel, 2002; Argote, 
McEvily and Reagans, 2003; Fiedler and Welpe, 2010). 
Specialisations in structures were also evidenced in the practices‘ endeavour to 
refer patients in specific cases to clinicians with a particular expertise. With a 
higher degree of specialisation appearing in the structure, expectations on 
competence in particular areas increased. Clinicians were reported to refer patients 
to other clinicians who were thought to be more competent in a particular area. As a 
practice, this improved the sense of team-work and it is believed to result in more 
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effective performance, considering that the responsibilities assigned in each 
specialised unit became routines (Postrel, 2002; Argote, McEvily and Reagans, 
2003). This also corresponds to the study by Maisey (2008) who found that QOF 
improved team-working in GP practices. 
Being in the same certain position or job for years provided practice staff with 
opportunities to learn more skills; hence, the knowledge embedded in the position 
became tacit for the individual and added to their memory. This knowledge was 
continuously used and re-used while the individuals were doing their jobs, making 
them more competent. In turn, such competence enabled them to deal better with 
patients and other people in the practice.   
The engagement in applying a high degree of specialisation became more visible 
after QOF. For example, all four practices established a special division or unit to 
deal with data management. Although this was not a new development for the 
practices, QOF enforced the functions of these units or divisions. As stated 
formerly, considering the importance of this area of work, practices reported 
hiring specialists in the area or training existing individuals to have the necessary 
skills and expertise in data management.  
These findings provide an insight into the idea that the more the specialised work 
was distributed, the greater would be the inclination for people to improve their 
competence in particular areas as they repeatedly did their jobs. This 
specialisation enabled the knowledge embedded in particular functions or jobs, 
and their embedded roles, to be enhanced through use and re-use of memory. In 
turn, practices would be able to work more efficiently. Indeed, this finding 
supports the idea that knowledge could be accrued through direct experiences of 
individuals over time (Stein, 1995). 
To conclude, the way practices assigned different functions into specialised units, 
divisions, or departments shows the degree of specialisation in their organisational 
structures. More specialised unit arrangements, such as an IT division, particular 
chronic disease clinics or competence-based job distributions enhanced procedural 
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memory development through enabling regular use of knowledge in specific 
context, which led to competence building. In turn, such competence at particular 
functions or jobs made it possible for the practices to achieve their goals more 
efficiently. This supports the idea that the higher degree of specialisation in the 
structure acted as an enabler to strengthen the process of memory development, 
which in turn, developed competences and efficiency (Cohen and Bacdayan, 
1994). Thus, it can be said that the findings fully support the hypothesis that the 
higher degree of specialisation a GP practices has, the more competent it 
becomes at hitting the QOF targets (H1).  
10.5.2. FINDING 2.  SPECIALISATION AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF RULES AND NORMS 
As discussed previously, routines contribute to the development of procedural 
memory through enhancement of knowledge over time. This leads to thinking 
about how knowledge is stored in organisations. There are various knowledge 
reservoirs mentioned in the literature, including organisational routines, people, 
relational, information device/modes, artefacts, policies and procedures, structures 
and norms and belief (Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Argote, 1999; Karsten, 1999; van 
der Bent, Paauwe and Williams, 1999; Feldman, 2000). Through the informants‘ 
narratives, it became clear that the practices engaged in all types of knowledge 
reservoirs and each contributed differently to the enhancement of memory.  
Physical storage, such as information/communication devices, database systems 
and internal emails, enabled people to share information and knowledge. The 
implantation of QOF was considered to be a tool to transfer knowledge and share 
information among healthcare professionals. As the information was available in a 
database and continuously updated, healthcare professionals were able to access it 
and even more, to be guided by particular templates and protocol in dealing with 
patients. This aligned with the work of Checkland et al. (2007) that the use of 
databases as knowledge reservoirs helped to transfer knowledge to less competent 
professionals, such as nurses, in doing routine work delegated by physicians.  
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In addition to transfer of knowledge, the use of the knowledge reservoirs 
contributed to improving the transparency of information in the practices. It made 
the quality control process easier than before, especially related to how clinical or 
administration leads monitored QOF target achievements, observed the behaviour 
of their colleagues and managed day-to-day work. It became more possible for the 
leaders to check the accountability of organisation members in fulfilling QOF 
targets. This finding aligned to the idea that QOF led to a re-stratification of roles 
for ―chasers‖ and those being chased, as well as the emergence of a surveillance 
regime. This represents changes in collegiality relationships, as well as control in 
practice organisations (McDonald et al., 2007; Huby et al., 2008; McDonald, 
Harrison and Checkland, 2008; Campbell, 2009; McDonald et al., 2009; 
Checkland and Harrison, 2010).   
Without neglecting the contribution of each reservoir, practice members provided 
a rich knowledge repository. People stored information along with the dynamics 
embedded in particular information. For instance, practice members were not only 
able to retrieve information about what changes in policies took place in their 
practice; they were also able to recall how and why it evolved, as well as its 
impacts on them. People also had subject matter knowledge, which is important to 
build practice competence. Such knowledge might be gained through formal 
education, training, courses and years of experience or their individual routines.  
To some extent, some practice members hold tacit knowledge, which is more 
difficult to transfer to others than explicit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994; Chou, 
2005). Tacit knowledge can only be transferred through effective communication, 
interaction with people and teamwork (Nonaka, 1994; Chou, 2005). Practice staff 
also acted as a means to connect with other knowledge reservoirs, such as policies 
and procedures, structures and relationships between people, as well as 
communication/information devices.   
However, reliance on people as the only knowledge reservoir had some 
disadvantages which related to the sustainability of knowledge in the organisation 
(Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Argote, 1999; van der Bent, Paauwe and Williams, 
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1999). When people decided to leave a practice, the turnover caused a potential 
loss in the organisational memory capacity. The practices therefore needed to 
ensure that the knowledge embedded in any reservoir is accessible for all 
organisational members. This became more essential with competence-based jobs, 
which represent a high degree of specialisation in the structure, which to some 
extent, divided individuals into specific functions and units. The literature 
demonstrates that sharing information helps organisations to collectively achieve 
their objectives and this requires organisations to have certain mechanisms to 
guide the process (Argote, McEvily and Reagans, 2003; Fiedler and Welpe, 
2010). Several authors argued that formalisation is a way to coordinate such 
processes, through imposing procedures, rules and policies (Zinn and Mor, 1998; 
Aldrich, 2007).   
This study found that practices were engaged in several ways to ensure that 
knowledge was dispersed and shared formally and informally, especially with the 
fact that the GP practices were becoming more complex organisations, with a 
higher degree of specialisation. Indeed, previous research also confirmed that 
QOF contributed to an increase in the level of complexity in GP practices 
(Checkland and Harrison, 2010). In a formal way, mechanisms such as reports, 
meetings and feedback sessions were argued to help people to learn from others. 
Furthermore, the availability of information embedded in various knowledge 
reservoirs, including rules and procedures, provided valuable knowledge for 
individuals as needed (Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Moorman and Miner, 1998; 
Wijnhoven, 1999). These mechanisms supported the communication process in 
the practices, which was argued to be the key point in ensuring that knowledge 
was shared. This became more noticeable after QOF, as it required all patient 
information to be stored in a database that was accessible to clinicians to help 
them deal with patients.  
While there was an engagement in the formal procedures of storing and sharing 
knowledge through physical knowledge reservoirs, such as information system 
devices, practices also put strong emphasis on informal ways of sharing 
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knowledge. Most informants agreed that their practice embraced a ‗blame-free‘ 
norm. Rather than blaming individuals, practices encouraged staff to learn from 
failures and mistakes to improve their performance in the future. Wijnhoven 
(1999) states that organisations may control people‘s norms and values through 
social networks, to enhance organisational memory.  
Individuals were involved in various processes in the practices, regardless of their 
positions in the structure. The close relationship amongst individuals made the 
process of sharing knowledge easier, as they felt free to go and ask anybody 
competent in a particular issue. This strengthened the importance of relational 
reservoirs as knowledge reservoirs. In fact, nurses reported more of this type of 
relational knowledge reservoir than the GPs. The literature states that for nurses 
and other healthcare professionals, knowledge sourced from a relational reservoir 
is essential to perform their tasks (Argote and Ingram, 2000; Rulke, Zaheer and 
Anderson, 2000).  In addition, the practices showed respect and appreciation of 
each other‘s expertise rather than the clinicians‘, this contributed to the memory 
enhancement through sharing and supported team-building.  
Moreover, a noticeable characteristic found in all four practices was that most 
informants had long years of experience working in the same practice. They had 
relatively deep knowledge and understanding about the dynamics of their roles 
and also about their practice organisations. Long years of experience enabled 
them to have strong interaction with other practice members, which helped them 
to learn from each other. This aligned with the idea that social interaction 
enhanced the process of constructing new knowledge and bringing it to the unique 
organisational context (Appelbaum and Goransson, 1997; Gherardi and Nicolini, 
2000). 
It is clear from these narratives, that practices coordinated and managed the 
process of knowledge sharing by engaging in both formal ways, through 
rules/procedures, and informal ways through relational reservoirs and norms, 
which were highly supported by ‗blame free‘ norms. These mechanisms were 
crucial in integrating various functions in the practices, and became more 
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important in ensuring that the process of knowledge sharing was taking place in 
the structure, with a high degree of specialisation. Thus, this finding support the 
hypothesis that the higher degree of specialization a GP practice has, the more 
emphasis it places on rules and norms, to ensure knowledge sharing (H2). 
10.5.3. FINDING 3. FORMALISATION AND THE SIZE OF 
PRACTICES 
As organisations grow in size and complexity, they tend to be more formalised 
(Pfeffer, 1982; Robbins, 1990).   As discussed formerly, GP practices have 
become more complex organisations. However, interestingly, the practices put 
more emphasis on informal norms than formal rules and procedures in controlling 
the behaviour of practice members.  
The narratives collected from the interviews tended to concentrate heavily on 
norms and values in guiding practice staff social interactions, as well as 
supporting the process of learning from each other. Conforming to the discussions 
in previous sections, close relationships amongst individuals in the practices had 
been developed through years of working together, belong to the same 
community, and feelings of respect and appreciation toward each other‘s expertise 
and competence. This strengthened Wijnhoven‘s assertion that norms and values, 
as well as social network control can be used as a mechanism to help 
organisations manage the process of sharing knowledge and developing better 
organisational memory (Wijnhoven, 1999). 
The four practices were categorised as large practice organisations. More 
specifically, practice B was the largest and the most complex one with more than 
19,000 registered patients. While this was the case, in the all practices, there was 
no reported strong emphasis on rules and procedures as a way to formalise 
knowledge sharing and control the behaviour of the individuals.  
Accordingly, it is apparent that the findings did not support the idea that the 
larger a GP practice, the more formalisation to standardise behaviour there will 
be (H3). However, the practices‘ engagement in informal ways of managing 
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knowledge sharing and staff behaviour  through norms and values, as well as 
utilising a relational reservoir, prove the idea that strongly held norms and values 
can be used as a substitute for the regulations, rules and procedures of a 
formalisation mechanism (Robbins, 1990). Yet, as this study did not measure the 
varying degree of norms and rules in formalising behaviour, this could be 
beneficial for further investigation.  
10.5.4. SUMMARY 
This section discussed the findings with regard to the role of organisational 
structures on organisational memory and competence development. Significant 
changes in the practices‘ structure were discussed to show the whole picture of 
how QOF contributed to the change. More specifically, focus was given to 
specialisation and formalisation. While specialisation reflects differentiation in 
units and functions, formalisation referred to the ways in which an individual‘s 
behaviour can be governed through the use of rules, norms, or procedures. Within 
this context, various types of knowledge reservoirs were also discussed.  
Various changes in practice structure were evident, including staff recruitment, 
the establishment of chronic disease clinics, work delegation and the appointment 
of clinical leads to manage functions within practice organisations. Moreover, the 
way practices assigned different functions into specialised units, divisions or 
departments showed the degree of specialisation in their organisational structures. 
More specialised unit arrangements, such as an IT division, particular chronic 
disease clinics, or competence-based job distributions, enhanced procedural 
memory development through enabling regular use of knowledge in a specific 
context, which led to competence building. In turn, such competence at particular 
functions or jobs made it possible for the practices to achieve their goals more 
efficiently. By assigning clinical leads, practices aimed to ensure that competent 
individuals dealt with relevant and specific clinical tasks.  
While a high degree of specialisation existed in the structure, it was important for 
practices to ensure that knowledge embedded in their functions or units could also 
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be transferred to others, so that it could contribute to the development of 
organisation-wide competences. It is then crucial to ensure that knowledge was 
stored in ways that were accessible to other organisation members. Various 
knowledge reservoirs were used, including individual members of the 
organisation, information systems, policies and procedures and relational 
reservoirs. QOF contributed to increasing the importance of having a database 
management system as a knowledge reservoir and enabled clinicians and 
administrative staff to use and share relevant information, to help them in their 
jobs. Interestingly, such developments also marked up the emergence of different 
roles of ―chaser‖ and ―chased‖ in the practices. The system made its goal 
achievement process more transparent so that people could control each other in 
fulfilling QOF targets.  
However, with a high degree of specialisation and various knowledge reservoirs, 
practices needed to ensure that the process of knowledge sharing was taking 
place. In doing so, practices engaged in different mechanisms to support this. 
Formalisation through rules and procedures was reported to exist. Yet, more 
emphasis was placed on the existence of norms and values in supporting the 
process of knowledge sharing and behaviour governing. Regardless of the size of 
the practice, it seemed that the extent of formalisation was less apparent in the 
practices.  
Taking all the findings together, this study believes that organisational structure 
contributed strongly to the enhancement of organisational memory, which in turn 
led to better organisational competence. Thus, these findings support the second 
analytical proposition that more structured and organised GP practices are 
better able to enhance their organisational memory and competencies to hit 
QOF targets.  
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Table 25. Summary of Findings – Proposition 2 
No. Findings References Contribution of the study 
1.  
Engagement in 
various types of 
knowledge 
reservoirs 
(Walsh and Ungson, 1991; 
Argote, 1999; Karsten, 
1999; van der Bent, 
Paauwe and Williams, 
1999; Feldman, 2000). 
(Beaulieu and Horrigan, 
2005; Checkland, 
McDonald and Harrison, 
2007; Campbell, 
McDonald and Lester, 
2008; Huby et al., 2008; 
McDonald and Roland, 
2009; Menachemi et al., 
2009). 
While previous studies focused on how 
individuals preserved the memory and 
the use of information systems in sharing 
knowledge, this study contributed to 
broaden perspectives that a practice was 
engaged in more than two reservoirs. 
Evidence shows practice engagement in 
different knowledge reservoirs including 
organisational routines, people, 
relational, information device/modes, 
artefacts, policies and procedures, 
structures, and norms and belief. 
2.  
Various 
mechanisms 
were used to 
ensure 
knowledge 
sharing taking 
place in 
organisation 
(Zinn and Mor, 1998; 
Winjhoven, 1999; Argote, 
McEvily and Reagans, 
2003; Aldrich, 2007; 
Fiedler and Welpe, 2010) 
 
Although rules and procedures existed to 
manage knowledge sharing, there was 
more emphasis on the use of norms in 
managing behaviour.  
3.  
Practice size did 
not appear to 
increase the 
degree of 
formalisation 
(Pfeffer, 1982; Robbins, 
1990; Winjhoven, 1999) 
The findings seemed to contradict the 
idea that larger size means more 
formalisation. This is due to the nature 
of norms in the practices which were 
gained through years of work 
experience, appreciation of others, as 
well as a ‗blames free‘ culture. 
10.6. ANALYTICAL PROPOSITION 3: COMPETENCE 
AND LEVELS OF CHANGE 
Organisational change is a complex concept, which according to Wilson (1992) 
can only be understood from the perspective and through interpretation of 
individuals in organisations. On this ground, this study employed the informants‘ 
views and experiences as meaningful indicators for understanding the levels of 
changes undergone by GP practices after the introduction of QOF.  
From the findings in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9, it can be seen that the practices 
conducted several changes or adjustments to various aspects of their organisation. 
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It is important to note that being a part of the UK national health care system, GP 
practices have to follow government rules and regulations. As stated early, 
government regulations became a point of departure for future planning. The QOF 
scheme, as a key feature in the nGMS contract, was considered as a new source of 
financing, and at the same time, as a tool to measure the performance of the 
practices. A practice‘s participation in the nGMS contract meant that in order to 
be rewarded financially, they had to follow QOF guidelines and achieve its 
targets. This process showed that changes happening in the practices involved 
political decision, in the way that the decision to participate was strategically 
driven by external government regulations; practices also considered the strategic 
implications of such participation on their existence and the sustainability of 
operations. QOF was reported to contribute to about 20-30% of the practices‘ 
income. 
Interestingly, while they were bound to the same governmental directions and 
regulations, the way practices responded to the QOF scheme were relatively 
different from one to another. This was due to each practice‘s specific 
characteristics and competences, which had been built up over time. At this point, 
the idea of organisational memory and competence played an important part in 
determining which strategic directions the practices followed and how this would 
be done. This was shown in various aspects of the practice strategies.  
Practices did become involved in strategic processes, including competence and 
resource constraints assessments, as well as environmental scanning. These 
processes were considered essential to ensure that the practices had the resources 
available to shape and pursue their strategic directions (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, 
1996; Barney, 1991; Parkin, 2009). Practices assessed their competence and the 
opportunities available for them in the market. Their competence served as a 
foundation to think about the expansion of services. Practices decided to expand 
services by offering new ones or opening more branches, after considering that 
they had the spare resources and expertise to do so. 
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Following their decision to participate in QOF, practices initiated several 
adjustments to their structures. This is in line with the idea that in order to ensure 
that all key chains of activities are arranged to support objective achievement, 
changes in strategy may require adjustment to the organisational structure 
(Chandler, 1962; Miles et al., 1978; Hardy, 1996; Morgan, 2006). In the cases of 
the four practices, clinical leads were assigned to be responsible for QOF 
activities in particular disease areas. While such assignments were based on a 
practice‘s assessment of the required competences; when practices did not have a 
competence, they decided to change their routines and pursue different path of 
competences in order to fill the gaps. To some extent, this finding did not 
correspond to the idea that the development of competence is path-dependent 
(David, 1997). This decision was understood as a response to ensure that practices 
managed to fulfil QOF targets as they brought considerable financial 
consequences. Again, this strengthens the notion of political interest in the 
decision making process, which represents an emergent change (Wilson, 1992).   
Another notable change in organisational structure was the expansion in both the 
number of staff and the roles of healthcare professionals. To cope with the extra 
workload, practices recruited additional staff, especially nurses and HCAs. This 
was based on the need for relevant competences, as well as the potential cost 
effectiveness of such decisions. Moreover, with increasing the number of patients 
and QOF administrative work, clinicians reported delegation of routine clinical 
work to lower level healthcare professionals. This strengthened the evidence of 
previous research that the expansion of nurses‘ roles was due to the delegation of 
work (Leese, 2007; McDonald et al., 2007; Campbell, 2009; Grant et al., 2009). 
This also showed an increase in organisational memory capacity, as there was 
improvement in both the amount of resources and knowledge.  
Informants also experienced an increased use of information technology to aid 
with the work. Practices installed a relevant information system to help with 
acquiring and storing patient information using templates and protocols. This 
system also served as a ‗hub‘ to store information and share knowledge amongst 
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healthcare professionals in the practice. Previous studies also found that QOF 
increased the use of IT to help obtain patient data (Checkland, 2007; Grant et al., 
2009; Checkland and Harrison, 2010). 
In addition to the changes in strategy and structure, practices also experienced 
changes in operational levels. One of these changes was in human resource 
development, with more engagement in skills training and courses; furthermore, 
practices were also concerned with maintaining their quality of services, so that 
they ensured that delegation of work did not lead to a degradation in the quality. 
Thus, practices provided opportunities for nurses and HCAs to take part in skills 
training and courses to improve their competence, which in turn, expanded the 
practices‘ organisational memory capacity. This conforms to Appelbaum and 
Goransson (1997) who assert that staff development programmes may become the 
first point of departure to build the learning capability of organisations.  
Another operational adjustment related to changes in working hours/days, in order 
to provide more access for patients who were unable to attend the clinics due to 
their busy schedules. Some practices also extended the length of consultation time 
to accommodate QOF-administrative work. However, in Practice C, the 
partnership decided not to extend the consultation time, but chose to recruit more 
staff to spread the workload.  
These findings proved that organisations were responding to QOF by making 
adjustments in their strategies and structural arrangements. This conforms to the 
idea that in dealing with change, healthcare organisations may need to alter or 
fine-tune their strategy and structures (Koeck, 1998; Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001).  
Taken together, it can be seen that changes in the four practices took place at all 
levels and aspects of the organisations. Along with changes in organisational 
strategy and structure, practices also engaged in operational level changes. 
According to Wilson (1992), these characteristics reflect revolutionary 
transformation, where changes take place predominantly at the strategic level. It 
should be noted that the changes were made possible as practices possessed 
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competences in terms of the required skills and knowledge which built 
organisational memory. Hence, it appears that these findings support the third 
analytical proposition which is GP practices respond to QOF by pursuing 
strategic-level changes.  
Apart from this, it is interesting to note that informants maintained a considerable 
emphasis of ‗no change‘ narratives in all four practices, despite the fact that there 
were observable changes in strategy, structure, IT systems and other operational 
levels. The reasoning behind this narrative can be referred back to the first 
analytical proposition, which supports that practices strongly addressed their 
routines in conducting changes as responses to QOF. The way practices adjusted 
to QOF was based on their existed competences or memory; chronic disease 
treatments, for example, were not entirely new for the practices. 
Table 26. Summary of Findings – Proposition 3 
No. Findings References Contribution of the study 
1.  
Practices made 
changes in 
strategy 
(Chandler, 1962; Barney, 
1991; Hardy, 1996; David, 
1997; Koeck, 1998; Plsek 
and Greenhalgh, 2001; 
Miles & Snow, 2003; 
Morgan, 2006; Checkland, 
2007; Leese, 2007; 
McDonald et al., 2007; 
Campbell, 2009; Grant et 
al., 2009; Parkin, 2009)  
 Practices pursued a different direction 
in their strategies. The engagement to 
set up chronic diseases clinics was one 
of them 
2.  
Practices made 
changes in 
structure 
 Bigger team to cope with works / 
additional staff 
 Assigning clinical leads 
3.  
Practice made 
changes in the IT 
system 
 Data/IT management system 
 Assigning specific people, units, or 
divisions for managing IT. 
4.  
Practices made 
changes at the 
operational level 
 Staff development programmes  
 Changes in working hours and days 
 Adjustment in consultation times 
 Delegation of work 
 
Prior to QOF, these activities existed, but were not managed as specific functions 
in the practices. In their study, Huby et al. (2008) asserted that practices failed to 
‗detect‘ changes in their organisations, as there were differences between the 
changes described by respondents and observed by the authors. 
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10.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented a discussion of the findings. The discussion was divided 
into 4 major parts. First, it focused on QOF and its impact on practices and 
discussed how informants perceived changes caused by QOF and QOF‘s 
consequences. QOF was perceived to be a guidance to standardise the behaviour 
and performance of practices and represented government control. Second, it 
provided an insight into how organisational memory related to the development of 
practice strategy. Third, it depicted structural changes in the practices, as well as 
the role of structure in enhancing competence and helping the practices to hit the 
QOF targets. Fourth, the discussion aimed to show various levels of changes, in 
order to determine the degree of change undergone by GP practices. In general, 
the findings provided support for all analytical propositions. While the study 
corresponds to evidence found in previous studies, some differences were also 
noted and discussed.   
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION 
 
11.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter presented a discussion of the findings by comparing and 
contrasting them with the literature and previous studies. Some findings 
strengthened the existing literature and others offered different insights. Based on 
those findings, this chapter provides the contribution of the study to the 
knowledge as well as organisational and policy implications of the findings. The 
limitations of the study and recommendations for future research are also 
discussed. 
11.2. CONTRIBUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
STUDY 
11.2.1. THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION 
 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge by proposing and testing a 
conceptual framework that explains the role of organisational memory as a core 
competence in exploring the phenomenon of organisational change. This 
framework provides a comprehensive understanding of the direction and level of 
organisational change through the perspective of organisational memory; it 
determines the influential relationship between organisational memory and core 
competence, and between organisational memory and an organisation‘s strategy 
and structure. Moreover, the study provides a valuable explanation of the role of 
organisational memory in building core competences in primary care settings.   
This study contributes to the body of knowledge in the field of healthcare 
management by:  
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a) In the context of this study, there was only a small amount of research 
concerned with the issue of organisational memory and organisational 
change in the area of primary healthcare. Even less evidence was available 
in the context of P4P in general or QOF more specifically. Huby et al 
(2008) and Checkland and Harrison (2010) provide an insight into the 
organisational memory realm through an investigation of the effects of 
QOF on practice service delivery. The main conclusion of their findings 
was that individuals in the observed practices asserted that practice 
adaptation to QOF in their routine activities was relatively easy, as they 
had already been doing the same things. While the findings of this study 
strengthen previous research, they also offer a more comprehensive view 
of the realm of memory and change in the same context. The extension of 
the organisational memory literature, including knowledge reservoirs, the 
use of routines and its contribution to the development of organisational 
competence, brought significant implications to enriching theoretical 
perspectives in understanding organisational change, especially in the 
context of the highly regulated healthcare sector. This is important, as in 
such a context, the existence of primary care organisations is very much 
bound by the systems that are related to their dependences on government 
funding schemes.  
b) While external stimuli are necessary for triggering the organisational 
taken-for-granted framework of reference (paradigm) to define their 
strategic direction based on organisational past and managerial experience, 
this research study provides empirical evidence that this is not always the 
case and such stimuli are not always the trigger for organisational change. 
This is because,  an internal, self-reflexive learning process, which is more 
like evolutionary ‗organic‘ growth, can shape organisational direction, in 
which organisations learn from their collective memory and are involved 
in how to utilise their organisational memory to enhance their competence 
to develop their strategy with less stress.  
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c) This study incorporated elements of organisational strategy and structure 
in understanding how organisational memory affected the change process. 
This was expected to bring a richer perspective to the field, as well as 
enabling further analysis on the level and direction of organisational 
changes. There was very little research incorporating level of change with 
both organisational memory and changes. The framework of the study 
contributes significantly to theoretical development in health care 
management, especially in understanding how organisational memory 
affects the formulation of organisational strategy and structure, which in 
turn enhances organisational memory to be a core competence. On the 
other hand, the study provides a valuable contribution to the understanding 
of the relationship between organisational strategy and structure and level 
of change. 
All together, the study uses different perspectives to understand the phenomenon 
of organisational change and clarifies how changes to one organisational aspect 
potentially trigger other changes, creating a domino effect.  The significance of 
this understanding becomes more substantial when it is associated with ideas 
about whether primary care practices should be categorised as ‗organisations‘ or 
not.  
11.2.2. ORGANISATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
Translating the findings into the realm of organisational systems and practices, 
relevant implications can be drawn.  
a) The findings on how organisational memory, especially knowledge 
reservoirs, implies that GP practices were rich in embedded knowledge, 
possibly without recognising it. Knowledge was available and stored in 
different types of reservoirs, which were available for organisational 
members to use and reuse. More importantly, the findings showed that 
amongst different kind of knowledge reservoirs, organisation members 
stored rich knowledge on both the organisational content and its context. 
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Its importance became more significant when the practices considered 
expanding their knowledge capacity, which in turn, would contribute to 
the enhancement of competence, or development of new competences. The 
main difficulty attached to the knowledge reservoir lies in the fact that 
people stored both tacit and explicit knowledge. Unlike tacit knowledge, it 
is more possible to share explicit knowledge and transfer it to other people 
and to other knowledge reservoirs. The literature argues that the essential 
way to support the knowledge sharing process is through intensive 
communication and interaction between people working together. The 
findings of this study show that even in small organisations like GP 
practices, enhancing communication systems, through various uses of 
devices may be helpful to increase the possibility of knowledge sharing 
and transfer, especially with the high degree of specialisation in the 
structure. 
b) The study found that practices were engaged in operational level and 
predominantly strategic level change through changes in strategy, structure 
and systems. It is interesting to note that while QOF was externally 
developed as a way to improve practices‘ performance in delivering 
services through incentive-based performance; its effects were more than 
expected. In order to fulfil QOF targets, practices invested more money in 
a variety of activities, such as recruitment, training, IT systems and 
facilities. As a consequence, most practices were able to prove that they 
were worth the money given, and were able to obtain high QOF scores. 
This caused the Government to elevate the threshold, to reflect the actual 
level of service, which led to another turn of the cycle. Practices invested 
more to ensure that they were able to obtain high QOF points through 
changes at different levels. This implies that practices were bound to this 
contract, not only because they needed the money, but also that they were 
already deeply engaged in investing in their own improvement, and they 
could not stop, as it would bring detrimental effects to the practice 
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performance and more importantly, to the quality of healthcare services 
for patients.   
c) The QOF scheme was developed as a device to support evidence-based 
primary care practice. Thus, it was equipped with various tools to ensure 
that evidence was captured and could be used to find gaps between targets 
and actual performance. Despite the fact that the aim was to improve 
performance, the findings show that focuses on evidence gathering seemed 
to distract the attention of healthcare professionals away from patients. 
Intensive use of templates in data management during consultations 
created unintended consequences on the patient-clinician relationship and 
made the service less personalised, which strengthened evidence from 
many previous studies on QOF (Beaulieu and Horrigan, 2005; Fleetcroft et 
al., 2008; Maisey et al., 2008; Campbell, 2009; McDonald and Roland, 
2009; Rodriguez et al., 2009). 
Some practices reported making adjustments to consultation times. While 
this accommodated the time needed to fill in data, its effect on the 
dynamics of the patient-clinician relationship was not reported. Moreover, 
from the perspective of organisational memory, it was found that 
individuals retained their memory about patients and their situation which 
was notably helpful in maintaining personalised services. Yet, it became 
less possible to do this at the time due to the same reason. This implies the 
need for practices to find ways to tackle such consequences.  
d) From the narratives, it was found that the existence of norms, values and 
social networks were more evidenced in controlling people‘s behaviour in 
sharing knowledge and information, which was then expected to enhance 
organisational memory. However, as practices grew bigger, changing the 
working environment, there might be some potential for changing 
dynamics in how people work in the practices. Therefore, it seems to be 
necessary for practices to formalise the way they engage in enhancing 
organisational memory capacity through developing organisational 
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memory policies. This policy is important to enable organisations to 
manage their OM more efficiently and effectively, and also, enable 
organisations to synergise different kind of memory as well as manage its 
reservoirs (Wijnhoven, 1999).  
11.2.3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
The findings of the study suggest three main implications for policy makers 
seeking to improve the quality of healthcare. The insights were based on 
informants‘ perceptions on QOF and how it affected the practices. 
a) Improvement toward Reliable and Valid Methods of Assessment. QOF 
indicators were designed to assess both clinical and non clinical aspects of 
chronic disease care. They were centrally developed and uniformly 
imposed on primary care practices. This was useful as a way of 
standardising delivery of care, so that quality of care could be improved. 
Standardisation also made it possible for the Government to evaluate the 
performance of practices by comparing between them. This created 
competition, which was expected to lead to greater efforts in implementing 
QOF and pursuing good clinical care. A practice‘s compliance with QOF 
was essential, as it brought financial consequences. 
On this matter, there were strong arguments from informants concerning 
the shifting priorities of practices to be more ‗target oriented‘ or ‗business-
like‘. Such concerns were related to the way patients were treated. Patients 
are human-beings and should not be treated as targets or numbers. While 
such cases were claimed not to take place in the practices, most informants 
expressed concerns about the potential consequences. This suggests that 
the Government might have to ensure that QOF does not drive practices 
away from their main priorities of delivering healthcare services to 
patients. In fact, the involvement of patient experience indicators could be 
an indispensable factor to potentially lessen this unintended consequence. 
The current patient experience assessment was perceived to be 
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scientifically flawed, as it did not capture reliable representations of all 
patients. Thus, the challenge would be to equip patient experience 
assessment with a reliable and valid method to collect and analyse data. 
b) Potential de-motivation factors. This study found that there was some 
indication of de-motivation in the practices due to changes in indicators, as 
well as elevating the thresholds of QOF points. While the government 
considered these changes to be necessary to reflect improvement of 
healthcare standards, it was thought to be frustrating for practices as they 
needed to continually catch up with the new figures.  
Informants revealed that since the first year of implementation, practices 
had been able to obtain high points beyond the thresholds. This was said to 
exceed the government expectations on practice performances and 
achievements. In fact, as noted in the literature, there were no proper 
feasibility studies to explore the practice performance baseline, so that 
when practices actually exceeded the upper threshold of targets, the 
Government needed to increase or move the goal posts, to better reflect the 
actual capabilities of practices. This implies that the Government needed 
to find better ways to measure practices‘ actual capability prior to 
implementing the policy, especially as it was intended to improve 
performance, because it might not hit the policy‘s aims as expected. 
Practices had proven themselves to be better than the government expected 
them to be. 
The continuous adjustments required practices to make a greater effort to 
achieve the targets. This was seen to cause a sense of frustration, as the 
real financial gains for practices were not improved, if anything, they 
decreased. Even if the Government increased the money associated with 
one QOF point, the increased targets required more effort from practices to 
ensure that they could achieve the new targets. Recruitment and training 
staff, setting up IT systems, as well as building up supporting facilities 
were some of the investments that practices were reported to do. Taking 
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everything into account, practice investments seemed to outweigh the 
QOF money. Interestingly, practices could not do anything about it except 
continuously keep up with such changes. 
Hence, this study believes that QOF is actually a positive lure or bait to 
draw practices‘ own efforts in improving their quality of services. While 
QOF money was seen to be ‗fresh money‘ for practices, it pushed them to 
invest more, to show that they were worth it. This created a ‗virtuous 
circle‘ of performance improvement efforts. Although this circle was 
externally driven, it became strategically embedded as part of the internal 
organisational activities, which were significantly reflected through the 
study‘s assessment of the relationship between a practice‘s competence 
and their levels of change. However, in the policy context, while this may 
lead to positive enforcement of quality improvement, the Government 
should be aware that there was an indication of de-motivation which 
requires them to ensure that adjustments to both targets and indicators are 
rewarding from the perspective of practices.    
c) From the policy perspective, QOF was supposed to bring about 
performance improvement for practices and drive them to provide high 
quality of care through attaching incentive to performance. While practices 
did realise the main aims of QOF, this study also found that in its practical 
and implementation process, practices became more pragmatic and 
considered the importance of money in running organisations more. This 
was reflected through the narrative of  ‗income‘, ‗business‘, ‗target 
fulfilment‘, and ‗QOF points‘, which together, provided a picture of how 
financial incentives had become the main concern for the sustainability of 
practices as a ‗business entity‘, while at the same time, they tried to 
maintain their ethos as health care organisations.  The literature also points 
out other perspectives in understanding the development of QOF. One of 
these was to control GP practices‘ performance by creating a ‗market-like‘ 
competition through standardised indicators, in order to make one practice 
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comparable to another. Combining the practices‘ pragmatic perspective on 
money and the Government‘ intentions for QOF, it remains unknown 
whether these two fit together as expected or imply the need to amend and 
modify the policy on this particular scheme.  
11.3. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study had several limitations. In consideration of this, the findings need to be 
examined prudently. 
a. While generalisation of findings is argued to be one of the limitations of 
conducting qualitative study (Murphy et al., 1998), it is not the intention of 
the case study to make statistical generalisations, but more to be an 
analytical one (Yin, 2009). Four large practices in non-deprived areas and 
working under the same PCT were involved in the study, each practice 
with its own characteristics. Hence, the findings might not be suitable to 
be used as generalised outcomes for other settings. 
b. As this study aimed to explore organisational level change, the criteria of 
inclusion considered only those applicable to organisations. The study had 
39 informants and their involvement was arranged through the practices. 
The internal processes of the practices were unknown to the researcher. 
With the aim of this research being to explore the change process through 
the perspective of organisational memory, the informants‘ understanding 
of such processes provided invaluable insights. However, as the researcher 
did not have any control over selecting informants, some of them appeared 
to be less knowledgeable about their practice‘s conditions due to their 
work experience in the practices. This implies the possibility of refining 
the criteria of inclusion, not only for organisations, but potentially for 
informants as well. 
c. As the change process itself is argued to be a perceptive phenomenon that 
can only be explained through organisational members‘ accounts, there 
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were potential biases embedded in the individual perceptions. There was a 
possibility of respondent bias in the way that the responses given were 
filtered to reflect their own perspectives instead of an objective assessment 
of the situation. The researcher tried to eliminate such effects through 
cross-checking and triangulating informants‘ responses.  
d. Practices were reported to have made some adjustments to accommodate 
the implications that dysfunctional consequences were indicated. The 
consequences included distractions to the dynamic of patient-clinician 
relationships and less personalised services, as patients were unable to see 
their choice of GP. However, whether this made any real impact and 
improvement to the dynamics of the relationship is still unknown. As this 
study relied on interviews as a primary data sources, the information might 
not be drawn out through the interviews, implying the need to incorporate 
intensive observation. 
e. As stated formerly in both the Theoretical Review and the Findings, the 
discussion of organisational memory cannot be separated from the need to 
discuss knowledge reservoirs. The literature review found eight of them 
(see page 262) (Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Argote, 1999; Karsten, 1999; 
van der Bent, Paauwe and Williams, 1999), which were used as guidance 
to analyse the findings. It is possible that other reservoirs may exist which 
were not covered in this study.   
f. The processes embedded in this study were carried out by the researcher 
alone. As noted by Mays and Pope (1995), this can lead to researcher bias. 
While various efforts were made to support the validity and reliability of 
the findings, through attaching related quotations that support arguments, 
and double-checking and cross-checking of primary and secondary data, 
there is a possibility that such bias still exists. 
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11.4. SUGGESTIONS/RECOMMENDATION FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Relying on the discussion of the limitations of the study, there are several 
suggestions for future research. 
a. Similar studies may need to consider developing inclusion criteria for 
informants, even if the study is intended to analyse at the organisational 
level. Future research might need to include patients‘ perceptions, as well 
as government perceptions (the PCTs) towards practices to see if they 
perceived any changes or not. Potentially, this leads to a better 
understanding of the context. 
b. While this study included different types of knowledge reservoirs, some 
others might not have been addressed. To portray more exhaustive types of 
reservoirs, further studies should consider exploring a broader literature. 
Moreover, considering the importance of knowledge reservoirs in the 
discussion of organisational memory, it is suggested that a capacity 
comparison between each type of reservoir may provide a richer 
perspective in understanding it.  
c. As this study did not measure the varying degree of norms and rules in 
formalising behaviour, this could be beneficial for further investigation.  
d. This study focused on large-scale practices and found that these practices 
responded better to QOF and conducted changes at various levels, because 
they had their competences, which were built through their resources, 
including human resources. It would be interesting to find out how 
different sized practices reacted to QOF, even whether similar routines 
were portrayed or changes also took place at different organisational 
levels. It is suggested for future research to include different sizes of 
practices, to enrich findings in the field. 
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e. All of the GP practices involved in the study were from non-deprived 
areas and under the same PCT, which had its own financial situation and 
socio-demographic characteristics. It might be useful for future research to 
explore how practices from different socio-demographic backgrounds 
responded to QOF.  
f. On the assumption that high QOF scores represented practices with a good 
performance level, which in turn have been able to cope and adjust to 
changes, this research included GP practices that had very high QOF 
scores and had maintained their scores for 4−5 years. Further research 
might be able to prove if a relationship exists between QOF scores as a 
performance indicator and the extent and direction of organisational 
change
21
. It might be useful also for future healthcare research to examine 
the relationship between level of performance and the role of 
organisational memory in change management in health care 
organisations.  
g. Regarding the methodology used in the research, it is suggested combining 
interviews and observation would lead to capturing more comprehensive 
and richer information.  
h. P4P programmes are widely used in both primary and secondary health 
care systems; future research might need to explore the impact of these 
programmes on the organisational memory, as well as the relationship 
between organisational memory and competence, and organisational 
strategy and structure in secondary health care settings. 
i. Finally, future research will need to examine the factors that affect the 
construction of organisational memory in health care settings. 
 
                                                             
21 In the literature, the relationship between QOF score and performance level of GPs is not yet 
clear; although some studies found a relationship between high QOF score and a good 
performance, other studies show inconsistent link (Downing et al.,2007; Kiran et al., 2010; 
Williams and Lusignan,2006).     
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: PROTOCOL FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
In conducting a systematic review, it is important to build a robust protocol. The 
protocol will ensure that transparency and consistency of methods is in place since 
the beginning of the study (Petticrew & Roberts, 2005). It also acts as guidance for 
other researchers to re-check and potentially replicate the study. The protocol will 
also lay strong foundation to assess any limitations for the review and enable 
researchers to conduct constructive revisions. 
 
1. FORMER SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 
The review started by investigating the existing systematic reviews of P4P in health 
sector. The following specialized databases have been searched: 
1. Centre of Review and Dissemination in the University of York. This can be 
accessed through www.crd.york.ac.uk/crd . 
2. The DARE Database (http://.york.ac.uk/inst/crd/crddatabase.htm) 
3. Cochrane Database of Systematic Review (www.nelh.nhs.uk/cochrane.asp) 
4. Campbell Collaboration (www.Campbellcollaboration.org) 
www.publichealth.nic.org.uk. , which includes details of systematic reviews in 
Public health. 
5. Effective Public Health practices website in Canada 
(http://www.city.hamilton.on.ca/PHCS/EPHPP/EPHPPResearch.asp) 
6. MDRC Database which includes USA government programs 
(http://www.mdrc.org) 
7. Research Evidence in Education library (http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/reel) 
8. US Department of Education‘s Institute of Education Science (http://w-w-
c.org 
 
2. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION 
This review employed several considerations to specify the fitness of studies that 
have been used for the review. The criteria for inclusion can be summarized as 
follow: 
1. Language: Only literature published in the English language was included. 
2. Publication type: Only empirical studies were reviewed. 
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3. Setting: Academic research, governmental studies related to Health Sector,    
especially in the context of Primary Health Care. 
4. Study Design: All types of study designs and research methods were included. 
5. Period : Papers published between 1970 and 2009. 
 
3. SEARCH STRATEGY 
A broad search strategy was used to ensure the maximum number of published 
evidence was accessed.  
3.1.  Electronic Databases. 
The search covered databases in the following categories  
1. Health and Medicine--Health Sciences 
2. Social Sciences--Educational Studies 
3. Social Sciences--Health Economics 
4. Social Sciences--Management Studies 
Specific emphasis was placed on the following databases. 
1. Health Management Information Consortium (HMIC) (OvidSP) 
2. HEED: Health Economic Evaluations Database 
3. Social Sciences Citation Index (ISI) on Web of Knowledge 
4. ERIC (CSA Illumina) 
5. ERIC (Dialog) 
6. Business Source Premier (EBSCO) 
7. MEDLINE (1950 onwards) (OvidSP) 
8. EMBASE (OvidSP) 
 
3.2. Identifying ongoing research. 
This study checked the website of a range of agencies and ongoing and recent 
completed research projects funded by.  
 ESRC (Economic & Social Research Council) 
 National Health Service NHS 
 National Research Register (NRR) 
 Department of Health (DoH) 
 National Audit Office (NAO) 
 National Library for Health www.nelh.nhs.uk 
 The European Community‘s Research & Development Information Search. 
www.cordis/eu/home.htm. 
 UK Research Council http://www.reuk.ac.uk 
 Centre of Economic Policy Research http://www.cep.org.ccepe/ 
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 Centre for Evidence-Based Public Health Policy http://www.msoc-
mvc.gla.ac.uk/evidence/evidence.html. 
3.3. Keywords Used in Electronic Searching. 
The following keywords have been used in the electronic databases: Pay for 
Performance, P4P, Pay for Quality, Performance Based Incentives, Merit Pay, 
Compensation & Performance, Value Based Purchasing, Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF), health care, organisational change, competence(s), 
organisational competence(s) and organisational memory. Different strategies were 
devised for different databases as appropriate (i.e. Combine Searches). 
3.4. Contact with Experts. 
Experts working in this field were contacted in order to identify other studies 
relating to this review, which may have been missed by database searches or may 
not yet have been published for some reason. 
3.5.  Reference Scanning. 
In this study additional relevant publications found in reference lists of the selected 
articles were reviewed.  
3.6. References Management 
The names of the available database, the keywords and the results, were all recorded 
in a Search Diary. The Endnote program was used to sorting titles, abstracts and full 
texts at the availability of a complete e-version of studies.  
3.7. Information Extraction 
The substantive and methodological features of each study were coded by using 
questionnaires designed to identify information on key features of interest, study 
aims, research design (method used and research sample), analysis conducted and 
conclusions, and implications. To do this in a systematic manner, paper forms have 
been used to record information.  
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APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDIES 
 
Distribution of Studies by Context 
 
 
Distribution of Studies by Year of Publication 
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Distribution of Studies by P4P Programmes 
 
Note: 
The number of study using QOF is larger (60.87%) than UK setting based (60.00%), 
as there was one study conducted in Australia by Elliot-Smith and Morgan (2010) 
used QOF as a benchmark for assessing GP practice performance in Australia. 
 
Distribution of Studies by Research Method 
 
 
 
 
QOF
60.87%
Others
37.39%
Combined (QOF 
and others)
1.74%
Qualitative
19.13%
Quantitative
76.52%
Both
4.35%
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Unit of Analysis used in the Studies 
 
 
 
 
Individual
26.09%
group / 
organisation
62.61%
Both
2.61%
data unclear
8.70%
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DESCRIPTIONS OF P4P PROGRAMMES INCLUDED IN THE 
STUDIES 
 
Measures Used to Evaluate the Impact of P4P Programmes 
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Thresholds of P4P programmes 
 
 
Target of P4P Programmes 
 
 
 
Relative
2.61%
Absolute
86.09%
Both
0.87%
Data not clear
10.43%
Individual
24.35%
group / 
organisation
66.09%
Both
0.87%
data unclear
8.70%
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APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW GUIDELINE 
 
Investigator: 
Mohammad Alyahya 
 
Research Title: 
Exploring the Organisational Impact of the NHS Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) in GP Practices. 
 
Introduction 
 Research Background and Aim: 
o In April 2004, the UK government launched the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF), according to this new scheme part of a GP practice‘s 
income links to their performance level in four quality domains. 
o This research aims to explore the impact of QOF on GP practices.  
o The interview will focus on the impact of QOF in terms of changing 
organisational strategies, structures, norms and values in GP practices. 
 Assurance of Ethical Conduct 
o  All information will be treated confidentiality. 
o Respondents‘ names will not be revealed in any part of the report. 
 
Themes and Issues for Interview 
 Brief background about Respondents’ job. 
o How long have you been working in this organisation (and in others 
previously)?  
o If the respondent is a GP: Are you salaried or partner GP? How long have been 
working as a GP? 
o What kind of jobs do you do?  
 Respondents’ view about the impact of QOF on GP practice’s: 
o Organisational memory and core competence(s) 
o Organisational strategy 
o Level of change 
o Direction of change 
o Structure/ job design, job responsibilities, and decision making. 
o Organisational values, norms and identity. 
 
Note: For the Organisational memory and competence(s), no direct questions were 
asked. Instead, indirect questions were asked under each theme, and information 
extracted from answers of each other themes.  
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Below are different questions for each theme, these questions were developed and 
emerged case by case. As the researcher‘s understanding of the field developed, so 
did the lines of inquiry.  
The interviews had an open discussion format and the questions were used as 
guidance and to help those who could not understand the management issues in their 
practice. The questions were asked of each interviewee depending on: The position 
and experience of the interviewee, how long he/she had been working in the 
practice, and the order of the interview. 
 
Interview Guideline 
Main theme Theories Behind the theme 
Organisational 
strategies 
Could you please tell me about the practice strategy? 
Do you know the practice‘s vision, targets/objectives? What would this 
practice like to achieve or to become in the next future (five years)? 
 
Do you have a business plan? Do you consider QOF in your plan? If 
so, how? 
 
Who in the practice and how does the practice set plans and according 
to what and why?  
 
Are you aware of things that they considered when they set the 
practice plans? Why do you think they considered such things? 
Organisational 
change 
When QOF came in 2004, as far as you remember, what did the 
practice do to accommodate the implementation of QOF? What did the 
practice do to achieve QOF targets? 
Do you recognise any changes that have happened since 2004? Tell me 
about these changes? Do you think that QOF was behind these 
changes? Why? 
Do you think there are differences in the way the practice was run or 
managed before and after QOF? 
Organisational 
structure 
Tell me about the structure of this practice? Who is responsible to 
whom? Who reports to whom? How is the job assigned and 
distributed? 
Tell me about your Job responsibilities, role? Do you have any work 
related to QOF?  Have your job responsibilities increased in the last 5 
or 6 years and why? 
After QOF, did the practice arrange or re-arrange the job 
responsibilities or roles among the staff? 
How is decision making, either clinical or administrative, done in the 
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Main theme Theories Behind the theme 
practice? How did this change after the QOF and Why? 
How does the practice manage to control the accomplishment of 
clinical V.S administrative duties? 
Values, norms, 
and identity 
Tell me about the values and norms of the practice. 
Tell me about the identity of the practice. 
How do the values of the practice affect you doing your job? 
What are the main characteristics of this practice? How can you 
differentiate this practice from other practices? In your opinion do you 
think people of the practice are aware of these characteristics and 
patients as well? Do you perceive any changes in the practice norms 
and values because of QOF? 
Do you think patients‘ perception towards the practice has changed in 
the last 5 or 6 years? In your opinion do you think that was because of 
QOF? Why? 
 How and Why has QOF changed your perception/your colleagues 
towards the practice? 
 
These questions were developed based on empirical evidence of QOF, theory of 
organisational change and memory and on scientific common sense. The following table 
summarises the theories behind the question development:  
 
Interview’s Question Development 
Main theme Main Theories Behind the theme 
Organisational 
memory 
O.M is considered as a key factor in constituting organisational 
competences (Winjhoven, 1999; Drejer, 2000; Drejer & Riis, 2000; 
Drejer, 2001). 
Individuals and organisations learn and remember what they have 
learnt (episodic memory) and this helps them to articulate and draw 
their future (van der Bent, Paauwe and Williams, 1999; Rowlinson et 
al., 2010).  
In GP practices people served as repository of knowledge or memory. 
They contributed to the development of ‗stories‘ in organisation 
(Checkland, 2007; Huby et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 2008; 
Checkland and Harrison, 2010).  
 
Organisational 
strategies 
Organisations might pursue unprompted strategic direction in order to 
respond to changes from external environment (Mintzberg, 1978; 
Shortell, Morrison and Robbins, 1985; Shortell & Kaluzny, 2006). 
Organisational capability resides with O.M. which in turn constitutes 
the competences (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003). 
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Main theme Main Theories Behind the theme 
QOF has encouraged the practices to be business-like investment 
(Bokhour et al., 2006; Roland et al., 2006; Sutton, Ikenwilo and 
Skatun, 2007; Maisey et al., 2008; Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 2009; 
Menachemi et al., 2009; Checkland and Harrison, 2010). 
Level of change 
Evolutionary and/or transformational change takes place on the 
strategic level and then implemented in all organisational level 
(Wilson, 1992).  
QOF has encouraged GPs to enlarge their capacities and expand their 
services by establishing new clinics (Edwards and Neal, 2008). 
Direction of 
change 
In order to achieve objectives, organisations need to direct their 
strategic orientation to what they are competent in (Aimé, 1997; 
Prahalad & Hamel, 2006).  
Core competences determine organisational strategic direction 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, 1996; Barney, 1996, 2001).  
 
QOF as a new government payment system is considered as  a 
mechanism of change (Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 2008; Huby 
et al., 2008; Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 2009; Checkland and 
Harrison, 2010). 
 
GPs practices readiness for change:  
Practices equipped themselves for the implementation of QOF by 
incentivising and training staff (Beaulieu and Horrigan, 2005; Bokhour 
et al., 2006; Casalino et al., 2007; McDonald et al., 2007; Locke and 
Srinivasan, 2008; Whalley, Hugh and Sibbald, 2008; Grant et al., 
2009). 
Organisational 
structure 
Strategic level changes might need structural adjusting including 
differentiating and specialising in certain aspects   (Koeck, 1998; Plsek 
and Greenhalgh, 2001). 
Organisational structure built through dynamic processes which blend 
historical force and management decisions, as a part of a broader 
process of O.M creating (Walsh and Ungson, 1991). 
 
Expansion in GPs services has followed by:  
Re-stratification of roles between healthcare professionals. 
Increasing admin and clinical staff work load and responsibilities. 
Recruiting more staff, especially nurses and HCAs and creating 
additional positions to accommodate establishment of IT system. 
Few people, mainly partner GPs, who take the decisions, and creating 
multi-disciplinary teams led by a GP (Roland et al., 2006; Leese, 2007; 
Huby et al., 2008; Maisey et al., 2008; Damberg, Raube and Teleki, 
2009; Gemmell et al., 2009; Grant et al., 2009; McDonald et al., 2009; 
Menachemi et al., 2009; Checkland and Harrison, 2010). 
Values, norms 
and identity 
Meta-memory represents the values, norms, and quality information 
about the substantive memory; which is called Memory of Memory 
(Wijnhoven, 1999). 
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Main theme Main Theories Behind the theme 
Norms and values play a key role in maximising knowledge sharing 
within the organisations (Wijnhoven, 1999). 
While identity is important to support change, organisation needs to be 
able to pursue organisational change to preserve its identity (Gagliardi, 
1986; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Hatch & Schultz, 2004). 
As an identity developed through embodied history, O.M shapes 
organisational identity (Weick, 1979; Stein, 1995; Stein and Zwass, 
1995). 
The integration and alignment between memory, norms, and 
organisational identity in dealing with change nourish the O.M, and 
which in turn supports developing organisational competences 
(Wijnhoven, 1999; Gumport, 2000; Tsai, Lin and Chen, 2010)  
QOF encouraged knowledge sharing within the practices (Beaulieu 
and Horrigan, 2005; Checkland, McDonald and Harrison, 2007; 
Campbell, McDonald and Lester, 2008; McDonald et al., 2009). 
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APPENDIX 4: ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 
 
There are increasingly debates amongst researchers over the ethical dilemmas in 
conducting research (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). In order to lessen the friction 
caused by ethical issues, researchers need to make explicit statements to alert people 
involved in the research that they may be exposed to the issues.  
Two ethical issues frequently challenge researchers in organisational studies 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). The first is the use of participant observation research 
methods, in which participants are involved as observers of other participants. The 
question of ethics refers to the conflicting roles played by participants. A study 
might not be able to eliminate the bias or deception from participants as observer. 
The other issue is about control and use of data by researchers. The researcher must 
be responsible for handling and taking care of the collected data, including how to 
transcribe it. For that purpose, this research undertook some strategies to deal with 
ethical concerns.  
The first strategy was to obtain ethical approval from both the University of York 
and NHS Ethics Committees. According to NHS regulations, all research conducted 
in health organisations needs to obtain Ethics and Research Governance Approval 
before starting data collection. Prior to the data collection process, a research 
proposal, ethics forms and other required documents were submitted to both the 
Humanities and Social Science Ethics Committee (HSSEC) at the University of 
York and NHS Ethics Committee. The supporting documents included 1) a covering 
letter giving brief information on what the research was about; 2) a consent form to 
ensure through written proof that all data and information would be treated 
anonymously and the involvement of respondents in this research remained 
voluntarily, and 3) a participant information sheet which contained an introduction, 
purpose of this study, emphasis on voluntary participation, the possible  benefit of 
the research, the possible risks which might threat the participants, and the time 
needed for contribution to the study. After making minor corrections to the 
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information sheet and consent form, the research was approved by both HSSEC and 
NHS committees. 
The second strategy involved the data treatment mechanism. To assure the 
confidentiality of all informants regarding the information given to researcher, it was 
treated anonymously. Moreover, the names of the people taking part in the research 
and any other information that could have identified them did not appear in any 
research process that followed. This mechanism limited the chance of prejudice over 
any units of analysis, either individuals or organisational.  
Third, in order to ensure the security of information required in this research, effort 
was made to protect all written documents, recorded interviews and transcriptions of 
interviews by storing them in a lockable cabinet, with access available only to the 
principal researcher and his supervisors. According to the rules and regulations of 
The University of York personal data will be stored for 5 years. This is to allow for 
re-checking data and information, especially when the work is to be published. 
However, data will be stored at the University of York under the previously 
described conditions. 
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Invitation letter  
Version: 2 (04/06/2009) 
 
Date:     /      /   
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
Assessing the Organisational Impact of the NHS Quality and Outcomes Framework 
(QOF) in GP Practices 
Reference number:  
We are carrying out a research to explore the impact of QOF in GP practices, with particular 
emphasis on How and Why GP practices have altered their behaviour following QOF 
implementation. We would be very grateful if you could take part in this study. Before you 
decide, it is important to understand why the research is being undertaken and what we intend 
to do. Please take the time to read the information on the following pages carefully. 
If you are interested in taking part in the study then (you need to fill the reply slip and return 
it back in the provided envelope). Remember that you do not have to participate in this study. 
Furthermore, you would be free to leave the study at any time and there would be no need for 
you to give a reason. 
We very much appreciate your help with this research and believe that you and your 
colleagues can provide a valuable perspective on this important topic. If you have any 
queries, or questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. If you provide your contact details 
then we will only be too happy to send you a summary of the findings of the study. However, 
please be assured that this study is confidential and all information that we receive will be 
anonymised with no comments or responses attributed to any specific individual or 
organisation.  
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
Mohammad Alyahya                                                         
  
Centre for Health and Public Service Management 
The York Management School 
Sally Baldwin Buildings, Block B 
University of York 
Heslington, York YO10 5DD 
 
Tel  +44 (0) 1904 433431 
Email  ma548@york.ac.uk 
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 Participants Information Sheet 
 
Version 3 (14/08/2009) 
Ref. Number: 09/H1311/67 
 
 
Assessing the Organisational Impact of the NHS Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) in 
GP Practices. 
 
Chief Investigator: Mohammad Alyahya 
                                                         
You are invited to take part in a research study which is being conducted as a part of a PhD 
degree at The University of York. We appreciate your participation which we believe will 
greatly enhance the findings of this study. 
Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being undertaken and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully. Please ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like 
more information.  
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The NHS Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is a Payment for Performance (P4P) 
system that uses financial incentives to incentivise General Practitioners who meet specified 
quality targets. Evidence from previous research, particularly in the USA, shows that 
financial incentives can improve the performance of healthcare providers. Whilst financial 
incentives have been reported to improve performance and influence behaviour in beneficial 
ways, the impact of such rewards has been shown to generate a range of unintended and 
dysfunctional consequences for staff and patients.  
The aim of this study is to explore the impact of QOF on changing organisational strategies, 
structures, cultures, and behaviour in GP practices.  
 
 
Centre for Health and Public Service Management 
The York Management School 
Sally Baldwin Buildings, Block B 
University of York 
Heslington, York YO10 5DD 
 
Tel  +44 (0) 1904 433431 
Email  ma548@york.ac.uk 
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Why have I been chosen? 
You are being asked to participate as we are recruiting General Practitioners, nurses, health 
administrators, and senior staff who are working in large GP practices and PCTs. We aim to 
recruit around 40 people for the study, between 10 and 15 people from three practices.  
 
Is participation voluntary? 
Yes, participation is entirely voluntary. You are free to withdraw from the research at any 
time without giving a reason and without any detriment to yourself or your organisation.  
 
What does taking part involve?  
If you decide to take part in the research, you will be interviewed. The semi-structured 
interview will take a maximum of one hour, and with your permission, will be audiotaped.  
Before we start the interview, you will be given an opportunity to ask questions and sign a 
written consent form confirming that you would be happy to take part in the study.   
 
What is the likely benefit to me? 
Although there may be no direct benefit to you for participating in this study, it is expected 
that the findings will help to reach a better understanding about the financial rewards and 
performance management systems that could be useful in setting health policies and 
improving the performance of health providers.   
 
What is the possible risk or inconvenience to me? 
There are no risks attached to this study. Your interview scripts will be kept strictly 
confidential; available only to the researcher and his supervisor (Dr. Russell Mannion). The 
only tangible cost to the participant will be the inconvenience derived from the time required 
to attend for interview. 
 
What will happen to the information you provide? 
Interview tapes will be transcribed. All tapes and transcriptions will be locked in a safe place. 
All information collected during the course of the study will only be viewed by the research 
panel committee, and remain strictly confidential. 
At the end of the study this information will be used to write up a PhD thesis, publishing 
articles in professional and academic journals and conference presentations.  
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The reports, publications and presentations will include summaries and anonymised 
quotations from some interviews. However, the name of the people who have taken part in 
the research or any other information that could identify them will not appear in the thesis or 
in other written forms when the study is completed. 
All who take part in the research will be sent a summary of the final report. 
When the study is completed, all the information will be kept in locked filing cabinet in a 
storeroom of the York Management School, University of York for 5 years and will be 
destroyed after that time.    
 
What is the next step? 
If you are willing to participate in the study, please complete the reply slip and return in the 
provided envelope. We will contact you after receiving your reply slip to arrange the date and 
time of the interview. A consent form can be signed on the day of interview. The consent 
form will not be used to identify you. It will be filed separately from all the other 
information. However, you may keep this sheet for reference. 
 
Further Information: 
If you have any concerns or questions about this study, please feel free to contact the 
principal investigator, Mr Mohammad Alyahay, on 01904 433431 or e-mail 
ma548@york.ac.uk. 
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Assessing the Organisational Impact of the NHS Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) in 
GP Practices 
Investigator : Mohammad Al-Yahya 
  Please tick each 
box 
1.  I confirm that I have read and understand clearly the information sheet for this 
research and have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study 
 
2.  I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and I am free to 
withdraw from the research at any time without giving any reason and without any 
detriment to myself and my organisation 
 
3.  I agree to participate in this study  
4.  I understand that the interview will be audio-taped  
5.  I understand that only the members of the research team have access to the 
information collected during the study 
 
6.  I am aware that the information collected during the interview will be used to 
write up a PhD thesis, as well as journal articles and books 
 
7.  I understand that information collected during the course of the research project 
will be treated as confidential. This means that my name, or any other information 
that could identify me, will not be included in anything written as a result of the 
research 
 
 
 
 
8.  I am aware that some information collected during the study will be used in 
anonymised quotations. This means that the researcher will quote some parts of 
the interviews and use them in the thesis or in other written forms without 
revealing the names or any information that identify the participants. 
 
9.  I understand that when this research is completed the information obtained will be 
retained in locked filing cabinets in a storeroom in the Department of 
Management, University of York for 5 years and then will be destroyed 
 
 
Name of Participant 
 
Date Signature 
Name of Researcher 
 
Date Signature 
  
Centre for Health and Public Service Management 
The York Management School 
Sally Baldwin Buildings, Block B 
University of York 
Heslington, York YO10 5DD 
 
Tel  +44 (0) 1904 433431 
Email  ma548@york.ac.uk 
CONSENT FORM 
Version6 (14/08/09) 
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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS 
 
QOF : Quality and Outcomes Framework 
P4P : Payment for Performance 
GP : General Practice 
NAO : National Audit Office 
nGMS : New General Medical Service contract 
IT : Information Technology 
GPs : General Practitioners 
NHS : National Health Service 
NPM : New Public Management 
EMR : Electronic Medical Record 
BMA : British Medical Association 
DHSS : Department of Health and Social Security 
DoH : Department of Health 
HMSO : Her Majesty Stationary Office 
HMOs : Health Maintenance Organisation(s) 
LIFT : Local Improvement Finance Trust 
PFI : Private Finance Initiative 
Old GMS : Old General Medical Service contract 
PMS : Personal Medical Service contract 
PCT : Primary Care Trust 
GPC  : General Practitioner Committee  
NHS – PCC : National Health Service – Primary Care Commissioning 
NICE : National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
OM : Organisational Memory 
HCAs : Health Care Assistant(s) 
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